His Holiness Digya Darshan Rajendra Ram Doss v. Devendra Doss
. H
MuKHERJEA J. This appeal by certificate from a judgment
·Of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh arises out of a dispute re-
RAM DOSS v. DEVENDRA DOSS (Mukherjea, J.) 913
garcling thr: succession to the office of the spiritual heao (Mohunt)
of Sri Swami Hathiramjee Mutt, Tirumalai Tirupati. The facti; out
of which the appeal anses may be stated briefly. Succession to the
office of the Mohunt of the Mutt is admittedly reguiated by custom
which p1ov1des that upon the death of a mohunt his senior disciple
becomes the next mohunt. This is, however, subject to the condi
tion that the senior disciple must be a North-Indian Brahrnin. In
1947 Sri Prayagadasjee Varu was the Mohunt of the Mutt. Upon
his death in 1947 there was a dispute about the succession to the
office of Mohuat between two contestants viz. Sri Narayanadasjee
Varu and Sri Chetandossjee Varu. The dispute appears to have
been resolved by the intervention of what is described as the
Supreme Council of Mohunts viz the Akada Panchayat. Under the
terms of compromise which are to be found in Ex. B-8, Sri
Narayanadasjee Varu became the Mohunt and after him, the
office was to devolve on Chetandos5 and after Chetandoss on a
senior disciple of Narayandasjee Varu. Narayandasjee Varu died
in 1958 and there was again a dispute as to who would become
the next mohunt. Chetandos claimed to be the mohum under
the tenns of Ex. B-8 while Sri Rajendra Ram Doss Jee Varu the
present appellant before us claimed the office by virtue of his status
as a senior disciple of Narayanadasjee Varu. Rajendra Ram Doss
Jee Varu filed a suit to establish Ms right. The dispute and the
suit were both settled by another agreell1i:nt between Chetandoss
and Rajendra Ram Doss Jee Varu the terms of which are to be found
in Ex. B-1. Under this agreement Chetandoss was to succeed
Narayanadasjee Varu and, after Chetandoss, the office was to go
to Rajendra Ram Doss. Very soon after this, however, on 18
March 1962 Chetandoss died. This be,came the occasion for yet
another dispute about the succession to the office of the mohunt.
Rajendra Ram Doss claimed to be the mohunt in terms of the
two agreements we have referred to just now and also by virtue
of his being the only surviving disciple of Narayanadasjee Varu.
Devendra Doss Jee, the respondent in this appeal, however, put
up a claim to the office of mohunt by virtue of his position as a
senior disciple of the last reigning mohu"nt Chetandoss. He was.
however, a minor at that time and a suit was filed on his behalf
by his next friend Sri Mukundadasjee Varu, Mohunt of Bugga
Mutt, Tirupati. In that suit he claimed for declaration of his title
to the office of the mohunt with all the properties that are attached
to that office as well as an injunction against Rajendra Ram Doss
Jee Varu restraining him from interfering with the affairs of the
Mutt.
At the _ti.me of the trial of the suit both parties agreed about
two propositions :
(i) By immemorial custom and nractice. upon the death
of a mohunt his eldest or seniormost disciple succeeds
to the Gaddi; and
(ii) Only a North-Indian Brahmin.is entitled to be a
mo hunt.
It was contended by each party before the learned subordinate
Judge that the other party was not a North-Indian Brahmin, The
learned Subordinate Judge held that the defendant Rajendra Ram
Doss was a North-Indian Brahmin and was also entitled to suc
_ ceed as the senior disciple of Narayanadossjee Varu. Acc0rding
to the learned Subordinate Judge the period of mohuntship of
Chetandoss was to be treated as a break in the practice of the
customary rule that only the seniormost disciple succeeds upon
the death of the reigning mohunt. Devendra Doss appealed
against this judgment to the High Court. The High Court found
on facts tllat Narayan Doss was not a ~orth-lndian Brahmin and
was, therefore, not entitled to being considered as a possible suc
cessor to the office of the mohunt. The High Court further held
that since Devendra Doss was the senior disciple of Chetandoss
he should by the rule of custom succeed to the office of the mohunt
upon the death of Chetandoss. On these grounds the High Court
upheld the plaintiff's appeal and gave a declaration in his favour
and also an injunction against Narayan Doss from interfering with
the affairs of the Mutt. Rajendra Ram Doss has now appealed
from the decision of the High Fourt.
Mr. Chagla appearing for the appellant raised two contentions
in support of the appellant's claim. First, he contended that the
customary rule by which a senior disciple succeeds to the Gaddi
of a mohunt upon the death of a reigning mohunt has always pre
vailed in this Mutt except for what may be described as an intor
regnum when Chetandoss was installed as the Mohunt. It was dur
ing this period that there was a departure from the custom and at
the end of this period the custom has been restored. Therefore,
Mr. Chagla argued, if after the death of Chetandoss his period of
mohuntship be altogether ignored, Rajendra Rain Doss would auto
matically become entitled to become the mohunt as the senior dis
ciple of Narayandass. Secondly, Mr. Chagla argued that
Devendra Doss, the respondent, is bound by the agreement of 15
July 1961 which not only recognised that Rajendra Ram Doss was
a North-Indian Brahmin but also stipulated that Rajendra Ram
Doss as the only surviving disciple of Narayanadass ·should be
come the Mohunt of the Mutt. It was eontended that since
Rajendra Ram Doss claimed through Chetandoss, he could not
throw overboard the agreement to which Chetandoss was a party.
In other words, Mr. Chagla sought to meet the finding of fact
arrived at by the High Court to the effect that Rajendra Ram
Doss was not a North-Indian Brahmin by pointing out that
Devendra Doss would be estopped from making that contention
in view of the clear statement in the agreement of. 29 Octo~er
1947 that Rajendra Ram Doss was in fact a North-Indian Brahmm.
RAM DOSS v. DEVENDRA DOSS (Mukherjea, J.) 9 15
For the sake of convenience we shall examine thes~ two son
tentions of Mr. Chagla in the reverse order; that is to say, we
shall deal with his second contention first. The High Court after
carefully examining the evidence on record has come to a clear
finding on facts that Rajendra Ram Doss was not a North-Indian
Brabmin. The High Court has also found that the respondent
Devcndra Doss was a North-Indian Brahmin. This Court is not
generally inclined to set aside or ignore the findings on fact of th~
High Courts unless they appear to have been mnn;fostly wrong.
ln tl1is case, however, after going through th~ ·~vidence ourselves
we are clearly of the opinion that the High Court was right in its
findings that the plaintiff was a Nonh-Indinn Brnhmin while the
defendant was a South-Indian Iyengar. It is true that there is a
recital in Ex. B· 1 which is the agreement executed by and between
Chetandoss and Rajendra Ram Doss on 15 July 1961, that
Rajendra Ram Doss was a North-Indian Brah111in. It. may be
useful here to set out the mntcrial portion of the agrec111ent :-
"Now, therefore, it is agre.ed as follows :-
( 1) x x x
(2) x x x
(3) Sri Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramdossjee Varu
(the plaintiff in t!1e suit) who is a North Indian
Hindustani Brahmin and a disciple of the late
Mahant Narayandossjee Varu has to succeed to
the Mahantship after (the Defenda!lt) Sri
Mahant Chethandossjee Varu and till then he
shall be the junior Mahan!;
Far from treating this as an evidence in support of Rajendra Ram
Doss's contention that he was a North-Ind;an Brahmin the High
Court considers this to be a very suspicious recital. The High
Court observes :
" ........ T;,e very description of the defendant in
Ex. B· l as a North,Indian Brahmin when in the context
of that document it was really unnecessary to describe
him as such makes the recital suspicious."
Apart from this solitary evidence of Ex. B-1 the entire evidence
on record goes to show that'Rajendra Ram Doss was not a North
Indian Brahmin. Mr. Chagla .• however. contended that since
Devendra Doss is claiming th;·ouglt Ch~tLndoss, h~ is estopped
from denying t)1e correctness of a cate~orical statement made in
H an agreement to which Chetandoss was a principal nartv. The
princiole on which, Mr. Chegla relies has b·~en formu'ated by
Gross in his book on Evidence, Third Edition, in :he fellowing
manner:-
7-Ls21s .. p. c1m
"It not infrequently happens that two people agree,
expr~ssly, or by necessary implication, that their legal ·
relatmns shall be based on the assumption that a certain
state of facts exists, and, when this has been done, the
original parties to the agreement, as well as those claim
ing through them, are estopped from denying the exist
ence of the assumed state of facts."
Though this principle invoked by Mr. Chagla is quite correct so
far as it goes and is a principle which has found expression: in a
large number of judgments, ancient and modern, we do not think
that in the facts of this case Mr. Chagla's client can rely on this
principle. Even though a clear plea of estoppel arises from the
recital in Ex. B-1 the defendant did not rely on this plea and en
tered into an issue on the facts so that the whole malter became
open for the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge. I.i Young
and Anr. v. Raincocfa(') Coltman, J. after having observed that
"where it can be collected from the deed that the parties to it
have agreed upon a certain admitted state of facts as the basis on
which they contract, the statement of those facts, though put in
the way of recital, shall es top the parties to aver the contrary",
yet refused to treat the recital of the deed as concJusive on the
question before him cin the ground that "if the estoppel appears
on the record the party who is entitled to take the advantage.of it,
instead of relying on it goes to issue on the fact, he puis the
matter at large, and the jury may disregard the estoppel" 1n
the instant case Rajendra Ram Doss, the detendant, not only
failed to invoke the doctrine of estoppel before the learned Sub
ordinate Judge but joined issue with the plaintiff upon the question
whether the defendant was not a North-Indian Brahmin and ac
cordingly an issue was raised and evidence adduced on this ques
tion. Rajendra Ram Doss cannot, tMrefore, rely on the doctrine
of estoppel to prevent the plaintiff from proving tliat Rajendra
Ram Doss was in fact not a North-Indian Brahmin. The princi
ple has been confirmed by a recent decision of the House of Lords
in Greer v. Kettle Re Parent Trust & Finance Co., Ltd.(') Re
ferring to the decifr,n of T"ainson v. Tremere (') which is often
relied~ upon as an authority for the proposition that, in all cir
cumstances, statements in deeds estop all parties to the deed from
ever alleging and proving the true facts, Lord Russell, in his opi
nion, observed :
"I would not, speaking for myself. be prepared to
ac~ept it as authoritative at the present day ....... .
Later decisions: however. put the matter on what seems
to be the sounder basis."
(I) 18 L.J.C.P. 193. (2) [1937] 4 All. E.R. 397.
(3) [1834] 1 Ad. & El. 792.
RAM DOSS v. DBVBNDllA DOSS (Mukherjea, J.) 917
Then, his Lordship quotes with approval the observation of
Coltman J. in Young and Anr. v. Raincock(')·which we have
already cited above. In the light of the foregoing considerations
we see no reason to discard the finding of fact recorded by the
High Court to the effect that Devendra Doss was a North-Indian
Brahmin and Rajendra Ram Doss was not.
We now come to the.first contention of Mr. Chagla. Starting
from ihe proposition which is admitted by both parties to the suit
and which states that by immemorial custom the office of Mohunt
upon the death of a reigning mohunt goes to the latter's senior
most disciple, Mr. Chagla contends that by this test Chelan Doss
could. not have become the Mo hunt when he assumed that office
as a result of the two agreements embodied in Ex. B-8 and Ex.
B· 1. He further suggests that the period between Chetan Doss'
accession \o the office and his demise should be treated as an
inter-regnum of irregularity which is to be ignored completely as
if it never came to happen. On this footing, since Chetan Doss
succeeded. Narayan Doss the office of trie Mohunt is to be filled
up by finding out who would be the person entitled to succeed
upon the demise of N1ttayan Doss. That is how Mr. Chagla
sought to claim this office for Rajendra Ram Doss who, it was
contended, was the only surviving disciple of Narayan ·Doss.
Reliance was placed for this proposition on a Division Bench
Judgment of the Madras High Court in. Amzasami Pillai and Ors.
v. Ramakrishna Mudaliar and Anr. (') in which it was held that
it would seem "not unreasonable to hold thal where a person,
who had no right to the office of a trustee according to the rule of
devolution established by the founder, acquires a title to the office
by prescription, but restores it to one, who, except for the trans·
feror's prescriptive title, could have taken the office according to
the rules laid down by the founder, such transfer should be treated
as an exception to the general doctrine thaf a trusteeship is not
assignable ........ for such a transfer would put an end ·10 the
continuance of a management inconsistent with the founder's in
tention and once more Jet in the class of persons by whom the
founder contemplated the management should. be carried on". It
was argued that after the death of Narayan Doss .his senior disci
ple should have become the Mohunt according to the rule of cus
tom which is paramount in the~e matters. 1'1iough the fact re·
mains that Chetandoss became the Mohunt as a result of two
agreements after his death, the customary line of succession should
be restored and a senior disciple of Narayan Doss at that point
of time should become the Mohunt. This could be achieved only
by giving the office of Mohunt to Rajendra Ram Doss.
1 1 ~ L.J.C.P. 193. (2) I.L.R. 28 Mad. 219.
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
A; ,/<;have already s~.u, it is not possible to make Rajendra
Ram Doss the Mohunt for tile s!mple reason that he has been
found not to ~ a North-Indian Brahmin. Even on the assump
tion that Rajendra Ram Doss was the senior-most disciple of
Narayan Doss at the tirne oI the latter's death and, therefore.
satisJzes the requirement of one cuctomary rule, Rajendra Ram
Doss cannot be.:ome the Mohunt arcording w the other equally
customary rule that only a North-India Brahmin can be the
Molmnt of this Mutt.
In our opinion the rule of custom should prevail in all cases
and if any aberrations have to be corrected suet. correction must
take us in the dire.:tion of re-establishing the rule of custom. To
that extent the principle laid down in the case of Annasami Pillai
and Ors. v. Ramakrishna Mudaliar and Anr. (supra) is a correct
principle and has to be followed. That, however, does not re
solve the difficulty in this case. Assuming that Chetan DOss was
not a validly appointed Mohunt so that his period of office is to
be ignored, the question still arises whether in making a reversiOil
to the custo:nary rule of succession to the office of a mohunt such
reversion is to operate from the point where Chetan Doss' period
ended or from the point when this had commenced. It is only
an accident that in this case Chetan Doss had a very brief rcriod
of office so that or. his death it was at ieast possible to find on~
surviving disciple of the Mohunt who held the office bei'ore Chetan
Doss succeeded him. In most cases if there is a break in the
customary rule it may not at all be possible to revert back to the
customary succession if one has to start from the point where the
original break h1d commenced. In such cases even if it may be
possible to revert to the~customary practice, it may not be possible
to go back to the point \vhere the customary line of succe~ion
had its original break. Thus, in this case though ot has been
possible to trace at least one person who was a discip!e of
Narayan Doss after whcse death the customary practice was bro
ken and the office handed over to an alleged interloper" even this
lone survivor of the original line of succession is not a person who
is competent to become the Mohunt by the immemorial custom of
the Mutt. Therefore, it is not possible at all to re-establish the
customary line of succession if one treats the period of Chetan
Doss' mohuntship as altogether non-existing. If we have to revert
to the custom of the Mutt we cannot do so from the point of time
when Narayan Doss died and Ch~tan Doss became the Mohunt.
We have to do so from the point when Chetan Doss died. After
all, Chetan Doss has been unquestionably the Mohunt of the Mutt.
It is true tf.at on a subsequent re-examination of the whole matter.
doubts have been c~st on his title for !he office but bv commo11
accn,tancv of the Chelas of the ~iutt he had becomt: the Mohunt
and had remained a m.ohunt till his death. Ignoring the fact that
RAM DOSS v. DEVENDRA DOSS (Mukherjea, J.) 919
he was really the Mohunt of this Mutt for a specific period does not
help us re-establish the rule of custom rrevailing in this Mutt.
The only possible way in which the old custom may be ·r~-es•a
bl!shed is by making a fresh start from the point of the dealh of
Chetan Doss and that can only be done by allowing Devendra
Do.;s to be the :Mohunt. The High Court has come to a cleat
fa1ding that Devendra Doss is a North-Indian Brahmin and is
r',erefore fit to hold the office ofa mohunt according to the cus
tom of this Mutt. The High Court has also found that he was
thi; senior-most disciple of Chelan Doss who had been the reign
ing mohur.t upto the point of time when the dispute regardm!:
succession arose. If Rajendra Ram Doss' right to become \h~
;,fohunt ~ rejected on the ground that Chelan Doss was perhaps
an interloper the whole line of succession will be broken beyond
repair or redemption, for, once it is accepted that Rajendra Ram
Doss is not a· North-Indian Brahmin there is no other Jiving disci
ple of Narayan Doss who could restore the original line of suc
cession. In our view it is not open to us to Jay down a new rule
of succession or to alter the rule af succession completely. The
only way we can save the custom is by acceoting something as
fact which has so far been accepted by everybody concerned with
the Mutt as a fact and which cannot any longer be undone v:ith
ont demolishing Rltogether the custom of the Mutt. In these
circumstances we hold that Devendra Doss is entitled to succeed
Chetan Doss as his senior-most disciple en the strength of the
immemorial custom of this Mutt.
In the view that we take of this matter the appeal fails and
is dismissed. In the peculiar circumstances of this case we make
no orders to costs. All the stay orders passed in this matter by
this Court shall sta,1d vacated.
tG.C. Appeal dismissed.