Ramnikal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth

April 28, 1964. The Judgment of the Court was deli­ vered by h b D I RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J.-This appeal, by special leave, is "l.ag u ar UJ• J. directed against the order of the Bombay High Court and raises the question of the true construction of sub-els. (g) and (hh) of sub-s. ( 1.) of s. 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Act LVII of 194 7), hereinafter called the Act. The facts leading to the appeal, in short, are that the appellant is a tenant of the ground-floor of a house owned by the respondent.. The respondent sued for the ejectment of the appellant on the ground that he required the entire house, including the portion occupied by the appellant, for his residential purpose. He further stated in the plaint: "The whole suit bungalow is very old-built about 75 years ago and at present its different parts are likely to give way and collapse. Before sometime, a little portion of an upper balcony had collapsed. In the circumstances, on find· in& it unsafe to stay in it without making addio tions, Iii.rations and necessary chan,., I, tho plainti!, 11D obliged to wait till I &et po119- lion of thl whole bwlaatow. --. - -- -- 8 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 3 I, the plaintiff, have got the upper portion of the said 1964 suit bungalow vacated at present and only after Ramnlhl Pil .. the whole bungalow is got overhauled as stated bardu in para above. I, the plaintiff can utilize it for 1nJr:J-. my personal use." .ifmratlal The appellant contested the suit on various grounds Raghub.,. Dr/• including the ones that the respondent did not reasonably and bona fide require the premises for his occupation and that he did not reasonably and bona fide require the premises for carrying out repairs. The trial Court found that the respondent bona fide re­ quired the premises for his occupation. It repelled the con­ tention of the appellant that the provisions of s. 13 (1 )(g) would not be applicable when the landlord did not wish to occupy the premises as such but intended to occupy it after carrying out major repairs. and decreed the respondent'' suit for ejectment. The defendant went up in appeal. It was dismissed. The appellate Court, agreed with the views of the trial Court. The defendant then presented a revision petition to the High Court. It was rejected. 1t is against this order that he has filed this appeal. A preliminary objection has been taken that the revision to the High Court was incompetent as no question of juris­ diction was involved. For the appellant it is urged that on the facts found. the trial Court assumed jurisdiction which it did not have and that therefore the revision was compet­ ent. We uphold the preliminary objection and hold that the revision was incompetent. The question raised was whether a decree in ejectment should be passed on the ground of personal requirement under s. 13 (l )(g) of the Act where it was proved that the landlord wanted to pull down the premises and build an­ other and then occupy it. It was said that in such a case he had to proceed under cl. (hh) of s. 13 (1). It is clear that the question so raised is one of interpretation of these two clauses. Section 28 of the Act gives jurisdiction to the Court specified in it, to try a suit or proceeding between SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1g64] 196' a landlord and tenant relating to possession of the premises. ~ Pllam- Th.at section expressely provides that no other Court, sub- bardtll ject to the provisions of sub-s. ( 2) which do not apply to .,~,,_ this case, has jurisdiction to entertain such suits. It is clear A.mrat/al from this section that the trial Court had full jurisdiction to ;,,,1r.,,;;;;D111a1 J. entertain the suit for ejectment. That being so, it had jurisdiction to interpret whether cl. (g) of s. 13 (1) would apply to the present case. The appellate Court had juris­ diction to hear the appeal. The High Court could not, therefore, interfere in revision with the decision of the appel­ late Court, even if it had gone wrong, on facts or law, in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It follows that the revision application had to be dismissed by the High Court and that this appeal too must fail. Since the merits of the case have been argued fully before us, we express our opinion on the law point urged before us. The sole question to determine in this appeal is whe­ ther the respondent's case came within the provfaions of s. 13 (1 )(g) of the Act or fell within the provisions of s.13(l)(hh). We may now set out these provisions: "13 ( 1) NothwithstandinB anything contained in thi.i Act but subject to the provisions of section 15, a landlord shall be entitled to recover posses­ sion of any premises if the Court is satisfied ... (g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the pre­ mises are required for occupation for the pur­ poses of the trust; or (hh) that the premises consist of not more than two floors and are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate puxposc of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting new build­ ing on the premises sought to be demolished." - 8 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS s A landlord can sue for the ejectment of his tenant in 19U view of s. 13 ( 1) for various reasons including the one that Ratnihl PIJ he requires the premises reasonably and bona fide for occu· bardt11 pation by himself. The respondent alleged, and the Ccurts J~a­ below have found, that he bona fide required the premises in AmratlaJ the suit for occupation by himself. The respondent stated Ratllubar Da; in the plaint that he would take up residence in the pre- mises after overhauling it. It is on this account that the appellant submits that the case falls under s. 13(1)(hh), as the respondent wants the premises for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and erecting a new building. It is further contended for the appellant that the two grounds for ejectment under els. (g) and (hh) are mutu·11Iy exclusive and therefore a landlord cannot take advantage of cl. (g) when his case falls under cl. (hh) in view of the immediate steps he has to take after getting possession of the premises. We need not express an opinion on this point, as, for reasons to be mentioned later, the case falls under cl. ( g) and not under cl. (hh) of s. 13 (1) of the Act. We agree with the Courts below that the respondent's case falls~under cl. (g) when he bona fide requires the pre­ mises for his own occupation. The mere fact that he intends to make alterations in the house either on account of his_ sweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, does not affect the question of his requiring the house bona fide and reasonably for his oc· cupation, when he has proved his need for occupying the house. There is no such prohibition either in the language of cl. (g) or in any other provision of the Act to the effect that the landlord must occupy the house for residence with· out making any alterations in it. There could ot 'Je any logical reason for such a prohibition. Under ordinary faw, the landlord is entitled to eject his tenant whenever he likes, after following certain procedure except in case' where he has contracted not to eject him before the happening of a certain event. The Act restricts that general right of the landlord in the special circumstances prevailing in regard to the availability of accommodation and the incidental abuse of those circumstances by landlords in dcmandmg unjustifiably high rents. 6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ~ The Act has provided sufficient protection to the teuants -nikal l'itlllfl· against being harassed by threat of ejectment in case they ba~~iu are unable to satisfy landlords' demands. ' Various restric· IndraJa,,..,. tions have been placed on the right of the landlord to eject A.~lal the tenant. Section 12 O) provides that the landlora shall 01hubar D1qal J. not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the amount of the standard rent and permitted i!_!creases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of ~e tenancy in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the Act. Section 13 provides exceptional cases in which the landlord can eject the tenant even though he had been paying rent regularly or be ready and willing to pay rent. The provisions of s. 13 are for the advantage of the land­ lord and the various grounds for ejectment mentioned in that section are such which reasonably justify the ejectment of the tenant in the e~rcise of the landlord's general right to eject his tenant. There is therefore no reason why restric· tions not mentioned in the grounds be read into them. We do not therefore agree with the contention that cl. (g) will apply only when the landlord bona fide needs to occupy the premises without making any alteration in them, i.e., to occupy the identical building which 'the tenant occupies. There is no justification to give such a narrow construction either to the word 'premises' or to the word 'occupies' which have been construed by this Court in Krishamal lshwar/al Desai v. Bai Vijkor(') referred to later. There are provisions in the Act which ensure that the provisions of cl. (g) are not abused. Section 17 provides that if the premises are not occupied within a period of one month from the date the landlord recovers possession or the premises are re-let within a period of one year of the said date to any person other than the original tenant, the Court may order the landlord, on the application of the original tenant, within the time prescribed, to place him in occupa· tion of the premises on the original terms and conditions, This tends to ensure that a landlord does not eject a tenant unless he really requires the premises for occupation by himsell. (1) [1964] 1, S.C.R. 553. ·- ' 8 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 7 We are therefore of opinion that once the landlord esta- l964 blishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occu- RllmnlM Pl! pation. he is entitled to recover possession of it from the barda1 tenant in view of the provisions of sub-cl. (g) of s. 13(1) Indt~1M irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the pre- A.mratlal mises without making, any alterations to them or after mak- Raihub,;D., ing the necessary altetations. I The provisions of cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to the case where a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish the premises and /to erect a new building on them. The provisions of cl. '(hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenants. This is clear from the provisions of sul:>­ s. (3A) which provide that a landlord has to give certain undertaking before a decree for eviction can be passed on the ground specified in cl. (hh). He has to undertake that the new building will have not less than two times the num­ ber of residential tenements and not less than two times the fioor area contained in the premises sought to be demolish­ ed, that the work of demolishing the premises shall be com­ menced by him not later than one month and shall be com­ pleted not later than three months from the date he recovers posession of the entire premises and that the work of erec­ tion of the new building shall be completed by him not later than fifteen months from the said date. These under­ takings thus provide for a time schedule for the new build­ ing to come up into existence and ensures atleast the doubl­ ing of the residential tenements, i.e., rooms or groups of rooms rented or offered for rent as a unit: vide s. 5(12) of the Act. · Such undertakings would be unnecessary if the landlord seeks to eject the tenant from the premises in order to occupy the premises himself after making the necessary alterations to suit his conveniences. Further, s. 17 A provides for the ejected tenant's re-occupying the premises in case the land­ lord does not start the work of demolition within the period specified in sub-s. (3A). Section 17B provides for the ejected tenant to notify to the landlord within six months 1914 from the date on which he delivered vacant possession of the ~ 1'.itam- premises of his intention to occupy a tenement in the new bardtu building on its completion on the conditions specified in the J~an section. Section 17C provides that the landlord. would inti- .4.mrotlal mate to the tenant the date when the new building would be •gltub-;;;Dayal J. complete and that the tenant would be entitled to occupy the tenement on that date. These provisions clearly establish that the provisions of cl. (hh) apply when the landlord desires to demolish the premises for the purpqse of erecting a new building on the premises for being let to tepants. We may mention that the provisions of clauses similar to els. (g) and (hh) of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 13 of the Act have been construed in this way in Krishna Das v. Bidhan Chandra('), McKenna v. Porter Motors Ltd. (2 ), and Betty's Cafes Ltd. v. Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd. (3 ). The appellant has referred us to two cases of the Bombay High Court which tend to support him in so far as it is held in them that in circumstances similar to the present one, the case would come under cl. (hh) of s. 13 (1) and not under cl. (g). They are: Manchharam Ghe/abhai Pittalwala v. The Surat Electricity Co. Ltdt.(') and A/larkha Fakir­ mahomed v. The Surat Electricity Co. Ltd.(•). The latter case followed the previous one. In the former case the High Court said: "Indeed the expression 'occupation' occurring in clause (g) means 'possession followed by actual occupation', while for the purpose of clause (hh) what is necessary is 'possession for the purpose of demolition'. 'Occupation' within clause (g) would include 'possession', as it is obvious that one cannot occupy unless one is able to possess. but in the case of clause (hh) it is clear that. it is not necessary to occupy for the purpose of' demolition. What is necessary is that the l.and- (1) A.LR. 1959, Cal. 181 ; (2) [1956] A. c. 688; (3) f1959] A. C. 20 ; (4)-Civil Revisio~ /lpplication No. 204/56 decided on I-2-57 by the Bomb•!' High Court. (5) Civil Revision Appu<:lltion No. 164/57 decided on s-10-57 by the l!ombay Hiah Cuurt. - 8 S.<.;.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 9 lord must possess in order to enable him to 1961 demolish and erect a new building." Rmltnikal PIW Demolition of the existing building and subsequent erec- ~ lion of a new building are only intermediate steps in order lndr~ Amratlal to make Jhe building fit for occupation by the landlord; In Krishan/al I swarlal Desai' s case ( 1) this Court said in R.aghubar Dayal oonnection with the provisions of s. 17 ( 1) of the Act: "What is, hoyiever, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf .•••.• ,, 'Occupation' of the premises in cl. ( g) does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence. The owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. In a case like the present, if the plaintiffs on getting possession start their work of demolition within the prescribed period, they would have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their . occupation. We therefore hold that the respondent's case came within cl. (g) of sub-s. (1) of s. 13 of the Act and therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. Three months allowed for vac.atmg · the premises on the defendant tenant undertaking to vacate the premises himself during this period. Appeal dismissed. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS v. THE AMRUTANJAN LTD., MADRAS , (K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH ANDS. M. SU;RI, JJ.) Income Tax-Object and scope of s. 23-A-"Company in which tht! pu1,lic are substantially interested''-Mt:aning of-Indian Income T~ Ac1, 1922 (11 of 1922), 1. 23-A. The Income-tax Officer found that the respondent company had declare.I during the three years ending March 31, 1947, March 31, 1948· (I) (1964] r S.C.R. 553. 1961 April, 2/t..