Manohar Lal v. the State

1951. May 23. The Judgment of the Coon wa delivered by BosE J.-This is a criminal appeal against .a convic­ tion under section 16 of the Punjab 'frade Employees Act, 1940, as amended in 1943, read with section 7(1). The appellant is a shopkeeper who owns and runs a shop in the Cantonment Area oe Ferozepore. He has no "employees" within the meaning of the Act but is assisted by his son in running the shop. The: shop is S.C.R. SUPREME COURT. REPORTS 673 divided into two sections. In one, articles of haber­ dashery are sold; in the other, articles of stationery. Section 7(1) of the Act as amended i:equires that­ "Save as otherwise pro~ided by tbiJ Act, every shop ........ shall remain closed on a dose' 4ay." Sub-section (2) (i) states that- "The choice of a close day shall rest with the owner or occupier of a shop .... and shall be intimated to the prescribed authority within etc." The appellant made the following choice. He elected to close the haberdashery section on Mondays and the stationery section on . Saturdays and gave the necessary intimation to the prescribed authority to that effect. Ori Monday, the 17th of May, 1948, the appellant's son sold a tin of boot polish to a customer from the haberdashery section of the shop. The appellant was present in person at the time of the sale. Monday was a close day for the haberdashery section and so the appellant was prosecuted under section 16 read with section 7. The trying Magistrate held that in selling the article of haberdashery on a_ close day and in not observing Monday as a close day the appellant had infringed the provisions of section 7(1) of the Act. He accordingly convicted him and imposed a fine of Rs. 20. A revision application to the High Court failed. The High Court held that as the appellant had failed to keep his shop closed one day in the week, his convic­ tion was proper. A certificate for leave to appeal to this Court, on the ground that a substantial question of law relating to the Government of India Act, 1935, was involved, was granted and that is how we come to be seized ·of the matter. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that section 7 of the Act is ultra vires in that it does not fall under any of the items in either the Provincial or the Concurrent Legislative Lists in the Government of India Acr, 1935. In our opinion, the matter can come either under item No. 27 in List II or item No. 27 in List IIJ. 1951 Manohar Lal v. The State. Bose J. 195! Manohar Lal v. The State. Bose]. 674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1951J Item No. 27 in List II covers "trade and commerce within the Province." In our opinion, a Provincial Government could, under that entry, regulate the hours, place, date and manner of sale of any particular com­ modity or commodities. It could, ihr example, state that the sale of explosives or other dangerous subs­ tances should only be in selected areas, at specified times or on specified days when extra precautions for the general safety of the public and those directly concerned could be arranged for. That would appear to be obvious. In the same way, it could, if it so pleased, say that there shall be no sales on a particular day, say a Sunday or a Friday, or on days of religious festivals and so forth .. · Instead of doing that, it has chosen to regulate the internal trade of the Province in this manner which is only one of the various ways in which it could have acted. The matter can · also be brought under item 27 in List III : "welfare of labour; conditions of labour." The impugned section is a general one and applies to all kinds of shops; that is to say, to those in which labour is employed as well as to those which are run by the owners and their families. The Act in which the section occurs is directed at regulating the hours of employment of persons who are employed in the business of shops or commercial establishments. Therefore, in so far as section 7 covers establishments where labour is employed, it is undoubtedly intra vires. But it was argued that the section can have no appli­ cation to shops which an owner runs with or without the assistance of his family. Reliance for this was placed on section 2-A (i) and (j) which is as follows : "2-A. · Nothing in this Act shall apply to- • • • • (i) persons employed in a lll;U1agerial capacity .... and (j) the members of the family of the employer." It was argued that the salo was by the wn. He is not affected by the Act Therefore, he was entitled to sell and he could not sell unless the shop was kept S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 675 open to enable him to do so. SO also as regards the appellant, the owner, who was there in a managerial capacity. In our opinion, this is fallacious because the conviction here is not for the sale but for keeping the shop open on a close day. Section 2-A {j) does not give the son a right to keep the shop open or, for that · matter, a right to sell. All it says is that he, being a member of the family, shall not be affected by the pro­ visions of the Act. Section 7 (1), on the other hand, is directed against the owner of the shop, not against his family. It compels the owner to keep his shop closed one day in a week. It was then contended that if a person employed in a managerial capacity cannot be affected by the Act, then the appellant who was there in that capacity can­ not be compelled to close ,the shop under section 7. This is also fallacious. It happens in _the present case that the owner and the manager are the same but the Act obviously makes provision for a class of case in . which they are different. The owner is obliged to close the shop one day in a week, though the manager of the shop can work without, for example, having the twenty-four consecutive hours of rest every week which section 7-A enjoins. The appellant's capacity as mana­ ger will have to be separated from his character as owner for this purpose. Section 2-A(i) does not control section 7 (1). Lastly, it was argued that the scheme of the Act makes it plain that it is for ameliorating the conditions of labour employed in shops. It carinot therefore. apply to shops in which no labour is employed, particularly when the family of. the "employer" is expressly exclud­ ed from the purview of the Act. For this reason al~o, it cannot fall under item 27 in List III. We are of opinion that such .a narrow interpretation cannot be placed upon the entry. The legislature may have felt it necessary, in order to reduce the possibilities of eva­ sion to a minimum, to encroach upon the liberties of those who would not otherwise have been affected. That we think it had power to do. Further, to require a shopkeeper, who employs one or two men, to close and 1951 . ManoharLal v. The Stat,, Qose J. 1951 ManoharLal v. The State. Bose J. 1951 May 24 permfo his rival, who employs perhaps a dozen mctn­ bers of his family, to rctnain open, dearly places the former at a grave commercial disadvantage. To permit such a distinction might well engender discontent and in the end react upon the relations between employer and employed. All these are matters of policy into which we cannot enter but which serv.e to justify a wide and liberal interpretation of words and phrases in these entires. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant : Vidya Sagar. Agent for the;_ respondent : P. A. Mehta.