Shyam Sunder and Others v. the State of Rajasthan

MATHEW, J. This is an appoal by special leave, against the iudgment and decree of the High Court of Rajasthan, setting aside decree for recovery of damages under the Patel Accidents Act, 1855 <(hereinafter referred to as the Act). ·C .. '"' <I SHYA!v1 SUNDER v. RAJASTHAN (l'vt:.d1c,t,. J) 551 Navneetlal was a resident of Udaipur. He was in the emplov­ ment of the State of Rajasthan and was, at the material time, worki,;g in the office of the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Bhilwara as a Store Keep or. In connection with the famine relief works undertaken by the department he \Vas required to piocced to B(l.ns­ wara. For that purpose he boarded trnck No. RJE-131 owned by the deportment from Bhihve.re on May 19, 1952 and reached Chittorgarh in the evening. Re~id~s hiJn~eif, there \'i'ere FD.tch Singh FundjJal and Hccra Sing:1, the dnver, cleaner and a stranger jn the truck. On May 20, 1952, they resumed the journey from Chittorgarh at about 11 A. M. and reached Pratapgarh in the same evening. The truck ·started fro1n Pratapgarh to Bans\V<~ra at about IO A.M. on May 21, ]952. After having travelled for 4 miles fro:n Pratapgarh, the engine of the truck caught lire. As soon as the fire was seen the <lriver cautiont<l the occupants to ju1np out of the truck. Consequently, Navneetlal and the other persons jumped out Of the truck. \VJ1ile doing so, Navnectla1 strurk against a stone lying by the ~ide of the r0a:l and died instantaneollsly. Parwati Devi, widow of NnvneetlaI r.rought a suit [].gain.st the State of Rajasthan for damages under the provisions of the Act. The p!aintiff alleged that it w&s on account of the negligence of the driver of the truck that a truck \vhich ,va:.; not ror.dwortliy was put on the road and that it caught fire which led to tl:e death of Navneetlal and that the State wos liable for the negligence of its employees in tlie course of his employment. The plaint also alleg'd that the deceased had left behind him his widow, namely, th:! plaintiff, two n1inor sons, one minor daughter and his parents. The plaintiff claimed damages to the tune of Rs. 20,000!-and prayed for a decree for that amount. The State contended that the truck was qt1ite in order when it started from Bhilwara and even when it started from Pratapgarh to Banswara and that if it dc\'eloped some mechanical troubles suddenly which resulted in its catc'.1ing fire, the defendant was not liable as th'ro was M neglig,nce oa the part of the driver. The trial court found that the act of the driver in putting the truck?" the road was negligent as the truck was not rnadworthy and since the dnver was neghgent, the State was v1canously liable for his act. The Court assessed the damages at Rs. 14,760/· and granted a decree for the amount to the plaintiff. · It was ag1inst this decree that the State appealed to the High Court. The High Court came to the condusion that the plai~tiff had not proved by evidence that the driver was negligent, that the mere fact that the truck caught fire was not evidence cf negli­ gence on his part and that the maxim res ipsa /1quitur had. no appli­ cation. The Court said that the truck travelled safely from Bhil­ wara to Pratapgarh and that the engine caught fire after having 552 SUPREME COUJ.T REPORTS [ 1974 l 3 s.C.R. travelled a distance of 4 miles from Pratapgarh an<i that there was nothing on record to show that the engine of the truck was in any way defectlve or that it was not functioning properly. The Court was of the view that the mechanism of «n automobile engine is such that with all proper and careful handling it can go wrong while it is on the road for reasons which it might be difficult for a driver ,to explain. The Court then discussed the evidence and came to the conclusion that no inference of negligence on the part of the ,tlriver was pqssibl~ on the basis that ihe engine of the truck got heated of and on and that water was put in the radiator frequently, or that it took considerably long time to cover the distance between Bhilwara and Chittorgarh and that between Chittorgarh and Pratap· garh. The High Court therefore, allowed the appeal. The main point for consideration in this appeal is, whether the fact that the truck caught fire is evidencde of negligence on the part of the driver in the course of his employment. The maxim res ipso /oquitur is resorted to when an accident is shown to have occurred and the cause of the accident is primarily within the knowledge of the defendant. The mere fact that the cause of the accident is unknown does not prevent the plaintiff from recovering damageo, if the proper inference to in drawn from the circumstances which are known is that it w1s caused by the negligence of the defendant. Tho fact of tte accident may, sometimes, constitute evidence of negligence and then the maxim res ipso loquitur applies. The maxim is stated in its classic form by Erk, C. J. : " .... Wh< re the thing is to shown to be under the manage­ ment of the defendant or his scrvents, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the ab,ence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care." The maxim does not embody any rule of substantive law nor a rule of evidence. It is perhaps not a rule of any kind but simply the caption to an argument on the evidence. Lord Shaw remarked that if the phrase had not been in Latin nobody would have called it a principle (2), The maxim is only a convenient label to apply to a set of circumstances in which the plaintiff proves a case so as to call for a rebuttle from the defendant without having to allege and prove any specific act or omission o~ the part of the defendant. The principal function of the maxim is to prevent injustice which would result if a plaintiff were invariably compelled to prove the precise cause of the accident and the defen­ dent responsible for it, even when the facts bearing on tlie matter are at the outset unknown to him and often within the knowldge of the defendant. But though the parties' relative access to evidence is an influential, factor, it is not controllinll. Thus the fact that (I) See Scott v. London St. Katherine Docks (1865) 3 H. & C. S96, 601. (2) Soe Ballard v. North British Railway Co.1923 S. C. (H.L.)43. SHYA){ SUNDER V. RAJASTHAN (Mal~W, /,) 553 the defendant is as much at a loss to explain the aci;ident or ·­ himself died in it, docs not preclude an adverse inference against him if the odds otherwise point to his negligence (see John G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 4th ed., p. 264). The mere happening of the accident may be more consistent with the negligence on the part of tht defendant than with other causes. . The maxim is based on common sense ·and its purpose is to do justice when the facts bear­ ing on the causation and on the care excercised by defendant are at the outset unknown to the plaintiff and are or ought to be withfn the knowledge of the defendant (see Barkwa>' v. S. Wales Tran.lport(l). · the plaintiff merely proves a result, not any particular act or omission producing the result. . If the result in the circumstances . in which he proves it, makesit more probable than not thai it was cau$ed by the negligence of thio defendant, the doctrine of res ips11 loquitur is said to apply, and the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed unless the defendant by evidence rebuts that probability. The answer needed by the defendant to meet the plaintiff's case may take alternative fornis. Firstly, it may consist in a positive explanation by the defendant of how the accident did in fact occur, of such a kind as to exonerate the defendant from any charge of negligence. · It should be noticed that the defendant doesllot advance bis case inventing fanciful theories, unsupported by evidence, of how the event might have occurred. The whole inquiry is concerned with pro­ babilities, and facts ·are required, not nlere conjecture unsupported by facts. As Lord Macmillan said in his dissenting judcment in Jones v. Great Western (2) : · "Tb•; dividing line between conjecture and inference is often a very difficult one to draw. A conjecture may be plausible, but it is of no legal value, for its essense is that it is a mcre·guess. An inference, in. the legal sense, on the other band, is a deductioL from the.evidence, and if it is a reasonable deduction it inay have the validity of legal proof. The attribution of an occurrence to a cause is, I take it, always a matter of inference. The cogency of a legal inference of causation may vary in degree between practical ~rtainty and reasonable probability. Where the coincidence of cause and effect is not a matter of actual 01>servation there is. necessarily a hiatus in the dirt ct evidence, but Uris may be legitimately bridged by ;m inference from tLe frets actually observed and proved." In other words, an inference is adeductioo from established facts and an assumption or a guess is SJmething quite different but not necessarily related to established facts. (I). [1950] l All J;ngland Reports 392, 39~; 7 _;_M 45 Sup on 5 (2) [1930] 47 T. L. R. 39. 554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19741 3 S.C.R Alternatively, in those instances where the defendant is unable to explain the accident, it is incumbent upon him to advance positive proof that he had taken all reasonable steps to avert foreseeable harm. Res 1ps' /oquitur is an immensely important vehicle for importing strict liability into negligence cases. In practice, there are many cases where res iP'" /oquitur is properly invoked in which the defendant is unable to show affirmatively either that he took all reasonable pre­ cautions to avoid injury or that the particular cause of the injury was not associated with negligence on his part. Industrial and traffic accidents and injuries caused by defective merchandise are so frequently of this type that the theoretical limitations of the maxim are quite overshadowed by its practical significance (I). Over the years, the general trend in the application of the maxim has undoubtedly become more sympathetic to plaintiffs. Concomitant with the rise in safety standards and' expanding knowledge of the me· chanical devices of our age less hesitation is felt in concluding that the miscarriage ofa familiar activity is so unusual that it is most probably the result of some fault on the part of whoever is responsible for its safe performance (see John, G. Fleming, The Law of Torts,4th ed., p. 260). We are inclined to think the learned District Judge was correct in inferring negligence on the part of the driver. Generally speaking, an ordinary road-worthy vehicle would not catch fire. We think that the driver was negligent in putting the vehicle on the road. From the evidence it is clear that the radiator was g<tting heated frequently and that the driver was pouring water in the radiator after every 6 or 7 miles of the journey. The vehicle took 9 hours to cover the dis­ tance of 70 miles between Chittorgarh and Pratapgarh. The fact that normally a motor vehicle would not catch fire if its mechanism is in order vould indicate that there \las some defect in it. The District Judge found on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses that the driver knew about this defective condition of the truck when he started from Bhilwara. It is clear that the driver was in the management of the vehicle and the accident is such that it does not happen in the ordinary course of things. There is no evidence as to how the truck caught fire. There was no explanation by the defendant about it. It was a matter within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant. It was not possible for the plaintiff to give any evidence as to the cause of the accident. In these circumstances, we think that the maxim res ipsa foquitur is attracted. · It was, however, argued on behalf of the respondent that the State was engaged in p~rforming a function app.ertaining to its character ~s soverei~n as ~he dri~er wa.s acting in the course of his employment H in connection with famine reltef work and therefore, even if the driver (1) See Millner : "Negligence in Modern Law". 92, Sl!YAM SUNDER v. RAJASTl!AN (Mathew, J.) 555 was negligent, the State would not be liable for damages. Reliance was placed on the ruling of this Court in Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State ~f Uttar Pradesh (I) where this Court said that the liability of the State for a tort committed by its servant in the course of his emp­ loyment would depend upon the question whether the employ­ ment wa~ of the category which could claim the special characteristic of s?verelgn power. We do not pause to consider the question whether the >mmumty of the State for injuries on its citizens committed in the exercise of what are called sovereign functions has any moral justi­ fication today. Its historic and jurisprudential support lies in the oft­ quoted words of Blackstone(2) : "The king can do no wrong ...... The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing : in him is no folly or weakness". In modern times, the chief proponent of the sovereign immunity doc­ trine has been Mr. Justice Holmes who, in 1907, declared for a unani­ mous Supreme Court(3) :- "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any for1nal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Today, hardly anyone agrees that the stated ground for exempting the sovereign from suit is either logical or practical. We do not also think it necessary to consider whether there is any rational dividing line between the so-called sovereign and proprietary or commercial functions for determining the liability of the Slate. We are of the view that, as the law stands !Oday, it is not possible to say that famine relief work is a sovereign function of the State as it has been traditionally understood. It is a work which can be and is being und.ertaken by private individuals. There is nothing peculiar about it so that it might be predicated that the State alone can legiti­ mately undertake the work. In the view we have taken on the merits of the case, we do not think it necessary to canvass the correctness of the view experessed by the High Court that the appeal by the State before the High Court did not abate even though the legal representa•ives of the plaintiff­ re~pondent there were not impleaded within the period of limitation. In the result, we set aside the decree of the High Court, restore the decree and judgment passed by the District Judge and allow the appeal with costs. S.B.W. (I) 11965] 1 S. C. R. 375. (2) Blackstone, Commentaries (10th ed., 1887) (3) Kawananakav. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353. Appeal allowed.