Union of India v. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (p) Ltd.
Sikri, J. This _appeal by special leave is directed against the
order of the Railway Rates Tribunal hereinafter referred to as
the Tribunal at Madras, dated March 25, 1965, determining
reasonable rates at which siding charges can be recovered from
the complainants, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P) Ltd. now
respondent before u~. The. Tribunal determined that the existing
ch;uges being recovered by the North Eastern Railway were un
reasonable and unjustified and that the railway was not entitled
to r=ver any charge for the haulage of the wagons over the
assisted siding.
A similar appeal was. decided by this Court in Union of India
v. The Indian Sugar Mills Association(').· It was decided in that
case that the c@mplaint to the Tribunal was competent under s.
41 ( 1 )( c) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890.
Mr. Bindra, the_ learned counsel for the appellant, has raised
in substance three points before us : ( 1) that on the pleadings the
Tribunal was not justified in adjudicating upon the charges levied
for the maintenance of .the assisted siding; (2) that the Tribunal
had no jurisdiction under s. 41 ( l )( c) of the Act to determine
the reasonableness of the charges levied for maintaining the assist
ed siding; and (3) that the Tribunal had erred. in holding that
the Railway was not entitled to haulage charges for lines 3 and
4.
In order to appreciate the points ·raised by the learned coun
sel it is neressary to give a few facts, as determined · by the
Tribunal. The respondent company was incorporated in the year
1932 With its registered office at Kamla Tower, Kanpur, in the
State of Uttar Pradesh. The Company erected a sugar mill at
Ma.jho.wlia. in: the district of Champaran in the State of Bihar,
a.nd started.manufacturing sugar in the year 1933. The bulk
(I) [1967[ 3 S;C R 219 •.
UNION v. MOTILAL MILLS (Sikri, J.) 77
of sugarcane required for the manufacture of sugar was trans
ported to the respondent's mill from the sugarcane growing areas
in the neighbourhood of Majhowlia by the appellant Railway.
When the resi>ondent started manufacture of sugar in the year
1933 the railway in that region was operated by the Bengal and
North Western Railway Company Limited, which was later
taken over by the Secretary of State in Council and is now owned
and administered by the Government of India as the North Eas
tern Railway. By an agreement dated November 25, 1933,
between the respondent and the Bengal and North Western Rail-.
way Company Limited the Railway agreed to provide an assisted
siding at the Majhowlia railway station to afford better facilities
for the delivery of goods consigned to the mill and for the des
patch of goods sent out from the mill through the Railway. Under
the agreement the respondent had to pay fixed half yearly charge
amounting to Rs. 917 .20, representing 10% of the capital in
vested by the railway in the construction of the assisted siding,
for its use. This half yearly payment continued till 1958 when
the Railway gave a notice to the respondent on February 8, 1958,
intimating that on the expiry of six months from the date of the
receipt of the notice revised charges at the following rates would
be levied in lieu of the fixed contribution that was being paid
to the respondent railway :
(1) Rs. 779.56 towards interest on the capital and
cost of maintenance of the permanent way, points and
crossing and interlocking connected therewith; and
( 2) siding charge at the rate of Re. 1 per four
wheeled wagon hauled over the siding subject to a mini
mum of Rs. 7 per shunt.
These new rates were enforced on the expiry of the six months'
notice. In March 1960, the Railway desired that a fresh agree
ment be entered into with effect from April 1, 1960. As the
terms seemed onerous the respondent orotested and some corres
pondence ensued. Ultimately the Railway, by letter dated
August 21, 1962, intimated to the respondent that with effect
from March 1, 1963, the old agreement dated November 25,
1933, would stand t~rminated and the siding facilities would
be withdrawn. The respondent had no option but to pay the
new charges claimed by the Railway and the new charges were ,
as follows : ·
(1) fixed charges of Rs. 779.56 for each half year;
and
( 2) siding charges at. the rate of Re. 1 per loaded
four wheeled wagon subject to a minimum charge per
trip arrived at by multiplying the average time taken
per shunt by the cost of shunting engine hour.
On July 4, 1963, the respondent filed the complaint dated
June 26, 1963, before the Tribunal. While the case was pend
ing the Railway increased the fixed charge of Rs. 779.56 to
Rs. 3,134.88 per annum with effect from August 17, 1963.
The description of the railway station and the lines is given
by the Tribunal thus : Exhibit R. 2 is the sketch showing the
position of the several Jines at the Majhowlia station and also of
the station buildings and goods shed. Lines numbers 1 and 2
marked in this sketch are the running lines. Lines numbers 3
and 4 are the transfer lines which-constitute the assisted siding.
Admittedly, lines numbers 3 and 4 are within railway premises
and are completely on railway property. From the junction where
these two lines meet there is another line proceeding to the com
plainants' factory. This line is entirely within the property own
ed by the complainants and it is the private siding of the com
plainants.
Coming to the first point raised by the learned counsel; this
point was debated before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, after
examining -the original complaint, the amendments made in it,
and the evidence led by the Railway, came to the conclusion
that the respondent was entitled to raise the question of the
revision of hauling charges. The Tribunal after reviewing the
pleadings observed :
"In seeking for such correction being made in the
complaint the complainants were not obliged to attack
the increase under the aforesaid item as unreasonable
particularly in view of the fact that this increase was
notified to the complainants only after the filing of the
complaint _and also of the fact that there was already
the general allegation in the complaint that the increase
in the siding charges had been abnormal and unreason
able. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said
that the allegations made in the complaint would not
cover the increase under the items of interest and main
tenance charges also. It has also to be mentioned that
the respondent was not, in any way, misled by the alle
gations contained in the complaint and that no surprise
was sprung on the respondent by pressing the com
plainants' case· against the increase on account of in
terest and maintenance charges. The respondent was
fully aware that the increase on account of interest and'
maintenance charges had also to be justified on the
ground of increase in th11 cost of working the assisted
siding. Even before the commencement Qf the record
ing of the evidence the respon\'.lent was ready with the
UNION v. MOTILAL MILLS (Sikri, J.)
required evidence in that direction and hence it cannot
be said that the failure to single out the increase in the
maintenance charge and to attack the same in the com
plaint as an unreasonable levy has caused any prejudice
to the respondent .... Accordingly, I hold that the
reasonableness or otherwise of all the charges levied
by the respondent in respect of the assisted siding in
question can and ought to be considered under issue
number 4."
79
The learned counsel for the appellant has not been ab}e to
show that the Tribunal has misdirected itself in any manner in
comil:ig to the above conclusion. He. drew our attention to a
decision of the Privy Council in Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt.
Saran (1) where the Privy Council observed that "no amount of
evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put
forward." This Court in Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao(')
discussed the scope of this observation and stated the law
thus:
"The true scope of this rule is that evidence let in
on issues on which the parties actually went to trial
should not be made the foundation for decision of an
other and different issue, which was not present to the
minds of the parties and on which they had no oppor
tunity of adducing evidence. But that rule has no ap
plication to a case wh~re parties go to trial with know
ledge that a particular question is in issue, though no
specific issue has been framed thereon, and adduce evi
dence relating thereto. The rule applicable to this class
of cases is that laid down in Rani Chandra Kunwar v.
Chaudhri Narpat Singh(1 )".
In view of this decision we must overrule the contention of
the learned counsel on this point because the Tribunal has found
that the !lailway was ready with the required evidence and no
prejudice had been caused to it.
Section 41 (1) ( c) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, reads
as follows:
"41 (1) Any complaint that a railway administra
tion-
(a) is contravening the provisions of section 28,
or
(b) is charging for the carriage of any commodity
between two stations a rate which is unreasonable or •
(I) A.I.R.1930 P.C. S7. (2) [1956) S.C.R. 451, 461.
(3) [1906-07] L.R. 341.A. 27.
( c) is levying any other charge which is unreason
able may be made to .he Tribunal, and the Tribunal
shall hear and decide any such compfaint in accord
ance with the provisions of this Chapter."
Sections 29(1) and 29(2) react· thus:
"29 ( 1) The Central Government may by general
or special order fix maximum and minimum rates for
the whole or any part of a railway and prescribe the
conditions in which such rates will apply;
(2) The Central Government may, by alike.order,
fix the rates of any other charges for the whole or any
part of a railway. and prescribe the conditions in which
such rates of charges shall apply."
The word "rate" is· defined in s. 2(13) thus:
" 'rate' inci\ldes .any fare, . charge or other pay
ment for the carriage of any passenger, animal or
goods;"
The learned couns.el for the . appellant contends that this Court
in Union of India v. Indian.Sugar Mills Association(').correlat
ed s. 41(1) (c) to "any other charges" mentioned.in.s. 29(2),
and if the definition of the word "'rate" is applied. to s. 29(2)
it would mean that only charges. for .carriage of. goods and not
hauling charges could be complained against under s. 41 ( l )( c).
Bhargava, J.,_ speaking for the Court observed at p. 226 :
"It is clear that a complaint under s. 41 ( 1 )(b)
relates to fixation of a rate relating to charges men
tioned ins. 29(1), while ·s. 41(1)(c) relates to a.
complaint in respect of any other charge mentioned in
s. 29(2). It appears to us, in .these circumstances,
that the expression "any other charge" used in s. 29(2)
and s. 41 (1) (c) cannot .be.given. the narrow meaning
of covering a charge in respect of. the statutory .duty of
the Railway so as to exclude charges made or levied
by the Railway for' all other services."
After giving various reasons, Bhargava, J., concluded :
"It is enough to hold for the purposes of this case.
that at least the charges for carriage
of goods from parts of the railway to points or places,
not forming part of the railway, will certainly be cover
ed by the expression "any. other · charge" used in s.
41 ( 1 ) ( c), so that the complaint in the present case
·was competently entertained by the Tribunal."
(I) 119671 3 S.C.R, 219,
UNION V. MOT!LAL MILLS (Sikri, /,) 81.
A It is true that the argument sought to be ratSed now has
not been dealt with before, but it seems to us that the answer
to this is simple. The definition of "rate" cannot be applied to
the expression '"rates of any other charges". Here the word
"rates" merely meaos the scale or amount of any other charges.
The definition of the word "rate" cannot possibly be applied to
a s. 29(2) of the Act.
Coming to the thiid point, the Tribunal after reviewing the
evidence came to the following conclusion :
"'From the above discussions of the evidence, it
is clear that the goods consigned to the complainaots'
mills and despatched from the mills caonot be effec
tively haodled at the goods shed siding without the use
of the assisted siding. Under the existing facilities. at
the station it is practically impossible to deal with the
complainants' traffic at the goods shed. Any attempt in
that direction would involve very heavy expenditure on
the part of the railway and would also involve larger
time and works as compared with time and labour in-
volved in haodling this traffic at the assisted siding. In
other words, by handling complainaots' traffic at the
assisted siding the railway is really incurring less of cost
and less of work than it would have to\inc~r in attempt
ing to deal with the traffic at the goods' shed siding
.... Additional charge can be levied only for any spe-
cial or extra service that may be rendered in aoy par
ticular instance. The services rendered ~Y the respon
dent railway in connection with the handling of com
plainants' goods traffic at the assisted siding cannot be
said to be any special or extra service because the ser
vices rendered in that connection have been found to
be definitely less than the services which the respondent
railway had to render for handling these goods at the
goods shed siding as a statutory obligation even on the
freight levied from the complainaots. In view of the
conditions prevailing at Majhowlia station the railway
is really in an advanta~eous position, financially and
otherwise, in haodlin11: the complainants' goods at the
assisted sidinj! instead of at the goods shed siding. It
follows. therefore, that the respondent railway is not
entitled to levy any charge, in addition to the freight
already )evied, for the haodling of the complainants'
goods. at the a5sisted siding at this station which in
volves only a portion of the service which the railway
is obliged to render in handling these goods at the goods
shed siding. In other words, the claim for the haulage
charge for the shunting operation done at the assisted
siding is unjustified and unsustainable."
This is a finding of fact made by the Tribunal and no reason
has been shown for displacing this pure finding of fact. The
Tribunal has mentioned ample evidence from which it could
reasonably come to the conclusion arrived at by it. It must be
remembered that we are not sitting as a regular court of appeal
from decisions of the Tribunal, and in such cases we do not
ordinarily go into questions of fact.
ln the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Y.P. Appeal dismissed