Nityananda M. Joshi & Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors.
Sikri, J. These appeals by special leave are directed against .
the order ot the Central Government Labour Court, Bombay,
holding that the applications filed by the appellants against the
Life Insurance Corporation of India lljllder s. 33C(2) of the IndUS- .
trial Disputes Act, 1947, were barred under art. 137 of the Limi
tation Act, 1963, insofar as the claim was for period beyond three
years. In holding this the Labour Court followed the decision of
the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in The Manager M/s.
P. K. Porwal v. The Labour Court('). The Bombay High Court
held that applications filed under s. 3 3C ( 2) of the Industrial Dis
putes Act prior to its ameindment by Central Act :XXXVI of 1964
were governed by the period o.f limitation laid down in art. 13 7
of the Limitation Act; 1963, and this article applied to applications
under Jaws other than thos.e contained in the Civil Procedure Code,
1908.
Thfa Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The Presid
ing Officer, Labour Court, Hubli(') has dissented from the deci·
sion of the Bombay High Court and has held that art. 137 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply to applications under
s. 3 3C ( 2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This Court gave two
reasons for coming to this conclusion. The first ground was that
in spite of the changes. made in the Indian Limitati~ Act, 1963,
no drastic change was intended in the scope of ·art. 13 7 so as to
include withiin it all applications irrespective of the fact whether
they had any reference to the Code ot Civil Procedure or not.
This Court held that in spite of the chainges the interpretation of
art. 181 of the Limitation Act. 1908, by this Court in Bombay
Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva and Others(") would apply to art.
137 of the Limitatiqn Act, 1963. The second ground .given by
this Court was that it is only applications to Courts that are intend
ed to be covered under art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. · ·
In our view art. 137 only contemplates applicatiQDS to Courts.
In the Third .Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963,
an the other applications mentioned in the various articles are
applications filed in a court. Further s. 4 of the Limitation Act,
1963, provides for the .contingency when the prescribed period for
a.ny application expires on a holiday and the . only contfugeney
contemplated, is "wh¢n the court is closed". Again under s. 5 it is.
(I) 70 Born. L. R. 104.
(3) [1%4] 3 S.C.R. 700.
(2) [1970J 1 s.c.R. s1.
398 SUPltBME COURT ltEPOltTS [1970] 1 S.C.R.
only a court which is enabled to admit an application after the A
prescribed period has expired if the court is satisfied that the
applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application.
·It seems to us that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is that_
it only deals with applications to courts, and that the Labour
·Court is not a court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.
It is not lljlCCISary to· express our views on the first ground
given by this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The
Pruiding Officer Labour Court, Hub Ii (1). It seems to us that it
!:t, require serious consideration whether applications to courts
r other provisions, apart from Civil Procedure Code, are
included within art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, or not.
The learned counsel for the respondent cQillends that the
~ls should fail on another ground. He says that these appli
·cations were filed under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
while they should have been filed under s. 33C(l). He further
says that, at any rate, no application can be filed under s. 33C(2)
because the sub-sectioql does not mention how the question is to
be decided. There is no force in these submissions.
It is plain from the wording oi sub-s. ( 1) and sub-s. (2) of
s. 33C that the former sub-sectmn deals with cases where money
is due to a workman from an employer under a !l'ttlement or an
award or under the provisions of Chapter VA, while the latter
sulHection deals with cases where a workman is eidtitled to receive E
from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of
being computed in terms of money. Jn the present case applica
tions were filed by the employees against the respondent for com
puting in terms of mqoey the benefit of holidays and for recoverin_g
the amount This case falls squarely within sub-s. (2) of s. 33C.
1bere ia no award or settlement under which the benefit of holidays
had already been computed.
It is true tltat sub-s. (2) of s. 33C does not indicate the mode
in which the question as to the amount of money due or as to the
amount at which the benefit should be computed, may be decided.
But the sub-sectiQD had left it to the rule-making authQrity to make
a suitable provision. This ·is indicated by the expression "subject G
10 any rules that may be made under this Act" in sub-s. (2) of
·t. 33C. Rules have been made and r. 62(2' of the Industrial
Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, provides :
"Where any workman or a group of workmen is
entitled to rccc1ve from the employer any monc:y or any
1-fit which is capable of being computed-in terms of H
money, the workmen or the group of workmen, as the
(I) [t970) I S.C.lt. 'I.
..
NITYANANDA v. L.I.C. (Sikri, /.)
case may be, may apply to the specified Labour Court
in Form K-3 lor the de11:mlination of the amount due
or, as the aae may be. the 'amount at which such benefit
should be computed."
399
According to this rule an application in Form K-3 can clearly be
made.
In the result the appeals are allowed and the order of the
Labour Court set aside insofar as the Labour Court held that the
applicati<¥JS were barred by art. 13 7 of the Limitation Act. The
Labour Court will now pass the final order in accordance with law.
The appellants will be entitled to their costs, one hearing fee.
V.P.S. Appeals allowed •