M/S Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 457 : 2026 INSC 956
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited
v.
Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 7367 of 2024)
07 September 2026
[J.B. Pardiwala* and Manoj Misra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the NGT vide the impugned judgment was right in setting
aside the second Environmental Clearance (EC) and second
Consent to Establish (CTE) granted to the appellant by the Uttar
Pradesh State Impact Assessment Authority (UP SEIAA) and
Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (UPPCB) respectively;
whether the Revised Guidelines for Common Bio-Medical Waste
Treatment and Disposal Facilities, 2016 (RG, 2016) is mandatory
or directory in nature; whether the grant of relaxation in land
requirement in favour of the appellant for the establishment of a
Common Bio-medical Waste Treatment Facility (CBWTF) by the
Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) was permissible; on a
combined reading of the EIA, 2006 and the RG, 2016 respectively,
what is the status of land acquisition required for establishing a
CBWTF at the time of making a Form 1 application, at the stage
of Appraisal of the EC and at the time of making an application
for the issuance of CTE respectively; whether the UP SEAC and
the UP SEIAA respectively could have proceeded with the grant
of the second EC on the basis of the first Terms of Reference.
Headnotes†
Environment – NGT set aside the Environmental Clearance
(EC) and Consent to Establish (CTE) granted in favour of the
appellant in connection with the establishment of a Common
Bio-medical Waste Treatment Facility (CBWTF) – Whether
the grant of relaxation in land requirement in favour of the
appellant for the establishment of a CBWTF by the Central
Pollution Control Board (CPCB) was permissible – On a
combined reading of the Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) Notification, 2006 and the Revised Guidelines for
Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment and Disposal
* Author
458 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Facilities, 2016 (RG, 2016) respectively, what is the status
of land acquisition required for establishing a CBWTF at
the time of making a Form 1 application, at the stage of
Appraisal of the EC and at the time of making an application
for the issuance of CTE respectively – Whether the UP SEAC
and the UP SEIAA respectively could have proceeded with
the grant of the second EC on the basis of the first Terms
of Reference (ToR) – Whether the NGT vide the impugned
judgment was right in setting aside the second EC and
second CTE respectively granted to the appellant by the UP
SEIAA and UPPCB respectively:
Held: NGT committed an egregious error in passing the impugned
judgment quashing the second EC and second CTE – Clause 6 of
the EIA, 2006 states that an application in Form 1 can be made
after the identification of prospective site(s) – Therefore, land
allotment cannot be said to be a pre-condition for the making of an
application under Form 1 – The second EC and second CTE were
both granted in favour of the appellant on 20.12.2023 after land
was allotted to it by the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development
Authority (UPSIDA) on 19.09.2022 and after relaxation was
granted by the CPCB on 17.11.2023 – Therefore, as far as the
fulfilment of land acquisition conditions are concerned, the second
EC and second CTE was not vitiated – Impugned judgment set-
aside – Constitution of India – Art.77 – Water (Prevention and
Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 – Air (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1981 – Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Bio-
Medical Waste Management Rules, 2016 – Revised Guidelines
for Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment and Disposal Facilities,
2016. [Paras 110-112]
Bio-Medical Waste Management Rules, 2016 (BMWM Rules) –
Revised Guidelines for Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment
and Disposal Facilities, 2016 (RG, 2016) – Whether the RG,
2016 is mandatory or directory in nature – Whether the grant
of relaxation in land requirement in favour the appellant for
the establishment of a CBWTF by the CPCB was permissible:
Held: The RG, 2016 is mandatory in nature – It must be scrupulously
followed by the relevant authorities and the project proponents
alike during the process of obtaining/grant of permissions for the
establishment of a CBWTF – Its non-publication in the Official
Gazette could not be said to have affected its mandatory nature –
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 459
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
The decision of this Court in B.K. Srinivasan had clarified that
when a strict mode of publication has not been prescribed, either
by the parent statute or the subordinate legislation, a reasonable
mode of publication may be sufficient – Neither the EP Act nor the
BMWM Rules prescribe a strict mode of publication for the RG,
2016 – Therefore, publication in the Official Gazette, although the
general rule, cannot be said to be a sine qua non – The publication
of such technical guidelines on the official website of the CPCB
was reasonably sufficient – Moreover, the RG, 2016 lays down
crucial standards which form the foundation for the grant of EC and
CTE/CTO respectively to a CBWTF and are so deeply embedded
in the existing authorisation mechanism – All project proponents
are sufficiently made aware of its existence whilst commencing the
process for obtaining different clearances – Therefore, it cannot
be argued that they do not constitute enforceable standards for
the grant as well as revocation of permissions – Any reliance
on the ratio in Gulf Goans would, therefore, be misplaced – As
per Clause 7 of the RG, 2016, the land requirement of one acre
prescribed for setting up a CBWTF may be relaxed upon the
fulfilment of one of the two pre-conditions i.e., the land must be
situated either within municipal limits with a population of more
than 25 lakh or within a rural area – Additionally, consultation with
the CPCB and the imposition of additional control measures is
mandatory – Appellant’s CBWTF is located within Village Noorpur
and is therefore, in a rural area – Relaxation was granted only
after due consultation with the CPCB and the imposition of
additional control measures which took into account the operational
effectiveness of the CBWTF in a smaller area – Therefore, the
grant of relaxation cannot be faulted – Constitution of India –
Art.77 – Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 –
Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. [Para 110]
Environment – Whether the UP SEAC and the UP SEIAA
respectively could have proceeded with the grant of the
second EC on the basis of the first ToR:
Held: The setting aside of the first EC by the decision of the
Tribunal in Aniruda Panwar did not have the consequence
of rendering the first ToR invalid – There was no deliberate
concealment or non-disclosure of material information which
affected the Form 1 application or the issuance of the first ToR –
Therefore, the first ToR was intact – Considering that the first
460 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
ToR was also valid for a period of four years, the grant of the
second EC on the basis of the first ToR could not be said to be
wrong. [Para 110]
Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 –
s.25 – Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 –
s.21 – Revised Guidelines for Common Bio-Medical Waste
Treatment and Disposal Facilities, 2016 (RG, 2016) – Clause
2 – EIA, 2006 – Clause 6 – Status of land acquisition required
from a project proponent seeking to establish a CBWTF at
the time of making the Form 1 application, at the stage of
appraisal of the EC and at the time of applying for a CTE
respectively:
Held: The stages involved in the process of obtaining a prior
EC are four: Screening, Scoping, Public Consultation and
Appraisal respectively – According to the O.M., the need for
such a credible document only arises at the fourth stage – So,
although the application in Form 1 can be made by a project
proponent before such a credible document is obtained, yet this
document must be available for scrutiny when the SEAC and
SEIAA respectively, ‘finally appraise’ the EC application – Land
allotment for the particular purpose/project is not necessary
before the application under Form 1 can be made, i.e., before
the first stage of screening – Identification is enough – Such a
view is further substantiated by two things: (i) when the EC is
inherently site-specific there arises no reason for placing such
a high burden at the Form 1 stage itself, and (ii) a reading
of the prescribed Form 1 enclosed as Annexure-I to the EIA,
2006, under the head ‘Basic Information’, requires the applicant
to provide details of the “Location/site alternatives under
consideration”, meaning thereby that the applicant is only to
provide details of the site(s) in which he intends to setup the
project/activity concerned – In the present case, the applications
dated 06.07.2021 made to the UPSIDA seeking allotment of
plots E-25 and E-26 respectively, for establishing a CBWTF,
was sufficient to prove that the plots were identified or were
being considered by the appellant – The second take-away is
that, when the stage of appraisal arrives, a credible document
becomes crucial – Undoubtedly, this credible document in the
context of the present matter would either be a successful
allotment in favour of the appellant or, if the allotment is not in
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 461
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
vogue, then a provisional allotment/ acknowledgment issued by
the UPSIDA – Clause 6 of the EIA, 2006 and the O.M. dated
07.10.2014 respectively clarify that legal possession by way of
a sale deed, lease deed etc., may not necessarily be obtained,
both before making the Form 1 application and at the stage of
appraisal, respectively – Further, a perusal of the order dated
20.09.2021 issued by the MoEF&CC as well as s.25 of the
Water Act and s.21 of the Air Act respectively, indicate that (a)
the applicability of the EIA, 2006 and the necessity of obtaining
prior EC must simply be ascertained/identified by the SPCB/PCC
at the time of grant of CTE and, (b) prior EC must be obtained
before a Consent to Operate (CTO) can be granted by the SPCB/
PCC – Therefore, when the chronology is rightly understood, a
CTE can be issued before the issuance of a prior EC upon a
mere assessment of the applicability of the EIA, 2006 – In that
case, when the identification of prospective site(s) is the land
acquisition requirement for making a Form 1 application under
the EIA, 2006, then successful land allotment for the CBWTF
cannot be made a condition precedent, both for the making of an
application for CTE and the grant of CTE respectively – Having
said so, relaxation in land requirement, if any, in accordance
with Clause 7 of the RG, 2016 must be granted by the SPCB/
PCC in consultation with the CPCB before they can issue a
CTE for land admeasuring less than one acre – Clause 2 of the
RG, 2016 does not make land procurement or land allocation
a strict pre-requisite for initiating the process of obtaining both
the EC and CTE respectively. [Paras 69-73, 110]
Words and Phrases – “land procured” in Clause 2 (d) and
“upon allocation of site” in Clause 2(e) respectively of the
Revised Guidelines for Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment
and Disposal Facilities, 2016 (RG, 2016):
Held: A hyper technical view of the words “land procured” in
Clause 2(d) and “upon allocation of site” in Clause 2(e) of the
RG, 2016 respectively cannot be taken, in a manner which is
contrary to the meaning evinced by the EIA, 2006 – Clause 6 of
the EIA, 2006 and the O.M. dated 07.10.2014 communicate what
is required from any project proponent while making the Form 1
application and at the appraisal stage, without any ambiguity –
No reason, either in law or by way of technical necessity, why
a stricter condition must be placed for a proponent seeking to
462 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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establish CBWTF in comparison to proponents undertaking other
activities/projects. [Para 81]
Revised Guidelines for Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment
and Disposal Facilities, 2016 (RG, 2016) – Genesis, scope and
nature of, discussed – Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 –
Bio-Medical Waste Management Rules, 2016. [Paras 37-42]
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Bio-Medical Waste
Management Rules, 2016 – Revised Guidelines for Common
Bio-Medical Waste Treatment and Disposal Facilities, 2016 (RG,
2016) – Publication in the Official Gazette not a sine qua non:
Held: Neither the EP Act nor the BMWM Rules prescribe a strict
mode of publication for the RG, 2016 – Undeniably, the case
would fall under the third-type of scenario as per the decision in
B.K. Srinivasan – Therefore, publication in the Official Gazette,
although the general rule, cannot be said to be a sine qua
non – Publication of such technical guidelines i.e. the RG, 2016,
on the official website of the CPCB was reasonably sufficient –
Moreover, the RG, 2016 lays down crucial standards which form
the foundation for the grant of EC and CTE/CTO respectively to
a CBWTF – They are so deeply embedded in the authorisation
mechanism and all project proponents are sufficiently made aware
of its existence whilst commencing the process for obtaining
different clearances – Therefore, it cannot be argued that they
do not constitute enforceable standards for the grant as well as
revocation of permissions. [Para 54]
Case Law Cited
Pankaj Jain Agencies v. Union of India and others, [1994]
Supp. 1 SCR 602 : (1994) 5 SCC 198; I.T.C. Bhadrachalam
Paperboards and Another v. Mandal Revenue Officer, A.P. and
Others, [1996] Supp. 5 SCR 643 : (1996) 6 SCC 634; Union of
India and Others v. Ganesh Das Bhojraj [2000] 1 SCR 1081 :
(2000) 9 SCC 461; Nabha Power Limited and Another v. Punjab
State Power Corporation and Another, 2024 INSC 833 : [2024]
11 SCR 445 : (2025) 5 SCC 353; Sammbhu Nath Jha v. Kedar
Prasad Sinha and Others [1972] 3 SCR 183 : (1972) 1 SCC 573;
State of Kerala and Others v. P.J. Joseph (1957) 3 SCC 638;
Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Another, 2026 SCC
OnLine 101 – distinguished.
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 463
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India [2019] 5 SCR 916 :
(2019) 15 SCC 401; Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v.
Ajay Kumar [2003] 2 SCR 387 : (2003) 4 SCC 579; State of
NCT of Delhi and Anr. v. Sanjeev @ Bitto, 2005 INSC 180 :
[2005] 3 SCR 151 : (2005) 5 SCC 181; Gulf Goans Hotels
Company Limited and Another v. Union of India and Others
[2014] 10 SCR 536 : (2014) 10 SCC 673; Air India Cabin Crew
Assn. v. Yeshaswinee Merchant and Others [2003] Supp. 1
SCR 455 : (2003) 6 SCC 277; Major E.G. Barsay v. State of
Bombay, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 30; B.K. Srinivasan and Others v.
State of Karnataka and Others, [1987] 1 SCR 1054 : (1987) 1
SCC 658; Harla v. State of Rajasthan, 1951 SCC OnLine SC
54; Rajendra Agricultural University v. Ashok Kumar Prasad and
Others, [2009] 15 SCR 1168 : (2010) 1 SCC 730; Ramakrishna
Vivekananda Mission v. State of W.B. and Others, [2004] 6 Supp.
SCR 423 : (2005) 9 SCC 53; Bengaluru Development Authority v.
Sudhakar Hegde and Others, [2020] 5 SCR 755 : (2020) 15
SCC 63 – referred to.
Aniruda Panwar and Anr. v. Ministry of Environment, Forests and
Climate Change and Ors. (Original Application No. 622 of 2022
passed by National Green Tribunal ) – discussed.
List of Acts
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; Water (Prevention and
Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; Air (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) Act, 1981; Bio-Medical Waste Management Rules, 2016;
Revised Guidelines for Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment
and Disposal Facilities, 2016; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords
Environmental Clearance (EC); Consent to Establish (CTE); Uttar
Pradesh State Impact Assessment Authority (UP SEIAA); Uttar
Pradesh Pollution Control Board (UPPCB); Revised Guidelines for
Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment and Disposal Facilities,
2016; RG, 2016; Common Bio-medical Waste Treatment
Facility (CBWTF); Terms of Reference (ToR); Relaxation in land
requirement; Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB); UP SEAC;
Status of land acquisition; Stage of Appraisal of the EC; Screening;
Scoping; Public Consultation; Appraisal; Publication in Official
Gazette; Strict mode of publication; Technical guidelines; Land
allotment; Prospective site; Land procurement; Land allocation;
464 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Project proponent; Prior EC; Environmental Impact Assessment
Notification; Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Authority
(UPSIDA); Form 1 application; Second EC; Second CTE.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7367 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.07.2024 of the National
Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in AN No. 04 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Saurabh Rajpal, Vinay Kumar Singh,
Siddhanth Singh, Rongon Chowdhary.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Ms. Garima Prashad, Sr. A.A.G., Pinaki Misra, Sr. Adv., Sumit
Babar, Vikramaditya Singh, Sajal Singhai, Hardeep, Ms. Yashika
Gupta, Nitish Kant Sharma, Sudeep Kumar, Ms. Rupali.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.:
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:-
INDEX§
I. FACTUAL MATRIX ........................................................... 2
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES ................................. 17
A. Submissions on behalf of the Appellant ............. 17
B. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent No. 1 ....19
III. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION .................................... 22
IV. ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 23
A. Mandatory nature of the RG, 2016 and the decision
of this Court in Gulf Goans .................................. 23
§ Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 465
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
i. The genesis, scope and nature of the RG, 2016 ...26
ii. The requirement of authentication under
Article 77 of the Constitution ........................... 31
iii. Whether the non-publication of the RG, 2016 in
the Official Gazette could be said to affect its
mandatory nature ............................................. 33
B. Permissibility of the grant of relaxation in land
requirement ............................................................ 41
C. The status of land acquisition required from a
project proponent seeking to establish a CBWTF
at the time of making the Form 1 application, at
the stage of appraisal of the EC and at the time
of applying for a CTE respectively ...................... 46
i. Clause 6 of the EIA, 2006 read with the O.M.
dated 07.10.2014 ............................................. 46
ii. Clause 2 of the RG, 2016 ............................... 50
iii. Applying for a CTE under the Water Act and
Air Act respectively ............................................ 53
D. The grant of the second EC on the basis of the
first ToR ................................................................... 60
i. Whether the decision in Aniruda Panwar could
be said to have set-aside the first ToR ............ 60
ii. Validity period of the ToR ................................. 69
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................. 74
1. This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 05.07.2024
passed by the National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi
(hereinafter, the “Tribunal”) in Appeal No. 04 of 2024 (hereinafter, the
“impugned decision”), whereby the Tribunal set-aside the
Environmental Clearance (“EC”) dated 20.12.2023 and Consent
to Establish (“CTE”) dated 20.12.2023 respectively granted in favour
of the appellant herein in connection with the establishment of a
Common Bio-medical Waste Treatment Facility (“CBWTF”).
466 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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I. FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The Environmental Impact Assessment Notification dated 14.09.2006
(“EIA, 2006”) issued by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and
Climate Change, Government of India (“MoEF&CC”) makes
provisions requiring prior EC in respect of certain projects/activities/
industries. Initially, a CBWTF did not fall within its ambit. However,
vide notification dated 17.04.2015, the expression “bio-medical waste
treatment facility” was inserted to the Schedule of the EIA, 2006,
thereby adding it to the list of projects/activities requiring a prior EC.
3. M/s Punahchakran Private Limited (hereinafter, the “appellant”)
submitted two applications dated 06.07.2021 to the Uttar Pradesh
State Industrial Development Authority (“UPSIDA”) for the allotment
of plot nos. E-25 and E-26 admeasuring 0.45 acres and 0.44 acres
respectively, situated at the UPSIDC Industrial Area, Babrala, District
Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh, for the purpose of establishing a CBWTF.
4. Before the said land could be allotted to the appellant, on 11.08.2021,
it submitted an application in Form 1 before the Uttar Pradesh
State Impact Assessment Authority (“UP SEIAA”) for the issue of
Terms of Reference (“ToR”) to commence the Environmental Impact
Assessment (“EIA”) study.
5. On 12.08.2021, the UPSIDA rejected the allotment applications
made by the appellant. In the immediate aftermath of this rejection,
the appellant submitted yet another application before the UPSIDA
seeking allotment of the same plots but for a different purpose i.e.,
for the establishment of an industrial unit for “fabrication of industrial
equipment”.
6. On 17.08.2021, the UP SEIAA issued a standard ToR (hereinafter,
the “first ToR”) to the appellant, thereby commencing the process
for an EIA study.
7. On 15.09.2021, the appellant’s land allotment application for
establishing an industrial equipment fabrication unit was allowed
by the UPSIDA.
8. Thereafter, the appellant approached the Uttar Pradesh Pollution
Control Board (hereinafter, the “UPPCB”) and submitted an
application dated 27.09.2021 seeking the grant of a Consent to
Establish (“CTE”) for the CBWTF under the provisions of the Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (“Water Act”) and
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 467
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (“Air Act”)
respectively. Plots E-25 and E-26 respectively of the UPSIDC
Industrial Area were indicated to be the land in which the CBWTF
was proposed to be set-up.
9. It is pertinent to note that as per the O.M. dated 27.04.2018 the
requirement of a public hearing under Paragraph 7(i)(III)Stage(3)
(i)(b) of the EIA, 2006 was exempted since the site was located in
an industrial area. Therefore, on 18.02.2022, after obtaining the EIA
study report, the appellant submitted its proposal to the UP SEIAA
for grant of prior EC.
10. On 26.04.2022, the UPPCB had granted a conditional CTE
(hereinafter, the “first CTE”) to the appellant.
11. On 03.06.2022, in compliance with Clause 2 of the Revised
Guidelines for Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment and Disposal
Facilities, 2016, (hereinafter, the “RG, 2016”), a GAP Analysis
Report was submitted to the UP SEAC by the Member, Secretary,
UPPCB. This report indicated the details of the bio-medical waste
generated in the eight nearby districts along with the proposed/
operating CBWTFs in the concerned areas as under:
S.
No.
District Bedded,
HCF
Non-
Bedded
HCF
No
Beds
Covered Facility
1 Muradabad 481 707 6699 ● Sushila Bio-
Medical (Operated)
● Bhagwatsaran
(Proposed)
2 Sambhal 111 252 1034 ● M/s Punahchakran
Pvt. Ltd.
(Proposed)
3 Badayu 147 30 1988 -
4 Aligarh 474 387 9512 -
5 Hathras 148 207 1822 -
6 Etah 122 128 1319 -
7 Kasganj 81 102 1043 -
8 Bulandsheha 293 243 4482 -
Total Beds 1857 2056 27899
Amount of Bio-Medical Waste
in Kg
102.8
Kg
6974.75
Kg
Total – 7080.55 Kg
468 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
12. Upon a consideration of the GAP Report and taking into account all
the other details, the UP SEAC in its 663rd meeting dated 16.06.2022
recommended the grant of EC to the appellant. Thereafter, on
05.07.2022, the UP SEIAA in its 625th meeting expressed agreement
with the recommendation of the UP SEAC. As a consequence,
the EC (hereinafter, the “first EC”) was issued to the appellant on
13.07.2022.
13. However, on 19.08.2022, the first CTE and first EC granted in favour
of the appellant by the UPPCB and UP SEIAA respectively were
challenged before the Tribunal in Original Application No. 622 of
2022 titled Aniruda Panwar and Anr. v. Ministry of Environment,
Forests and Climate Change and Ors.
14. After obtaining the first CTE and the first EC and after the institution
of the aforesaid O.A., the appellant approached the UPSIDA through
its online application dated 15.09.2022 requesting consent for a
change in the nature of use and category of industry being proposed
to be set-up in the allotted plots i.e., from “fabrication of industrial
equipment” to “CBWTF”. This change was allowed by the UPSIDA
vide letter dated 19.09.2022.
15. Indotech Waste Solution (hereinafter, the “respondent no. 1”)
situated in the District Kasganj is also engaged in the business of
treatment and disposal of bio-medical waste generated by health
care facilities. It had similarly made a Form 1 application sometime in
the year 2021 to establish a CBWTF. The UP SEAC and UP SEIAA
respectively are said to have also arrived at a decision to issue an
EC to the respondent no. 1 in their meetings dated 19.10.2022 and
14.11.2022 respectively i.e., after the first EC was already issued
to the appellant. However, it is admitted that a consequent order of
EC was not issued in favour of the respondent no. 1.
16. The Tribunal vide its judgment dated 31.07.2023 in Aniruda Panwar
(supra) converted the O.A. No. 622 of 2022 in Appeal, allowed the
same and declared the first CTE and first EC respectively to be
illegal, null, void and of no effect for the following reasons:
i. First, Clause 2 of the RG, 2016 unequivocally establishes that
procurement of land for the purpose of establishing a CBWTF
is a condition precedent for filing an application seeking the
grant of EC and CTE respectively.
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 469
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
ii. Secondly, subsequent approval of change in land use granted
by the UPSIDA could neither legalise nor validate the first CTE
and first EC respectively.
iii. Lastly, Clause 7 of the RG, 2016 requires that the CBWTF be
set-up in a plot size of not less than one acre. As an exception,
relaxation of this land requirement may be granted after the
fulfilment of certain criteria and along with the imposition of
additional control measures. Considering that the appellant’s
plot size was 0.89 acres and that the UPPCB and UP SEIAA
had not specifically granted any such relaxation or, stipulated
additional control measures or, consulted with the CPCB to
do so, the first EC and first CTE respectively could not have
been validly issued.
17. Having held so, the Tribunal nevertheless granted liberty to the
appellant to re-apply for the grant of EC and CTE respectively, either
after procuring additional land or after seeking relaxation of the land
requirement in accordance with law. The operative portion of the
Tribunal’s decision in Aniruda Panwar (supra) is reproduced thus:
“78. In view of the above, the application converted to
appeal is allowed and CTE and EC being violative of
CBWTF Guidelines 2016 are held to be illegal, null and
void and to be of no effect.
79. However, the Applicant shall be at liberty to apply
again for grant of EC and CTE for establishment of
CBWTF after procuring additional land in Babrala
Industrial Area or seek relaxation of land requirement in
accordance with law and in case any such application is
filed by Respondent no. 7 again UPPCB and UPSEIAA
shall be bound to dispose of the same strictly not only in
accordance with the statutory provisions/environmental
norms but also CPCB Guidelines .”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. It is the case of the appellant that they made earnest efforts to
pursue both the alternatives suggested by the Tribunal in Aniruda
Panwar (supra), i.e., procure additional land and apply for relaxation
in land requirement respectively. It seems to have approached the
470 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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UPSIDA for procuring the adjacent plot no. E-27 and was waiting
to participate in the bidding process. Since the EC process is site-
specific, on 07.08.2023, it also submitted a fresh Form 1 application
for the issuance of a new ToR accounting for plot E-27 along with
plots E-25, and E-26 respectively. On, 10.08.2023, a new ToR
(hereinafter, the “second ToR”) inclusive of plot E-27 was also issued
by the UP SEIAA. Parallelly, the appellant approached the UPPCB
through its representation dated 08.08.2023 seeking relaxation in
the land area requirement in consultation with the CPCB.
19. While the fate of the bidding process for plot no. E-27 is unknown,
it appears that land area relaxation was granted by the CPCB as
per the proposal made by the UPPCB, with accompanying control
measures on 17.11.2023 and the same reads thus:
“It is to inform that the criteria outlined under CPCB
revised guidelines for development of new CBWTF is
required to be followed to ensure effective compliance of
BMWM Rules, 2016. However as requested by UPPCB
the area criteria may be relaxed for the proposed plot
from 1.0 Acre (4046 m2) to 0.89 Acre (3601 m2) by
adopting the following additional measures.
a. UPPCB shall assess the increased stack height with
stringent emission norms and take other measures
to ensure that the operation of CBWTF shall have
minimal impact on human health & environment
around the proposed site;
b. Effluent generated shall be treated up to the
standards as prescribed under the BMWM Rules,
2016 and shall be utilized completely for vehicle
floor washing, cooling tower make up, gardening
etc. CBWTF shall maintain zero liquid discharge
from the CBWTF
c. Adequate measures shall be taken for odour control
by the CBWTF
d. OCEMS should be installed and connected with
CPCB and UPPCB server for transmission of real
time data for prescribed parameters of incinerator.
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 471
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
e. Initially the Operating capacity of incinerator of
CBWTF may be restricted to 2.5 ton/day. UPPCB
shall monitor the CBWTF for six months and based
on its performance operational capacity may be
increased accordingly with prior information to
CPCB.
This is issued with the approval of Competent Authority,
CPCB”.
(Emphasis supplied)
20. After the UP SEIAA had revoked the appellant’s first EC in accordance
with the Tribunal’s judgment in Aniruda Panwar (supra), on
17.10.2023, the appellant had submitted a fresh proposal to the
UP SEIAA for the grant of prior EC.
21. Vide its e-mail communication dated 17.11.2023, the respondent
no. 1 addressed a complaint against the appellant to the UP SEAC
highlighting the following aspects: (i) that plot no. E-27 had not yet
been allotted to the appellant, (ii) that since plot nos. E-25 and
E-26 respectively were originally allotted to the appellant for the
establishment of a ‘green category’ industry i.e., the fabrication
of industrial equipment, the process of allotment should not have
been revisited by the UPSIDA to entitle the appellant to establish
a ‘red category’ industry in the same plot, and (iii) that the GAP
Analysis for the entire State as mandated by the RG, 2016 had not
been conducted and therefore, the appellant’s case must not be
considered for the issuance of CTE.
22. Since relaxation was granted by the CPCB and it was no longer
necessary to procure plot E-27, vide letter dated 21.11.2023, the
appellant applied to withdraw the second ToR issued in its favour.
23. Despite the aforesaid allegations levelled by the respondent no. 1,
on 20.11.2023, the UP SEAC in its 810th meeting recommended
the grant of EC to the appellant. It must be noted that it was the first
ToR and its consequent EIA study, not the second ToR, which was
taken into consideration during its decision-making process. The
UP SEIAA also concurred with the said decision and therefore, the
EC dated 20.12.2023 (“hereinafter, the “second EC”) was granted.
24. Further, on the same date i.e., on 20.12.2023, the UPPCB also
granted the CTE (hereinafter, the “second CTE”) to the appellant.
472 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
25. Aggrieved, on 16.01.2024, the appellant preferred an Appeal bearing
Appeal No. 4 of 2024 under Sections 16(g) and (h) of the National
Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (“NGT Act”) before the Tribunal challenging
the second EC and the second CTE respectively.
26. In the meantime, on 19.02.2024, a Consent to Operate (“CTO”) was
also granted to the appellant by the UPPCB.
27. Vide the impugned decision dated 05.07.2024, the Tribunal decided
to set-aside the second EC and second CTE respectively for being
illegal and held as under:
i. First, that the RG, 2016 have been framed in exercise of
statutory power and are mandatory, enforceable and binding
in nature.
ii. Secondly, Clause 7(b) of the RG, 2016 which allows a deviation
from the one acre plot size requirement is anchored on the
fulfilment of a crucial precondition i.e., the CBWTF must be
established within municipal limits with population of more
than 25 lakhs or be established in a rural area. Babrala does
not fulfil either criteria and the authorities failed to look further
into this aspect. Therefore, the UP SEAC, UP SEIAA, UPPCB
and the CPCB respectively have acted in a very mechanical
and unmindful manner insofar as applying Clause 7(b) to the
instant project was concerned.
iii. Thirdly, that this Tribunal in Aniruda Panwar (supra) did
not strictly lay down that the appellant’s application for land
relaxation must be allowed. It was clear that the process shall
be undertaken in accordance with law and not in an illegal or
arbitrary manner. Hence, it cannot be suggested that there was
any direction in this regard made by the Tribunal in Aniruda
Panwar (supra).
iv. Lastly, that in granting such land relaxation, the UPPCB
and CPCB respectively have paid undue weight to irrelevant
factors like the investment made by the appellant and the
GAP analysis report. Moreover, the UPPCB had either
deliberately or unintentionally projected that the first EC and
first CTE respectively were only declared null and void and
not illegal. No heed was paid to the multivarious factors
relevant to operational effectiveness of the plant in a smaller
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 473
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
area. Therefore, when considerations which were either
untrue or irrelevant had been relied upon by the authorities,
it undoubtedly showed that there was no real application of
mind and as a result, the entire exercise of grant of land
relaxation was vitiated on account of malice in law. The
relevant observations made by the Tribunal in the impugned
decision are reproduced thus:
“140. A perusal of para 7(a) shows that it requires
setting up of CBWTF preferably on a plot size of
not less than one acre in all the areas. However,
CBWTF can be developed in adjacent plots to cover
up requirement of the area but cannot be set up in
two or more different plots located in different areas.
141. Para 7(b) contemplates a deviation from the
requirement of not less than one acre land and says
that if there is a new CBWTF to be established in
a municipal limit with population of more than 25
lakhs or rural areas, the land area requirement may
be relaxed but not in any case less than 0.5 acres
by SPCB/SPCC with additional control measures
such as zero liquid discharge, increase in stack
height, stringent emission norms, odour control
measures or any other measures felt necessary
by the prescribed authority on case to case basis,
only in consultation with CPCB
142 One of the conditions for relaxation or deviation
in the requirement of not less than one acre of land
is that the municipal limit wherein a new CBWTF is
proposed, should have a population of more than 25
lakhs or CBWTF is proposed to be established in a
rural area. It is not disputed before us that Babrala
is a Nagar Panchayat. It is thus, not a rural area.
143. A Nagar Panchayat is an urban local body
i.e., Municipality. […]
-xxx-
145. Article 243Q refers to three kinds of
municipalities i.e., (a) Nagar Panchayat (by
474 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
whatever name called) for a transitional area, that
is to say, an area in transition from a rural area to
an urban area, (b) a Municipal Council for a smaller
urban area; and (c) a Municipal Corporation for a
larger urban area.
147 The population of Babrala Nagar Panchayat
whether taking as per 2011 census or as per any
subsequent estimation is not even one lakh, what
to say of more than 25 lakhs. Para 7(b) of RG
2016, therefore, was outrightly inapplicable for
exercising the power of relaxation in respect of
the proposed CBWTF of respondent 7 It is really
surprising and very astonishing that neither SEIAA
UP nor CPCB have looked into this aspect of the
matter at all and acted in a very mechanical and
unmindful manner,
148. Suggestions has been made that since there
was a direction by this Tribunal in Aniruda Panwar
vs. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate
Change & Others (supra) that application for grant
of EC may be considered by exercising the power
of relaxation in respect of requirement of area
but authorities have totally misled themselves
by ignoring that Tribunal clearly said that such
consideration shall be in accordance with law and
not in an arbitrary and illegal manner.
149. We also notice that the then Member
Secretary, UPPCB by seeking clarification from
CPCB regarding relaxation in land requirement
for CBWTF vide letter dated 16.10.2023 has only
stressed upon the fact that proponent has made
investment of 132 lakhs which include cost of
land, building, plant and machinery; as per Gap
Analysis, there was requirement of CBWTF to be
established and that respondent 7 was already
granted CTE and EC but due to gap in certain
procedure and formalities, earlier CTE and EC
became null and void and not illegal. This is
clear misreading and appears to be a deliberate
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 475
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
attempt on the part of the then Member Secretary,
UPPCB to suggest that earlier CTE and EC was
only null and void and not illegal though judgment
of Tribunal in Aniruda Panwar vs. Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change &
Others (supra) clearly declares that CTE and EC,
not in conformity with the RG 2016 in respect of
requirement of area is null, void and illegal and
nullity for all purposes […]
-xxx-
151. We further find that CPCB in its letter dated
17.11.2023, instead of applying mind on this
aspect directing SEIAA UP to look into the question
whether any relaxation is admissible or permissible
in accordance with provisions of RG 2016 in the
case in hand, has simply observed that the area
criteria may be relaxed from one acre to 0.89
acres by adopting certain measures which relates
to additional conditions necessary for prevention
of pollution of air. There is no reference to the
question as to whether the area where CBWTF
is proposed qualify the requirement of population
for the purpose of attracting the provisions of para
7(b) or not.
152 In the ultimate order granting relaxation, again
the same considerations, as are mentioned in the
letter dated 16.10.2023, have been reiterated which
in our view, were irrelevant since it is not investment
made by respondent 7 which was relevant but the
operational effectiveness of the plant in a smaller
area ought to have been considered. There is no
application of mind on this aspect. There is no
consideration whether sufficient space for storage
of BMW generated by health care facilities collected
by CBWTF for processing and also for storage of
inert/residual matter etc., and for other operational
purposes was available.
-xxx-
476 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
154. We also do not find any hesitation in observing
that the officer concerned who has issued EC and
CTE to respondent 7 after judgment of Tribunal
in Aniruda Panwar vs. Ministry of Environment,
Forest and Climate Change & Others (supra) has
acted for reasons other than bonafide and clearly
it is malicious in law. There was/is no extraordinary
urgency in proceeding to grant the requisite
clearance to respondent 7 instead of considering
the matter in the light of relevant provisions and
by application of mind to the relevant factors. The
entire exercise is clearly malicious in law. It is well
settled that even if there is no malice in fact but
if there is something malicious m law, it is vitiated
in law.
-xxx-
164. In brief the malice in law can be said when
a power is exercised for an unauthorized purpose
or on a fact which is claimed to exist but in fact, is
non-est or for the purpose for which it is not meant
though apparently it is shown that the same is being
exercised for the purpose the power is supposed
to be exercised […]
-xxx-
166. In view of the above discussion, we have no
hesitation but to hold that EC and CTE granted in
the case in hand, cannot be sustained. They are
contrary to law, illegal and are liable to be set aside.
167 The Appeal is accordingly allowed. Impugned
EC dated 20.12 2023 and CTE dated 20 12.2023
are hereby set aside.”
(Emphasis supplied)
28. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant has preferred
the present appeal.
29. This Court vide its order dated 15.07.2024 directed that a report be
furnished by the District Magistrate, Sambhal regarding the location
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 477
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
of the CBWTF established by the appellant and the population of
the Babrala Nagar Panchayat. The relevant portions of the said
order of this Court is reproduced thus:
“4. According to the appellant, its CBWTF is situated in a
rural area. However, this is contested by the respondent
who contends that the Facility is not situated in a rural
area, but is situated within the limits of Babrala Nagar
Panchayat with a population much less than twenty-five
lacs.
5. We have heard Mr Shyam Divan, senior counsel
appearing for the appellant and Mr Pinaki Misra, senior
counsel for the respondent.
6. Certain documents have been produced by the
appellants in the course of the hearing, in interlocutory
applications, but it has been fairly accepted that these
were not part of the record before the NGT. In order to
obviate any controversy on the factual aspect so as to
allow this Court to have a clear indication in regard to
the location of the Bio-medical Waste Treatment Facility
which has been conducted by the appellant, we are
of the view that a report should be called for from the
District Magistrate, Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh.
7. The CBWTF of the appellant is situated on plot No
E-25/26, UPSIDC Industrial Area, Babrala – 243751,
District Sambhal. The District Magistrate, Sambhal shall
submit a report to this Court on the following aspects:
(i). Whether the CBWTF of the appellant is situated
within the limits of Babrala Nagar Panchayat;
(ii). In the event, that the answer to (i) above is in
the affirmative, the population of the Babrala Nagar
Panchayat; and
(iii). In the event, that the answer to (i) above is in the
negative, whether the CBWTF is situated in a rural area.
8 The report to be submitted by the District Magistrate
shall be based on the official records as available. The
report shall be submitted within a period of one week.”
(Emphasis supplied)
478 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
30. Mr. Shyam Divan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant canvassed the following submissions:
i. The CBWTF plant established by the appellant is located in a
rural area, more specifically under Village Noorpur. The same
is brought forth by the report dated 24.07.2024 furnished
by the District Magistrate, Sambhal in compliance with the
order of this Court dated 15.07.2024 as also the letter dated
10.07.2024 addressed by the Revenue Inspector, Sambhal
respectively. The location of the appellant’s facility does not
fall within the limits of the Babrala Nagar Panchayat. In fact,
the distance between the plant and the border of the Babrala
Nagar Panchayat is about 2.6 km.
ii. It must be further noted that the Governor of the State of Uttar
Pradesh, vide notification dated 05.09.2001, in exercise of the
power under Section 2(d) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area
Development Act, 1976 (“UP Industrial Area Act”) notified
the Industrial Area, Babrala (at serial no.78 of the Gazette
Notification) wherein, it has been categorically mentioned that
it is situated in Village Noorpur.
iii. Therefore, the pre-condition under Clause 7(b) of the RG, 2016
as regards the relaxation of land requirement for a CBWTF
stands fulfilled and the grant of such relaxation with additional
control measures by the CPCB on 17.11.2023 cannot be
faulted with. As a result, the impugned decision setting aside
the second EC and second CTE respectively on this ground
was completely erroneous.
iv. The first ToR granted to the appellant was never set-aside
by the Tribunal vide its decision in Aniruda Panwar (supra).
Moreover, the Office Memorandums (“O.M.”) dated 29.08.2017
and 08.06.2022 respectively issued by the MoEF&CC explicitly
state that the validity of a ToR is for a period of four years.
Therefore, there was no requirement for the appellant to
obtain a fresh ToR.
v. The second ToR which was issued to the appellant on
10.08.2023 was subsequently withdrawn vide letter dated
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 479
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
21.11.2023. Therefore, it can neither be said that the appellant
provided any false or misleading information to the authorities,
nor can it be said that the authorities were wrong in considering
the first ToR while issuing the second EC and second CTE
respectively.
vi. The relevant authorities had duly applied their mind during
the process of granting the second EC and second CTE
respectively, and the same can be independently demonstrated
by the chronology of events placed on record. As such, it
cannot be stated that the decision(s) of the UP SEAC, UP
SEIAA, UPPCB and the CPCB respectively lacked application
of mind or was malicious in law.
B. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent No. 1
31. Mr. Pinaki Misra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondent no. 1 canvassed the following submissions:
i. The information furnished by the project proponent in Form
1/1A along with the proposed ToR form the basis and soul
of the grant of EC for any project. Providing missing or
misleading information in Form 1/1A significantly impedes the
functioning of the authorities and the conduct of the EIA study.
It is for this reason that Clause 8(vi) of the EIA, 2006 provides
that “Deliberate concealment and/or submission of false or
misleading information or data which is material to screening
or scoping or appraisal or decision on the application shall
make the application liable for rejection, and cancellation of
prior environmental clearance granted on that basis.” In the
present case, both the first and the second ToR were granted
on deliberate concealment and/or the submission of false/
misleading data. Reliance was placed on the decision of this
Court in Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India reported
in (2019) 15 SCC 401 to submit that such lapses must vitiate
the whole process and the appellant must recommence from
the Form 1 stage.
ii. The issue whether allocation or procurement of land is a
condition precedent for filing an application for grant of EC and
CTE respectively to a CBWTF was considered by the Tribunal
in Aniruda Panwar (supra) and was answered in the affirmative
480 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in light of Clause 2 of the RG, 2016. In consonance with such
a finding, the decision in Aniruda Panwar (supra) held the
first ToR granted in favour of the appellant to be illegal and
void. Naturally, the second EC and second CTE respectively
which were granted on the basis of the defunct first ToR cannot
have any validity under law. Therefore, the impugned decision
rightly set-aside the second set of permissions.
iii. Even the second ToR granted in favour of the appellant would
be hit by the decision of the Tribunal in Aniruda Panwar
(supra) since it mentions plot E-27 without the appellant having
actually procured the said plot from the UPSIDA.
iv. Moreover, the very issuance of the second ToR clearly evinces
that the first ToR could no longer be put to use.
v. The relaxation in land requirement granted by the CPCB
cannot be sustained for three reasons: First, the letter dated
16.10.2023 addressed by the Member Secretary, UPPCB to
the CPCB had observed that the first EC and first CTE granted
to the appellant were declared null and void ‘but not illegal’ by
the Tribunal in Aniruda Panwar (supra). This false premise
contributed to the decision granting relaxation and hence, such
a decision is vitiated by malice in law. Secondly, relaxation
cannot be given as a matter of right and must be reserved only
for exceptional circumstances. Such an exception must seldom
be used especially when the project in question is located in an
industrial area and the same was emphasized by the Tribunal
in Aniruda Panwar (supra). Lastly, the UPPCB and CPCB
respectively were preoccupied with irrelevant considerations
like the investment made by the appellant and ignored the
crucial question as regards the operational effectiveness of
the CBWTF in a smaller area. Therefore, their decision suffers
from due application of mind.
vi. The decisions of this Court in Indian Railway Construction
Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar reported in (2003) 4 SCC 579 and
State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjeev reported in (2005) 5 SCC
181 respectively lay down the criteria for judicial review of
discretionary administrative action and the present case was
a fit one for interference by the Tribunal.
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 481
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
III. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
32. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having gone
through the materials on record, the question which falls for our
consideration is whether the NGT vide the impugned judgment and
order dated 05.07.2024 was right in setting aside the second EC
and second CTE respectively granted to the appellant by the UP
SEIAA and UPPCB respectively.
33. In order to arrive at a finding on the aforesaid, the following legal
issues need to be dealt with:
i. Whether the RG, 2016 is mandatory or directory in nature?
ii. Whether the grant of relaxation in land requirement in favour
the appellant for the establishment of a CBWTF by the CPCB
was permissible?
iii. On a combined reading of the EIA, 2006 and the RG, 2016
respectively, what is the status of land acquisition required
for establishing a CBWTF at the time of making a Form 1
application, at the stage of Appraisal of the EC and at the time
of making an application for the issuance of CTE respectively?
iv. Whether the UP SEAC and the UP SEIAA respectively could
have proceeded with the grant of the second EC on the basis
of the first ToR?
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Mandatory nature of the RG, 2016 and the decision of this
Court in Gulf Goans
34. Before we proceed to the other issues raised in this appeal, it is
imperative that we deal with the question pertaining to the mandatory
nature of the RG, 2016. This is especially because there seems to be
a repeated trend of submissions being made before the Tribunal that
in light of the decision of this Court in Gulf Goans Hotels Company
Limited and Another v. Union of India and Others reported in (2014)
10 SCC 673, the guidelines may not have the ‘force of law’. The
impugned decision has held that the RG, 2016 is binding, however,
in doing so it has not made any specific reference to the ratio in Gulf
Goans (supra) or the line of argument referenced hereinabove.
482 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
35. Gulf Goans (supra) was concerned with a set of guidelines pertaining
to permissible construction activity in the coastal areas of Goa, more
specifically the distance that has to be maintained from the high
tide line. It is to be noted that these guidelines were issued before
the enactment of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (“EP Act”)
which penalized environmental violations through statutory power. In
this background, it was held that such executive guidelines cannot
be enforced to the prejudice of an individual unless shown to have
acquired the force of law. To acquire such character, the guidelines
were required to satisfy certain minimum elements i.e., they must
inter alia have (i) a certain form possessed by other laws in force;
(ii) encapsulate a clear mandate or explicit command which may
be prescriptive, permissive or penal; (iii) disclose the achievement
of a specific and identifiable purpose; (iv) have some authentication
and (v) be notified or published either in the mode prescribed by the
statute or in the Official Gazette. It was added that the first element
itself i.e., the form, or the absence thereof will not be determinative.
However, the second and third elements i.e., a clear mandate and
purpose, were indispensable.
36. In effect, Gulf Goans (supra) held that the impugned guidelines/
notifications therein had not acquired the force of law for several
reasons including the lack of an expressed or clearly defined dicta
which supported that they were not mere suggestions or expressions
of opinion, the government failing to discharge the burden that the
guidelines were authenticated in accordance with Article 77 of the
Constitution, and the failure to notify or publish them in the Official
Gazette. The relevant observations are reproduced below:
“17. […]However, we are unable to find in the said
guidelines any expressed or clearly defined dicta. In fact,
having read and considered the guidelines, we are left
with a reasonable doubt as to whether what has been
spelt out therein are not mere suggestions or opinions
expressed in the process of a continuing exploration to
identify the correct parameters that would effectuate the
purpose i.e. safeguarding and protecting the environment
(sea beaches) from human exploitation and degradation.
19. Article 77 of the Constitution provides the form in
which the Executive must make and authenticate its
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 483
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
orders and decisions. Clause (1) of Article 77 provides
that all executive action of the Government must be
expressed to be taken in the name of the President.
The celebrated author H.M. Seervai in Constitutional
Law of India, 4th Edn., Vol. 2, 1999 describes the
consequences of government orders or instructions not
being in accordance with clauses (1) or (2) of Article 77
by opining that the same would deprive the orders of the
immunity conferred by the aforesaid clauses and they
may be open to challenge on the ground that they have
not been made by or under the authority of the President
in which case the burden would be on the Government
to show that they were, in fact, so made. In the present
case, the said burden has not been discharged in any
manner whatsoever. […]
20. Clause (2) of Article 77 also provides for the
authentication of orders and instruments in a manner
as may be prescribed by the Rules. In this regard, vide
S.O. No. 2297 dated 3-11-1958 published in the Gazette
of India, the President has issued the Authentication
(Orders and Other Instruments) Rules, 1958. The said
Rules have been superseded subsequently in 2002.
Admittedly, the provisions of the said 1958 Rules had
not been followed in the present case insofar as the
promulgation of the guidelines is concerned.
21. In the absence of due authentication and promulgation
of the guidelines, the contents thereof cannot be treated
as an order of the Government and would really represent
an expression of opinion .[…]
22. It is also essential that what is claimed to be a law
must be notified or made public in order to bind the
citizen. […]
24. It will not be necessary to notice the long line of
decisions reiterating the aforesaid view. So far as the
mode of publication is concerned, it has been consistently
held by this Court that such mode must be as prescribed
by the statute. In the event the statute does not contain
any prescription and even under the subordinate
484 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
legislation there is silence in the matter , the legislation
will take effect only when it is published through the
customarily recognised official channel, namely, the
Official Gazette (B.K. Srinivasan v. State of Karnataka)
[(1987) 1 SCC 658] . Admittedly, the “guidelines” were
not gazetted.
25. If the guidelines relied upon by the Union of India
in the present case fail to satisfy the essential and vital
parameters/requirements of law as the trend of the
above discussion would go to show, the same cannot
be enforced to the prejudice of the appellants as has
been done in the present case.[…]”
(Emphasis supplied)
i. The genesis, scope and nature of the RG, 2016
37. At this juncture, it would be appropriate for us to pause and look
into how the RG, 2016 came into existence. Section 8 of the EP Act
mandates that no person shall handle or cause to be handled any
hazardous substance except in accordance with such procedure and
after complying with such safeguards as may be prescribed. Sections
6 and 25 of the EP Act respectively, grant powers to the Central
Government to make rules in respect of the aforesaid and requires
the publication of these rules in the Official Gazette. In exercise of
the powers conferred under the aforementioned provisions of the
EP Act, the Bio-Medical Waste Management Rules, 2016 (“BMWM
Rules”) came into existence through publication in the Official Gazette.
38. The BMWM Rules, in turn, under several provisions, refer to certain
guidelines which are to be issued by the CPCB that would further
regulate the standards and procedures to be followed by operators
of CBWTFs i.e., the RG, 2016. As per Rule 3(c), the authorisation
granted by the prescribed authority must itself be in accordance with
the RG, 2016. Rule 5 relating to the duties of a CBWTF operator
also relies on the RG, 2016 for prescribing detailed responsibilities.
Rule 17, which is of some relevance to the broad issue canvassed
under the present appeal, also states that site selection for setting
up a CBWTF shall be made in accordance with the RG, 2016. For
better context, the relevant provisions of the BMWM Rules are
reproduced hereinbelow:
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 485
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
“3. Definitions -
[…]
(c) “authorisation” means permission granted by the
prescribed authority for the generation, collection,
reception, storage, transportation, treatment, processing,
disposal or any other form of handling of bio-medical
waste in accordance with these rules and guidelines
issued by the Central Government or Central Pollution
Control Board as the case may be;
(d) “authorised person” means an occupier or operator
authorised by the prescribed authority to generate, collect,
receive, store, transport, treat, process, dispose or handle
bio-medical waste in accordance with these rules and
the guidelines issued by the Central Government or the
Central Pollution Control Board, as the case may be;
5. Duties of the operator of a common bio-medical
waste treatment and disposal facility.-It shall be the
duty of every operator to -
(a) take all necessary steps to ensure that the bio-
medical waste collected from the occupier is transported,
handled, stored, treated and disposed of, without any
adverse effect to the human health and the environment,
in accordance with these rules and guidelines issued
by the Central Government or, as the case may be, the
central pollution control board from time to time;
14. Maintenance of records.- (1) Every authorised
person shall maintain records related to the generation,
collection, reception, storage, transportation, treatment,
disposal or any other form of handling of bio-medical
waste, for a period of five years, in accordance with these
rules and guidelines issued by the Central Government
or the Central Pollution Control Board or the prescribed
authority as the case may be.
17. Site for common bio-medical waste treatment
and disposal facility.-(1) Without prejudice to rule 5 of
these rules, the department in the business allocation
of land assignment shall be responsible for providing
486 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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suitable site for setting up of common biomedical waste
treatment and disposal facility in the State Government
or Union territory Administration.
(2) The selection of site for setting up of such facility shall
be made in consultation with the prescribed authority,
other stakeholders and in accordance with guidelines
published by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and
Climate Change or Central Pollution Control Board.”
(Emphasis supplied)
39. In addition to the above, Schedule III to the BMWM Rules which lists
out every prescribed authority and the corresponding duties entrusted
to them, require the CPCB to “prepare Guidelines on bio-medical
waste management” and “lay down criteria for establishing common
bio-medical waste treatment facilities in the country”, amongst other
things. Additionally, the Schedule also requires Municipalities or
Corporations, Urban Local Bodies and Gram Panchayats to provide
or allocate suitable land for development of common bio-medical
waste treatment facilities in their respective jurisdictions “as per the
guidelines of the Central Pollution Control Board”.
40. What can be gathered from all these different provisions under the
BMWM Rules is that the rules themselves require the RG, 2016 to
be made and scrupulously followed for its effective implementation.
This aspect could not have been conveyed with better clarity. In such
circumstances, there must arise no doubt as regards the mandatory
nature of the RG, 2016. To alleviate any residual uncertainty, the
RG, 2016 itself in its introductory paragraph reads thus:
“Also, the Bio-medical Waste Management Rules, 2016
mandates that the operator of a CBWTF authorised by
the prescribed authority is required to take all necessary
steps to ensure that the bio-medical waste collected from
the occupier is transported, handled, stored, treated and
disposed of, without any adverse effect to the human
health and the environment, in accordance with the
BMWM Rules and the guidelines issued by the Central
Government or the Central Pollution Control Board
(CPCB) from time to time. Therefore, these guidelines
have been prepared with an aim to have uniformity in
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 487
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
ensuring site selection, allowing and establishment of a
state-of-the-art CBWTF, operation as well as verification
of compliance to the BMWM Rules, 2016 throughout the
country. However, any other aspects which are not been
covered under these guidelines and needs attention, in
such a case, the prescribed authority may take suitable
action in the interest of protection of the environment in
consultation with MoEF & CC/CPCB. Also, it is pertinent
to mention here that these guidelines are mandatory
henceforth under the Bio-medical Waste Management
Rules, 2016.”
(Emphasis supplied)
41. Moreover, observing alleged non-compliance to the BMWM Rules
and the RG, 2016 in the State of Uttar Pradesh by the UP SEIAA
and UP SEAC respectively in the process of grant of EC to CBWTFs,
the MoEF&CC thought fit to issue an OM dated 01.04.2022, the
relevant parts of which reads thus:
“2. The communications highlights that the SEIAA abd
SEAC of Uttar Pradesh is not taking into consideration
the Biomedical Waste Management Rules, 2016 and
Revised CPCB Guideline provisions while according
Environmental Clearance for CBWTFs.
3. In view of the above, it is requested to kindly examine
the matter as per provisions stipulated under Biomedical
Waste Management Rules, 2016 and respective CPCB
Guidelines. It is to emphasize here that the provisions
contained in guidelines may be strictly followed while
giving clearance to new facilities through Gap-Analysis.
Further, CPCB may ensure the compliance through
regular monitoring. An Action taken Report may also
kindly be provided to the Ministry.”
(Emphasis supplied)
42. Therefore, the intention behind bringing in the RG, 2016 and making
it a binding mandate on all the stakeholders is as clear as a noon
day. However, it seems as though the ratio in Gulf Goans (supra)
is still blindly being resorted to, as one final attempt, by project
proponents and surprisingly, State SEIAAs/SEACs alike, to avoid
488 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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compliance with RG, 2016. To thwart such devious attempts, we must
take a closer look at necessary elements laid down in Gulf Goans
(supra) and contextualise them with the RG, 2016. No doubt, the
first three i.e., a form, a clear mandate and an identifiable purpose,
don’t require much debate insofar as the RG, 2016 is concerned.
ii. The requirement of authentication under Article 77 of the
Constitution
43. As regards the question of authentication under Article 77 of
the Constitution, this Court in Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v.
Yeshaswinee Merchant and Others reported in (2003) 6 SCC 277
held that the object and effect of Article 77 is to insulate the executive
action of the government which is formally taken in the name of the
President from challenge on the ground that it is not an order or
instrument made or executed by the President. However, this cannot
be read to mean that all other executive action which is not formally
expressed to have been taken in the name of the President, ipso facto
becomes invalid. In other words, any alleged non-compliance with
Article 77 only precludes the drawing of an irrebuttable presumption
that it is an order or instrument made in the name of the President
and by no stretch of imagination, invalidates the order itself. It can
always be established by evidence aliunde that the order was made
by the competent authority of the Central Government in the name
of the President [See also, Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay
reported in 1961 SCC OnLine SC 30]. The relevant observations
made in Air India Cabin Crew Assn (supra)are thus:
“72. In our opinion, reference to Article 77 is wholly
inappropriate. The exercise of statutory power under
Section 34 by the Central Government, even though not
expressed to have been taken in the name of President,
does not render it invalid. Clause (2) of Article 77 insulates
an executive action of the Government formally taken
in the name of President from challenge on the ground
that it is not an order or instrument made or executed
by President. Even if an executive action of the Central
Government is not formally expressed to have been taken
in the name of President, Article 77 does not provide
that it would, therefore, be rendered void or invalid.[…]”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 489
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
44. Keeping in mind the clarification made by Air India Cabin Crew
Assn (supra), it would be even more absurd to assert that
executive guidelines issued in exercise of statutory power would
be automatically invalid if not authenticated. We say so because, it
cannot be disputed that the RG, 2016 has been, in fact, made by
the appropriate authority i.e., the CPCB, in pursuance of a clear
mandate outlined by the EP Act and the BMWM Rules respectively.
Furthermore, what is of particular note is that Gulf Goans (supra)
was concerned with guidelines which did not have statutory backing.
As a matter of fact, Gulf Goans (supra) itself, while differentiating
Air India Cabin Crew Assn (supra) recognised that when executive
guidelines or directions are issued pursuant to a statute, it may not
be necessary that the burden of proof of authentication under Article
77 be discharged and observed thus:
“19. […] The decision in Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v.
Yeshaswinee Merchant [(2003) 6 SCC 277, p. 311,
para 72 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 840] , taking a somewhat
different view can, perhaps, be explained by the fact
that in the said case the impugned directions contained
in the government letter (not expressed in the name of
the President) was in exercise of the statutory power
under Section 34 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953. In
the present case, the impugned guidelines have not
been issued under any existing statute.”
45. As a result, the only element that now requires some explanation is
that of publication, that too, whether it must be made in the Official
Gazette.
iii. Whether the non-publication of the RG, 2016 in the Official
Gazette could be said to affect its mandatory nature
46. While it would have been possible for us to differentiate Gulf Goans
(supra) from the present case by stating that the RG, 2016 came
to be issued in furtherance of several statutory provisions and
thereby dispense with the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, we are afraid that doing so may lead to an oversimplified
and fallacious misinterpretation that all statutory guidelines need not
be published in the Official Gazette. The answer is, rather, slightly
more layered.
490 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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47. This Court in B.K. Srinivasan and Others v. State of Karnataka
and Others reported in (1987) 1 SCC 658 largely dealt with a
similar issue wherein the consequences of a failure to publish the
Outline Development Plan and the Regulations therein in the Official
Gazette was being ascertained to see if the violations committed
by the appellants deserved commensurate action. Holding that the
non-publication in the Official Gazette was not detrimental, this
Court observed that:
i. First, a law along with all the changes and/or additions made
to it by various processes, whether permanent or subordinate,
must be notified ‘directly and reliably’ to those from whom it
seeks compliance. To put it simply, that law must be so made
that it can be known.
ii. Secondly, the question whether non-publication of something
in the Official Gazette is fatal must be viewed from three
perspectives or angles: (a) the first angle wherein a specific
mode is prescribed for its publication by the parent statute. In
such cases, the said mode must be followed; (b) the second
type wherein there is a silence in the parent statute but the
subordinate legislation prescribes a mode for its publication.
In such cases, the prescribed mode may be sufficient, if
reasonable. (c) The third-type wherein both the parent and
subordinate legislation are silent, or where the subordinate
legislation prescribes a plainly unreasonable mode. In such
cases, effect can be given only if it is published through the
customarily recognised official channel i.e., the Official Gazette
or “some other reasonable mode”.
The relevant observations are thus:
“15. There can be no doubt about the proposition that
where a law, whether parliamentary or subordinate,
demands compliance, those that are governed must be
notified directly and reliably of the law and all changes and
additions made to it by various processes. Whether law
is viewed from the standpoint of the “conscientious good
man” seeking to abide by the law or from the standpoint
of Justice Holmes’s “unconscientious bad man” seeking
to avoid the law, law must be known, that is to say, it
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 491
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
must be so made that it can be known. […] Where the
parent statute prescribes the mode of publication or
promulgation that mode must be followed. Where the
parent statute is silent, but the subordinate legislation
itself prescribes the manner of publication, such a mode
of publication may be sufficient, if reasonable. If the
subordinate legislation does not prescribe the mode of
publication or if the subordinate legislation prescribes
a plainly unreasonable mode of publication, it will take
effect only when it is published through the customarily
recognised official channel, namely, the Official Gazette
or some other reasonable mode of publication. There
may be subordinate legislation which is concerned with
a few individuals or is confined to small local areas. In
such cases publication or promulgation by other means
may be sufficient [Narayana Reddy v. State of A.P.,
(1969) 1 Andh WR 77]”
(Emphasis supplied)
48. In B.K. Srinivasan (supra), it was not the parent statute but the rules
which prescribed a mode by stating that “The Outline Development
Plan and the Regulations as approved by the State Government
under sub-section (4) of Section 13 shall be published in the Official
Gazette”. Therefore, the factual circumstances fell under the second-
type aforementioned. Hence, in an attempt to discover whether the
mode prescribed by the rules was ‘reasonable’, this Court probed into
what was, in essence, required as a consequence of the publication
and attempted at a holistic reading of the entire scheme of the Act
and rules thereunder. In doing so, it was held that the plan and the
regulations themselves need not have been ‘bodily published’ or
reproduced in the Official Gazette. For better clarity, we deem it
necessary to reproduce the relevant observations:
“16. In the present case Section 13(4) has prescribed
the mode of publication of the Outline Development Plan
and the Regulations. It requires the Outline Development
Plan and the Regulations to be published in the
prescribed manner and the Plan and particulars to be
permanently displayed in the offices of the Director and
the Planning Authority and a copy to be kept available for
492 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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the inspection of the public at the office of the Planning
Authority. The particulars referred to, we presume, are
the particulars mentioned in Section 12(2) of the Act
consisting of various reports, including the Regulations.
“The prescribed manner” is what is prescribed by Rule
33, that is, publication in the Official Gazette. If we now
turn to Section 9(1) and 9(2), we find that there too the
Outline Development Plan is required to be published in
“the prescribed manner”. The prescribed manner for the
purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 9 is that
prescribed by Rule 32. Rule 32 we have seen prescribes
making a copy of the Plan available for inspection,
publishing a notice in Form II in the Official Gazette and in
one or more newspapers and displaying a notice in Form
II at the office of Planning Authority and at other specified
places. It is true that Rule 33 speaks of publication of
approved Outline Development Plan and Regulations
in the Official Gazette, suggestive of a requirement that
the Outline Development Plan and Regulations should
bodily be incorporated in the Official Gazette. But if the
entire scheme of the Act and the rules is considered as
an integral whole it becomes obvious that what Section
13(4) contemplates besides permanently displaying
the Plan and the particulars in the offices of Director
and Planning Authority and keeping available a copy
for the inspection of the public at the office of Planning
Authority is a public notice to the general public that
the Plan and Regulations are permanently displayed
and are available for inspection by the public. Such
public notice is required to be given by a publication in
the Official Gazette. This is how it was understood by
the authorities and everyone else concerned and this
is how it was done in the present case. This appears
to be a reasonable and a rational interpretation on
Section 13(4) and Rule 33 in the setting and the scheme.
We are of the view that there was compliance with
the requirements of Section 13(4) and Rule 33. We
have earlier mentioned that Section 13(1) requires the
provisional Outline Development Plan and particulars to
be published by notification in the Official Gazette, with
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 493
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
a view to invite comments from the public. What was
published in the present case under Section 13(1) was
also a notice in Form II and not the whole of the Plan
and particulars. Such publication evoked considerable
public response. As many as 600 representations from
individuals and institutions were received. That is why we
said that everyone concerned, that is, the Government,
the Director, the Planning Authority and the public,
individual and institution alike, thought that publication
of a notice in the Gazette inviting the attention of the
public to the display and the availability for inspection of
the Plan and particulars was all that was contemplated
by the provisions providing for publication. We do not
think that there is any reason or justification for us to
adopt an interpretation which departs from common
understanding of the Act and the Rules.”
(Emphasis supplied)
49. There was also an omnibus curative clause in the parent Act in
B.K. Srinivasan (supra) which protected a publication defect when
sufficient knowledge of the requirements in the plan and regulation
existed with the violating individual. While the presence of this
clause added another layer of reasoning, it did not materially affect
the conclusion already arrived at. What we are trying to convey is
that even when the publication of something in the Official Gazette
is required by the plain words of the subordinate legislation (rules),
there is some scope, albeit narrow, for the interpretation that its
non-publication in the Gazette was not detrimental to its legality or
binding nature based on an examination of whether the prescribed
mode was reasonable or not.
50. In the present litigation, we are concerned with a situation fitting
within the third type i.e., when there is silence both in the parent
statute and the rules as regards what mode of publication must be
followed. As a general rule, even in such scenarios, publication must
ideally be made in the Official Gazette. After all, it is the customarily
recognised official channel of the government. But, of course, the
natural corollary to any general rule is the possibility of it having one
or more exceptions. B.K. Srinivasan (supra) too referred to such
outliers when it clearly stated that “some other reasonable mode of
494 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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publication” may also be acceptable apart from publication in the
Official Gazette. It is tacit that to take benefit of this exception, the
court must be satisfied that such an alternate mode or manner of
publication was indeed reasonable.
51. At this juncture, we must point out that Gulf Goans (supra) itself
laid down the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette as
a pre-requisite by placing reliance upon B.K. Srinivasan (supra).
However, in the larger background of the facts in Gulf Goans (supra),
this Court did not find it necessary to delve further into whether the
mode of publication undertaken was reasonable or not.
52. A handful of decisions of this Court have held that publication in
the Official Gazette is required. However, on a closer examination,
all of them can be differentiated. In Pankaj Jain Agencies v.
Union of India and others reported in (1994) 5 SCC 198, I.T.C.
Bhadrachalam Paperboards and Another v. Mandal Revenue
Officer, A.P. and Others reported in (1996) 6 SCC 634, Union
of India and Others v. Ganesh Das Bhojraj reported in (2000) 9
SCC 461 and Nabha Power Limited and Another v. Punjab State
Power Corporation and Another reported in (2025) 5 SCC 353
respectively, the exemption order/notification was required to be
published in the Official Gazette by the parent statute itself. Such
was the case in Sammbhu Nath Jha v. Kedar Prasad Sinha and
Others reported (1972) 1 SCC 573 as well where the notification of
appointment of the Commission of Inquiry needed to be published in
the Official Gazette by the statute. In State of Kerala and Others v.
P.J. Joseph reported in (1957) 3 SCC 638, the alleged statutory
order varying an existing rule was, again, required to be published
in the Official Gazette under the relevant provisions of the statute.
The most recent decision in Viraj Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India
and Another reported in 2026 SCC OnLine 101 also related to an
order which was expressly required to be published in the Official
Gazette by the statute and it was observed that “The Legislature
in its wisdom, has not left the mode of promulgation to executive
discretion”. All the aforesaid are instances where this Court has
given effect to a clear stipulation in the parent Act which prescribed
a set mode of publication or in other words, cases which fell under
the first type set out in B.K. Srinivasan (supra).
53. Harla v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1951 SCC OnLine SC 54
was concerned with a situation wherein the Jaipur Opium Act, 1924
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 495
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
i.e., offence creating parent statute itself had not been promulgated
and published appropriately. Similarly, in Rajendra Agricultural
University v. Ashok Kumar Prasad and Others reported in (2010)
1 SCC 730, the issue was with regard to the non-publication of
the statute in the Official Gazette. In Ramakrishna Vivekananda
Mission v. State of W.B. and Others reported in (2005) 9 SCC
53, it was the special rules i.e., a subordinate legislation, which
was required to be previously published according to the statute
and in ascertaining the import of the words ‘previously published’,
recourse was taken to the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 which
mandated publication in the Official Gazette. These set of decisions
deal with the Act or the Rules themselves not being published in
the Official Gazette and therefore, again, have little to do with the
specific question we are faced with.
54. Now, turning to our facts; neither the EP Act nor the BMWM Rules
prescribe a strict mode of publication for the RG, 2016. Undeniably,
we would fall under the third-type of scenario as per the decision
in B.K. Srinivasan (supra). Therefore, publication in the Official
Gazette, although the general rule, cannot be said to be a sine
qua non. We are of the view that publication of such technical
guidelines i.e. the RG, 2016, on the official website of the CPCB
was reasonably sufficient. Moreover, the RG, 2016 lays down crucial
standards which form the foundation for the grant of EC and CTE/
CTO respectively to a CBWTF. They are so deeply embedded in the
authorisation mechanism and all project proponents are sufficiently
made aware of its existence whilst commencing the process for
obtaining different clearances. Therefore, it cannot be argued that
they do not constitute enforceable standards for the grant as well
as revocation of permissions. Consequently, falling back on the ratio
in Gulf Goans (supra) would be of no help.
B. Permissibility of the grant of relaxation in land requirement
55. The RG, 2016 under Clause 7 provides for the “Land Requirement”
of a CBWTF and reads thus:
“7) Land requirement
Sufficient land shall be allocated to the CBWTF to
provide all requisite systems which include dedicated
space for storage of waste (both treated and untreated),
496 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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waste treatment equipment, vehicle washing bay, vehicle
parking space, ETP, incineration ash storage provision,
administrative room, space for DG Set etc.,.
(a) Preferably, a CBWTF shall be set up on a plot size
of not less than one acre in all the areas. However, a
CBWTF can be developed in adjacent plots but cannot
be set up in two or more different plots located in different
areas. Separate plots can be permitted only for vehicle
parking if located in the close vicinity of the proposed
CBWTFs or the existing CBWTFs.
(b) In case of upcoming or new CBWTFs (both in
municipal limits with population more than 25 lakhs
or in rural areas), the land area requirement may be
relaxed (but in any case not less than 0.5 acre) by the
SPCB/PCC, with additional control measures such as
zero liquid discharge, increase in stack height, stringent
emission norms, odour control measures or any other
measures felt necessary by the prescribed authority on
case-to-case basis, only in consultation with CPCB.”
(Emphasis supplied)
56. Clause 7 begins with a short prelude explaining that sufficient
land shall be allocated to the CBWTF so that all requisite systems
will have adequate space. It goes on to state that a CBWTF shall
preferably be set up on a plot size of not less than one acre in all
areas. The use of the word “preferably ” here must not be read to
mean that the one acre standard is not compulsory. Instead, the
word is used to signify that a single plot need not admeasure one
acre and that multiple but adjacent plots can be combined to fulfil
this requirement. While different plots which are separate cannot be
used for the CBWTF as a general rule, a deviation from this may be
allowed if the separate plot is in the close vicinity and is solely for
the purpose of vehicle parking. That the one-acre requirement is a
strict rule is further substantiated by the fact that land area relaxation
may be allowed in certain cases i.e., for upcoming or new CBWTFs
which are either in municipal limits with a population of more than
25 lakh or in rural areas. However, such relaxation cannot exceed
0.5 acre under any circumstance. The State Pollution Control Board
(“SPCB”) or the Union Territory Pollution Control Committee (“PCC”)
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 497
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
would be the authority which would decide whether relaxation
could be granted or not. In all eligible cases, relaxation would be
accompanied with additional control measures including inter-alia
zero liquid discharge, increase in stack height, stringent emission
norms, odour control measures or any other measures considered
necessary and the matter shall be consulted with the CPCB.
57. It could, therefore, be said that the grant of relaxation has a pre-
condition and is also subject to certain mandatory accompanying
conditions. The pre-condition relates to the location of the proposed
site(s) i.e., it must be within municipal limits having more than 25 lakh
population or within rural limits. The accompanying conditions are
that: (i) consultation with the CPCB is mandatory and, (ii) additional
control measures must be imposed.
58. It is this issue pertaining to Clause 7 of the RG, 2016 which weighed
heavily with the impugned decision and it reached the conclusion
that the pre-condition was not fulfilled in the instant case. There
was some confusion as regards whether the UPSIDC Industrial
Area was situated within Nagar Panchayat limits or rural limits, and
if it was situated in the former whether the population of the Nagar
Panchayat was more than 25 lakh or not.
59. The impugned decision upon finding that the industrial area was
located within the Babrala Nagar Panchayat, proceeded to observe
that its population was not even one lakh as per the 2011 census.
Therefore, it was sure that Clause 7 was outrightly inapplicable and
the authorities including the CPCB and the UP SEIAA respectively,
had misdirected themselves in exercising their powers for the grant
of relaxation.
60. This Court vide order dated 15.07.2024 directed that a report be
furnished by the District Magistrate, Sambhal regarding the location
of the CBWTF established by the appellant and the population of the
Babrala Nagar Panchayat. We have been apprised that the UPSIDC
Industrial Area has been formed in village Noorpur, Pargana Asadpur,
Tehsil Gunnaur, District Sambhal. It is not situated within the limits
of the Babrala Nagar Panchayat but falls within the Noorpur Gram
Panchayat. In fact, the distance of the said industrial area from the
border of the Babrala Nagar Panchayat is about 2.6 km. Several
other authorities including the Executive Officer of the Babrala Nagar
Panchayat, the Tehsildar at Gunnaur and the Regional Manager,
UPSIDA, all confirm that the plots fall within rural limits.
498 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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61. Moreover, in exercise of the powers under Section 2(d) of the UP
Industrial Area Act, a Gazette notification was issued by the State
of Uttar Pradesh declaring the areas mentioned in the Schedule
annexed thereto as Industrial Development Areas. Sl. No. 78 of
the Schedule pertains to the Industrial Area that we are concerned
with and it is declared to be located at Village Noorpur. Therefore, it
cannot be argued that plot nos. E-25 and E-26 respectively situated
within the limits of a rural area did not fulfil the precondition under
Clause 7(b) of the RG, 2016.
62. Aniruda Panwar (supra) emphasized that setting up a CBWTF on
land admeasuring one acre was the rule and relaxation of this land
requirement was the exception. Relaxation must not be granted as a
matter of right and in a casual manner. On this, we are in agreement.
However, in the present case, relaxation was granted after due
consultation with the CPCB and the prescription of additional control
measures which took into account the operational effectiveness of
the appellant’s plant in a smaller area. Therefore, the fact that the
investment already made by the appellant was also a factor which
was considered by the UPPCB and the CPCB respectively, would
not be sufficient to indicate that there was malice in law. Similarly,
while we agree that the representation made by the UPPCB vide
letter dated 16.10.2023 to the CPCB was wrong in stating that the
first EC and first CTE respectively were only null and void and
not illegal, this does not seem to have affected the actual grant of
relaxation by the CPCB in any manner. The mandate under Clause
7 of the RG, 2016 was strictly followed and the CPCB has not acted
in ignorance of the law. It is not the respondent no. 1’s case that the
additional control measures which ultimately came to be imposed
were not sufficient or adequate in some way.
63. In view of the aforesaid, on the issue of relaxation in land requirement,
the second EC or the second CTE could not have been quashed
by the impugned decision.
C. Status of land acquisition required from a project
proponent seeking to establish a CBWTF at the time of
making the Form 1 application, at the stage of appraisal of
the EC and at the time of applying for a CTE respectively.
64. The answer to this issue hinges on a careful reading of Clause 6 of
the EIA, 2006, Clause 2 of the RG, 2016, Section 25 of the Water
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 499
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
Act and Section 21 of the Air Act respectively along with some
O.M.’s/orders issued by the MoEF&CC.
i. Clause 6 of the EIA, 2006 read with the O.M. dated 07.10.2014
65. Clause 6 of the EIA, 2006 deals with the application to be made for
obtaining a prior EC. It reads thus:
“An application seeking prior environmental clearance
in all cases shall be made in the prescribed Form 1
annexed herewith and Supplementary Form 1A, if
applicable, as given in Appendix II, after the identification
of prospective site(s) for the project and/or activities to
which the application relates, before commencing any
construction activity, or preparation of land, at the site
by the applicant. The applicant shall furnish, along with
the application, a copy of the pre-feasibility project report
except that, in case of construction projects or activities
(item 8 of the Schedule) in addition to Form 1 and the
Supplementary Form 1A, a copy of the conceptual plan
shall be provided, instead of the pre-feasibility report.”
(Emphasis supplied)
66. Basically, it states that the application for prior EC must be made in
the prescribed Form 1/supplementary Form 1A after the identification
of prospective site(s) but before commencing any construction activity
or preparing the land. It also indicates that such identification must
be for the specific project or purpose for which the EC is sought
and this is brought forth by the expression “to which the application
relates”. Therefore, land which is identified as a prospective site
for a different purpose, cannot pass the muster of Clause 6 when
the EC is being sought for establishing some other project/facility.
67. The submission of Mr. Divan is that the words “identification of
prospective site(s)” clearly indicate that a successful allotment of
land for the purpose of establishing of a CBWTF in the appellant’s
favour was not necessitated by the EIA, 2016. He would state that
it may be sufficient if the project proponent has simply identified the
land concerned. In our opinion, while his submission would be right
for when the Form 1 application is made, the threshold would shift
when the EC process progresses to the appraisal stage i.e., Stage 4.
500 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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68. The O.M. dated 07.10.2014 issued by the MoEF&CC would shed
some further light. It states that an EC is always site-specific, meaning
that if the project comes to be set-up in a land different than that
for which EC was given, then such EC would automatically become
invalid. The O.M. also adds that full acquisition of land may not be a
pre-requisite for considering an EC application. However, there must
be some credible document showing the status of land acquisition
with respect to the project site when the case is brought before the
concerned EAC/SEAC for appraisal. The relevant portions of the
said O.M. are reproduced thus:
2. The matter has been examined in the Ministry.
The EC granted for a project or activity under the EIA
Notification 2006, as amended, is site specific. While
full acquisition of land may not be a pre-requisite for
the consideration of the case for EC, there should be
some credible document to show the status of land
acquisition w.r.t. project site when the case is brought
before the concerned EAC/SEAC for appraisal. It has
been accordingly decided that the following documents
relating to acquisition of land w.r.t the project site may
be considered as adequate by EACs/SEACs at the time
of appraisal of the case for EC.
[…]
(ii) In case the land is being acquired through private
negotiations with the land owners, credible document
showing intent of the land owners to sell the land for
the proposed project.
3. It may, however, be noted that the EC granted for a
project on the basis of aforesaid documents shall become
invalid in case the actual land for the project site turns
out to be different from the land considered at the time
of appraisal of project and mentioned in the EC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
69. If noticed closely, it states that some credible document showing the
intent of the land owners to sell the land for the proposed project
would be sufficient at the appraisal stage. The stages involved in the
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 501
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
process of obtaining a prior EC are four: Screening, Scoping, Public
Consultation and Appraisal respectively. According to the O.M., the
need for such a credible document only arises at the fourth stage.
So, although the application in Form 1 can be made by a project
proponent before such a credible document is obtained, yet this
document must be available for scrutiny when the SEAC and SEIAA
respectively, ‘finally appraise’ the EC application.
70. This brings us to our first take-away i.e., land allotment for the
particular purpose/project is not necessary before the application
under Form 1 can be made, i.e., before the first stage of screening.
Identification is enough. Such a view is further substantiated by two
things: (i) when the EC is inherently site-specific there arises no
reason for placing such a high burden at the Form 1 stage itself,
and (ii) a reading of the prescribed Form 1 enclosed as Annexure-I
to the EIA, 2006, under the head ‘Basic Information’, requires the
applicant to provide details of the “Location/site alternatives under
consideration”, meaning thereby that the applicant is only to provide
details of the site(s) in which he intends to setup the project/activity
concerned.
71. How can a Form 1 applicant then satisfy that it has identified
prospective site(s) or that some site is under consideration for
the purpose for which EC is sought? While we are not inclined to
lay down a general standard, we can say without doubt that, in
the present case, the applications dated 06.07.2021 made to the
UPSIDA seeking allotment of plots E-25 and E-26 respectively, for
establishing a CBWTF, was sufficient to prove that the plots were
identified or were being considered by the appellant.
72. The second take-away is that, when the stage of appraisal arrives,
a credible document becomes crucial. What could be this credible
document in the context of the present matter? Undoubtedly, it
would either be a successful allotment in favour of the appellant
or, if the allotment is not in vogue, then a provisional allotment/
acknowledgment issued by the UPSIDA.
73. Clause 6 of the EIA, 2006 and the O.M. dated 07.10.2014 respectively
clarify that legal possession by way of a sale deed, lease deed etc.,
may not necessarily be obtained, both before making the Form 1
application and at the stage of appraisal, respectively.
502 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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74. Let us see if the RG, 2016 says anything different. The Tribunal in
Aniruda Panwar (supra) was of the opinion that it did.
ii. Clause 2 of the RG, 2016
75. Clause 2 of the RG, 2016 lays down the criteria for the development
of a new CBWTF. Amongst other things, it states thus:
“c) SPCB/PCC shall identify the coverage area, which
require additional treatment facility and bring it to the
notice of the concerned department in the business
allocation of land assignment in the respective State
Government or UT Administration. The department in
the business allocation of land assignment shall be
responsible for providing suitable site in the identified
coverage area for setting up of a CBWTF, in consultation
with the prescribed authority (i.e., SPCB/PCC), other
stakeholders and in accordance with these guidelines
issued by CPCB from time to time.
d) Alternately, a CBWTF may also be allowed to be
established on a land procured by an entrepreneur in
accordance with the location criteria suggested under
these guidelines.
e) The SPCB/PCC or concerned department in
the business allocation of land assignment in the
respective State Government or UT Administration
may seek expression of interest from the proponents
for development of new CBWTF (s) in the identified
coverage area. Upon allocation of site to the proponent,
the proponent is required to take necessary approvals as
required under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986
for development of the new CBWTF in accordance with
these guidelines.”
76. According to the above, in the normal course of things, it would be
the SPCB or the PCC which shall identify the requirement of new
CBWTFs in each coverage area. The department entrusted with the
business allocation of land assignment in the State/UT administration
would then provide suitable sites. Thereafter, expressions of
interest (“EoIs”) may be sought for the establishment of a CBWTF.
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 503
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
Upon allocation of the site to the successful project proponent, it
would be upon such proponent to obtain the necessary approvals.
Alternatively, an entrepreneur may also seek to establish a CBWTF
on land procured by himself in accordance with the location criteria
under the RG, 2016.
77. The use of the words “land procured” in the context of an entrepreneur
in Clause 2(d) and “upon allocation of site” in the context of the
SPCB/PCC/administration’s initiative in Clause 2(e), is of particular
note. We are of the opinion that, fundamentally, these words do
not convey a message different from that of the EIA, 2006. In other
words, there is no conflict as such between the relevant provisions
of the EIA, 2006 and the RG, 2016 respectively as highlighted in
Aniruda Panwar (supra).
78. According to the RG, 2016, there are two ways through which the
process of establishing a CBWTF can be commenced: One, by the
SPCB/PCC/administration via Clauses 2(c) and 2(e) respectively,
and two, by the entrepreneur via Clause 2(d).
79. Clause 2(d) only states broadly that land must be procured by
the entrepreneur before establishing a CBWTF. It does not lay
down specifically that (i) allotment must be complete before the
Form 1 application can be made under the EIA, 2006, or (ii) mere
identification is insufficient before the Form 1 application is made
under the EIA, 2006, or (iii) legal possession must be obtained prior
to the appraisal stage under the EIA, 2006.
80. Moving on, Clause 2(e) admittedly states that the project proponent
must proceed with obtaining approvals under the EP Act after the
site is allocated in its favour by the SPCB/PCC/administration. But
this aspect must be interpreted in the context of the entire process
that is envisaged under Clause 2 and not as laying down a rigid rule
that allocation is a pre-condition for seeking other approval(s). When
EoIs are sought from multiple persons for establishing a CBWTF,
the RG, 2016 places a duty only upon the successful allocatee to
commence the necessary approval process, and not everyone who
responded to the EOIs. It is for this simple reason that the words
“upon allocation” is used. Moreover, what is plainly clarified is that
despite the land being allocated by the SPCB/PCC/administration,
such allocatees must independently obtain the necessary approvals
as per the EP Act and that this over-arching obligation cannot be
504 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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dispensed with. This intent behind the Clause 2(e) must not be
morphed or misconstrued as laying down a standard which requires
successful allotment before an application under Form 1 is made
for the EC.
81. We must not favour a hyper technical view of the words “land
procured” in Clause 2(d) and “upon allocation of site” in Clause 2(e)
of the RG, 2016 respectively, in a manner which is contrary to the
meaning evinced by the EIA, 2006. Clause 6 of the EIA, 2006 and
the O.M. dated 07.10.2014 communicate what is required from any
project proponent while making the Form 1 application and at the
appraisal stage, without any ambiguity. We do not see any reason,
either in law or by way of technical necessity, why a stricter condition
must be placed for a proponent seeking to establish CBWTF in
comparison to proponents undertaking other activities/projects.
iii. Applying for a CTE under the Water Act and Air Act respectively.
82. A project proponent seeking to set-up a CBWTF has to obtain
previous consent(s) from the SPCB/PCC by virtue of Section 25 of the
Water Act and Section 21 of the Air Act respectively. These previous
consents are two in number i.e., the CTE and CTO respectively.
83. Section 25 of the Water Act lays down restrictions on new outlets and
new discharges by stating that no person shall, without the previous
consent of the SPCB, establish or take any steps to establish any
industry, operation or process, or any treatment and disposal system
or any extension or addition thereto, which is likely to discharge
sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or sewer or on land.
Section 26 covers those persons who were already operating an
industry, operation or process discharging any sewage or trade
effluent and brings them within the ambit of Section 25.
84. Section 21 of the Air Act states that no person shall establish or
operate any industrial plant in an air pollution control area unless
the previous consent of the SPCB has been obtained.
85. A cursory reading of the aforesaid provisions do not explicitly and
separately mention the CTE and CTO respectively. Nevertheless,
a two-stage regulatory process is followed by the CPCB/SPCB and
PCC. The two stages at which the consents are to be obtained signify
two distinct operational milestones vis-à-vis the project and require
separate applications as well as verifications. Broadly, a CTE is
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 505
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
required before the project/plant is built or set-up so that the layout,
location, proposed air pollution and water pollution control systems
etc., can be evaluated before the project takes further shape. A
CTO, on the other hand, is required once construction is done and
before the commercial operations begin. Its object is to verify that
the actual infrastructure including the installed machinery, pollution
control mechanisms etc., abide by what was previously approved.
86. Therefore, as the CTE is concerned, what we can gauge is that the
project proponent must apply for it before establishing or taking steps
to establish or setting up such industry/operation. What actions could
potentially fall both within and outside the ambit of the expressions
“establish” or “take any steps to establish” or “setting up” is difficult
to conjure with certainty. But, undeniably, these expressions are
of wide import because they can include actions ranging from
finalising land, materials, infrastructure labour, obtaining parallel
approvals etc. Therefore, when both Sections 25 of the Water
Act and 21 of the Air Act mandate that a CTE has to be obtained
before establishment or taking steps for such establishment, one
cannot say, that only the act of procurement of land must predate
the application for a CTE while the other acts which otherwise
broadly constitute ‘establishment’ can be undertaken subsequent
to the CTE being applied for and/or obtained. There is no contrary
indicia supporting the view that land procurement or land allotment
alone must occur prior to the CTE application. We have already held
that Clause 2 of the RG, 2016 does not say otherwise. Meaning
thereby that, successful land allotment cannot strictly be a pre-
condition to obtaining a CTE.
87. This can further be substantiated through the order dated 20.09.2021
issued by the MoEF&CC which reads thus:
“Whereas, prior Environmental Clearance is a statutory
requirement for project/activities covered in the schedule
of the EIA Notification 2006, issued under section 3 of
the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.
2. And whereas, obtaining the consents under Water
(Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 & Air
(Prevention& Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 is mandatory
for all industrial units in Red, Orange and Green
categories.
506 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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3. And whereas, the grant of EC and Consents are
requirements under different statutes and are not inter-
dependent and can be carried out as a parallel process.
4. And whereas, many a times it has been observed that
while industrial units are in possession of valid ‘Consent
to Establish’ (CTE)/ ‘Consent to Operate’ (CTO) issued
by State Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs)/ UT Pollution
Control Committees (UTPCC), however, they have not
obtained the Environmental Clearance (EC), even though
it was required as per provisions of EIA Notification 2006.
5. And whereas, it has been observed that this situation
is arising because majority of the SPCBs/ UTPCCs are
issuing CTE/CTO to projects without ascertaining the
applicability of prior EC to projects/ activities, resulting in
an avoidable situation of closure for even those industries
also who seek to carry out their activities following due
procedure.
6. Now therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by
section 5 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986(29
of 1986), the Central Government, hereby directs that
all SPCB/UTPCC shall:
i. Ascertain the applicability of EIA Notification at
the time of grant/renewal of CTE and stipulate
appropriate condition for obtaining Environmental
Clearance (EC), if applicable, before construction/
commencement of project/activity.
ii. Ensure that the project proponent possesses a
valid Prior EC in terms of the extant EIA Notification,
if applicable, at the time of grant/renewal of CTO
and no CTO shall be granted or renewed unless
EC, if applicable, has been obtained
7. This is issued with the approval of the Competent
Authority.”
(Emphasis supplied)
88. The aforesaid order was made to address those situations wherein
CTEs/CTOs were being issued to projects without ascertaining the
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 507
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
applicability of the EIA, 2006 owing to the fact that the EC and
the CTE/CTO process can be undertaken parallelly. As a direct
consequence, several projects did not apply for EC and were being
subjected to closure. Therefore, it was directed that the applicability
of the EIA, 2006 be ascertained by the SPCB at the time of grant
of CTE itself and that no CTO be granted unless prior EC was
already obtained.
89. When the order dated 20.09.2021 is read holistically with what
we have held in the previous sub-section i.e., that proof of land
allotment only needs to be furnished during appraisal of the EC,
what becomes clear is that although land allotment may be a
precondition for obtaining the CTO (because prior EC has to be
mandatorily obtained before the CTO), yet such a requirement may
not restrict the making of an application for CTE or even the grant
of CTE for that matter.
90. In view of all the aforesaid, we are afraid that we are in disagreement
with the decision in Aniruda Panwar (supra) on the reasoning that,
owing to Clause 2 of the RG, 2016, a project proponent seeking
to establish a CBWTF must have successfully procured or gotten
land allocated in his favour even before commencing the process
of obtaining prior EC and/or CTE.
91. Whilst we differ in the interpretation it afforded, we must nevertheless
clarify that the conclusion reached in Aniruda Panwar (supra) cannot
be assailed for being wrong. As discussed above, identification of the
prospective site(s) for the specific project/activity is the threshold for
when an application for EC is made. Obtaining a credible document
showing the status of land acquisition is the pre-requisite for when
the EC is being appraised by the SEAC and SEIAA respectively. Prior
to applying in Form 1, the appellant had approached the UPSIDA
vide application dated 06.07.2021 for land allotment to establish
a CBWTF and had therefore, identified prospective site(s) for the
purpose for which the EC was being sought. So, up until this point,
there was no issue. However, it failed to fulfil what was expected from
it at the appraisal stage. In other words, at the time when the UP
SEAC and UP SEIAA respectively, were appraising the appellant’s
EC application for the grant of the first EC, i.e., on 16.06.2022 and
05.07.2022 respectively, the UPSIDA had rejected the appellant’s
request for land allotment for setting up a CBWTF. Thereafter, it
508 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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only re-issued an allotment letter in favour of the appellant for a
different type of industry/facility. Meaning thereby that, there was no
credible document indicating that a CBWTF could be established in
the said land when the UP SEAC and the UP SEIAA appraised the
EC application. Only after the first EC was granted did the appellant
apply and obtain permission for change in land use. This could not
have retrospectively legalised the grant of the first EC.
92. As far as the first CTE is concerned, although it could not have
been faulted with for non-allotment of land prior to the date on which
the CTE was applied for i.e. prior to 27.09.2021, yet the UPPCB
was under an obligation to check whether the specifications of the
land provided by the appellant in its application for CTE fulfilled
the land requirements prescribed under Clause 7 of the RG, 2016.
Since the land identified by the appellant was of a size less than
one acre, the UPPCB must have directed the appellant to either
identify additional prospective plots or apply for a relaxation in land
requirement before granting the first CTE. Hence, for this reason,
the first CTE was illegal and void.
93. Now, we must look into whether the second EC or second CTE could
be said to have become vulnerable for any reason/ground discussed
hereinabove. Considering that the appellant was not required to
apply through a fresh Form 1 after the first EC and first CTE were
set-aside by Aniruda Panwar (supra) (an aspect which will be dealt
with in detail in the next sub-section), we only need to see whether
land acquisition requirements were met at the appraisal stage.
When the UP SEAC and UP SEIAA sat for appraisal on 20.11.2023
and 20.12.2023 respectively, the appellant obtained allotment of
plots E-25 and E-26 respectively for establishing a CBWTF from
the UPSIDA on 19.09.2022, and relaxation in land requirement of
1 acre was also allowed by the CPCB on 17.11.2023. The second
CTE was also granted by the UPPCB on 20.12.2023 after land
relaxation was already allowed by the CPCB. Therefore, the second
EC and CTE stood the test of the land acquisition requirements at
each stage of the process.
D. The grant of the second EC on the basis of the first ToR
94. Mr. Misra would argue that when the first EC and first CTE was set-
aside by Aniruda Panwar (supra) for the reasons stated therein,
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 509
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
the first ToR was also implicitly set-aside. Therefore, the second
EC and second CTE granted on the basis of such a defunct ToR
cannot be said to be valid under law. On the other hand, Mr. Divan
would state that the setting aside of the first EC and first CTE had
no effect on the first ToR. Moreover, the ToR was also valid for a
period of four years.
i. Whether the decision in Aniruda Panwar could be said to have
set-aside the first ToR
95. It cannot always as a mechanical rule be said that when the EC is
set-aside, the ToR is also automatically rendered null and void for
a project proponent who is desirous of obtaining a fresh EC. The
answer depends on the grounds due to which the EC is vitiated
and what was found to be illegal or defective in the four stage EC
process. It also depends on how far back into the process the defect
had crept in. For example, if the illegality arose from the appraisal
stage alone i.e., due to non-application of mind by the SEAC/SEIAA,
then there would be no use in relegating the project proponent
back to the absolute beginning. But, say, the illegality arose from
an incomplete or shoddy EIA report which did not abide by the
prescribed ToR, then the project proponent would have to prepare a
fresh EIA report. Here again, there wouldn’t be any need to disturb
the ToR itself. However, say, the ToR itself was improperly issued
because necessary details in the Form 1 application were false,
incomplete or misleading, then the whole process would have to be
recommenced afresh. As a matter of practice, the stage at which
the process must be restarted is indicated with sufficient clarity in
the order setting aside the EC. However, admittedly, the decision in
Aniruda Panwar (supra) is not intelligible on this aspect.
96. Mr. Misra would submit that, once the first EC was set-aside, the
entire process was required to be started afresh because the
appellant had falsely claimed that plots E-25 and E-26 respectively,
had been procured in their Form 1 application. According to him,
this would amount to deliberate concealment and/or submission of
misleading and false information material to the screening, scoping
and appraisal stages under Clause 8(vi) of the EIA,2006, which
tainted the whole process. He would also place reliance on the
decision of this Court in Hanuman Laxman Aroskar (supra) to
substantiate this argument.
510 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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97. In Hanuman Laxman Aroskar (supra), the EC granted for
development of the greenfield airport project in Goa was called
into question for several flaws in the EIA process including the
failure of the project proponent to disclose the name and identity
of forests within an aerial distance of 15km of the project despite
the fact that the Form 1 mandatorily required a clear disclosure of
“areas which are important or sensitive for ecological reasons —
wetlands, water sources or other water bodies, coastal zone,
biospheres, mountains and forests”. Deprecating such practice,
this Court observed that non-disclosure of vital information and
suppression of material facts in Form 1 has a cascading effect on
the entire EC process: (i) It would impair the ability of the EAC/
SEAC to recommend a rejection of the application for EC at the
threshold under Clause 7 II.Stage(2)–Scoping(iii), (ii) affect the
functioning of the EAC/SEAC in the preparation of the ToR, (ii)
lead to a deficient EIA report, and (iii) influence the EAC/SEAC’s
appraisal of the EC application, amongst others. Since Form 1 is
the base upon which the whole process rests, it was cautioned that
the depth and accuracy of information provided in Form 1 must not
be compromised and the project proponent must be held to the
highest duty of transparency and rectitude. If the project proponent
did not abide by the same, then an EC already granted could also
be cancelled on the basis of Clause 8(vi) of the EIA,2006. The
relevant observations are thus:
“61. Under the 2006 Notification, EC process is based
on the information provided by the applicant in Form 1.
That the information provided in Form 1 is crucial can
be borne from the following circumstances:
61.1. EAC or SEAC, as the case may be, formulates
comprehensive ToRs on the basis of the information
furnished in Form 1 which addresses all possible
environmental concerns. It is on the basis of ToR, that
further studies and the EIA are carried out on the impact
of the proposed project on the environment.
61.2. At the appraisal stage, the regulatory authority
examines the documents submitted by the applicant
“strictly with reference to ToR” and communicates any
inadequacy to EAC or SEAC.
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 511
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
61.3. Category B2 projects, which do not require scoping,
are evaluated by SEAC on the basis of the information
furnished by the applicant in Form 1 alone.
61.4. The appraisal of all projects or activities which
are not required to undergo public consultation, or
submit an EIA report, shall be carried out on the basis
of the prescribed application Form 1 and Form 1-A as
applicable.
61.5 An application for extension of the validity of EC for
certain projects is to be made by submitting a revised
Form 1 within the validity period.
62. The information provided in Form 1 serves as a
base upon which the process stipulated under the 2006
Notification rests. An applicant is required to provide
all material information stipulated in the form to enable
the authorities to formulate comprehensive ToR and
enable persons concerned to provide comments and
representations at the public consultation stage. The
depth of information sought in Form 1 is to enable
the authorities to evaluate all possible impacts of
the proposed project and provide the applicant an
opportunity to address these concerns in the subsequent
study. Missing or misleading information in Form 1
significantly impedes the functioning of the authorities
and the process stipulated under the notification. For
this reason, any application made or EC granted on
the basis of a defective Form 1 is liable to be rejected
immediately. Clause (vi) of Para 8 of the notification
provides thus[…]
70.1. Form 1, which was filed by the project proponent,
did not contain any disclosure of the name or identity of
forests within an aerial distance of 15 km. Item 2 under
the heading of “Environmental Sensitivity” requires a clear
disclosure of “areas which are important or sensitive for
ecological reasons — wetlands, water sources or other
water bodies, coastal zone, biospheres, mountains and
forests”.
512 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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72. […] The project proponent is bound by the highest
duty of transparency and rectitude in making the
disclosures in Form 1.
73. There can be no manner of doubt that Form 1 is
an important ingredient in the entire process envisaged
under the 2006 Notification. Hence, clause (vi) of
Para 8 of the 2006 Notification provides that deliberate
concealment or submission of false or misleading
information or data which is material to screening or
scoping or appraisal or decision on the application shall
make the application liable for rejection and lead to the
cancellation of a prior EC granted on that basis. The
declaration which is required of the project proponent
is to a similar effect.
80. […] There is an intrinsic link between the disclosures
in Form 1 which constitute the basis for formulating ToR
and between the ambit of the EIA report required by ToR
and the final EIA report. ToR guide the preparation of
the EIA report. A failure to disclose information in Form
1 impairs the functioning of EAC in the preparation of
ToR and in consequence, leads to preparation of a
deficient EIA report.”
(Emphasis supplied)
98. Coming back to the facts of our case, our finding on the previous
issue has already made clear that procurement or allotment of land
was not a pre-requisite for making an application under Form 1.
Therefore, there arises no question of deliberate concealment or
non-disclosure which vitiated the first ToR. The respondent no. 1 has
not pointed any other aspect which, in their opinion, was false or
defective in the Form 1 application made on 11.08.2021 and which
may have made the ToR itself invalid/void/insufficient in any manner.
99. Rather, what the appellant was actually guilty of in terms of Clause
8(vi) of the EIA,2006 was concealing the fact that UPSIDA had
thereafter allotted the plot for a difference purpose i.e., for fabrication
of industrial equipment. But this was a material concealment in
connection with the appraisal stage of the EC process and had
nothing to do with Form 1. The same comes across very clearly
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 513
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
on a bare reading of the following observations in Aniruda Panwar
(supra):
“68. […] In the absence of such evidence Respondent
No 7 must be held to have suppressed material facts
from UPPCB and UPSEIAA UPPCB and UPSEIAA
must also be held to have ignored material facts in this
regard that as on 26.04.2022 when CTE was granted
by UPPCB and on 13.07.2022 when EC was granted
by UPSEIAA to Respondent No.7 for establishment of
CBWTF, establishment of CBWTF was not permissible
in plots No. E-25 and E-26 situated in Babrala Industrial
Area which had been allotted by Respondent no. 6
UPSIDA to Respondent No 7 for setting up Industrial
Fabrication Equipment (ETP/STP/WTP/C).
69. Concealment of material information by Respondent
No 7 and impermissibility of land use for establishment
of CBWTF at the time of grant of CTE and EC cannot
be casually brushed aside […]” It was observed that
“concealment of material information…at the time of
grant of EC…cannot usually be brushed aside ”.
100. Therefore, while the appellant’s actions were hit by Clause 8(vi) of the
EIA, 2006 and affected the appraisal of the EC, such concealment
did not render the first ToR invalid.
101. Moreover, a careful reading of Hanuman Laxman Aroskar (supra)
also reveals that due attention must be paid to the nature of the non-
disclosure or concealment in Form 1 as well. We say so because
Hanuman Laxman Aroskar (supra) linked the significance of an
accurate and complete Form 1 with its potential to enable the EAC/
SEAC to reject the application at the threshold and/or, affect the
preparation of the ToR and/or, affect the ambit of the EIA report
and/or, influence the appraisal of the application by the EAC/SEAC.
Therefore, the information which is withheld or concealed in Form 1
must be such that it will push the fresh EC process off course, into
error or astray, in some manner, small or big, unless the entire
exercise is started from scratch. In other words, there must be some
impact that such a false disclosure or non-disclosure in Form 1
would cause to the entirety of the EC process in order to direct the
applicant to go back to the starting line. This is also precisely why
514 [2026] 9 S.C.R.
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Clause 8(vi) of the EIA, 2006 uses the words “information or data
which is material to” the screening, scoping, appraisal or decision
on the application, in the context of rejecting any application or
cancelling the EC already granted. For ease of reference, Clause
8(vi) is reproduced thus:
“Deliberate concealment and/or submission of false
or misleading information or data which is material to
screening or scoping or appraisal or decision on the
application shall make the application liable for rejection,
and cancellation of prior environmental clearance granted
on that basis. Rejection of an application or cancellation
of a prior environmental clearance already granted, on
such ground, shall be decided by the regulatory authority,
after giving a personal hearing to the applicant, and
following the principles of natural justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
102. When such material information has either been concealed or
falsified, then both reason and logic demands that the same be
remedied in the fresh EC which may be re-issued. Materiality has
nothing to do with whether the lapse or error was minor or not.
In matters concerning the environment, nothing must be casually
deemed minor. However, all we wish to convey is that, before
relegating the applicant way back to Form 1, there must be some
benefit that accrues from remand to a specific stage. Some cogent
reason must exist. Hence, along with assessing whether there
was deliberate concealment and/or submission of false/misleading
information or data, the material nature of the data/information and
an assessment of which all stages could be said to have been
affected must also be looked into, especially for deciding where
the applicant has to resume from after its EC is set-aside. Whether
the ToR could have become null/void directly depends on the stage
from which this restart has to occur.
103. Considering that the appellant had successfully obtained a relaxation
in the land requirement for a CBWTF from the CPCB instead of
further pursuing the procurement of additional land from UPSIDA, it
would be pointless to direct the appellant to re-apply through a fresh
Form 1 application and obtain a fresh standard ToR. In opting to
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 515
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
proceed with the land relaxation, even if demoted back to the Form 1
stage, the appellant would have to provide the exact same details
on the Form 1 application, the fresh standard ToR would be identical
and the fresh EIA report prepared in pursuance of it would also be
no different. Hence, when the EC is set-aside in such cases, the
applicant must not be required to mechanically restart the process,
particularly when going to the starting line virtually adds nothing to
the procedure and is purely redundant. We must be alive to the
costs and delay that would accompany such a pointless restart.
104. On the contrary, if the appellant had been unsuccessful on the
relaxation front and proceeded to procure plot E-27, then it would
have had to apply through a fresh Form 1 application and a new
ToR would have been indispensable. This is because, as we had
indicated above, the EC process is site-specific and if the project
or even a part of the project comes to be established on different
land, then the EC would be invalidated. It naturally follows that if
plot E-27 was sought to be included in the project site, then the first
ToR which only mentioned plots E-25 and E-26 respectively would
have created a mis-match. A fresh Form 1 application, followed by
a fresh ToR and a EIA report which accounted for the additional
land, would have been necessary. Anticipating this precise problem,
the appellant rightly obtained a second ToR through a fresh Form 1
application which included plot E-27. However, once plot E-27 was
out of the picture, the appellant applied to cancel the second ToR
and proceeded with the first ToR whose validity was not affected
by the decision in Aniruda Panwar (supra).
ii. Validity period of the ToR
105. Responding to the submission that the first ToR was rendered
invalid, Mr. Divan also submitted that the first ToR remained valid for
a period of four years from the date of its issuance. To substantiate
the same, he would rely on two O.M’s issued by the MoEF&CC
dated 29.08.2017 and 08.06.2022 respectively, which read thus:
O.M dated 29.08.2017
“Subject: Terms of Reference for EIA/EMP studies
for the projects/activities requiring Environmental
Clearance under the ElA Notification, 2006 -
Extension of validity period - regarding.
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In order to streamline the process and provide greater
clarity in issuing Terms of Reference (ToRs) for
undertaking EIA/EMP studies for the projects/activities
requiring Environmental Clearance under the EIA
Notification, 2006, the following decisions have been
taken with immediate effect:
(i) The validity of ToRs for projects/activities (except for
River Valley and HEP Projects), for submission of EIA/
EMP reports shall be three years.
(ii) The validity of ToRs for River Valley and HEP Projects,
for submission of EIA/EMP report shall be four years.
(iii) The above validity period can be extended by the
concerned Regulatory Authority for a maximum period
of one year without referring the proposal to the EAC/
SEAC concerned, provided an application is made by
the applicant before expiry of the validity period, together
with an updated Form-1 and proper justification and
there is no change in terms and conditions of the ToRs.
After the lapse of validity, such extension will need EAC/
SEAC consideration.
(iv) Thus, an outer limit of validity of ToRs shall be 4
years for all the projects/activities and 5 years for River
Valley and HEP Projects.
(v) The ToRs will specifically mention the date of expiry
of validity.
(vi) Extension of validity of ToRs beyond the outer limit
of four years for all projects/activities, and five years
for River Valley and HEP projects, shall not be allowed/
considered by the Regulatory Authority.
[…]
(ix) In case the proposal for Environmental Clearance
along with EIA/EMP reports based on the ToRs
prescribed, is not submitted within the validity period of
ToRs, and/or not complying with the above conditions, the
process shall be started de novo. The already collected
baseline data may be re-used, provided it is not more
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 517
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
than 3 years old and duly recommended by EAC/SEAC
in their due diligence.
(x) In case, any proposal for ToR is delisted for want of
additional information within the time period, as stipulated
by the Ministry, the same can be listed again after the
requisite information is submitted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
O.M. dated 08.06.2022
“Subject: Standardizing the validity of baseline data
and public consultation reports for submission
of proposal within the validity period of Terms
of Reference (ToR) under the provisions of EIA
Notification, 2006 – regarding.
As per the provisions of EIA Notification, 2006, Terms
of References (ToR) are being accorded to the various
developmental projects listed in the schedule to the EIA
Notification, 2006 except schedule 8(a) for undertaking
EIA/EMP study. In this regard, Ministry issued Office
Memorandum No. J-11013/41/2006-IA-II (I) (Part) dated
29th August 2017 stating that the validity period of ToR
as three years for all the projects/activities and four years
for River Valley and HEP Projects. This validity period
could be further extended by a maximum period of one
year, thereby making the outer limit for validity of ToR
as four years for all projects/activities and five years for
River Valley and HEP projects.
[…]
6. The aforesaid matter has been examined in the
Ministry. In order to address this issue in a practical
manner and to bring uniformity in handling such
proposals, the following standard procedures shall be
followed with immediate effect:
[…]
(v). In case the proposal for EC along with EIA/EMP
reports based on the ToRs prescribed is not submitted
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within the validity period of ToRs, and/or not complying
with the above-mentioned criteria, the concerned Member
Secretary shall not accept the proposal and process
shall be initiated de novo by the PP.”
(Emphasis supplied)
106. The aforesaid spell out that the validity of a ToR issued for a CBWTF
would be 3+1 years. In the event the project proponent does not place
its proposal for EC along with the EIA report and other necessary
particulars, if any, before the SEIAA within the validity period of the
prescribed ToR, only then the process would have to be started de
novo. Here, de novo would mean right from the making of a Form 1
application for issuance of a fresh ToR.
107. The rationale behind tethering the ToR to a set time-limit was
elucidated upon in the decision of this Court in Bengaluru
Development Authority v. Sudhakar Hegde and Others reported
in (2020) 15 SCC 63. It was stated that every ToR relies upon
information furnished in the Form 1 application which, in turn,
comprises of data on an “as is” basis. However, the environment
is in a constant state of flux and therefore, after a point, the data
forming the basis of the ToR would become outdated and the EIA
study would pale into insignificance. For this reason, the MoEF&CC
did not want to indefinitely continue the validity of a ToR. It was to
account for such environmental dynamism that an outer limit was
laid down. The relevant observations are thus:
“48. Significantly, the process of obtaining an EC
commences from the production of the information
stipulated in Form 1/Form 1-A. Information submitted
in Form 1 relies on data and information on an “as is”
basis at the relevant time of submitting information.
Material information regarding the particulars of the
proposed project as well as the potential impact on the
environment is sought to enable the EAC or the SEAC
to prepare a comprehensive TOR on which basis the
applicant proceeds to prepare the EIA report.[…]
49. MoEFCC stated that it was clearly undesirable to
indefinitely continue a TOR. The environment is, by its
very nature, dynamic. Soil quality, air characteristics and
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 519
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
surrounding flora and fauna are among the characteristics
of the environment which are constantly in a state of
flux. A robust framework of environmental governance
accounts for the dynamic nature of the environment.
It is for this reason that project proponents are also
required to ensure the submission of an Environmental
Management Plan and compliance with the monitoring
procedures envisaged under the 2006 Notification. An
indefinite TOR defeats the very purpose which underlies
the 2006 Notification for it may lead to situations where
the state of the environment has changed drastically, yet
the EIA process is carried out on the basis of outdated
information.[…]”.
(Emphasis supplied)
108. In light of all the aforesaid , the first ToR could not be said to have
been invalidated when the first EC was set-aside by Aniruda Panwar
(supra), especially when it remained unimpacted by the reasons
due to which the first EC was quashed. It would be irrational for a
ToR to be allowed the full extent of its validity period solely when
the EC process is ongoing i.e., when the project proponent is yet to
complete the EIA study or the public consultation or submit his EC
proposal before the SEIAA. It is not the case of the respondent no.
1 that the baseline data was outdated or faulty. Therefore, viewed
from all angles, the first ToR was still valid and the second EC could
have been granted on the basis of the first ToR.
109. It also cannot be said that the very factum of issuance of the second
ToR indicated that the first ToR could no longer be put to use. We
have explained why the second ToR may have been necessary if an
additional plot was sought to be acquired by the appellant. Based
on subsequent factual developments, the appellant ensured that
the same was duly withdrawn on 21.11.2023.
V. CONCLUSION
110. A conspectus of the aforesaid discussion is as follows:
i. The RG, 2016 is mandatory in nature. It must be scrupulously
followed by the relevant authorities and the project proponents
alike during the process of obtaining/grant of permissions for
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the establishment of a CBWTF. Its non-publication in the Official
Gazette could not be said to have affected its mandatory
nature. The decision of this Court in B.K. Srinivasan (supra)
had clarified that when a strict mode of publication has not
been prescribed, either by the parent statute or the subordinate
legislation, a reasonable mode of publication may be sufficient.
Neither the EP Act nor the BMWM Rules prescribe a strict
mode of publication for the RG, 2016. Therefore, publication
in the Official Gazette, although the general rule, cannot be
said to be a sine qua non. The publication of such technical
guidelines on the official website of the CPCB was reasonably
sufficient.
ii. Moreover, the RG, 2016 lays down crucial standards which form
the foundation for the grant of EC and CTE/CTO respectively
to a CBWTF and are so deeply embedded in the existing
authorisation mechanism. All project proponents are sufficiently
made aware of its existence whilst commencing the process for
obtaining different clearances. Therefore, it cannot be argued
that they do not constitute enforceable standards for the grant
as well as revocation of permissions. Any reliance on the ratio
in Gulf Goans (supra) would, therefore, be misplaced.
iii. As per Clause 7 of the RG, 2016, the land requirement of one
acre prescribed for setting up a CBWTF may be relaxed upon
the fulfilment of one of the two pre-conditions i.e., the land
must be situated either within municipal limits with a population
of more than 25 lakh or within a rural area. Additionally,
consultation with the CPCB and the imposition of additional
control measures is mandatory. The appellant’s CBWTF is
located within Village Noorpur and is therefore, in a rural
area. Relaxation was granted only after due consultation with
the CPCB and the imposition of additional control measures
which took into account the operational effectiveness of the
CBWTF in a smaller area. Therefore, the grant of relaxation
cannot be faulted.
iv. Clause 6 of the EIA, 2006 states that an application in Form
1 can be made after the identification of prospective site(s).
Therefore, land allotment cannot be said to be a pre-condition
for the making of an application under Form 1.
[2026] 9 S.C.R. 521
M/s Punahchakran Private Limited v. Indotech Waste Solution & Ors.
v. The O.M. dated 07.10.2014 issued by the MoEF&CC clarifies
that, at the stage of appraisal of the EC i.e., at Stage IV, some
credible document showing the intent of the land owner(s) to
sell the land for the proposed project must be obtained in case
the land is being acquired through private negotiations. In the
context of the present case, such a credible document would
either be a successful allotment in favour of the appellant for
the establishment of a CBWTF or, if the allotment is not in
vogue, then a provisional allotment/acknowledgment issued
by the UPSIDA for the establishment of a CBWTF.
vi. A perusal of the order dated 20.09.2021 issued by the
MoEF&CC as well as Section 25 of the Water Act and Section
21 of the Air Act respectively, indicate that (a) the applicability
of the EIA, 2006 and the necessity of obtaining prior EC must
simply be ascertained/identified by the SPCB/PCC at the time
of grant of CTE and, (b) prior EC must be obtained before
a CTO can be granted by the SPCB/PCC. Therefore, when
the chronology is rightly understood, a CTE can be issued
before the issuance of a prior EC upon a mere assessment
of the applicability of the EIA, 2006. In that case, when the
identification of prospective site(s) is the land acquisition
requirement for making a Form 1 application under the EIA,
2006, then successful land allotment for the CBWTF cannot
be made a condition precedent, both for the making of an
application for CTE and the grant of CTE respectively. Having
said so, relaxation in land requirement, if any, in accordance
with Clause 7 of the RG, 2016 must be granted by the SPCB/
PCC in consultation with the CPCB before they can issue a
CTE for land admeasuring less than one acre.
vii. Clause 2 of the RG, 2016 does not make land procurement
or land allocation a strict pre-requisite for initiating the process
of obtaining both the EC and CTE respectively.
viii. The second EC and second CTE were both granted in favour
of the appellant on 20.12.2023 after land was allotted to it by
the UPSIDA on 19.09.2022 and after relaxation was granted
by the CPCB on 17.11.2023. Therefore, as far as the fulfilment
of land acquisition conditions are concerned, the second EC
and second CTE was not vitiated.
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ix. The setting aside of the first EC by the decision of the Tribunal
in Aniruda Panwar (supra) did not have the consequence
of rendering the first ToR invalid. There was no deliberate
concealment or non-disclosure of material information which
affected the Form 1 application or the issuance of the first
ToR. Therefore, the first ToR was intact. Considering that the
first ToR was also valid for a period of four years, the grant
of the second EC on the basis of the first ToR could not be
said to be wrong.
111. In view of all the aforesaid, we have reached the conclusion that
the NGT committed an egregious error in passing the impugned
judgment quashing the second EC and second CTE respectively.
112. As a result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby, allowed. The
impugned judgment and order passed by the NGT, Principal Bench,
is hereby set-aside.
113. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
114. Registry shall forward one copy of this judgment to the National
Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi and the Principal Bench
thereafter shall circulate the judgment to all the circuit benches of
the Tribunal
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey