Jai Narain v. Kishen Chand
Hidayatullah, C.J., This is ~ appeal by a tenant who had
rented a shop No. 2687 in Kinari Bazar, Delhi from the respon
dent on Rs. 13.50 P per month. In those premises he was selling
Usha sewing machines and fans. It appears that the level of t~e
shop was too high from the road and his clients were troubled m
going to his shop and so he lowered the level and thereby altered
the premises to suit his convenience. The landlord thereupon
filed a suit against him for his eviction under s. 13(1)(k) of the
Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952. The suit was filed
on November 13, 1957. The trial court ordered on February 19,
1959 ejectment and payment of Rs. 145/- as arrears of rent. An
appeal against the order of the trial court was dismissed by the
appellate authority on November 16, 1959. A revision applica
tion was then filed by the tenant on March 25, 1960. During the
course of that revision he invoked the provisions of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1956 which had come into force on February 9,
1959 and relied upon s. 14 (1) (j) of the new Act read withs. 57.
Previously he had not relied upon the new Act although the Act
had been in force during the pendency of the previous proceed
ings. The High Court acting under s. 14(1)(j) and sub-s. (10) of
the same section, gave him the alternative of paying compensa
tion in the sum of Rs. 500 which it appears that the landlord
hi.mself had assessed as the damages caused by the act of the
tenant. The landlord later filed an application for review of the
order and pointed out that the new Act was not applicable to
the case in view of the first proviso of s. 57 sub. s. (2). The High
Court thereupon granted the review and reversed its earlier order
and ordered the eviction of the tenant.
In this appeal it is contended that the High Court was in
error in passing the order on review and that the previous order
was the correct order in the light of the provisions of the Act of
1958. We have therefore to consider which of the two orders
of the High Court is the correct order and whether the review was
properly granted or not.
As is very frequent in our country, Rent Control Acts are
changed from time to time causing numerous difficulties in their
interpretation and application. Here too, we have a succession
of Acts which were passed, to say nothing of the amendments
which were made in the body of each of the Acts as they came.
We are concerned first with the Act of 1952, namely. The Delhi
a11d Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Section 13(1)(k) of that
Act gave a right to the landlord to evict a tenant who, whether
before or after the commencement of the Act had caused or per
mitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises, or not
withstanding previous notice. had used or dealt with the premises
JAi NARAIN v. KISHEN CHAND (Hidayatu/lalr, C.J.) 8 57
in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord
by the Government or the Delhi Improvement Trust while giving
him a lease of the land on which the premises were situated. We
are not concerned with the latter part but with the first part where
the tenant before or after the commencement of the Act had
caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the pre
mises. Whether the lowering of the floor was causing substantial
damage to the premises is a question into which we need not go,
because the concurrent finding of the courts of fact is that it did
so. This question was not raised before us. Therefore, if s.
13 (l)(k) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 applied,
the eviction of the tenant was the proper order to make in view
of the finding .that he had caused substantial damage to the pre
mises. However, the matter comes to the Court because of the
passing of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which came into
force on February 9, 1959. Section 57(1) of that Act provided
that the Delhi an&! Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 in so far as it
was applicable to the Uniop. Territory of Delhi, was being re
pealed. While repealing it, a special saving was however made,
by sub-s. (2) of the same section in favour of all suits and other
proceedings which were then pending under the repealed Act and
it was provided that those suits and proceedings should be cO.nti
nued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the
Act as if that Act had continued to be in force and the new Act
had not been passed. This would have really been a very proper
provision to make to separate the operation of the two Acts but
the Legislature went still further and added two provisos. We
are ccmcerned only with the first of the two provisos on which
much dispute has arisen in this case. That proviso reads as fol
lows:
"Pro_vided that in any such suit or proceeding for
the fixatmn of standard rent or for the eviction of a te
nant from any premises to which section 54 does not ap
ply, the court or other authority shall have regard to
the provisions of this Act :"
This proviso contains a proviso within itself which excepts the
case. of pre~ises to which s. 54 of the Act does not apply. That
sectmn proVIdes as follows :
"Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of
the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, or
the Slum Ar~as (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956
or the Delhi Tenants (Temporary Protection) Act
1956." '
The ~ffect. of the proviso which we have quoted above is variously
d~scnbed by counsel on opposite sides. According to Mr. C. B.
Agarwala who argued for the tenant, the ~ords "to w_hich sec
tion 54 does not apply" govern the words ' any such smt or pro
ceeding" and not the words "any premises". The High Court
in the order passed on review was of the opinion that these words
governed the words "any premises". In our opinion, this is the
correct view to take of the matter. ·
To begin with, it must be noticed that the proviso speaks of
two things, namely, tlie fixation of standard rent and the eviction
of a tenant from any premises. The wocds "from any premises"
cannot be connected with the phrase "for the fixation of standard
rent'', because then the preposition would have been "of any
premises" or "for ·any premises" and ,not "from any premises."
This means that the first phrase has to be read as complete in
itself beginning from the words "for the fixation" and ending
with the words, "standard rent". The second phrase then reads
"or for the eviction of a tenant from any premises". The words
"from any premises" go very clearly with the words "eviction of a
tenant" and not with the words "any suit or proceeding".
The question then arises, where does the phrase "to which
s. 54 does not apply" connect itself ? According to Mr. Agarwala
that phrase must be connected with the words "in any such s.uit
or proceeding". Since the suits contain two kinds of matters,
namely, fixation of standard rent and eviction of a tenant from any
premises, we have to turn to the provisions of the statutes to
which s. 54 refers, namely, the Administration of Evacuee Pro
perty Act, 1950, the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance)
Act, 1956 and the Delhi Tenants (Temporary Protection) Act,
1956. The first two do not deal at all with the fixation of fair
rent and the third speaks of fair rent, but it does not provide for its
fixation. It would be pointless to use the language 'any suit or
proceeding to which s. 54 does not apply' in relation to fixation
of standard rent. It follows therefore that the phrase "to which
s. 54 does not apply" really governs 'premises'. Read in that
way, all the three Acts fall in lin_e, because they provide for pre
mises and not for fixation of standard rent. The Administration
of Evacuee Property Act. 1950, the Slum Areas (Improvement
and Clearance) Act, 1956 and the Delhi '.fenants (Temporary
Protection) Act, 1956 all deal with premises and property and
therefore the phrase "to which section 54 does not apply" is con
nected with the words "premises". That is the view which the
High Court has taken and we think rightly. The proviso did not
apply and the matter had to be governed by the old Delhi and
Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 which had ~ repealed.
It was contended before us that this legislation was intended
to soften action against tenants still further and that the policy
JAi NARAIN v. K!SHEN CHAND (Hidayatullah, C.J.) 8 59
A of the law had been to give more and more protecti~ to the
tenants and we must therefore read the statute in consonance with
that policy. ThiS would be an argument to consider if the lan
guage of the statute was not quite clear. But the language is
clear enough to show that the proviso applies only to those cases
in which s. 54 cannot be made applicable. It is admitted before
R us that thiS area is subjected to the Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1956. If that is so, then, on the terms of the
proviso on which much reliance is placed by Mr. Agarwala, the
provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 cannot be taken
into consideration. They are to be taken into consideration only
in those cases to which the Acts mentioned in s. 54 do not apply,
that is to say, in respect of premises not governed by those sta
tutes. Since this shop iS governed by one of the statutes, the
J:li'oviSo has no application. The High Court's' view was therefore
right. In the circumstances, the appeal fails and will be dismiss
ed with costs.
R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.