CMA/106/2024 of SHRI MUNNA @ MANWAR KHAN SON OF SHRI GHASI KHAN, Vs SHRI SHAMNOOR SON OF SHRI FATTU KHAN,
[2026:RJ-JP:16921]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 106/2024
1 Shri Munna @ Manwar Khan Son Of Shri Ghasi Khan,
Resident Of Village Kayad, Tehsil And District Ajmer.
2 Shri Sethu Son Of Shri Sawai Khan, Resident Of Village
Kayad, Tehsil And District Ajmer.(Since Deceased)
Through Legal Representatives-
2.1 Smt. Sharifan Wife Of Late Shri Sethu, Resident Of Village
Babayacha, District Ajmer.
2.2 Shri Usman Mohammad Son Of Late Shri Sethu, Resident
Of Village Babayacha, District Ajmer.
2.3 Shri Gulsher Son Of Late Shri Sethu, Resident Of Village
Babayacha, District Ajmer.
2.4 Shri Nafees Mohammad Son Of Late Shri Sethu, (Since
Minor, Through Natural Guardian Mother Smt. Sharifan
Wife Of Late Shri Sethu) Resident Of Village Babayacha,
District Ajmer.
----Appellants
Versus
1 Shri Shamnoor Son Of Shri Fattu Khan, Resident Of Bada
Bera, (Aasama) Ki Dhani , Bavayacha, Tehsil And District
Ajmer.
2 Nausar Wife Of Hari, Daughter Of Shri Bhanwarlal,
Resident Of Chhatdi, Vaya Gagwana, Tehsil And District
Ajmer.
3 Chauthi Wife Of Om, Daughter Of Bhanwarlal, Resident Of
Shastri Nagar, Ajmer.
4 Smt. Sharda Wife Of Ramkaran, Daughter Of Bhanwarlal,
Resident Of Village Ghughra, Tehsil And District Ajmer.
5 Smt. Manna Wife Of Gordhan, Daughter Of Bhanwarlal,
Resident Of Village Akhari, Tehsil And District Ajmer.
6 Shri Bhagchand Son Of Bhanwarlal, Resident Of Village
Akhari, Tehsil And District Ajmer.
7 Shri Suresh Son Of Bhanwarlal, (Since Minor Through
Guardian And Brother Shri Bhagchand Son Of Bhanwarlal)
Resident Of Village Kayad, Tehsil And District Ajmer.
8 Shri Mahendra Sen Son Of Shri Pusalal Sen, Resident Of
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Tabiji, Tehsil And District Ajmer.
9 Shri Jagpal Singh Son Of Harnam Singh, Resident Of
Diggi Bazar, Ajmer.
10 Kanhaiyalal Son Of Shri Tuljaram, Resident Of Gurunanak
Colony, Sukhadia Colony, Ajmer.
11 Smt. Manju Kanwar Wife Of Rajendra Singh, Resident Of
House No. 64/50, Lohakhan, Police Line, Ajmer.
12 Ashwajeet Shekhawat Son Of Bhanwarsingh Shekhawat,
Resident Of Ashok Nagar, Narishala Road, Ajmer.
13 Sub-Registrar, Ajmer, Sub-Registrar Office, Jaipur Road,
Ajmer.
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. R.K. Agrawal Sr. Adv.
Mr. Adhiraj Modi
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Yashovadhan Agarwal
Mr. Aditya Sharma for
Mr. J.P. Gupta
Mr. Kshitij Jain on behalf of
Mr. Vigyan Shah AAG
Mr. Neeraj K. Tiwari
MR. S.N. Kumawat
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA
Judgment
Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments 16.04.2026
Date on which the judgment was reserved 16.04.2026
Whether the full judgment or only the operative
part is pronounced
Full Judgment
Date of pronouncement 22.04.2026
1. The present civil miscellaneous appeal has been filed against
the order dated 07.2.2023, passed by learned Additional District
and Session Judge, No. 3, Ajmer, in Civil Misc. Case No. 85/2012,
whereby the application for temporary injunction filed by the
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plaintiffs-appellants under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with
Section 151 CPC has been dismissed.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs-appellants
entered into an agreement to sell dated 25.08.2010 with
defendant-respondent Nos. 2 to 5 for the purchase of their 2/3rd
share in the land measuring 10 Bighas 10 Biswas, as described in
the plaint, for a total consideration of Rs. 20,00,000/-. The entire
sale consideration was paid at the time of execution of the
agreement. The said agreement was executed and the
consideration was received and acknowledged by defendant-
respondent No. 1, Shri Shamnoor S/o Fattu Khan, acting as power
of attorney holder pursuant to the power of attorney dated
08.05.2008 executed by defendant-respondent Nos. 2 to 5 and
duly authenticated by a Notary Public.
2.1 Since defendant-respondent Nos. 2 to 5 did not cooperate in
executing and registering the sale deed as agreed, the plaintiffs-
appellants filed a suit for specific performance along with ancillary
reliefs against defendant-respondent Nos. 2 to 5 and others,
registered as Civil Suit No. 222/2012 before the Court of the
learned Additional District Judge No. 3, Ajmer. In the said suit, the
plaintiffs-appellants also filed an application for temporary
injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151
CPC, seeking to restrain defendant-respondent Nos. 2 to 7 from
alienating or transferring the suit land in any manner and from
making any development or construction thereon, along with other
ancillary reliefs.
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2.2 In response to the said application, defendant-respondent
Nos. 2 to 7 admitted the execution of the power of attorney as
well as the agreement to sell. However, they contended that the
attorney had not passed on the consideration amount of
Rs. 20,00,000/- to them, and therefore, the agreement could not
be enforced and the temporary injunction, as prayed for, ought not
to be granted.
2.3 Defendant-respondent No. 1, in his separate reply, submitted
that he was duly authorized under a notarized power of attorney
dated 08.05.2008 to act on behalf of defendant-respondent Nos. 2
to 7 in all matters relating to the suit property, including its sale.
He contended that, in exercise of such authority, he had validly
executed the agreement to sell dated 25.08.2010 in favour of the
plaintiffs-appellants after receiving the entire consideration of
₹20,00,000/-, and expressed his readiness to execute and register
the sale deed.
2.4 Defendant-respondent Nos. 8 to 10, being purchasers prior to
the alleged agreement to sell, submitted in their joint reply that
they had acquired the entire land through registered sale deeds
dated 10.08.2006 and were in lawful possession thereof. Relying
on Mutation No. 233 dated 07.06.1999, they contended that the
plaintiffs had no enforceable right as the defendants-sisters lacked
khatedari rights and accordingly prayed for rejection of the
temporary injunction application.
2.5 After hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court dismissed the
application for temporary injunction vide order dated 07.12.2023.
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3. Hence aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs-appellants
preferred the present civil misc. appeal before this Court.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
impugned order dated 07.12.2023 is manifestly perverse, as it
exhibits a complete lack of judicial approach, material irregularity,
and illegality. The learned trial Court failed to consider the
material facts pleaded by both parties and proceeded without
proper examination of the case record, thereby arriving at a
perfunctory conclusion.
4.1 Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the
trial Court did not undertake a minimal requisite analysis of the
facts, especially regarding the rights of the defendant-respondent
Nos. 2 to 5 under the Hindu Succession Act, 1955 and the legal
effect of mutation entries, revenue proceedings and decrees
passed in regular suits. It ignored the essential legal and factual
aspects, leading to a miscarriage of justice.
4.2 Learned counsel for the appellants contended that order
dated 07.12.2023 erroneously assesses the prima-facie case
without examining the pleading, evidence, and legal principles
involved. It failed to appreciate that the defendant-respondent
Nos. 2 to 5 had acquired indefeasible rights to their share
immediately upon their father’s death, which could not be
neglected by revenue mutation entries or revenue decrees. He
further contended that the trial Court misconstrued the
implications of revenue entries, including mutation No. 233 and
subsequent decrees, which were set aside or confined in regular
revenue suits. It ignored the legal effect of these proceedings and
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the law governing succession and property rights under the Hindu
Succession Act.
4.3 Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the impugned
order disregards settled legal principles that revenue mutations
are for fiscal purposes only and do not determine rights of
ownership. The trial Court failed to consider that the rights of the
defendants-respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are protected by law and that
the sale agreement and power of attorney were executed in
accordance with legal requirements.
4.4 Learned counsel for the appellants further argued that the
order dated 07.12.2023 is passed without proper discussion or
analysis of the balance of convenience and irreparable injury. The
plaintiffs-petitioners, who paid full consideration and acted
bonafide, stand to suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is
refused. Conversely, the defendants-respondents’ claim is
fraudulent and unsupported by lawful rights.
4.5 Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the trial
Court entered into a mini-trial by delving into disputed facts
instead of examining the prima-facie case on record, thus
exceeding its jurisdiction and neglecting the principles guiding
temporary injunctions. He further submitted that the impugned
order results in unjust deprivation of the plaintiffs-petitioners’
rights and ignores the necessity to prevent multiplicity of
proceedings and protect bonafide purchasers. Therefore, the order
is contrary to the principles of equity and justice.
4.6 Learned counsel for the appellants urged that the present civil
miscellaneous appeal may be allowed and the impugned order
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dated 07.12.2023 be quashed & set aside and temporary
injunction application may be allowed.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted
that the respondents have demonstrated that the disputed
property was lawfully acquired through legitimate proceedings,
with all requisite consideration having been paid and proper
revenue records reflecting the rights of the respondents. He
further submitted that the appellant’s claim lack merit, as the
orders passed by the competent authorities, including the order
dated 07.12.2023, having been rendered after a meticulous
examination of the facts and have rightly declined the interim
injunction application.
5.1 Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the
plaintiffs-appellants’ assertions regarding agreement to sale after
the sale deed in favour of defendant no. 8 to 10 are devoid of
proof and are contrary to the established legal record. He further
contended that the plaintiffs-appellants have failed to establish
any prima-facie case to warrant interference at this stage.
5.2 In view of forgoing, learned counsel for the respondents
prayed that the order dated 07.12.2023 may be upheld and the
present civil miscellaneous appeal is liable to be dismissed.
6. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the
material facts available on record.
7. This Court finds that the fundamental issue in this case
revolves around the alleged share in the disputed property and
the validity of the agreement executed in favor of the plaintiffs-
appellants. However, the documents on record, including the
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orders passed in the series of litigation between the parties,
establishes that as on the date of the agreement, defendant-
respondent Nos. 2 and 5 did not hold the purported 4/6 share in
the property. The order of the Divisional Commissioner dated
08.07.2009, which upheld the mutaion and set aside the order of
assistant collector, determined that defendant-respondent Nos. 2
and 5 had no rights over the property. This renders the plaintiffs-
appellants’ claim in regard to share of defendant no. 2 to 5 and
the agreement to sell, to be not enforceable at this stage, as the
legal foundation for their case is not prima-facie sustainable.
8. Furthermore, the series of judicial proceedings and appellate
orders demonstrate that the rights over the property were
thoroughly scrutinized and ultimately adjudicated against the
plaintiffs-appellants and defendant Nos.2 to 5. The finality of these
orders indicates that their claim lacks sufficient prima-facie
strength to warrant the granting of an interim injunction. The
agreement executed based on a purported share that was nullified
by the appellate authority does not establish an immediate right to
the property deserving of injunctive relief.
9. In addition, the Court considers the balance of convenience
and the potential for irreparable harm. Granting a temporary
injunction at this juncture would cause greater inconvenience to
the defendants-respondents, who are in lawful possession. The
plaintiffs-appellants fail to demonstrate any irreparable harm that
cannot be addressed through ordinary legal remedies at a later
stage. It is a well-established principle that injunctions should not
be granted where the applicant’s case is weak and the rights are
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not clearly established, particularly when the case has been
pending for an long period without interim relief.
10. The Court also notes that the fact, when asked from the
counsel for appellant about any interim order during pending
temporary injunction application, which was answered in negative.
This court therefore has to be more cautious in granting injunction
at this stage when the prima-facie case appears weak and where
the balance of convenience does not favor the plaintiffs-
appellants. The long pendency without interim relief further
supports the view that maintaining the status quo until final
adjudication is not prudent at this stage as there was no stay
since filing of the suit in 2012 till the impugned order was passed.
11. In the case of Mandali Ranganna and Ors. vs. T.
Ramachandra and Ors.; (2008) 11 SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Apex
Court prescribed the criteria for temporary injunction as follows:
“21. While considering an application for grant of
injunction, the court will not only take into
consideration the basic elements in relation thereto,
viz., existence of a prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable injury, it must also take
into consideration the conduct of the parties.
22. Grant of injunction is an equitable relief. A
person who had kept quiet for a long time and
allowed another to deal with the properties
exclusively, ordinarily would not be entitled to an
order of injunction. The court will not interfere only
because the property is a very valuable one. We are
not however, oblivious of the fact that grant or
refusal of injunction has serious consequence
depending upon the nature thereof. The courts
dealing with such matters must make all endeavours
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to protect the interest of the parties. For the said
purpose, application of mind on the part of the
courts is imperative. Contentions raised by the
parties must be determined objectively.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In the case of Skyline Education Institute (Pvt.) Ltd. vs.
S.L. Vaswani and Ors.; AIR (2010) 2 SCC 1 42, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that interim injunctions should be decided on
undisputed facts and available material, and interference is
warranted only if the discretion exercised is perverse, erroneous,
or results in manifest injustice. For proper appreciation, the
relevant paragraph is reproduced hereunder:
“19. ……….it necessary to observe that as the suit
filed by the appellant is pending trial and issues
raised by the parties are yet to be decided, the High
Court rightly considered and decided the appellant's
prayer for temporary injunction only on the basis of
the undisputed facts and the material placed before
the learned Single Judge and unless this Court comes
to the conclusion that the discretion; exercised by
the High Court in refusing to entertain the appellant's
prayer for temporary injunction is vitiated by an error
apparent or perversity and manifest injustice has
been done to it, there will be no warrant for exercise
of power under Article 136 of the Constitution.”
13. In view of above, based on the totality of the facts, legal
principles, and judicial pronouncements, this Court finds that the
plaintiffs-appellants have failed to establish a prima-facie case,
and the balance of convenience tilts against them. Therefore, the
application for temporary injunction was rightly rejected.
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14. Consequently, the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is
hereby dismissed, and the order dated 07.02.2023, passed by
the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 3, Ajmer, in
Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 85/2012, is upheld.
15. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
16. Record of the learned trial Court be sent back forthwith.
(BIPIN GUPTA),J
Anand Tanwar/