Janapareddy Latchan Naidu v. Janapareddy Sanyasamma
Cited by 1 judgment in this corpus
- RAI RAMKRISHNA & OTHERS v. THE STATE OF BIHAR · 1963 INSC 25
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
1963
Janapareddy Latcluzn
.Naitlu
v.
J anaparetld y
Sr.myasamma
1963
/"'4;.rJiy L.telwn
NaUu
v.
1"114/xlfeJ~,
Sari1asamma
Hui•,.iullah, /,
922 StJPllME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL.
HrnA.YA.Tt;LL.i.H, J.-The respondent who is the
wife of the appellant obtained a decree for main·
tenance on August !J, l949, by which the appellant
was ordered t<J pay Rs. 3,000 per year to her on the
28th day of February of every year with interest at
6% per year if the payment was not made on the due
sate. The decree included ascertained amounts as
arrears of past maintenance and other items to which
detailed reference is not necessary. In addition to
the personal liability the decree created a charge fr'r
past and future maintenance on three lots of pro
perties.
The respondent filed execution petition No. 91
of 1952 for execution of the maintenance decree and
sought to bring the properties charged by the dei.:ree
to sale. She purchased two items of the properties
for a sum of Rs. 20,200 subject to her maintenance
charge after obtaining the permission of the Court.
Later she filed execution No. 43 of 1955 seeking to
bring to sale properties other than those purchased
l.Jy her in the earlier execution. The appellant also
liled an application under s. 4 7 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to record full satisfaction of the decree on
the ground that the respondent by purchasing the
properties subject to her charge could not maintain
a fresh application for the sale of the other proper
ties. The Subordinate Judge of Vi>akhapatnam
upheld the contention of the appellant and dismissed
the execution petition as not maintainable. The
respondent appealed to the Hi!h Court. The Hiith
Court reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge
and ordered the execution to proceed. The appellant
has now appealed after obtaining special leave from
this Court.
The short question is whether the decree_ must
be held to be satisfied because the respondent pur
chased in an earlier execution one lot of properties
subject to her charge for maintenance. Learned .
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'
• •
I
..
1 s.c.ll. SUPREME COURT REPORTS !123
counsel for the appellant contends that the respon
dent mus1 now look to the properties purchased by
her for satisfaction of her claim in respect of main·
tenance past or future. In the alternative he contends
that execution against the properties in his possession
cannot proceed till the respondent has first proceeded
against the properties with her. In our opinion
neither proposition is correct.
The maintenance decree passed by the Subor·
dinate Judge of Visakhapatnam is not only a decla
ratory decree but also an executory decree. It
provides that the appellant shall pay to the respon·
dent Rs. :l,00() per year as maintenance on the
28th day of February of every year as long as she
lives. When the first execution was levied the
amounts due up lo J unc 28, 1!152, were realised by
the sale of the properties of lots I and 2. The res·
pondent as the auction-purchaser deposited Rs. 6,010
to\)'ards the balance of the purchase price after dedu
ctipg the maintenance amount under the decree as it
thon stood. The present execution concerns the sum
which fell due between June 28, 1952, and
February 28, Hl55. Included in this sum are
Rs. 8,000 towards maintenance and Rs. 867·8-0
towards costs.
The contention of the appellant is that the
respondent having purchased the first lot of properties
subject to the charge cannot now recover this amount
from the properties remaining with the appellant.
In other words, the appellant contends that there is
some kind of merger of the right under the mainte·
nance decree with the right arising from the auction
purchase and the respondent can enforce her' right
only against those properties which she has purchased
and not against properties which remain with the
appellant.
The argument involves a fallacy because it
ISSume& th"t a charge created by a decree on a
i963
J1u1apareddy Lcteha
Naidu
v.
JaMpa1'i4:J
StUIJaamma
flid•yatulloh, J,
196'
!~:iLatcJ.m
v. ,..,,,.,,..,, s_...
Hid41.i.lloh, J.
number of properties disappears when the charge
holder in execution of the charge-decree purchases
one lot of properties. An executory charge-decree
for maintenance becomes ex~cutable again and again
as future sums become due. The executability of
· the decree keeps the charge alive on the remaining
properties originally charged till the future amounts
cease. In other words the charge subsists as long as
the decree subsists. By the execution the charge is
not transferred in its entirety to the properties pur
chased by the charge·holder. Nor is the charge
divided between those properties and those which
still remain with the judgment debtor. The whole
of the charge continues over all the properties jointly
and severally. ~or is any priority established between
the properties purchased by the charge-holder and
those that remain. It is not permissible to seek an
analogy from the case of a mortgage. A charge is
different from a mortgage. A mortgage is a transfer of
an interest in property while a charge is merely a right
to receive payment out of some specified property.
The forru~r is described as jns in rem and the latter
as only a Jus ad rem. In the case of a simplt"
mortgage, there is a personal liability express or
implied but in the case of charge there is no such
personal lial;ility and the decree, if it seeks to charge
the judgment-debtor personally, has to do so in
addition to the charge. This being the distinction it
apor.ars to us that the appell;mt's contention that the
cori>eq uences of a mortgagee acquiring a share of the
mortgagor in a portion of the mortgaged proprety
obtain in the case of a charge is ill-founded. The
charge can be enforced against all the properties or
severally.
In the present case the respondent could
proceed at her option to recover the arrears of main
tenance as they fell due from any of the properties
which were the subject of the charge, that is to say,
those which were in the p<>llllC8Sion and ownership of
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 925
the appellant and those in the possession and owner
ship as auction-purchaser. There is nothing in law
which requires the respondent to proceed against the
properties which she had earlier purchased. There is
no question of marshalling of these properties. It is
true that the Court may decide which of the proper
ties charged should be sold and in what order and the
Court does choose between different properties when
ordering sale. To that extent the Court can assist
a judgment-debtor. But this can only be in respect
of the properties which the judgment-debtor holds
and against which the charge-holder wants to
proceed. But the Court cannot say to the, charge
holder that he must exhaust his remedies over and
over again against the properties purchased by him
in execution of his charge-decree and subject to his
own charge. Therefore, between the appellant and
the respondent the Court cannot order the respondent
to proceed against properties in her possession even
though it can make an election on behalf of the
appellant and enforc~ the charge against one item in
preference to another belonging to him .
In our opinion the respondent was entitled to
proceed against the remaining properties in the hands
of the appellant which continued charged. The
executing court may, of course, sell only such items
as may be sufficient to meet the present dues under
the decree but the appellant cannot insist that the
respondent should proceed against the properties
• acquired by her under the first sale. We express no
opinion on the question whether the decree can re
__personally executed against the appellant because
that question did not arise here. The appeal accord
ingly fails and is dismissed with costs. ... .
Appeal dismissed.
I!lf3
Janapor1dJy Latd,an
Nllidu
"· I a..pare#y
S111yas1tnm•
Hid1ydullah, J,
/