Workmen of the Motor Industries Co. Ltd. v. Management of Motor Industries Co. LTD., Bangalore
Shelat, J. This appeal, founded on special leave, arises out
of an industrial dispute between the respondent-company and the
Motor Industries Company Employees Association which the
Government of Mysore referred to the Labour Court, Bangalore, F
for adjudication under s. IO ( 1) ( c) o( the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. The dispute related to the dismissal by the management of
three workmen, Sandhyavoo, G. Prabhakar and M. V. Vasudevan
out of the five workmen against whom the management had held
a domestic enquiry at which they were found guilty of acts of
misconduct charged against them. G
The facts leading to the said dispute and the reference are as
follows:
On August 24, 1964 the said association handed over to the
management a charter of demands. Negotiations between the
parties having failed, the demands were taken before the concilia- H
tion officer when the parties arrived at a settlement dated Decem-
ber 23, 1964. On April 29, 1966, the management issued I
notice suspending for a day, i.e., May 4, 1966, one B. G. Shenoy
WORKMEN V1 MOTOR INDUST. CO. (Shelat, J.) 307
as and by way of penalty. In consequence of a protest by the
association, the said suspension was postponed and on May 10,
1966, the management served a charge-sheet on Shenloy and sus
pended him pending an enquiry. On May 11, 1966 the associa
tion demanded withdrawal of the said suspension and the said
charge-sheet. Discussions took place on that day from 9.45
AM. to 12.30 P.M. between the association and the management·
and the parties thereafter adjourned at 1 P.M. for lunch having
decided to resume the talks at 2.30 P.M. At 2 P.M. the first
shift ended and the workers of the second shift began to come in.
The workmen of the first shift, however, stayed qn and those of
the Sl'r.ond shift along with the workmen of the general shift joi.ned
them and all of them went on strike. The discussions which were
resumed at 2.30 P.M. ended in an agreement at 5 P.M. and the
workmen returned to work. On May 18, 1966 the assistant
establishment officer submitted a complaint to the chief personnel
officer alleging certain acts of misconduct by a crowd of workmen
mentioning therein the names of five of them including the said
three workmen. On May 25, 1966 charge-sheets alleging stop- .
page of work, abandoning the place of work, 1nciting clerks and
officers of G. 2 department to join the said strike, disorderly beha
viour including intimidation and assault on one, A. Lakshman Rao,
were served upon those five workmen. Correspondence thereafter
ensued between the association and the management wherein the
association protested against the management's decision to adopt
disciplinary action against the said five workmen despite the agree
ment ·arrived at on May 11, 1966. Thereafter, a domestic enquiry
was held on June 30, 1966 which was completed on July 27, 1966
when the enqillry officer made his report hold1ng the said three
workmen, Sandhyavoo, Prabhakar and Vasudevan, guilty of ~cts
of misconduct under standing order 22(2), (3), (13) and (18).
He exonerated the other two workmen except on the charge of
participating in the strike and loiter1ng about under clauses (2)
and (18) of the said standing order. On August 12, 1966, the
management, agreeing with the report, passed orders of dismissal
against the said three workmen which gave rise to the said refer
ence. On March 23, 1968 the Labour Court gave its award hold
ing that the said enquiry was validly held and that the mainage
ment were justified in passing the said orders of dismissal.
. Mr. Ramamurthi, appearing for the association, challenged
the said awaro on the following grounds : (1) that the said asso
ciation not having given a call for the said strike, the said charges
were misconceived a.nd the orders of dismissal were consequently
not sustainable;.(2) that the said strike, which was spontaneously
staged by the yvorkmen, was not illegal under s. 24 of the Indus
trial Disputes Act, nor was it in contravention of any law as
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1970) I S.C.R.
required by standing order 22(2) and (3); (3) that the said dis
ciplinary proceedings were in c0ntravention of the agreement
ai:rived at on May 11, 1966, and therefore, the diSlllissal following
such disciplinary proceodings amounted to unfair labour practice;
( 4) that the orders of dismissal were passe<l on charges including
that of intimidation though the misconduct of intimidation was
not found proved by the enquiry officer ?nd hence the said orders
were illegal; ( 5) that to punish only three workme'l when a large
number of workmen had takein part in staging the strike and in
inciting others to join 11 constitutrd victimisation; and (6) that
the findings of the enquiry ofli.:er were based on no evidence or
were perverse in that no reasonable body of persons could have
arrived at them on the evidence before him.
The argument on which the first contention was based was
that the settlement dated December 23, 1964 was arrived at be
tween three parties, the management, the association and the
men, ~d that µie association being the union registered under the
Trade Unions Act was an entity distinct from the workmen. Under
cl. 5 of the settlement it was the association which was obliged to
give four days' notice if it decided to reson to strike, go-slow
tactics or other coercive action. The said clause did not imp<''\C
any such obligation on the workmen. The workmen thus having
no such obligation and the said strike being a spontaneous one,
without any call for it from the association, it could not be said
to be in breach of the said settlement, am' therefore, would not
lall under the mischief of s. 23 of the Act, the first condition of
which is that to be illegal under s. 24 read with s. 23 it must be in
breach of a contract. Standing order 22 requires that participat
ing in a strike would be misconduct if it is in breach of some
provision of law. But as the strike was not in c0ntravention of
s. 23, it would not constitute misconduct under that standing
order. Therefore, the charges against the said three workmen
were misconceived a.nd the orders of dismissal passed against them
on the basis that they stood established were bad. In our view
this argument cannot be sustained. The construction of cl. 5 of
the settlement suggested by Mr. Ramamurthi is contrary to (a)
the tenor of that settlement, (b) the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act under which a settlement arrived at between an em
ployer and a union representing the employees during conciliation
proceedings is binding not only on such uniqn but also the work
men whom·it represents and (c) the principles of collective bar
gaining recognised by industrial law. The settlement was a pack
age settlement by which the management and the workmen,
through their association, arrived at certain terms in the presence
of the conciliation officer. The settlement. besides settling the
demands contained in the said charter of demands, sets out the
necessity of harmonious relations and of cooperation between the
,
WOlDlEN v. MOTO!l INDUS-r. co. (She/at, I.) 309'
A management and thci workmen so as to promote higher and better
llfllduction. . It was to achieve this object that direct action on the
part of either of them such· as a strike by· the workmen and a lock
out by tile employer without notice was prohibited. Evidently the
provision for four days' 111<>tice before any direct action was taken
by either of them was provided tor 'so that during that period if
• tliefe ]Has any lflevance it could be ironed out oy negotiation.
Cl. 5 ,of ,the setd~ment falls in two parts : ( l) .~e subs~tive ~.
and (2) the c;:oroUl\I)' thereot. The first part inter alia provided
ibat neither tbC ~iation nor the management .would resort to
any direct act.ion, such as strike; go-slow tactics or lock-out or any
sucn coercive action without giving to the other a four days' notice.
The secona pan provided an undertaking on the part of the asso-
c ciation to cooperate with the management, if there was any strike
by workmen ·'OV'l:thout ·any can therefor ·from th1n1ssociation, if the
J:!lllllll&emt:ll,t were to tiike disciplinary action against the workmen.
1f the construction of cl. 5 suggested by Mr. Ramamurtbi' were to
be accepted it would leild to a surprising result, namely, that though
a strike at' the mstanee elf the assaciatiqn required four days'
D ·notice, a'.strike by the y;orkmen witllout any call froi:n the associa
tion wciuld not require any such notice and tliat the. settlement left
complete'1ibert)r to the workmen to Iitunch a sudden strike. Such
·a cqnstructlon '.appears qn the very face of it contrary to the object
a11d PQrpos_e , ~ ~ settleJ!!ent and patti9ularly cl. 5 which en vi·
sages a 11ottce periQ\1 Of four days to enable the parties to resolve
I: a· dispute \Jef9te dirCct action on its account -is iesort.ed to by either
of. tl1~ • ·The =ested construction is illso untenable, for surely
the' ~iation · pe<;tive of tne workme,n cannot by itself resort
to· any clirect ai;tion: ii ow can, for instance, the asi>ociation resort
to· go-~9\v ,tactjcs without giv~g · a ciill for it to the ·workmen ?
It is ob.vious, theretore, ~a~.~l.' 5 does not contemplate any dicho
t~ bet)veen the association and the workmen as suggested by
r ~r. ;R,amami¢hl, besides being repugnant to the. principle that a
settlemtint an;ived at 'by the association must be regarded as one
made '>Y .it in .its representative, character, and therefore, binding
6n the workmen. Therefore, although. the 8ettlemeiit mentions in
cf. 5 tjle mana$ement, w9rkmqd and t)le association, the expression
'workiJ'leri' thCjtein .was unne~sa.ry, for, Without that expression
G ~ it woajd have ~n as Cfficacfotisly binding on the workm~ as
_011 tl!e 11$8ociation .. ~.conclusion .is strengthqried by th~ f~
~ .~ settlement ll)CUtiOJ18 fu.e man!lge~e'!t _and the associatton
orl ·behalf qf .the workmen· only as tlie ·parties thereto and the
.signatories thereto also are oally ·the representatives ol ' the twO
90lii~. Noµe of .the woi:lcmen, nor any one separately represent-
" _i,ng tl\ein a.lti,xeci ·1.µs .signatu~· to it. If a lighting strike without
_bo\ic;e. is 1U,es~ uii~ any p~sion of law (a q\Iestion which we
~hiill pre..entty consiaer &tandmg order 22 wohld coJl\e into opera
.non ana &tatting qr joit\ing such a strike 'arid' il!citiilg others to
L 13 Sup.C,I,/69-o ..
310 SUPREME CX>UAT .REPORTS [ 1970] I S.C.R.
loin it would amount to miSconduct for which disciplinary action
by the management would be possible.
The next quei;tioo is whether the management could validly
take disciplina,ry action against the workmen concerned in respect
of the said strike. The recitals of the said settlement show that u
a result of the association presenting the said charter of demands
negotiations between the management and the aasociation took
place on the said demands as also on certain p~ made by
the management, that on their failure conciliauon proccedin!I'!
took place in the course of which the parties anived at the said
aettlement which, as aforesaid, was signed by the representatives Of
the management and the association in the presence of the conci
liation officer. The settlement thus was one under s. 12 ( 3) of the
Industrial Disputes Act and rule 59 of the Rules made thereunder
by the: Govemmqnt of Mysore. It was to come into force as from
January 1, 1965 and was to remain in force for three years and
was thereafter to continue to be in force until its tennination by
either side. It is clear from Part I thereof that the object with
which it was made was to promote harmonious rdatons and co
operation between the comp~y. the association and the workmen
so that the company may on the one hand DC al>le to achieve
increased production and On the other be in a position to afford
maximum opportunity for continued employment. To accom
plish these aims it was agreed that the company <:fl its part should
be managed on sound and progressive lines and the association
and the workmen on their part should combat any wasteful prac
tices adversely affecting workmanship and production and assist
the mainagement in apprehending persons responsible for acts such
as theft, sabotage and other subversive activities. As cl. 5 ol the
settlement itself states it was "in order to ensure continuation of
smooth working" that the company and the association agreed that
in no case would either of them resort to direct action such as
lock.outs, strikes, go-slow and other coercive action without four
days' notice and that should one or more workmen resort to any
such direct action without the approval Of the association, the
association would cooperate with the company in any disciplinary
action which the company would take against such workmen. Then
follows the agreement on the said demands ol the workmen, 3ifld
the proposals made by the management in the details of which it
is not necessary to go, and finally, the agreement that the parties
would adhere to the code of discipline and the grievance procedure
annexed as ~exure IV to the settlement. The said code also
inter alia provided that there should be no strike or Jock.out with
out notice, that neither party should resort to coercion intimida
tion, victimisation or go-slow tactics, that they would avoid litig~
tion, sit-down and stay.in strikee and lock.outs and would not
perm.it demonstrations which are not peaceful or rowdyism. Read
H I
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I G
WORKMEN V. MOTOR INOUST, CO, (She/at, /.) 311
in the context of the other provisions of Part. I of the settlement
of which it is part, cl. 5 was intended! to prohibit (a) direct action
without notice by ot at the instanee of the association, and (b)
strikes by workmen themselves withOtit fue approval Of the ~
ciation. . The words "'1 no case" used in the; clause emphasJSe
that direct action by either party without notice should not be re
sorted to for any reason whatsoever. There can be no doubt that
the settlement was one as defined by s. 2(p) of the Industrial Dis
putes Act and was binding on the workmen i¢er s. 18(3) of the
Act until it was vitlidiy terminated and was in force when the said
strike took place. The strike was a lightning one, was resorted
to without notice and was not at the call of the association ~
was, therefore, in breach of cl. 5.
Could the management. then take disciplinary ac.tion against
the c0ncerned workmen in respect of such a strike. ? Standing
order 22 qnumerates various acts constituting misconduct. Cls. 2,
3, 13 and 18 provide that striking either singly or in combination
with others ln contravention of the provisions of any Act, inciting
any other workmen to strike in cqnlravention of any Jaw, riotous
or disorderly behaviOUJ:" or any act subversive of discipline l!nd
loitering within the cqmpany's premises while on duty or absence
without permission from the appointed place of work c0nstitute
misconduct. . The j>?int is whether participation iiri . and incite
ment to join !he said strike were in respect of a strike whiqh was
in contraVel)tion of any Act or law. Section 23 proy.jdes. that no
workman employed in an industrial esta])lishment sl\all go on
strike in breach of contract and during the.perio4 in. which a settle
ment is in operation, in respect of any of the .matters . C()vered by
· such a settlement. The prohibition against a worlanl\ll going .on
strike thus envisag\)S two conditions; (a) that it is.in ~ch of a
contract and (b) that it is during the period in which a settl.emc;nt
is in operation a,nq is in respect of any of. the .matters, c;overed by
such settlement. The said settlemeint was a . contract between the
~mp any. and the. asso9\ation repl'!\~ting. the workmen and it was
m operation on May 11, 1966. But was it in respect of a matter
covered by the settlement 7 Under s. 24 .a strike is illegal if it is
commeooed in cOntravention of s. 23. Section 26 inter alia p~
vides that any workman .who commences, continues or atherw1se
acts in furtherance of. a strike which iii iileg'al ul!der the Act sh.all
be punislled with illlprisohment far a ~enil extending to one inon~J:i
or with fine which ·may extend to Rs. $0 .or with ~- · secµoD. 27
provides .punishinent of a person wh(! instigat~. or inqites-Qthers
to take part in or, otherwise jicts in .futtheranee of an Hlegal strike.
The stiike envisaged by these two sections is cleyly the one Whicb
is ille2al under s. 24 read with s. 23 . .A strike in breach of a con
tract during the operation of a settlememit anci in respect of a matter
covered by that settlement falls under s. 23 ( c). But whereas s. 26
312. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970] 1 S.C.R.
I
punishes a workman for going on an illegal strike-or for any act A
in furtherance of such a strike, s. 29 lays down the penalty for
a person, not necessarily a workman, who commits· breach of a
term of a settlement which is binding under the Act. · It is, there
fore, an offence for any person on whom a _settlement is binding
under the Act to commit a breach thereof and the legislature has
viewed it to be a more serious offence, for, it has a higher punish- B
ment of imprisonment extending to six months than the punish
ment for commencing etc. an illegal strike under s. 26. . Thus,
commencing a strjke or acting iIJ furtherance of it in breach of a
settlement binding on the person who so commences it or acts in
its furtherance is an offence punishable under s. 29.
It is clear that there is a distinction between. a strike envisaged -
by s. 23 ( c) in respect of a matter covered by a settlement and a
strike in breach of a settlement envisaged by s. 29. That position
was conceded by Mr. Gokhale for the management;~ But his argu
ment was that the strike in question was, firstly, in respect of a
matter covered by the said settlement, namely, its prohibition with
out notice while that settlement was in force and secondly that it
was in breach of that settlement, and consequently, it was illegal
both under s. 24 and s. 29. This contention does not seem
correct, firstly, because though an agreemeµit not to resort to a
strike without notice would be the subject matter of a settlement,
a strike in contravention of such an agreement is not in respect
of any of the matters covered by such settlement. Secondly, such
a construction would mean as if Par!iame;nt intended to provide
two different penalties, one under s. 26 and the other under s. 29,
for the very same offence, one higher than the other, an intention
difficult to attribute. The strike was in the matter of the suspen
sion of the said Shenoy pending a domestic enquiry against him,
a matter which obviously was not one of the matters covered by the
said settlement. It was, therefore, not a strike illegal under s. 24
read ·1vith s. 23 ( c). However, the strike was in contravention of
cl. 5 of the said settlement a.nd that settlement being binding on
. the workmen concerned and in operation at the time was punish·
able under s. 29, and therefore, iJlegal under that section.
The question whether a strike in contravention of a similar
clause in a settlement was illegal arose in The Tata Engineering
and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. C. B. Mitter & Anr. (1 ) As in cl. 5
of the settlement before us, the settlement there also provided that
"in no· case" would the parties thereto resort to direct action such
as lockouts, strikes, go-slow and other direct action without four .
days' notice. The strike in question was commenced in respect H
of a demand by a workman for ·a pair of gum-boots .. a dema,id
(1) C.A.No. 633of1963, dee. on April 2, 1964.
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WOllMBl'f v. MOTOll. OO>UST. co. (Shelat, I.) 313
A not cowred by the settlement. It was common ground that the
strike would not fall within the ambit of s. 24 bµt the controversy
~whether it WllS otherwisC illegal; the workmen's contention
being di.at it was not, as the Said clause against a strike without
il.otice applied ~y to one declared for enforcing one or the other
demand8 which. fOnned the subject matter of the settlement and
since the strike arose out ol a matter not covered by the settlement,
that clause was illapp&able. This Court negatived the conten
tion and held that the words "in no case" in that clause meant a
strike for whatever reason and tho11gh it was conceded that jt was
not illegal under s. 24, ii: was, nevertheless, held to be illegal not
because it was in respect o( a matter covered. by the said settle.,
ment but because it was in contravention of the settlement which
was binding_ on the concerned workmen, which meaint that tbe
Court held ilie strike to be illegal under s. 29. In our view the
decision in the present case must be the same. The strike was
illegal not under s. 2.4 but becau~ it wa• in contravention of the
settlemeint binding on the workmen concerned. Consequently,
standing order 22 would apply and participating in or inciting
others to join such a strike would amount to misconduct for which
the management were. entitled to take disciplinary action.
£
But against that position, the argumqnt was that the agreement
dated May 11, 1966 under which' the workmen called off the
strike also pri:>vided that no disciplinary action would be taken
against any workmen in respect of the strike on that day and that
therefore the proceedings taken against the three workmen in
violation of that agreement aniounted to unfair labour practice.
The agreement was. oral. According to Bernard, Secretary of tile
association, the agteelli.ent was that (a) the charges and the sus
pension order passed. against the said Shelioy should be withdra\\ID,
(b) the company should pay the wages for the 3 ! hours period
of the strike provi4ed !he workmen made good ~ loss of produc
tion durin~ that period, and ( c) . the management would take no
'action against any one for going Qll strike. The evidence of Martin,
the company's !e$;hliical airector, on the other h1111d, was that the
company agreed Ollly not to punish the said Shenoy and to consider
paying wages for the hours of the strike. The Labour Court Oii
this ovidence held that· the association failed to prove that the
management had agreed not tO take action against allY of the work-
men in conne¢tion with .the strike though it may be.that they migt:
have agreed not to victimise any workman for participatilllg in the
strike.- In fact, the management did not . impose . any penalty
against any workn18n. for joining the strike, not .evon against the·
three CQ!lcerned workmen. Thit findjng being purely One of fact
and the Labour Court havin11 given cogent reasons for· it we would
not interfere with it without the utmost reluctance. We have been
taken through the evidence and the correspondence between the
314 SUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1970) I S.CR.
parties but we fail to seo any error on the part of the Labour Court
111 reaching that finding.
The next contention was that the orders of dismissal were bad
as they took into account the charge of intimidation of the com
pany's officers although the enquiry officer had found that that
charge was not proved. The charge-sheets, exs. M/ 4A, M/ SA
and M/ 6A against the three workmen alleged in express terms dis
orderly behaviour and iintimidation. The report of the enquiry
officer against the said Vasudevan clearly stated that the enquiry
officer accepted the evidence of the management's witnesses and
that on that evidence all the charges against him stood proved.
While summarising those charges, he, no doubt, did not in so many
words me the expression "intimidation". But the evidence which
he, as aforesaid, accepted, was that Vasudevan along with other
workmen entered the G. 2 department at about 3 P.M. on that
day and thumping his hand on the table of the said Lakshman Rao
threatened that officer in the following words : "now I am in the
forefront [of the crowd]. You camnot do anything. You ask
your people to come out and you also come out. Otherwise you
can see what we can do for you now". The said Lakshman Rao
had also deposed that he was surrounded by the workers who
started pushing and pullin~ him. The evidence of other officers
was that as the crowd which forced its way into this department
got unruly they were also forced to leave their places of work.
The evidence against Prabhakar was that he too was in the fore
front of that crowd which squeezed· Lakshman Rao and some
members thereof inflicted kicks on him. Similarly, there was the
evidence of one Raja, the assistant personnel officer, and others
that Sandhyavoo was one of those in the forefront of that crowd.
According to Raja, Sandhyavoo tried to lift him from his seat with
a view to force him to leave his tablo and finding that the crowd
had become restive he left his place. Acceptamce of this evidence
by the enquiry officer must necessarily mean acceptance of the
version of these officers that they were intimidated by the crowd
which forced its way into their department led by thes~ three work
men. Though the enquiry officer has not, in so many wo•ds, used
the expression 'intimidation' his finding of disorderly behaviour
must be held to include acts of intimidation.
Lastly, were the orders of dismissal against the three workmen
ac:s of victimisation on the part of the management when admit
t, .Hy a large number of workmen had staged the strike and also
'- 'ed others to join that strike? The orders against the three
w." '.men being identical in terms we take the orders passed a~ainst
Vasudevan as a specimen. That order sets out four ~cts of mis
conduct by him; (I) striking or stopping work, (2) inciting, (3)
riotous and disorderly behaviour and ( 4) loitering about in the
WORKMBN v. MOTOll INDUST. CO. (Shelat, J.) 31 &
company's premises. Though each Ollie of these acts, according to
the order, was misconduct punishable with dismissal, the order
states that so far as acts 1 'and 4 were concerned, the management
did not wish to take a serious view of them as a large number of
"misguided''. workmen. had stopped work and left their places of
work without permission. The management, therefore, took ac
tion only m respect of acts falling under els. 3 and 13 of standing
order 22 evidently for the reason that they considered incitement,
intimidation and riotous and disorderly behaviour as "very grave
in nature". We do not think that in taking this view the m3jlliage
ment discriminated against the three workmen concerned as against
the rest or that they dismissed them with the object of victimis
ing. The evidence in the enquiry clearly disclosed that whep the
crowd forced its way into the G. 2 department it was Jed by these
three workmen, all of whom were in the fore.front thereof and two
of them had defiantly forced the officers to leave their tables. One
of them had threatened as to what he and the others who were
behind hi111 in that crowd could do to him if he did not comply
3jn<I the other had tried even to lift another officer from his chair
to compel him to leave his place of work. In these circumstances
the management cannot be blamed if they took a serious view of
these acts of the three workmen concerned, who had taken up
their position in the forefront of that crowd, a position indicative
of their having led that crowd into that departmont and having
acted as its !elide~. An act of discrimination can only occur if
amongst those equally situated an unequal treatment is meted out
to one or more of them. Havini been found to be the leaders
of the crowd, action taken agai\fi.<t them cannot on any principle
be regarded as discriminatory or unequal. The decision in Burn &
Co. Ltd. v. Workmen(') relied on by Mr. Ramamurthi has no
bearing on the facts of this case and cannot assist him. Once a
misconduct graver 1:hain that of the rest was found proved against
these three workmen and for which the punishment is dismissal,
victimisation cannot legitimately be attributed to the management.
It is relevant in this connection to remember that so far as their
rarticipation in the strike aiDd loitering a bout were concerned, no
action was taken against these three workmen on the ground that
those acts were common with those of the rest of the workmen.
In view of these facts it is not understarrdable how the impugned
orders of dismissal could be characterised as acts of victimisation.
It is also not possible to say that the fiinding of incitement and
disorderly behaviour of ·these three workmen was perverse or such
as no reasonable body of persons could come to on the evidence
on record on the ground only that the others also were guilty of
those acts. For, there would be nothing wrong if those who misled
or misguided other workmen were selected for disciplinary action
(I) (1959] I L.L,J. 4.lO.
316 SUPREME COURT IU!POllTS [1970] l S.C.ll.
and n~t the victims of their persuasion, who in following their A
precept did similar acts.
In our judgment the orders of dismissal, based on the findings
in the domestic enquiry which did not suffer from any infinnity.
could not be successfully impeached, and therefore, the Labour
Coun was right in upholding them. The appeal fails and is dis- 11
missed. There will be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.