Podar Plastics(p) Ltd v. Its Workmen
Cited by 1 judgment in this corpus
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
-
GAJENDRAGADKAR J .-This appeal arises from an Gajendragadkar /.
Industrial diSQute between the appellant Podar Plastics (P)
Ltd. and the respondents, its workmen, and it has reference
to the claim made by the respondents for bonus for the year
1959. The respondents claim that for the relevant year they.
should get bonus equivalent to three months' salary includ
ing dearness allowance. On hearing the parties and on con
sidering the evidence adduced by them, the Tribunal has
directed that the appellant shall pay to the respondents
bonus at the rate of half month's basic wages excluding
allowances and overtime for the said year. It is against this
award that the appellant has come to this Court by special
leave.
The appellant is a private company and its registered
office is situated at Podar Chambers, Parsee Bazar Street,
i Fort, Bombay. It owns a factory at Supari Baug Road
where it manufactures plastic products. The appellant's
case before the Tribunal was that if proper accounts are
made in accordance with the Full Bench Formula, it would
be found that there is no available surplus from which any
bonus can be paid to the respondents. On the other hand,
the respondents urged that the working of the Formula
would show a substantial available surplus from which three
months' wages as bonus can be easily paid. As usual, the
controversy between the parties centered round prior charges
~ which the appellant claimed ought to be deducted from the
gross profits. One of the points of dispute between the
134-159 S.C.-2.
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964)
1963 parties was whether depreciation which has to be deducted
P<Hl•r p;;;;;ic• (P) as a prior charge should be statutory depreciation or
Ltd. notional normal depreciation. The figure of the profit was
11, .;~rkmen admitted at Rs. 2 · 70 lacs. The Tribunal made alternative
calculations, one on the basis that statutory depreciation
G•i•ndra1adk17 1· alone should be deducted, while the other was prepared on ·
the basis that notional normal depreciation as claimed by
the appellant should be deducted. On the first calculation
the available surplus was found to be Rs. 0 · 44 lac. On the
alternative calculation, it was found to be Rs. 0 · 33 lac. For
the purpose of this appeal we will accept the latter calcula
tion which is made on the basis that the notional normal
depreciation has to be deducted.
It. has been conceded before us by the learned Addi.
Solicitor-General for the appellant that there are two mis
takes in this calculation. The amount of notional normal
depredation which has been shown as Rs. 0 · 78 lac ought to
be Rs. 0 · 73 lac. Similarly the amount of income-tax which
is shown as Rs. 0·96 lac ought to be Rs. 0·95 lac. Thus,
the two mistakes accounting for nearly Rs. 6,000 have
been made in favour of the appellant by the Tribunal in
making this calculation, and that would make the available
surplus as Rs. 0·39 lac; that is .one aspect of the matter
which has to be borne in mind iii dealing with the appeal
before us.
The main point which has been urged before us hy the
learned Addi. Solicitor-General relates to the claim made
by the appellant for the deduction as a prior charge of
Rs. 60,000 by way of notional remuneration for Mr. K. R.
Podar, one of the Directors of the Company. We have
already seen that the appellant is a Private Ltd. Co. and
four of the major shareholders are members of the Podar
family; they are: R.A. Podar, G.R. Podar, K.R. Podar and
B.J. Podar; the 5th shareholder is M/s. Podar Trading Co.
Private Ltd., 6th is Jay Agents Private Ltd., 7th is the
National Traders Private Ltd. and the 8th is Ratilal B.
Desai. According to the appellant, K.R. Podar devoted
the whole of his time to the supervision and management of
the appellant concern, and so, he was entitled to charge
remuneration at th.! rate of Rs. 5,000 a month. In sup-
{
6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS I9
port of this claim, Mr. Gupta, the Manager of the concern, - If'3
made an affidavit and offered himself for cross-examination. Podar pT.;ics (P)
He stated that Mr. Podar attends the factory from 9 A.M. to l Ltd.
P.M. and 2-30 P.M. to 6-30 P.M. In his cross-examination, it Its ;;,kmen
was brought out that when the previous Director was paid G . d-dk 1 . . a Jen raga -ar •
Rs. 1000 per month as remunerat10n, a resoluhon had
been passed by the Board of Directors in that behalf; but
no such resolution has been passed in regard to the
remuneration of Mr. K. R. Podar. Besides, the appellant
itself has urged that Mr. Podar did not actually charge any
remuneration because it was thought that the financial posi-
tion of the appeUant was n'ot very satisfactory, and so, Mr.
Podar wanted to save expenditure on account of his re-
muneration. It may be conceded that in a concern like
the appeUant's if one of the Directors spends his time in
supervising and managing the affairs of 'the concern, he
would be entitled to charge a reasonable remuneration. This
position has not been and cannot be disputed in view of
the decisions of this Court in Gujarat Engineering ClJmpany
v. Ahmedabad Misc. Industrial Workers' Union('). and
Kodaneri Estate v. Its Workmen and Another('). Relying
on these decisions, it is urged on behalf of the appellant that,
\he Tribunal was in error in not allowing any deduction on
account of remuneration to Mr. Podar.
In our opinion, the appellant cannot seriously quarrel
with the finding of the Tribunal, because it is conceded that
Mr. Podar in fact has not charged any remuneration. The
working of the Formula is no doubt notional in some res
pects, but we think it would not be permissible for the
employer to make it still more notional by introducing
claims for prior charges on purely hypothetical and almost
fictional basis. If Mr. Podar had been paid remuneration
regularly and it had been duly shown in the books of
account, a claim in that behalf could have been made by
the appellant, and subject to the scrutiny by the Industrial
Tribunal as to reasonableness of the said payment, such a
claim would have been allowed; but if for any reasons Mr.
Podar did not charge any remuneration, it would be unfair
t<i allow a deduction on that account to be made notionally
('J [19611 II L.L.J 660. (1) [1960! I L.L.J. 273.
1963
Podar Plastics (P)
Ltd.
v.
Its Workmen
Gajendragadkar J.
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
because the working of the Formula is sometimes described
as notional. The inclusion of such an item solely for the
purpose of depressing the available surplus cannot, in our
opinion, be allowed. Besides, the Tribunal does not ap
pear to have accepted the evidence for Mr. Gupta and it
has made a significant comment that Mr. K. R. Podar has
himself not stepped into the witness-box to make a claim for
his remuneration. Mr. Gupta was asked whether Mr.
Podar was going to give evidence, and he answered the
question in the negative. Therefore, i[ in the circumstances
proved in this case, the Tribunal did not feel justified in
allowing the claim for deduction made by the appellant in
regard to the notional remuneration of Mr. Podar, the
appellant cannot make a serious grievance.
The other point in controversy is in regard to the direc
tion of the Tribunal that the appellant was not entitled to
make any claim for rehabilitation. It appears that the
Tribunal was inclined to take the view that since the ap
pellant had begun its business with second-hand machinery,
it was not entitled to make a claim for rehabilitation on the
basis of replacement of the said machinery by brand new
machinery. In other words, the Tribunal seems to be of
the opinion that in cases where an employer is carrying on
his business with second-hand machinery, rehabilitation
should be calculated on the basis that the said second-hand
machinery would be replaced by second-hand machinery and
not by new machinery. This view has been rejected by this
Court in the case of South India Mil/owners' Association
and Ors. v. Coimbatore District Textile Workers' Union and
Ors('). Therefore, the appellant is right in contending that
the approach adopted by the Tribunal in dealing with the
question of rehabilitation is erroneous.
That, however, does not help the appellant because in
the present case. the Tribunal has considered the evidence
given by Mr. Dinshaw on behalf of the appellant in sup
port of its claim that the rehabilitation requirement of the
appellant would be of the order of Rs. 8,84,629. It is true
that one of the reasons given by the Tribunal is that the
(1) [I9f'] l!L.L.J. 223,
'•
6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 21
appellant is not justified in making a claim for rehabilita- 1961
" tion on the basis that new machinery would be purchased Podar Plastics (P)
by him for rehabilitating his old one; but there are several Ltd.
other reasons which the Tribunal has discussed and these Its w:rkmen
reasons indicate that the Tribunal was not satisfied with --
the accuracy of the statements made by Mr. Dinshaw and Giiiendragadkar l
their reliability. Incidentally, it appears that the appellant
made a novel claim for rehabilitating his dead stock as· one
of the items under rehabilitation, and the Tribunal has re-
jected that claim. In the result, the finding of the Tribunal
i is based on its appreciation of the evidence led by the
appellant and that cannot be disturbed having regard to the
material which is available on the record. The Tribunal
has taken the precaution of adding that if the appellant leads
better evidence in future, its claim for rehabilitation would
have to be judged on the merits and the present decision
will not create any bar against it. In our opinion, that is
all that can be done in the present appeal.
The learned Addi. Solicitor-General, however, attempted
to argue that the Tribunal should have made some allow
ance for rehabilitation on an ad hoc basis and in support
of this contention, he has referred us to some of the obser
vations made in the case of South India Millowners' Associa
tion('). It appears that in that case, the appellant Mills
had not adduced relevant evidence about the original price
and subsequent depreciation of the machinery prior to its
purchase by the appellant, and so. acting on the evidence
available on the record, the Tribunal adopted some ad hoc
basis. No grievance was made about the ntl hoc basis
adopted by the Tribunal; the only grievance made was
against certain observations made by the Tribunal that if
the existing machinery is >ccond hand. it should be rehabili
tated only by second hand machinery. and this Court held
that the said observations did not represent the true legal
position in the matter. It would, we think, be erroneous to
assume that this Court approved of or affirmed the ad hoc
basis adopted by the Tribunal in that particular case. On
what material the said ad hoc basis was adopted is not
known, and it would, we think, be unreasonable to suggest
that if the employer does not adduce sufficient evidence to
(1) [1962] I L.L.J. 223.
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [rg64J
196J justify his claim for rehabilitation and the Tribunal is in
Podar Pla.<tics (P) clined to reject the evidence which has been adduced, the
Ltd. Tribunal must nevertheless award some rehabilitation on a v.
Its Workmen purely hypothetical and imaginary ad hoc basis. In such
.Gai•nd-;;;,dkar J. a case all that the Tribunal can do is to safeguard the posi
tion of the employer by giving him opportunity to adduce
better evidence in future, and that is what the Tribunal has
done in the present case.
An attempt was then made by the learned Addi. Solici
tor-General to make a claim for the deduction of the wealth
tax. It has been consistently held by this Court that in
bonus calculations the employer is entitled to claim a deduc
tion of the income-tax as well as wealth tax; but, in the
present case, there is no material to determine what the
amount of wealth tax charged or paid is, and so, no relief
can be granted to the appellant on that account.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed wi!h
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
BOMBAY UNION OF JOURNALISTS & ORS.
v.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY & ANR.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO AND K. C. DAS '
GUPTA JJ.)
Industrial Dispute-Reference by Government-Discretion of Govern·
ment-Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), s. 25F-Scope of-Duty
of Government to make a reference.
The appellants 2 and 3 were working journalists and they 14-:re
retrenched on payment of three months salary in lieu of notice. The
first appellant took up their case and alleged that the retrenchment was
not bona fi.de and they were in fact victimised. On the failure of conci·
liation procee'din.gs a report was submitted to the State Government
(respondent No. I). After hearing the parties concerned the Govem
a111t pup<! aa order rofusi•I to refor Iha dispute. The reasons given
J