Purshottam Das v. Smt. Raj Mani Devi

Bachawat, J. The appellant is the tenant and the respondent is the landlord of House No. SB, Old 122 Maya Mirganj, Allaha­ bad. The appeal arises out of a suit for ejectment by the land­ lord against the tenant from the house. On October 11, 1961, the landlord obtained permission to institute the suit from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under s. 3(1) of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent aind Eviction Act, 1947. On October 14, 1961 the landlord instituted the present suit for eviction against the tenant. On March 27, 1962 the Commissioner Allahabad Division acting under s. 3 (3) revoked the permission to institute the suit. On March 30, 1963 the State Government acting under s. 7F set aside the Commissioner's order and gave leave to the landlord to file the suit with effect from July 30, 1963. On July 11, 1963 the Trial Court decreed the suit. The tenant filed an appeal against the decree. On November 4, 1963 the appellate court set aside the decree and remanded the suit for fresh trial. After the suit went back on remand the Trial Court decreed the suit on March 2, 1964. The Trial Court held that the permission granted by the State Government became effec­ tive from July 30, 1963 and as the suit was still pending a decree could be passed in the suit. An appeal against the decree was dismissed on November 28, 1964. A second appeal was dis­ missed by the High Court on April 28, 1966. The present appeal has been filed by the tenant after obtaining special leave. The sole question in the appeal is whether in the circumstances there was a valid permission to institute the suit under s. 3 ( 1). In Bhagwan Das v. Paras Nath(') this Court held that a suit validly instituted after obtaining permission of the Commissioner under s. 3 ( 3) did not become incompetent if the State Govern­ ment acting under s. 7F revoked the permission after the institu­ tion of the suit. In that case the District Magistrate refuSF.d to give permission under s. 3 (1) to institute the suit. The Com­ missioner acting under s. 3 (3) set aside the order and granted permission to institute the suit. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court on November 2, 1960. The tenant filed an appeal against the decree. During the pendency of the appeal the State Government acting under s. 7F revoked the permission granted by the Commissioner. The Court held that though the order under s. 3 (3) was subject to an order under s. 7F the Govern­ ment's power under s. 7F to revoke the permission granted by the Commissioner became exhausted once the suit was validly institnted. In support of his contention that the present suit is not main­ tainable, the appellant relies on the following observations of Hegde, J. :- (I) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 297. 578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1969} 2 S.C.R. "When the Commissioner sets aside the order passed by the District Magistrate granting permission to file a suit for ejecting a tenant, the order of the Commissioner prevails. If he cancels the permission granted by the District Magistrate there is no effective permission left and the suit instituted by the plaintiff without awaiting his decision must be treated as one filed without any valid permission by the District Magis­ trate." Having regard to these observations the present suit though validly instituted after obtaining the permission under s. 3 ( l) became incompetent when the permission was revoked by the Commissioner under s. 3(3). But the order under s. 3(3) it­ self was set aside by the State Government under s. 7F during the pendency of the suit. The question is what is the effect of this order under s. 7F. Now, s. 3(4) provides that the order of the Commissioner under s. 3 ( 3) subject to an order passed by the State Government under s. 7F. If the State Government acting under s. 7F sets aside the order of the Commissioner revok­ ing the permission, the order under s. 3 ( 1) granting permission is revived. The result is that there is an effective permission to institute the suit under s. 3 ( 1) and the suit is validly instituted. In Bhagwan Das's Case(') the suit was validly insti­ tuted after obtaining permission from the Commissioner under s. 3 (3). The State Government could not render such a suit incompetent by any order under s. 7F. In the present case the suit was validly instituted after obtaining permission from the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under s. 3 ( 1). The effect of the order of the Commissioner revoking the permission was that the suit became incompetent. The State Government acting under s. 7F had power to revise and set aside the Commissioner's order and restore the permission granted under s. 3 ( 1) so as to make the suit competent. The order of the State Government after stating that in the interest of justice the house should be available to the landlord for his use, set aside the Commissioner's order under s. 3 ( 3). The result was that the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed under s. 3 ( 1) stood restored. The further direc­ tion in the order that the landlord "is advised to file a suit for eviction from the house in dispute against the opposite party in a civil court under s. 3 of the Act, which will be applicable four months after the date of the order" really means that the penuis­ sion under s. 3 ( 1) would become effective on the expiry of 4 months. The landlord had thus an effective permission to insti­ tute the suit under s. 3 ( 1) on the expiry of four months from March 30, 1963, that is to say, as from July 30, 1963. The (1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 297. { ' G ' PURSHOTTAM v. RAJ MANI (Bachawat, J.) 579 A decree in the suit was passed on March 2, 1964. O~ that date the .--.( landlord had a valid permission to institute the suit. The 5uit was therefore maintainable. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. There will no order as to costs. Y. P. Appeal dismissed •