Works Manager, Central Railway Workshop, Jhansi v. Vishwanath and Ors.

Dua, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court affirming on revision under s. 115 Civil P.C. the order of th~ learned Additional District Judge, Jhansi, who had allowed the respondent's appeal from the order of the learned City Magistrate, Jhansi, made on an application presented by the respondents under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act IV of 1936. The City Magistrate was the "authority" appointed under s. 15 and tlle district court was the court of appeal under s. 17 of the said Act. The respondents through the Assistant Secretary of th~ National Railway Mazdoor Union Work-shop Branch, Jhansi had asserted in their application under s. 15 that they were workers within the meaning of s. 2 ( 1) of the factories Act ( 63 of 1948) and complained that th-;y were denied wages for overtime work done by them on the erroneous ground that they were no: workers within the aforesaid provision. The learned Magistrate held that the respondents had been entrusted with purely clerical duties and they were not connected in any manner with the manufactur­ ing process. On this conclusion their application was dismissed. On appeal the learned Additional District Judge disagreed with this view and came to the conclusion that the work done by the respondents was incidental to or connected with the manu­ facturing process. It was observed in the order that some of the respondents were entrusted with the duty of checking the time of work of each worker in the workshop, a few others were time­ keepers and the remaining respondents prepared account sheets on the basis of the time sheets and did other work incidental to the running of the work-shop including payment of wages to the staff of the workshop and the office. The High Court on revision, as already observed, affirmed the order of the learned Additional District Judge. · On appeal in this Court the short question we are called upon to decide is whether the respondents, who are time-keepers fall within the purview of the definition of "worker" as contained in s. 2 ( 1) of the Factories Act. The respondents have raised a preliminary objection that the appeal is incompetent on the ground that respondent No. 29 (T. A. Kolalkar) had died after the order of the High Court but his name continqed to appear in the array of respondents, As his legal representatives had not been brought on the record, the appe.al ~gainst him is incompetent and since there was a .ioint apphcat10n on behalf of all the re·r,~n, 1 ents which was dealt w!lh and decided by a common order by the learned Magistrate, the appeal against the other r.espondenis must also be held to be incompetent. The impugned order having become final as the 723 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1970] 2 S.C.lt deceased T. A. Kolaikar, the present appeal against other respon­ dents should, according to the argument, be held to be incom· petent because the reversal of the impugned order as against them would give rise to conflicting decisions on the point. Recently this Court disallowed a similar objection in Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Shri Ram Adhar Singh and others(') and when the attention of the respondent's learned counsel was drawn to that decision, the objection was not seriously pressed. We now turn to the merits of the appeal. The word "worker" is defined in s. 2 ( 1 ) of the Factories Act to mean "a person employed directly or through any agency, whether for wa~es or not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premb;s used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or foe subject of the manufacturing process." This definiti?n seems to us to be fairly wide because it takes . within its sweep not only persons employed in any manu­ fa_cturing process but also in cleaning any part of the machinery er premises used for a manufacturing process and goes far beyond the direct connection with the manufacturing process by . extending it to other kinds of work which may either be incidental ·to or connected with not only the manufacturing process itself but also the subject of the manufacturing . process. The word "manufacturing process" is defined ~ s. 2(k) of the Factories Act in fairly wide language. It means any process for : " ( i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finish­ ing, paclcing, oiling, washing, cleaning break­ ing up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adaptin.e any article or substance with a view to its use. sale, transport, delivery er disposal, or (ii) pumpinl! oil. water or sewage, or 1 iii) generating. transformin.e or transmitting power; or !iv) composing types for printing. priniing by letter G press, lithography. photogravure or other similar process or book binding: ( v) constructing. reconstructing. repairing, refitting. finishing or breaking up ships or vessels;" Now the conclusion of the learned Additional District Judge H on the nature 0f work of the respondents. which, in our opinion, ,. CENTRAL RLY. v. VJSHWANATH (Dua, J.) 729 being one of fact, must be held to be binding on the High Court on revision and also not open to reassessment on the merits in this Court on special leave appeal f; om the order of the High Court on revision, is that, the time keeper; pr.epare the pay sheets of the workshop staff, maintain leave account, dispose of settle­ ment cases and maintain records for statistical purposes. Four­ teen of the respondents, accordin.·2 '.o t'1is conclusion, are time­ keepers who maintain attendance cl the st1ff, job card particu­ la1s of the various jobs under operation and time-sheets of the staff working on various shops dealing with the production of Railway spare-parts and repairs etc. Fom of the respondents are head time-keepers entrusted with the task of supervising the work of other respondents. The qnestion arises if on this conclu­ sion it can be held that as a matter of law the respondents fall outside the definiton of "worker" as contemplated by s. 2 (1) of the Factories Act and that the High Court erred in dismissin~ the revision. The appellant's learned counsel has submitted that the exprei­ sion "incidental (o" or "connected with" connotes a direct con­ nection with the manufacturing process and ther.efore if the duties assigned to the respondents have no such direct connection with the manufacturing process then they cannot fall within the pur­ view of the word "worker". In support of his submission he has referred to some law dictionaries. In Law Lexicon in Briti>h India by Ramanathan Iyer "incidental power" is stated to be, power that is directly and immediately appropriate tc the exis­ tence of the specific power granted and not one that has a slight or remote relation to it. The word ''incidental" in the expres';ion "incidental labour" as used in Mechanic's Lien Statutes allowing liens for work and labour performed in the construction, re· pairs etc. of a building etc. is stated in this Law Lexicon to mean labour directly done for and connected with or actually incorpo­ rated in the building or improvement : service indirectly or remotely associated with the construction work is not covered by this expression. Reference has next been made by the counsel to the Law Dictionary by Ballentine where also the expression "incidental power" is staied in the same terms. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary the meaning of the words "incident" and "incidental" as used i.1 various English statutes have been noticed. We do not think they can be of much assistance to us. The deci­ sion in Haydon v. Taylor(') noticed in this book at first sight appeared to us to be of some relevance, but on going throu~h it. we do not find it to be of much help in construing the statutory provisions with which we are concem~d. Similarly the decision in Frederick Haves Whymper v. John Jones Harney(') seems to be of little guidance. (I) 122 E.R. 554 12) 144 P.R. eJc 730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1970] 2 S.C.R. On behalf of the respondents our attention has been drawn to a decision of this Court. in Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd. v. Regional Director Employees State Insurance Corpo­ ration Etc. (1). This decision deals with the Employees State Insurance Act and on a comparison of the definition of the word "employee"' as contained ins. 2(9) of that Act with the definition of the word "worker" ins. 2( 1) of the Factories Act, it is observed that the former definition is wider than the latter. It is further added that the benefit of the Factories Act does not extend to field worlcers working outside the factory whereas the benefit of the Em;:iloyees State Insurance Act extends inter a/ia to the em­ ployees meniioned in s. 2(9)(i) whether working inside the fac­ tory or estahlishment or elsewhere. Reliance has, however, been placed on behalf of the respondents on the observations at page 99 of the report where reference is made to the clerks entrusted with the duty of time-keeping and it is observed that all these em­ ployees are employed in connection with the work of the factory. A person doing non-manual work has been held in this case to be include<' in the word "employee" within the meaning of s. 2(9) (i) if employed in connection with the work of the factory. The ratio of this decision which is concerned with the construc­ tion of different statutory language intended to serve a different ob.iect and purpose is of no direct assistance in construing the definition of the word "worker" as used in the Factories Act. The respond~nts' counsel has then submitteJ that the previous history of the Act throws helpful light on the legislative intend­ ment and in this connection he has referred to the definition ot the word "worker" in the Factories Act XXV of 1934. The word "worker" in s. 2 (h) of that Act was defined to mean : "a person employed, whether for wages or not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufact11ring process, or in any other kind of work whatsoever inci­ dental to or connected with the manufacturing proces' or connected with the subject qf the manufacturirg process, but does not include any person solely em­ ployed in a clerical capacity in any room or place where no manufacturing process is being carried on." It is argued that the deletion of the words conveying exclu­ sion of persons solely employed in a clerical capacity in a place where no manufacturing process is carried on suggests that the present definition of "worker" is wide enough to take within its fold even those persons who are employed solely in clerical capa­ city if otherwise :hey fall within the definition. The appellant counsel has, on his part, by reference to the definition in the Act (1) [1967] 3 S.CR. 92 0 ! 731 of 1934, argued that the deletion of the word "whatsoever" after "any other kind of work" is indicative of the legislative intention tc restrict the scope of "any other kind of work" in the current Act. The Factories Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in factories. It is probably tru.e that all legislation in a welfare state is enacted with the object of promot­ ing general welfar~; but certain types of enactments are more rspcnsive to some urgent social demands and also have more immediate and visible impact on social vices by operating mor.~ directly to achieve social reforms. The enactments with which we are concerned, in our view, belong to this category and, there· fore, demand an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative purpose, without doing vio!.~nce to the language. The· definition of "worker" in the Factories Act, therefore, does not seem to us ;o exclude those employees who are entrusted solely with clerical duties, if they otherwise fall within the definition of the word "worker". Keeping in view the duties and functions of the respondents as found by the learned Additional District Judge. we are unable to find anything legally wrong with the view taken by the High Court that they fall within the definition of the· word "worker". Deletion of the word "whatsoever" on which the appellant's counsel has placed reliance does not seem to make much difference because that word was, in our view, redundant. We have not been persuaded to hold that the High Court was in error in affirming the decision of the learned Additional Dis­ ttict Judge. In the result this appea'. fails and is dismissed with costs. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.