Oil and Natural Gas Corporation vs. Sanjeev Thapa
2026 INSC 1019
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 498/2024)
M/S OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD Appellant(s)
VERSUS
SURYAKAND D. LAD & ORS.
R-1: Suryakand D. Lad
R-2: Krishna V. Patil
R-3: Rahul A. Jadhav
R-4: M. Kashilingam
R-5: Padma Vilas Shinde
R-6: Gurunath B. Apankar
R-7: Kamlabai S. Joglekar (Deceased) Through her Legal
Representative Rekha Ashok Darvesh
R-8: M/s. Noble Enterprises
Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27228/2023)
M/S OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD Appellant(s)
VERSUS
SUBRAMANIAM S. ARJUN AND ORS.
R-1: Subramaniam S. Arjun
R-2: Mohammed Ahmed Mirza
R-3: Llyas. Yakub. Shaikh
R-4: Eknath Vitthal Kamble
Digitally signed by
SACHIN KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA
Date: 2026.09.19
13:44:33 IST
Reason:
Signature Not Verified
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R-5: V. Thagavell Nadar
R-6: Sultan Ismail Machiwala
R-7: Shivaji Shanker Khandagale
R-8: Subhash. Dattaram Dalvi
R-9: Bhaskar, L. Suryavanshi
R-10: Mohammed Tamil Abdul Masjit
R-11: Shantaram. G. Dawal
R-12: Vilas. Balavant Chavan
R-13: Dashrath. C. Aroskar
R-14: Baliram. Rajaram. Patekar
R-15: Isravell. M. Nadar
R-16: Kashinath. Y. Walande
R-17: M/s G.B. Mhatre
Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27407/2023)
M/S OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD Appellant(s)
VERSUS
RAMANATHAN A. YOGISHWARAN AND ORS.
R-1: Ramanathan A. Yogishwaran
R-2: M/s G. B. Mhatre
R-3: M/s A. R. Naim and Sons
Through Shri Ibrahim Patel
Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 499/2024)
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M/S OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD Appellant(s)
VERSUS
MOHD. HANIF ISMAIL HAKAM AND ORS.
R-1: Mohd. Hanif Ismail Hakam
R-2: Ramswamy V. Dever
R-3: Shunmugham M. Devar
R-4: Muttupandi. S. Devar
R-5: Paneersel. A. Pariyar
R-6: Samuvell. B. Nadar
R-7: Pushparaj. G. Pariyar
R-8: Raman A. Yageshwaran
R-9: Essay N. Padayachi
R-10: Prafulla Shankar Salunke
R-11: Vijay Bapu Ambekar
R-12: C. H. Durai
R-13: Murugam A. Yogeshwaran
R-14: Gopalan G. Yogeshwaran
R-15: Uchamani T. Devar
R-16: Gopi Kasi Nadar
R-17: G. Raja Singh
R-18: Prakash D. Pawal
R-19: Ashok Gurunath Malwade
R-20: Akhtar N. Girnari
R-21: Essay Mutthu S. Murathuver
R-22: Suyambuturai T. Nadar
R-23: Bharatlal Harishchandra
R-24: Girish Bhailal Patel
R-25: Chellapandi S. Nadar
R-26: Bhanuj T. Bhattacharya
R-27: Muthu Arumugaam Devar
R-28: Jairaj Kondanna Indrollu
R-29: Noorallah S. Sayyad
R-30: Ram Parvesh Ram Kurmi
R-31: Vell R. Chettiyar
R-32: Thangavelli K. Nadar
R-33: Tirumalai S. Subbaiah
R-34: M/s. G. B. Mhatre
R-35: M/s. A. R. Naim and Sons
Respondent(s)
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O R D E R
Heard Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General for the
appellant and Mr. Riwaj Rai, learned counsel for the respondent
No.8 in SLP© No. 498/2024.
2. Despite service of notice being complete on all the remaining
respondents, only respondent Nos. 1 to 8 in SLP (C) No. 498/2024,
respondent No. 1 in SLP (C) No. 27407/2023, Respondent No. 16 in
SLP (C) No. 27228/2023 and Respondent No. 20 in SLP(C) No. 499/2024
have entered appearance; however, nobody is present on behalf of
any of the respondents, except respondent No. 8 in SLP© No.
498/2024 when the matter is taken up and heard.
3. Leave granted.
4. The present appeals arising out of the common order dated
23.08.2023 passed by the High Court of Bombay in W.P.(C) Nos. 2443
of 2022, 1724, 1826 and 2355 of 2021 by which the liability to pay
gratuity to the private respondents has been fastened on the
appellant.
5. Learned Solicitor General submits that the Controlling
Authority before whom the matters were initially agitated held the
appellant liable to pay the gratuity despite being informed of the
fact that the appellant is not liable to pay the same and further
that it has no jurisdiction to decide the liability with regard to
the appellant.
6. He submits that as per Section 4 of the Gratuity Act, payment
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of gratuity has to be made only to an “employee”, and the private
respondents who claim payment of gratuity were not “ employees” of
the appellant. He contends that there is no employer-employee
relationship between the parties, and thus, the provisions of the
Gratuity Act are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of
the present cases. He further contends that, under Section 21(4) of
the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 ("CLRA
Act", for short), the responsibility for payment of wages would not
be on the appellant for the reason that it only talks about the
wages and not gratuity which is a separate component as per Clause
(vi) of Section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.
7. Learned Solicitor General submitted that in the same Section,
it has been clarified that any gratuity payable on the termination
of an employee in cases other than those specified in sub-clause
(d) would not come under the definition of wages. He drew the
attention of the Court to Clause 12.4 of the contract between the
appellant and the contractor, which relates to the terms and
conditions, specifically Clause 12.4.1, which clearly stipulates
that the said agreement is a job contract and does not create any
employer-employee relationship between the appellant and the
employees of the contractor and further that this is a contract at
arm's length.
8. He further submits that even in law, the jurisdiction of the
Controlling Authority is limited to a dispute with regard to the
amount of gratuity payable under the Gratuity Act and thus, the
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question of deciding the liability and fastening it on the
appellant was totally beyond its jurisdiction.
9. Learned Solicitor General refers to a recent decision of a
coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of the Municipal
Council, represented by its Commissioner, Nandyal Municipality,
Kurnool District, A.P. versus K. Jayaram and Ors . dated
16.12.2025, which has clearly held that a person working under any
establishment, being sent there through a contractor, cannot claim
an employer-employee relationship with the principal employer for
whom he works, having been sent by the contractor.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 8-Contractor, submits
that the liability does not rest on him, as whatever amount is
payable, ultimately has to come from the principal employer, which
in the present case is the appellant.
11. Though there is no representation today before the Court, on
behalf of the other private respondents, but a counter affidavit on
behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 7 is on record. The stand taken in
the same is basically harping on the fact that they had worked for
the appellant for a long period. However, on the issue which has
been discussed above, there is nothing to counter the submissions
of the learned Solicitor General.
12. Having considered the matters in their entirety and in the
facts and circumstances of the present cases, in our considered
opinion, the order impugned cannot be sustained. We are in
agreement with the submissions of the learned Solicitor General
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that the very maintainability of the proceeding in view of the
relief claimed before the Controlling Authority was not
permissible. The adjudication by the Controlling Authority with
regard to the liability was beyond its jurisdiction, as the only
power conferred on the Controlling Authority under the statute was
to compute the amount which may be payable to the concerned
“employee”. The Appellate Authority, before whom the appellant
succeeded, had rightly interfered in the matters and we find that
the reversal of the order of the Appellate Authority by the High
Court vide the impugned order was not justified.
13. Further, we find that under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 as
also the CLRA Act, the contentions of the learned Solicitor General
are sustainable. Though the judgment in the case of The Municipal
Council represented by Commissioner, Nandyal Municipality, Kurnool
District, A.P (supra) has been referred and relied upon by the
learned Solicitor General but we do not find any purpose will be
served by referring to the same at this juncture, in view of the
order we propose to pass.
14. Accordingly, for the reasons aforesaid, on the short point of
the Controlling Authority not being competent to go into the lis,
as was raised before it by the private respondents who had worked
through the contractor under the appellant, the appeal is allowed.
The order of the High Court is set aside and the order passed by
the Appellate Authority stands revived.
15. However, before we part, we observe that in the present
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proceedings, the amount of gratuity claimed by the so-called
employees has already been paid to them by the appellant in terms
of the order of this Court dated 15.12.2023. Accordingly, there
shall be no recovery made from them. After, clarifying the
aforesaid position in law, the appeals stand disposed of.
16. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
......................J.
(AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH)
......................J.
(MANMOHAN)
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 9th, 2026