Ram Krishan and Another v. the State of Delhi
CRANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-Ram Kishan, the
first appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 43, is a partner
proprietor in the firm of Kundan Lal Raja Ram of
Saharanpur. Prem Chand, the second appellant, is
a partner in the firm of Narain Prasad and Prem
Chand in the same place. The appellant, Gian Chand,
is the munim of a firm called Lekh Raj Shambhu
Nath. Some of the Saharanpur mt'lrchants, including
1956
Ram Krishan
and another
v.
The State of Di:lhi
Chandrasi:khara
Aiyar J,
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956)
the three firms, were suspected of exporting potatoes
at concessional rates on false declarations or certifi
cates that they were seed potatoes. Police investi
gation was procee<lingin this connection at Saharan
pur in October, 1951. Madan Lal, Railway Section
Officer, examined as P. W. 4 in the case, was deputed
by the Railway Department to assist the Special
Police Establishment in the investigation. Labhu
Ram, Railway Parcels clerk in the Railway at Saha
ranpur, was deputed by the Station Master to help
the Police party.
It is alleged by the prosecution that during the pro
gress of the investigation, and after the houses and
shops of the accused persons had been searched, Ram
Kishan took Labhu Ram aside and proposed that the
three firms would be prepared to pay Rs. 2,000 if the
case was hushed up and that Madan Lal was to be
sounded. Madan Lal refused to have anything to do
with such a proposal, but as the accused persisted in
their offer, it was ultimately decided that a trap
should be laid for them at Delhi in Madan Lal's house.
It is unnecessary to narrate in detail the steps taken
in connection with this plan. The trap succeeded.
The three accused and Labhu Ram were at Delhi on
the morning of the 29th December and an increased
sum of Rs. 5,000 was paid in the sha.pe of currency
notes to Madan Lal by Ram Kishan while two police
officers and a Magistrate were hearing the con versa
tion from an adjoining room and saw the payment
through a hole in the door.
The appellants were charged under section 120-B
of the Indian Penal Code for criminal conspiracy to
cause the offence of criminal misconduct punishable
under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
(II of 1947), to be committed by Madan Lal, one of
the prosecution witnesses. They also stood charged
with an offence under the same section read with
section 116 of the Indian Penal Code for abetting the
commission of criminal misconduct by the said Madan
Lal by paying him a sum of Rs. 5,000 by way of
illegal gratification, which offence was, however, not
committed by him.
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 185
The Special Judge, Delhi; who tried the case, found
the appellants guilty under both heads of charges.
He sentenced Ram Kishan to three months' rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000;·Prem Chand
and Gian Chand to two months' rigorous imprison
ment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 each. He did not sepa
rately convict or sentence the accused under the head
of criminal conspiracy. The High Court reduced the
sentence on Gian Chand to the term of imprisonment
already undergone and a fine of Rs. 500.
There is no dispute that the amount was actually
paid to Madan Lal even though he said he could do
nothing to help the appellants, who begged him some
how to help them out of the impending prosecution.
Evidence has also been given by the Magistrate and
the police officers about the talk and the lower courts
have found on the evidence of Madan Lal and Labhu
Ram and the eavesdroppers that Rs. 5,000 was offered
as a bribe and not as compensation money in settle
ment of the amounts legitimately due to the Rail.,
way.
An attack against the concurrent findings of fact
being wholly futile in the circumstances, Mr. Sethi,
for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 43of1954,
raised some questions of law on their behalf. His
first point was that section 5(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act (II of 1947), under which the accused
were charged and convicted was inapplicable to the
facts. His second point was that Madan Lal was not
a "public servant" within the meaning of the Act and
hence the charge was unsustainable. He urged a.s
his third point that trap cases of this kind must be
sternly discouraged and deprecated by the courts,
inasmuch as opportunities for the commission of
offences should not be deliberately created so that
people who yield to the temptations of ordinary
human nature might be punished as criminals; in
other words, crimes committed under such circum
stances should be regarded only as venial and not
heinous.
To appreciate the first contention it is necessary
to pay attention to the language of section 5 of the
1956
Ram Krishan
and another
v.
The State of Delhi
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar J.
1956
Ra1n K rishan
and another
v.
The State of Delhi
Cl1audrasckhara
Aiyar J,
Prevention of Corruption Act, which is in these
terms:-
"S. 5(1) A public servant is said to commit the
offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his
duty,-
(a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees
to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for
himself or for any other person, any gratification
(other than legal remuneration) as a motive of re
ward such as is mentioned in section 161 of the
Indian Penal Code, or
(b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees
to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any
other person, any valuable thing without considera
tion or for a consideration which he knows to be in
adequate, from any person whom he knows to have
been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any
proceeding or business transacted or about to be
transacted by him, or having any connection with
the official functions of himself or of any public ser
vant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person
whom he knows to be interested in or related to the
person so concerned, or
(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappro
priates or otherwise converts for his own use any
property entrusted to him or under his control as a
public servant or allows any other person so to do,
or
(d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by other
wise abusing his position as a public servant, obtains
for himself or for any other person any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage.
(2) Any pub1ic servant who commits criminal
misconduct in the discharge of his duty shall be
punishably with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.
(3) In any trial of an offence punishable under
sub-section (2) the fact that the accused person or
any other person on his behalf is in possession, for
which the accused person cannot satisfactorily
account, of pecuniary resources or property dispro
portionate to his known sources of income may be
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 187
proved, and on such proof the Court shall presume, 1956
unless the . contrary is proved, that the accused per- Ram K rish an
son is guilty of criminal misconduct in the discharge and another
of his official duty and his conviction therefor shall v.
not be invalid by reason only that it is based solely The State of Delhi
on such presumption.
( 4) The provisions of this section shall be in Chand.-asekhara
d . d . f h l Aiyar J, addition to, an not m erogat10n o any ot er aw
for the time being in force, 1 and nothing contained
herein shall exempt any public servant from any pro-
ceeding which might, apart from this section, be in-
stituted against him".
The object of the Act as set out in the preamble is
to make more effective provision for the prevention
of bribery and corruption. A new offence of crimi
nal misconduct by a public servant is created by sec
tion 5 a~d under sub-section (2) it is made punish
able with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to seven years or with fine or with both. The offence
is of four kinds or categories. Bribery as defined in
section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, if it is habitual,
falls within clause (a). Bribery of the kind specified
in section 165, if it is habitual, is comprised in clause
(b). Clause (c) contemplates criminal breach of trust
by a public servant and the wording takes us to sec
tion 405 of the Code. It is with clause (d) that we
are really concerned in the present case.
It was argued that the intention of the Act was to
create by means of clause (d) an offence different
from a single act of bribery and that it can come into
play only when there is no offer to give and accept
ance of a bribe by a public servant. Before it can be
made applicable there must be proof, it was said,
that the public servant adopted corrupt or illegal
means and thereby obtained for himself or for any
other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advan
tage. To force a bribe out of an unwilling person is
different from the acceptance ofa bribe from a volun
tary giver and that before a charge under sectiOn
5(1), sub-clause (d) could be sustained, there must
be threat or inducement, or promise proceeding from
the public servant or duress or extortion practised by
1956
Ram Krishan
and another
v.
The State of Delhi
Chandrasekhara
Aiyar J,
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1956)
him to obta.in the pecuniary advantage. This argu
ment proceeds upon the footing that the Act seeks to
create and creates an independent offence distinct
from simple bribery. In one sense, this is no doubt
true but it does not follow that there is no overlap
ping of offences. We have primarily to look at the
language employed and give effect to it. One class of
cases might arise where corrupt or illegal means are
adopted or pursued by the public servant to gain for
himself a pecuniary ad vantage. The word "obtains",
on which much stress was laid does not eliminate the
idea of acceptance of what is given or offered to be
given, though it connotes also an element of effort
on the part of the receiver. One may accept money
that is offered, or solicit payment of a bribe, or ex
tort the bribe by threat or coercion; in each case, he
obtains a pecuniary advantage by abusing his posi
tion as a public servant. The word 'obtains' is used
in sections 161 and 165 of the Penal Code. The other
words "corrupt or illegal means" find place in .section
162. Apart from "corrupt and illegal means", we
have also the words "or by otherwise abusing his
position as a public servant". If a man obtains a
pecuniary ad;vantage by the abuse of his position, he
will be guilty under sub-clause (d). Sections 161,
162 and 163 refer to a motive or a reward for doing
or forbearing to do something, showing favour or
disfavour to any person, or for inducing such con
duct by the exercise of personal influence. It is not
necessary for art offence under clause ( d) to prove all
this. It is enough if by abusing his position as a
public servant a man obtains for himself any pecu
niary advantage, entirely irrespective of motive or
reward for showing favour or disfavour. To a certain
extent the ingredients of the two offences are com
mon, no doubt. But to go further and contend that
the offence as defined in clause (d) does not come with
in the meaning of bribery is to place too narrow a con
struction on the sub-clause. A speedy disposal of
corruption cases by special courts, the benefit of in
vestigation by higher police authorities are some of
the provisions intended for the protection of public
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 189
servants prosecuted under the Act while they are 7956
subJ"ected also to increased disabilities, namely, a Ram Krishan
longer term of imprisonment as punishment and the and a11other
... application of the presumption referred to in sub- v.
clause (3). The State of Delhi
In support of the contention that Madan Lal was
not a "public servant", reference was made to sec- Chandrasekltara
Aiyur J. tion 137 of the Indian Railways Act.. Under the Act
as it stood before it was amended by Act XVII of
1955, every railway servant was deemed to be a pub-
lic servant only for the purposes of Chapter IX of the
Indian Penal Code and it was provided by sub-clause
(4) that "notwithstanding anything in section 21 of
the Indian Penal Code a railway servant shall not
be deemed to be a public servant for any of the pur-
poses of that Code except those mentioned in Chapter
IX". The amended sub-clause (1) is in these terms:
"Every railway servant, not being a public ser
vant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal
Code shall be deemed to be a public servant for the
purposes of Chapter IX and section 409 of that
Code".
Sub-section (4) has now been omitted. The Preven
tion of Corruption Act provides by section 2 that
"For the purposes of this Act, 'public servant' means
a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian
Penal Code". The result is that before the amend
ment, railway servants were treated as public ser
vants only for the purposes of Chapter IX of the
Indian Penal Code but now as the result of the
amendment all railway servants have become public
servants not only for the limited purposes but
generally under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
It has been stated already that a trap was laid for
catching the appellants and this circumstance, ac
cording to the learned counsel for the appellants,
should be taken into account in the matter of sen
tence. In this connection, our attention was invited
to the well-known and weighty observations of Lord
Goddard, C.J., in Brennan v. Peek(1) where his Lord-
(1) (1947] 2 All E.R. 57~.
~5
1956
Ra1n K 1'ishan
and another
v.
The Side of Delhi
Chandrasekhara
AiyarJ.
ship expressed the hope that "the day is far distant
when it will become a common practice in this
country for police officers to be told to commit
an offence themselves for the purpose of getting evi
dence against someone; if they do commit offences
they ought also to be convicted and punished, for
the order of their superior would afford no defence".
While there is much to be said in support of the opi
nion expressed by the learned Chief Justice, it can
not be laid d.own as an absolute rule that the laying
of traps must be prohibited on the ground that by so
doing we hold out an invitation for the commission
of offences. The detection of crime may become diffi
cult if intending offenders, especially in cases of cor
ruption are not furnished opportunities for the display
of their inclinations and activities. Where matters go
further and the police authorities themselves supply
the money to be given as a bribe, severe condemnation
of the method is merited, as in Rao Shiv Bahadur
Singhandanotherv. The Stateof VindhyaPradesh(').
See also Ramjanam Singh v. The State of Bihar(•).
But whatever the ethics of the question might be,
there is no warrant for the view that the offences
committed in the course of traps are less grave and
call only for lenient or nominal sentences.
For the appellant in the connected Appeal No. 44
it was urged by his learned counsel that he was only a
munim of a firm and not a partner or a proprietor as
the other appellants and that it could not be stated of
him that he was interested in giving or attempting to
give any bribe for hushing up the case. There is,
however, the clear and definite evidence of Labhu Ram
that Gian Chand came along with the appellants to
him when the talk about the bribe took place. He
says that on the morning of the 29th December, 1951,
the three accused who were staying at the Coronation
Hotel, Delhi, told him that they had amongst them
selves collected Rs. 5,000 to be paid to Madan Lal
and that in the house of Madan Lal all the three
accused one by one made request to Madan Lal to
hush up the potato case pending against them. This
(ll [19MJ s.o.R. 1098. (2) Or. Appeal No. 81of1953,
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 191
is corroborated by Madan Lal who states that all the 1956
three accused said that the money had been sub- Ram Krishan
scribed by them jointly and requested him to accept and another
the same and get the case withdrawn. The case of v.
Gian Chand does not stand on any different footing The State of Delhi
from that of the other appellants.
d fi d d Chandrasekhara The convictions an sentences are con rme an AiyarJ.
the appeal will stand rejected.