Commissioner of Lncome Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur v. Hukamchand Mohanlal
Grover, J. This is an appeal by certificate from a judgment of
the Madhya Pradesh High Court in an Income tax Reference. The
Reference related to the assessment made on the assessee for the
year 1962-63 for which the accounting period was the year ending
March 3 l, 1962. The assessee carried on business as sole sell-
ing agent · of M/s. Mohanlal Hargovindas, Jabalpur. The
assessee succeeded to this business on the death of her husband on
or about February 17, 1960. It would appear that M/s. Mohan
lal Hargovindas had recovered a certain amount towards sales-tax
from the assessee's husband relating to the period January 26.
C.I.T. v. HUKAMCJ.iAND (Grover, J.) 787
1950 to March 31, 1951. In an appeal filed oy the said firm,
however, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax remitted the
sum of Rs. 24,341/- so recovered by the firm by an order dated
November 31, 1960. Consequently M/s. Mohanlal Hargovin
das refunded that amount to the assessee by means of a draft dated
October 31, 1961. This draft was received by the assessee on
November 9, 1961 which fell in the accounting period. The In
come tax Officer sought to tax this amount under the provisions of
s. 41 ( 1) of the Income tax Act 1961, hereinafter called the ~Act'.
He did not accede to the contention of the assessee that the
income, if at all, was the i;ncome of the assessee's deceased hus
band and not her income. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner
dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee. The Tribunal acceded
to the contention of the assessee that since the allowance or de·
duction in question had been obtained by a different assessee,
namely, her husband she was not liable to pay tax on that amount
under s. 41(1) of the Act. The Tribunal was moved by the Com
missioner of Income tax for stating a case and referring the fol
lowing question to the High Court :
"Whether the sum of Rs. 24,341 was liable to tax
under s. 41(1) of the Income tax Act, 1961 ?"
The High Court answered the question in favour of the assessee.
Section 41(1) is in t_he following terms:-
"41(1) Where an allowance or deduction has beerr
made in the assessment for any year in respect of loss,
expenditure or trading liability incurred by the assessee,
and subsequently during any previous year the assessee
has obtained, whether in cash or in any other manner
whatsoever, any amount in respect of such loss or ex
penditure or some benefit in respect of such trading lia
bility by way of remission or cessation thereof, the
amount ob~ined by him or the value of benefit accru
ing to him, shall be deemed to be profits and gains ·of
business or profession and· accordingly chargeable to
income tax as the income of that previous year, whether
the business or profession in respect of which the allow
ance or deduction has been made is in existence in that
year or not".
As pointed out by the High Court under the general law if a trad
ing liability has been allowed as a business expenditure and if
this liability is remitted in any subse.quent year the amount remit
ted cahnot be taxed as income of the year of the remission nor
H can the account for the year in which the liability was allowed be
reopened or adjusted. Section 41(1) was enacted to supersede
this principlo but this section can apply only to tho assosseo. In
A the present case if the husband of the assessee had been alive and
had received the amount which had bjeen remitted during his life--
time he would certainly have been liable to pay tax under the
provisions of s. 41(1). But .ll:anhaiyalal having died and his
\'VidoW being the assessee she cannot possibly be brought within
tlie section. Section 2(7) of the Act defines lhe wotd "assessee".
The definition is very general and assessee is s~ated to mean a B
person by whom income tax or super tax or any other sum of
money is payable un<t~r the· Act and includes every person as
mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c). The assessee, in the pre
sent case, does not fall within any of those clauses. There is no
specific provision in the Act under which it can be said that the
assessee is a person by whom income tax is payable on tihe amount c
of Rs. 24,341/• which came tel !ier by way of remission on account
of what had transpired ill the lifetime of her husband. The Act
does not contain any provision making a successor in business or
the legal representative of an assessee to whom an allowance has
already been granted liable to tax Ul)der s. 41(1) in respect of
the amount remitted and received by the successor or the legal
representative. The only provision which relates to the liability D
of the legal representative is s. )59 of the Act. Sub-section (I)
thereof provides that where a person dies his legal representative
shall be liable tb pay any sum which the deceased would have
been liable to pay if he had not died in the like manner and to
the same extefit as the deceased. The corresponding provision in
the Jficome tax Act 1922 was s. 24B. In Commissioner of In
come tax Bombay v. Amarchand N. Shroff(') it was laid down by
this Court that s. 24B did not authorise the levy of tax on receipts
by the Jegal representative of a dece-ased person in the year of
assessment succeeding the year of account beifig the previous year
in which such penion died. The assessee had ordinarily to be a
living person and could not be a dead person. By s. 24B the F
legal personality of the. deceased assessee was extended for the
duration of the entire previous year in the course of which he
died, The income received by him before his death and that
received by his legal representative after his death but in that pre
vious year became assessable to income tax in the relevant assess
ment year. Any income received in the year subsequent to the
previoUs year or the accounting year could not be called income
received by the deceased person. Thus the provisions of s. 24B
did not extend to tax liability of the estate of a deceased person
btyo,nd the previou~ or the accounting year in which that person
died. To the same l!lloct is the decision in Commissioner of
fntome rax, Bomba.v v. James Anderson('). Indeed the learned
coun~l for the Revenue did not afid could not rely on the provi
sions af s. 159 cl' the Act in the :present case nor was any reliance
al 31 I. T. R. 343.
C.l.T. v. HUKAMCHAND (Graver, J.) 789
A placed on any other section in the Act apart from s. 41 ( l). The
question referred is a.lso based on that very section. That section,
in our opinion cannot possibly apply to the present case bec.ause
the assessee who is roow sought to be taxed is noc the assessee con
templated by that section. The assessee withhn s. 41 (1), namely,
Kanhaiyalal having died the Revenue could not take any advantage
B of its prnvisions. The High Court rightly observed that the ques
tion whether the amount of Rs. 24,341/- was )iable to tax as the
personal income of the assessee did not arise in the present case in
which the sole point to b\e decided was whether that amount was
assessable in the assessee's hands under s. 41 (1) of the Act.
We, therefore, entirely concur in the view of the High Cow.t
and agree with the answer ret1.1rned by it. In t;bei result ,the ,appeal
fails .and it is dismissed with costs.
K.B.N. Appeal dismissed_