Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.

Raghubar Dayal, J. Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande, appellant D No. 1, was married to the complainant Indubai in about 1956. He married Kamlabai in February 1962, during the lifetime of Indubai. Deorao Shankar Lokhande, appellant No. 2, is the brother of the first appellant. These two appellants, together with Kam!abai and her father and accused No. 5, a barber, were tried for an offence under s. 4 94 I.P. C. The latter three were acquitted by E the Magistrate. Appellant No. 1 was convicted under s. 494 I.P.C. and appellant No. 2 for an offence under s. 494 read with s. 114 1.P.C. Their appeal to the Sessions Judge was dismissed. Their revision to the High Court also failed. They have preferred this appeal by special leave. The only contention raised for the appellants is that in law it was necessary for the prosecution to establish that the alleged second marriage of the appellant No. 1 with Kamlabai· in 1962 had been duly performed in accordance with the religious rites applic­ able to the form of marriage gone through. It is urged for the appellants that the essential ceremonies for a valid marriage were G not performed during the proceedings which took place when ap­ pellant No. l and Kam!abai married each other. On behalf of the State it is urged ti!at the proceedings of ihat marriage were in accordance with the custom prevalent in the community of the appellant for gandharva form of marriage and that therefore the second marriage of appellant No. 1 with Kam!abai was a valid H marriage. It is also urged for the State that it is not necessary for the commission of the offence under s. 494 I.P.C. that the second B. S. LOKHANDE v. STATE (Dayal, /.) 839 A marriage be a valid one and that a person going through any form of marriage during the life-time of the first wife would com­ mit the offence under s. ~~4 lP.C. even if the later marriage be void according to the law applicable to that person. Section 494 I.P.C. reads : B "Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished With imprisonment of either descrip­ tion for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine." Prima facie, the expression 'whoever .... marries' must mean 'whoever .... marries validly' or 'whoever .... marries and whose marriage is a valid one'. If the marriage is not a valid one, accord­ ing to the law applicable to the parties, no question of its being void by reason of its taking place during the life of the husband D or wife of the person marrying arises. If the marriage is not a valid marriage, it is no marriage in the eye of law. The bare fact of a man and a woman living as husband and wife does not, at any rate, normally give them the status of husband and wife even though they may hold themselves out before society as husband and wife and the society treats them as husband and wife. Apart from these consid_erations, there is nothing in the Hindu law, as applicable to marriages till the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, which made a second marriage of a male Hindu, during the life-time of his previous wife, void. Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that a marriage may be solem- F niud between any two Hindus if the conditions mentioned in that section are fulfilled and one of those conditions is that neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage. Section 17 provides that any marriage between two Hindus solemniud after the com­ mencement of the Act is void if at the date of such marriage either party had a husband or wife living, and that the provisions of G ss. 494 and 495 I.P.C. shall apply accordingly. The marriage between two Hindus is void in view of s. 17 if two conditions are satisfied : (i) the marriage is solemnized after the commencement of the Act; (ii) at the date of such marriage, either party had a spouse living. If the marriage which took pl~ce between the appel­ lant and Kamlabai in February 1962 cannot be said to be 'solem- H nized', that marriage will not be void by virtue of s. 17 of the Act and s. 494 I.P .C. will not apply to such parties to the marri­ age as had a spouse living. L4Sup./6S-7 840 SUPllEMB COUltT IU!POR.TS (1965] 2 S.C.R. The word 'solemnize' means, in connection with a marriage, A 'to celebrate the marriage with proper ceremonies and in due form', according to the Shorter O)dord Dictionary. It follows, therefore, that unless the marriage is 'celebrated or performed with prop« ceremonies and due form' it cannot be said to be 'solemnized'. It is therefore essential, for the purpose of s. 17 of the Act, that the marriage to which s. 494 l.P.C. applies on account of the provi- B sions of the Act, should have been celebrated with proper cere­ monies and in due form. Merely going through certain ceremonies with the intention that the parties be taken to be married, will not make them ceremonies prescribed by law or approved by any esta­ blished custom. We are of opinion that unless the marriage which took place between appellant no. 1 and Kamlabai in February 1962 was per­ formed in accordance with the requirements of the law applicable. to a marriage between the parties, the marriage cannot be said to have been 'solemnized' and therefore appellant no. 1 cannot be D held to have committed the offence under s. 494 l.P.C. We may now determine what the essential ceremonies for a valid marriage between the parties are. It is alleged for the respon­ dent that the marriage between appellant no. 1 and Kamlabai was in 'gandharva' form, as modified by the custom prevailing E among the Maharashtrians. It is noted in Mul/ds Hindu Law, 12th Edition, at p. 605 : "The Gandharva marriage is the voluntary union of a youth and a damsel which springs from desire and sen- sual inclination. It has at times been erroneously descri- F bed as an euphemism for concubinage. This view is based on a total misconception of the leading texts of the Smritis. It may be noted that the essential marriage ceremonies are as much a requisite part of this form of marriage as of any other unless it is shown that some modification of those ceremonies has been introduced by G custom in any particular community or caste." At p. 615 is stated: "(l) There are two ceremonies essential to the vali- dity of a marriage, whether the marriage be in the H Brahma form or the Asura form, namely- ( l) invocation before the sacred fire, and \ B. s. LOr;HANI)B V. STATB (Dayal. 1.) 841 (2) saptapadi, that is, the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire. (2) A marriage may be completed by the perform­ ance of ceremonies other than those referred to in sub­ section (1), where it is allowed by the custom of the caste to which the parties belong." It is not disputed that these two essential ceremonies were not c performed when appellant no. 1 married Kamlabai in February 1962. There is no evidence on record to establish that the per­ formance of these two essential ceremonies has been abrogated by the custom prevalent in their community. In fact, the prosecu­ tion led no evidence as to what the custom was. It led evidence of what was performed at the time of the alleged marriage. It was D the counsel for the accused in the case who questioned certain witnesses about the performance of certain ceremonies and to such questions the witnesses replied that they were not necessary for the 'gandharva' form of marriage in their community. Such a statement does not mean ~at the custom of the community deemed what took place at the 'marriage' of the appellant no. 1 and E Kamlabai, sufficient for a valid marriage and that the performance of the two essential ceremonies had been abrogated. There ought to have been definite evidence to establish that the custom preva­ lent in the community had abrogated these ceremonies for such , form of marriage. What took place that night when appellant no. 1 married Kamlabai, has been stated thus, by P.W. 1 : "The marriage took place at 10 p.m. Pat-wooden sheets-were brought. A carpet was spread. Accused no. 1 then sat on the wooden sheet. On the other sheet accused no. 3 sat. She was sitting nearby accused no. 1. Accused no. 4 then performed some Puja by bringing a Tambya-pitcher. Betel leaves and cocoanut was kept on the Tambya. Two_garlaJids were brought. Accused no. 2 was having one and accused no. 4 having one in his hand. Accused no. 4 gave the garland to accused no. 3 and accused no. 2 gave the garland to accused no. 1. Accused nos. 1 and 3 then garlanded each other. Then they each struck each other's forehead." +, - 842 SUPREMB COUllT RBPOR.TS [1965] 2 S.C.R. In cross-examination this witness stated : "It is not that Gandharva according to our custom is performed necessarily in a temple. It is also not that a , Brahmin Priest is required to perform the Gandharva marril\ge. No 'Mangala Ashtakas' are required to be chanted at the time of Gandharva marriage. At the time of marriage in question, no Brahmin was called and Mangala Ashtakas were chanted. There is no custom to blow a pipe called 'Sher' in vernacular." Sitaram, witness no. 2 for the complainant, made a similar stare­ ment about what happened at the marriage ceremony and further stated, in the examination-in-chief : C "Surpan is the village of accused no. 3's maternal uncle and as the custom is not to perform the ceremony at the house of maternal uncle, so it was performed at an­ other place. There is no custom requiring a Brahmin Priest at the time of Gandharva." D He stated in cross-examination : "A barber is not required and accused no. 5 was not present at the time pf marriage. There is a custom that the father of girl should make to touch the foreheads of the girl and boy tq each other and the Gandharva is E completed by the act." It is urged for the respondent that as the touching of the forehead by the bridegroom and the bride is stated to complete the act of Gandharva marriage, it must be concluded that the ceremonies which, according to this witness, had been performed, F were all the ceremonies which, by custom, were necessary for the validity of the marriage. In the absence of a statement by the witness himself that according to custom these ceremonies were the only necessary ceremonies for a valid marriage, we cannot construe the statement that the touching of the foreheads completed the gandharva form of marriage and that the ceremonies gone G through were all the ceremonies required for the validity of the marriage. Bhagwan, witness no. 3 for the complainant, made no state­ ment about the custom, but stated in cross-examination that it was not neeessary for the valid performance of gandharva marriage in their community that a Brahmin priest was required and mangala H ashtakas were to be chanted. The statement of Jeebhau, witness no. 4 for the complainant, does not show how the custom has B. S. LOKHANDB V. STATB (Dayal, /.) 843 A modified the essential forms of marriage. He stated in cross­ examination : "I had witnessed two Gandharvas before this. For the last 5 or 7 years a Brahmin Priest, a Barber and a Thakur is not required to perform the Gandharva but formerly it was essential. Formerly the Brahmin used to chant Mantras and Mangala ashtakas. It was neces- sary to have a maternal uncle or any other person to make touch the foreheads of the sponsors together. A Brahmin from Kasara and Dhandana comes to our vill­ age for doing rituals but I do not know their names." C This statement too, does not establish that the two essential cere­ monies are no more necessary to be performed, for a Gandharva marriage. The mere fact that they were probably not performed in the two Gandharva marriages Jeebhau had attended, does uot establish that their performance is no more necessary according D to the custom in that community. Further, Jeebhau has stated that about five or seven years earlier the performance of certain ceremonies which, till then, were essential for the marriage, were given up. If so, the departure from the essentials cannot be said to have become a custom, as contemplated by the Hindu Marriage Act. Clause (a) of s. 3 of the Act provides that the expressions 'custom' and 'usage' signify any rule which, having been continu­ ously and uniformly observed for a. long time, has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family. We are therefore of opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish that the marriage between appellant no. 1 and Kamlabai in February 1962 was performed in accordance with the custo­ mary rites as required by s. 7 of the Act. It was certainly not performed in accordance with the essential requirements for a valid marriage under Hindu law. It follows therefore that the marriage between appellant no. 1 and Kamlabai does not come within the expression 'solemnized marriage' occurring in s. 17 of the Act and consequently does not come within the mischief of s. 494 l.P.C. even though the first wife of appellant no. 1 was living when he married Kamlabai in H February 1962. We have not referred to .and discussed the cases referred to in support of the contention that the 'subsequent marriage' referred 844 SVP:UMJI COUllT Rl!POil.TS (196S] 2 S.C.11.. to in s. 494 I.P.C. need not be a valid marriage, as it is unnecessary A. to consider whether they have been correctly decided, in view of the fact that the marriage of appellant no. 1 with Kamlabai could be a void marriage only if it came within the purview of s. 17 of the Act. The result is that the conviction of appellant no. 1 under B s. 494 I.P.C. and of appellant no. 2 under s. 494 read with s. 114 l.P.C. cannot be sustained. We therefore allow their appeal, set aside their convictions and acquit them. The bail bonds of appellant no. 1 will stand discharged. Fines, if paid, will be refunded. c Appeal allowed.