Payare Lal v. State of Punjab

N. S. Rindra, R. J/. Dhebnr and D. G1Epf-<t, for re11pondcnt. l<)Ol. Augullt 30. The Jud~ement o£ the Court wu delivcrcrl by 8 .\RlU!t, .T.-The 'appellant Payarc La.l was the Teh~ilda.r of Pat iah~. Ho and Bish~\n Chand, ~ I>atwar clt'rk of the TehHil Office, wNe pros.ecute f for otfencf.>» under s.5(2) of tho Prevention ° 1~/JJ Payareuf v. Stat. 1/ Pwnjd 1961 Pcyart Lnl v. State of Pllnj'lb Sarkar J. 330 SUPREJ\.!E COURT REPORTS fl~62] Corruption Act., W4-7. The Criminal Law Amend · ment Ac:tt J!)G2 (Act XLVI of 19;j2), to which it will be convenient hcrcaJter to refer as the Act., required the trial to he held by a special .Judge appointed under it and in accordance with certain pro\·i~iona of the Code of nriminal Pro~eclure nwntioned in s. 8 of tho .Aef.. The Principal qu1:stion in this appeal turns on the construction of ::;ulH;. (I) of thi~ section wltich we will latPr set. out. The trial commenced hP-forc· ~. Xa.rincier Singh the special .Tudgc, Patiala. He Iwanl the rvidence hut before he could de1ivcr a juclgmcnt he wa.~ transferred and was succeeded by S. Ja11jit Singh. S. Jagjit Singh did not recall the witnesscE; and hear tl1e evidence over again, but proceeded without any objec-tion from either siclc, with t)w trial from the Rt~ge at which his predecessor had left it a.ud having heard tho arguments of the n.dvoC<'tteB for tho parties, drlivered J1is judgment convicting both the accused of tho offences with which they lHtrl been rhar1:od and passed certain seutcnces on them. The accused appealed against their conviction ' to tho High Court of Punjab. The appeals came tG be heard by 1\fehn.r Singh J., who, though no point had been taken by the accused, himself fe]t. comi­ derablc difficulty as to whether S. tTagjit Singh had the }lOwer to decide tb.e caso uu th<' evidence recorded by his Jlredecessor and referred the matter to a larger bench taking tl1c view that if the course followed was defective, the defect would he one of jurisdict..ion of the Court and could not he cured hy the consent of parties. Tho case wn s thereupon heard by a bench of that Hi~h Court constituted by Gurnam Singh and Mehar Singh JJ. who took different views. Gurnam Singh J. held that s. 350 of the Codo applied to the trial before a special Judge in view of s. 8( I) of the Act and under tho terms of s. 350, which we will later set out, S. Jagjit Singh was entitled to proceed on the evidence recorded by his predecessor .--. 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 331 S. Narinder Singh, while Mehar Singh J., was of the opinion that s. 8(1) of the Act did not make s. 350 of that Code applicable to such a trial. He also held that what S. Jagjit Singh had done was not~ matter of mere irregularity curable under s. 537 of the Code. The matter was then referred to Passey J., '"'ho agreed with Gurnam Singh J. On the question of s. 537 of the Code, Gurnam Singh and Passey J J. expressed no opinion in the view that they had taken of s. 8( 1) of the Act. . The appeals were thereafter heard on the merits by Tek Chand J. who upheld the conviction of the appellant but reduced the sentence passed on him. He, however, acquitted the other accused Bishan Chand, giving him the benefit of doubt. The appellanb has now come up to this Court in further appeal with special leave. There is no appeal by the State against the acquittal of Bishan Chand. There is no covnhovf'rsy that the general principle of law is tbat a judge or magistrate can -_,.., decide a case only on evidence taken by him. Sect.ion 350 of the Code is a statutory departure from this principle. That section so far as mate­ rial was at the date S. J agjit Singh decided the case in these terms : 8. 350. WlHmever any Magistrate, after ?, having heard and recorded the whole or any .... part of the evidence in an inquiry or a trial, ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another Magistrate who has and who exercises snch jurisdiction•, the Magistrate so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor, or partly recorded by his predecessor and partly recorded by himself or he may resummon the - ~'t wit.nesses an~ recommence the inquiry or trial. It is only if tl1is provision was available to S. Jagjit Singh that the course taken by him can be supported. Payart Lal v. State ~J Punjab Sarkar J. J961 Pay<~r,Lal v. Stak of Punja'.J Sarkar J. --.· ._ .. -. · As we have said earli<'r, s. 8 of the Actmak certain provisions of the Code applicable to th8 proceedings before a specinl Jndge. The questio: is whe~her s. 350 of the C.ode w~ o~e of such provisions. The answer to this questiOn Wlll depend on the constmction of an b-ss.( 1) and (3) of a. 8 of the AC't, the material portions of which w,. now set out. S. 8 (1)-A special- judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial, and in trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure prescribed bv the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ... for the trial of warrant cases hv magjstrates. - (3) Save M provided in sub-section (1) ...... ... the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 189M, shall, so far as they r.re not inconsistent witll this Act, apply to the proceedings before a specit~l Judge 1 and for the purposes of the said p.rovisions, the Court of tl1e special judge shall be deemed to be a Court of session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors .... .... ............... . In substance these su b-scctions provide that 11 special Judge shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code for the trial of warrant cases by magistrates and savo to this extent, the provisions of the Code applicable to a Court of session, shall go>ern him as if he were such a Court subject to certain qualifications which arc not relevant for the present case. Ther~ i.~ no controversy that s. 350 of the Code is applicable only t.o magistrates and not a. Court of session aud canuot therefore bo applied to n. speoinl J udga under sub-a. (3) as it makes only those pt·ov~ions of the Code &pt'licable to him which would apply to a Court of se~sio~. The. only controversy is whether that sectwn IS apphcable to a li4}Jecial Juucro under sub-s .(!} of a. 8 of the Act. If it it! so applic';.bla, it must be applied 3 S.C.R. ·SUPREME COURT REPORTS 333 though .nncl~r sub-s. (3) it is not applicable, for this sub-sectron IS to havt) effect .. 'Save as provided in sub-section (1)". . . · The real question is, what i:i meant by the words "the procedure prescribed by the Code ··· ............... for the trial of warmnt C'l.SE'S by magistrates" in s. 8(1) of the Act ? Does s. 350 of the Code pres cribe · one of the rules of such procedure ? It is necessary however to point out that by an amendm ent made in the Act after judg­ ment had been delivered in this case by S. Jaajit :Singh, it has been expressly" provided . that s. 350 of the Code applies to the proce edings before a spe cial Judge . On the amended Act, therefore, the question that has arisen in this case, would no longer arise. For reasons to be hereafter stated, this A.mendment clearly does not govern the proce­ edings before S. Jagjit Singh and this case has to be decided without reference to the amendment. Is wa.s once held by the lladras High Court in lu, re Vaidy(snatha lyer (1) that a. 350 of the Code prescribed a rule of procedure f01: the trial of warrant cases a s mentioned in s. 8 { 1) of the Act. This seems to be the only reported rlecision taking that view. All oth~r decisions which have been Lrought to our notice take the contrary view. Even in :Madt"as, in In 1·e Fernand ez ('),a Full Rench of the High Court has now held. that s. 350 of the Code was not appli cable to a. special Judge and has overruled In re Vaidyanatlla lyer (1). 'l'h:1.t appeara to Le the poaitiun on the auth orities. It is true that s. 350 of tho Code i3 a provi ­ sivn applying to all ma.gistra.tos and ther efore, also to a magistrate trying a warrant :aso. That h~w­ evor does not in our opinion dec1do t~e ~uest!on. We think it relevant to observe that 1t ts a nght of an accus ed peaon that his case should b~ decided Ly a judge who has heard the whole of 1t and we agree with the viow c:tpresijed in Fernandez's C(,8C( 2 ) (1) (19H ) I M.L.J. 1.5; A.l .R. (195. ) Mad. 350. tl> (t95~J u ~u .. .J. 2~. 1361 l'ay r<re Lat v. S tau of Prurjt1b Surkar J. 16bl l"<lyar8 Lal v. St•lt D/ Ptlnjab Sarkar J. SUPREME C'OUH1, REPORTS [1UG2] that very clear words would be neeessarv to take away suoh an important and well establi~hcd right. We find no Ruch clear words here. . \Vc ~urn now to the word used. \Vlwn sub-s. (I) of ~. B of the Aet talks of a procedure pre~;cri· bed by the Code for the trial of warrant cases bv magistrates. it is reasonable to think that it ha::; tho provision.<; and tlw language of the Code in view. \Vhen we look at the Code, wo find that eh. XXI is headed ''Of the 'rrial of 'Varra.nt Ca~m~ by )fagi­ strateA". This chaptet· consists of ss. 2;)1 to :!<39. ::)ection ~51 is in thcFic terms : S. 2.51 In the trial of warrant ca~;cs by .Magistrates, tho !\Iagistrate shall,- (a} in any case instituted ou a polico report, follow tho procedure speeifi<:d in section 251A; and ( L) in any other case, follow the proce­ dure specified in the other provisions of thio~~ Chapter. The Codt~, therefore, exprc~sly ref\,lrs to as. 251-2;)9 a.s containing the procedure specified for the trial of warrant cases by magistrate~; this then, iH the procedure it prescribes for the trial of ~uch cases. It would be legitimate, thcrcfon·, to t.hink that the A<:t in 118ing the words «procedure prescri­ bed by the Code ...... for the trial of warrant c."t.~c~ by magistrates'' abo meant only thc~e seetions of the Code and did not contemplate s. :~50 of the Code as a proceduro so prescribed, though that !iOCt.iOn is applicable to the proceedings ucforo a magistrate trying a. warrant case. It does not seem to us that tho words "the procedure prcs<.:ribcd by tho Codo ......... for th~ trial of warrant eases by magistrates" meant a procedure which may be followed by magistrates in all cases. Further more s. 350 occurs in a chapter of tho Code which deals ,~th general provisions relating to inquiries and trials and is not a provision wllich has been sprciH­ cally prescribed by the Code for application to the - 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 335 trial of 'varrant cases by magistrates, as are ss. 251 to 259. Again, s. 350 of the Code cannot, without doing violence to tha language nsed in it, be applied to the proceedings before a special Judge. Clearly it cannot be applied where its terms make such application impossible. Now the section can be applied only when one magistrate muceeds another. It lays down what the succeeding magistrate can do. Now suppose one special Judge succeeds another. How can he exercise the powers conferred by the section ? The section applies only when the prede· cessor is a magistrate. The predecessor in the case assumed is however a :::;pecial Judge. Such a Judge is not a magistrate for the purpose of the Act, nor :loes 'the Act require that he is to be deemed to be auch. Section 8 (l) of the Act which only requires a special Judge to follow the procedure for the trial of a warrant case, cannot justify the creation of a fiction making the predecessor special JudgE', a magistrate. It is of some interest to note here that the amendment to the Act which expressly make~ s. 350 of the Code applicable to proceedings before a sp<Jcial Judge also provides that for the purposes of so applying the section, ((a special Judge shall be deemed to be a magistrate". Clearly, the legisla­ ture thought that unless such a fiction was cr•:lated, the application of the section to the proceeding~ before a special Judge would create difficulties or anomalies. Therefore also, tho Act could not in our view, have intended that s, 350 of the Code would be available to a special Judge as a rule of procedure prescribed for the tr~aJ of warrant cases. For all these reasons, we would prefer the opinion expressed by Mehar Singh J. We think that under the Act, as it stood before its amend­ ment as aforesaid, s. 350 of the Code was not available when one special Judge succeeded another. We hold that S. Jagjit Singh had no authority 1961 Payare Lal v. State of Punjab Sarkar J, -F•!J6'1'1 IAI v. . 3ul4 of Funjuil -3·•~1u.r J. 335 SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1962] .mder the law to proceed with ~he trial. of the <:ase from the stage at which S. Narmder Smgh left it. The conviction by S. Jagjit Singh of the appellant cannot be supported as he had not hea~d the evi­ dence in the case himself. The proc eedmgs before him were clearly incompetent. . It is then said that this defect was a mere irregularity and t-he convi~tion of the appellant can if sustainable on the evidence , be upheld under ,., 5S 7 of the Cudc. In regard to this section , it was said by the Privy Council in Pulul.:uri Kot"YY(' v. King Emperor (1}, . •'Whon a trial is conducted in a mamwr different from that prescribed by tho Code (a.• in N. A. Subramau ia Iyer 's case, 19vl L.R. 28 I.A. 257), tho trial is bad, and uo quc11tion of curing an irregularity arises; but if the tria.l is conducted substantially in the manner pres cribed by the Vode, but some irregularity 0ccurs in the oourl!e of such conduct, the itTegularity can be cured under 11ection 537, and none the less so because ~ho irregularity involves, as must nearly always be the case, a breach of ouo or mot·e of tho very compreheru;ive provh>ioms of the Code". It seem!J to u.s that the case fall~:~ within the firet category mention ed by the Privy Council. This is not a case of irr~gula.rity but want of com­ petency. Apart from s. 3!30 which, a~; we have said, is not a.p~lica.Llo to the prl't!ent case, the Couo does not Mnoe1vc of such a tl'ial. Tho trial otfemltl the cardinal principle of law earlict· statt•d tho acceptance of whi<:h by tho Codo hi olearly ma~ift•st from tho f~ot .that ~he Code embodies an exception to that pnnc1plo m 11. 350. Therefore, we thillk that e. 537 of.tho.Code has no applicntiou. It can· not be called tn :ud to make what was incompetent, com potent. There has beeu no proper trial of the caae and there should Lo one. (IJ (I'H) L.R.. H J.A. 65, 75. \ i I t ss.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 337 Then it is said on beha lf of the appellant that we sho~ld 1~ot send the case back for a fresh trial but dec1~e .•t ours elves on the evidence 011 the record. C<?I?mg from tl~e appellant , it i:; a ijomc­ wbat surpnsmg contentwn. Accordin(J' to him a point which we ha vc accepted, there ha~ realy Lc~n no proper trial of the case. It would follow from this tha.t there has to be one. In the absence of such a trial we cannot even look at the evideuce on the record. . Lastly, we have to say a. few words on the amendme~t of the Act expressly making s. 350 of the Code applicable to the procct'dings before a special Judge. The amendment came long after the decision of the case by S. Jagjit Singh and had not expressly been made retrospective. It was said on behalf of the respondent, the prose cutor, that the amendment being in a prQcedura.l provision was necessarily retrospective, and, therefore, no excep­ tion can now be taken to the action taken by K Ja.gjit Singh. Assuming that the rule contained in s. 350 of the Code is only a ru!e of procedure, all that would follow would be tha.t it would be pre­ sumed to apply to all actions pending as well as future: Kimhray v. Draper(!). Such a retrospec ­ tive operation docs not as8ist the respondent's · contention. Nor do we think it an argument again&t .send­ ing the case Laok for retrial tha.t the special Judge now heatin(l' the case would be entitled to proceed on the evi<.l~nce recorded by S. Na.rinder Singh in \'iow of the amendment. Wh~theor he would be enti­ tled to do 60 or not would depend on whether the '-mended Act would n.pply to proceedings commen· OOd Lef'ore the ~mcndment. It has to be ncted that the impugned p~rt of the pro(..oeedings w~e co~o~~ ded before the umendmont. On this questiOn, w not propose to e:xprcBI:t &llJ opinion . In any ~vent, Und . .l- A: ...... IJiaO'lStrate er •· 350 as 1~ uow st&nUll a succee~ ~ ' . (1) [1863] s Q.l. 160. 19.61 Pa!Jllrt L<~l v. Stale of Pu11jall Sarl;nrJ. ,. li t I j t J~GJ Payart Lol v. Slak of Pu.job Sarl:D~ J . . 338 SUPREME COURT lth'POI~TS [19G2J bas power to rc1mmmon and examine a. witnc!!V furthnr. We eonnot Bpecu\atu what tho · special J uu"e who tries tho case afresh will think fit to do if s. 0 3GO of the Code is now applicable to the vr.oceed­ ings before him. For all these consiucmtions, we think it fit to scn<.l the case back for retrial. We therefore, c.~.llow ·tho appeal and set . asid~ tho conviction of the appellant and the t!entenco passed on him . 'fh~ case \Vill nQw go Lack for retrial a. ~cording to Jaw. Appeal allowt:d THE STATE 01" PUNJAB v. DARI~A 'f RA~l (J. L. lure&, K. SUDBA. RAO anu RAOUUDAlt D.U.AL JJ.) CtUtom.t Officn-lf a puliu officer-Land CIJ;1lorM­ VJ/tT~«I tmtlu IAe Stu CJUionl$ Acl-Oo11/e••io111 ~ to Ov.atom• Offi~r~- C07lt;c.lion on the ba~ti& of nu:A cOIIju&ioM­ Validity-L«nd C••:OIM Act, /!J2l (19 of l !JU) , &.9(1)-Foreig• Ezcloa111Je Rtgululi c-16 Act, 19-17 (7 of l!Jli) , •· 23(1~ta Cutllm14 ~ct, · I87S(S vf 1378) , ''· G, JG7(S)-I'uli ce Acl, 1S61 (5 of lliOI), 1. 1-bld ian Evide11ce Ac.t, llil2 (I of I.Y72) 1. 25. On receipt or information that some golu would be t.muggled from Paki.stan to India by the engine crew of the train coming from Lahore, the Land Cu3toms staff searched the engine on the arrival of the train at Amritsar and recovered a quantity of gold kept hidden underneath the toal In the tender of the engine. The driver of the~ngine, the relp ondcnt, who was arr~ted and taken to the Customs O!l'icc for luterr01,-ation, m.atle statement~ before the CU3toms offkials admittin~ bia · guilt. On the complaint of the Assistant Collector of Land CLC!tonu, the respondent was tried !.:Jt offencea under s. 23( I) CJf the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 19-17, and a. 161(8) of the Sea Cuatums Act, 1878, and convlc~ed by th~ Magl strale, _but on re\·blon the High Co~t of PunJab set '-Side the conv1c~on on the grounds iltltt ~l~ that Cu.swm, Omccrs were f ohce otrlcc:rs within the xnc:arung of tlat capreulon in a. 25 o the Ind i ~W Evidence Act, 1872, . ., _ . ~ -- .. - · ~ ··~ .. ~ - . ~- \ l '