CR/8189/2018 of SHAM SINGH Vs LUDHIANA IMPROVEMENT TRUST AND ANR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
****
CR-8189-2018 (O&M)
SH.DAYAL SINGH (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LR SHAM SINGH
. . . . Petitioner
Vs.
LUDHIANA IMPROVEMENT TRUST AND ANOTHER
. . . . Respondents
****
Reserved on: 22.12.2025
Pronounced on: 08.01.2026
Pronounced Fully/Operative Part: Fully
****
CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
****
Present: - Mr. Harjot Singh, Advocate, for the pet itioner.
Mr. M.S. Batth, Advocate, for the respondents.
****
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
LAC-58-1982 titled Shri Dayal Singh vs. Ludhiana Improvement
Trust, Ludhiana and another , arising out of a reference under Section 18 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was dismissed in de fault by the President,
Land Acquisition Tribunal, Ludhiana Improvement Trust, Ludhiana, vide order
dated 16.03.1983 (Annexure P-4). Sham Singh, son of Dayal Singh, moved an
application for restoration of the said reference o n 27.07.2012 along with an
application under Sections 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
seeking condonation of delay. Both applications wer e dismissed by the
learned Tribunal vide order dated 24.05.2018 (Annexure P-11), which is
assailed in the present revision.
2. As borne out from the record, Dayal Singh was t he original owner
of land measuring 117 kanals 15 marlas situated in village Haibowal Khurd,
Tehsil and District Ludhiana. The said land was acq uired by the State
Government pursuant to a development scheme framed by the Ludhiana
Improvement Trust known as the “256 Acres Development Scheme”, under
Sections 24 and 28 (2) of the Punjab Town Improveme nt Act, 1922.
VIVEK PAHWA
2026.01.08 16:54
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CR-8189-2018
Page 2 of 7
Notification under Section 42 was issued on 24.11.1 978, followed by an
award dated 12.06.1980 passed by the Land Acquisiti on Collector, assessing
compensation at the rate of ₹9.92 per square yard.
3. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, Dayal Singh
sought a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acq uisition Act during his
lifetime. The reference was forwarded to the Tribun al and registered as LAC-
58-1982 on 13.11.1982. However, Dayal Singh had exp ired earlier on
27.09.1982, i.e., before adjudication could commenc e. The reference was
dismissed in default on 16.03.1983 on the ground that no legal representative
had appeared to pursue the matter.
4. Incidentally, Sham Singh, the present petitione r, had also sought
a separate reference on the same day in respect of the same acquisition,
which was registered as LAC-59-1982. The record fur ther reveals that out of
the total acquired land, Dayal Singh had sold 8 kan als to Master Tara Singh
Memorial College for Women, Ludhiana, vide sale dee d dated 25.01.1974.
The said College sought a separate reference, numbe red as LAC-107-1982,
which was accepted by the Tribunal vide award dated 20.08.1986, enhancing
compensation to ₹26 per square yard for that portion of land.
5. In LAC-59-1982, Sham Singh claimed ownership ov er 62 kanals 4
marlas on the basis of a judgment and decree dated 11.12.1979 passed by the
Sub Judge Ist Class, Ludhiana, and ownership of 47 kanals 16 marlas on the
basis of alleged transfers involving Guru Gobind Si ngh Charitable Trust and
Dayal Singh Charitable Trust. LAC-59-1982 was dismi ssed by the Reference
Court vide order dated 11.05.2010 (Annexure P-7). The writ petition filed
thereagainst, i.e., CWP-17091-2010, was dismissed b y this Court on
13.01.2012 (Annexure P-8).
6. While dismissing the writ petition, this Court noticed that Sham
Singh had earlier filed CWP-2088-1994 claiming owne rship of the entire
acquired land measuring 118 kanals and seeking quas hing of the acquisition
proceedings and the Collector’s award. The said wri t petition was dismissed
VIVEK PAHWA
2026.01.08 16:54
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CR-8189-2018
Page 3 of 7
by a Division Bench vide judgment dated 25.05.1995, holding that the decree
dated 11.12.1979 relied upon by the petitioner was collusive and liable to be
set aside. It was further noticed that other suits and appeals filed by Sham
Singh had also been dismissed, with concurrent find ings that he had no right
or title over the land in dispute. The Court also f ound the alleged trust
transactions to be manipulated and imposed costs of ₹10,000/- upon the
petitioner for his contumacious conduct in obstructing implementation of the
scheme.
7. Seeking restoration of LAC-58-1982, the petitio ner contended
that the reference could not have been dismissed in default; that Dayal Singh
had expired prior to issuance of notice; that he was the sole legal heir under a
Will dated 24.09.1982; and that he was bona fide pu rsuing his remedy
through LAC-59-1982 under the belief that he was en titled to seek
enhancement independently. It was pleaded that limi tation would not apply,
as a reference under the Land Acquisition Act is req uired to be answered on
merits irrespective of appearance.
8. The respondents opposed the application, inter alia, on the
grounds of lack of locus standi, gross delay, knowl edge of dismissal since
inception, and inconsistent pleas regarding ownership and inheritance. It was
contended that the petitioner was fully aware of di smissal of LAC-58-1982,
having filed and pursued LAC-59-1982 in respect of the same land. Reliance
was placed upon Article 137 of the Limitation Act t o contend that the
application for restoration, filed after nearly 29 years, was hopelessly barred
by limitation.
9. The learned Tribunal, while noticing that a ref erence under
Section 18 ought not to have been dismissed in default in view of settled law,
nevertheless held that the application for restorat ion was barred by
limitation. It was found that the petitioner had knowledge of dismissal of LAC-
58-1982 and that Article 137 of the Limitation Act prescribed a period of
three years for seeking restoration. Since the appl ication was filed after an
VIVEK PAHWA
2026.01.08 16:54
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CR-8189-2018
Page 4 of 7
inordinate delay, the Tribunal declined to condone the delay and dismissed
the restoration application.
10. Assailing the said order, learned counsel for the petitioner
reiterated that dismissal of a land reference in default is impermissible in law
and that the Tribunal erred in applying limitation.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents supported the
impugned order, contending that knowledge of dismissal was established and
that the petitioner had slept over his alleged rights for decades.
12. This Court has considered the submissions of l earned counsel for
the parties and has carefully perused the record.
Reasoning by this court :
13. The primary contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that
a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 could not have
been dismissed in default and, therefore, the learn ed Tribunal was under a
statutory obligation to decide the reference on mer its, irrespective of non-
appearance of the claimant or his legal representat ives. Reliance has been
placed upon judgments of this Court holding that a reference once made
cannot be rejected for default.
14. There can be no quarrel with the settled legal position that a
reference under Section 18 of the Act ought ordinar ily to be decided on
merits and not dismissed for non-prosecution. However, the issue before this
Court is not the legality of the order dated 16.03. 1983 dismissing the
reference in default, but the maintainability of the application for restoration
filed after an inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly twenty-nine years.
The correctness of the dismissal order, even if ass umed to be legally flawed,
does not ipso facto obliterate the requirement of seeking restoration w ithin
the period prescribed by law.
15.1 The applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to pr oceedings
arising under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is no longer res integra. In Town
VIVEK PAHWA
2026.01.08 16:54
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CR-8189-2018
Page 5 of 7
Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Lab our Courts, Hubli and
others, (1969) 1 SCC 873 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Article 137
applies to applications made to courts under any st atute, unless expressly
excluded. This decision laid the foundation for the application of the residuary
article beyond the CPC.
15.2 Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P. Kunhaliumma
(AIR 1977 SC 282) is the locus classicus on Article 137, in which a Constitution
Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively settled the law by
holding that Article 137 of the Limitation Act gove rns all applications
presented before a civil court, irrespective of whether such applications arise
under the Code of Civil Procedure or under a specia l enactment, unless the
statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes its application.
15.3 In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and others v. Shah
Manilal Chandulal and others , (1996) 9 SCC 414 , the Supreme Court
reiterated that in the absence of an express exclus ion, the provisions of the
Limitation Act apply to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. It was
held that applications arising out of land acquisit ion proceedings are not
immune from limitation. Similarly, in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and
others, (1996) 3 SCC 132 , while dealing with delay and limitation in land
acquisition matters, the Supreme Court reaffirmed th at the Limitation Act
applies unless specifically excluded, and that cour ts must examine limitation
even in statutory proceedings.
16. An application seeking restoration of a refere nce dismissed in
default squarely falls within the ambit of the resi duary Article 137. In Baldev
Singh v. State of Punjab, 1982 PLR 124 (P&H), this Court specifically held that
an application for restoration of a land acquisitio n reference dismissed in
default is governed by Article 137 of the Limitatio n Act, prescribing a period
of three years, there being no special period provi ded under the Land
Acquisition Act.
VIVEK PAHWA
2026.01.08 16:54
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CR-8189-2018
Page 6 of 7
17. In the present case, the reference LAC-58-1982 was dismissed in
default on 16.03.1983. The application for restorat ion was instituted only on
27.07.2012. The delay of nearly three decades is not only gross but also fatal,
particularly when the record unmistakably establishes that the petitioner had
full knowledge of the dismissal. The petitioner him self had filed a separate
reference, LAC-59-1982, in respect of the very same land, with a clear
endorsement that both references were to be decided together. It, therefore,
does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to contend that he was unaware of
the fate of LAC-58-1982.
18. The explanation furnished by the petitioner th at he was bona
fide pursuing his remedies in LAC-59-1982 and other proceedings cannot
constitute “sufficient cause” within the meaning of the Limitation Act. Pursuit
of parallel or misconceived remedies does not suspend limitation, particularly
when such remedies ultimately stood dismissed on fi ndings adverse to the
petitioner regarding his locus standi and title. Th e petitioner’s litigation
history, as noticed in earlier judgments of this Co urt, reveals repeated and
unsuccessful attempts to assert ownership over the acquired land despite
concurrent findings negating such claims.
19. Equally untenable is the plea that limitation would not apply
merely because the reference could not have been dismissed in default. Even
assuming that the dismissal was procedurally irregu lar, the petitioner was
required to seek appropriate relief within a reason able time. Law does not
come to the aid of those who sleep over their right s, and courts exercising
revisional jurisdiction cannot resurrect stale claims at the cost of settled rights
and finality of proceedings.
20. It is also significant that the petitioner has , at different stages,
taken mutually destructive pleas—claiming the land to be HUF property,
asserting exclusive ownership on the basis of an al leged Will, and
simultaneously denying the ownership of his father while seeking benefits as
his legal heir. Such conduct disentitles the petitioner to any equitable relief.
VIVEK PAHWA
2026.01.08 16:54
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh
CR-8189-2018
Page 7 of 7
21. In view of the settled position of law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P.
Kunhaliumma (supra) and the consistent view taken by this Court in Baldev
Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) and subsequent decisions, it is held that an
application seeking restoration of a land acquisiti on reference dismissed in
default is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
22. In the face of this settled legal position, an y contention that such
an application is either not maintainable or is gov erned by any period other
than that prescribed under Article 137 is wholly un tenable. The objection
raised with regard to limitation is, therefore, dev oid of merit and is hereby
rejected.
23. The learned Tribunal has correctly appreciated the factual
matrix, applied the settled principles of law, and exercised its discretion
judiciously in declining condonation of delay and restoration of the reference.
No perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error is shown warranting
interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
24. Consequently, the present revision petition is devoid of merit
and is hereby dismissed. The impugned order dated 24.05.2018 passed by the
learned Land Acquisition Tribunal, Ludhiana Improve ment Trust, Ludhiana, is
upheld.
(DEEPAK GUPTA)
08.01.2026
JUDGE
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes
Whether reportable No
Uploaded on: 08.01.2026
VIVEK PAHWA
2026.01.08 16:54
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh