K. L. Varadarajan v. the Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras

KHANNA, J .-These three appeals by certificate are directed against the judgment of the Madras High Court whereby the High Court answered the following question referred to it under section 66 ( 1) of the lndian lnoome-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in respect of assessment years 1955-56, 1956-57 and 1957-58 against the assessee-appellant and in favour of the revenue : "Whether the declaration filed by the assessee unde. section 17 (1) in respect of the assessment year 1958-59 was operative in relation to the re-assessments in respect of the previous years ending on 31-12-1954, 31-12-1955 and 31-12-1956 corresponding to the assessment years 1955-56, 1956~57 and 1957-58 ?" The assessee during the relevant period was studying abroad. He derived income during that pericd by way of dividend on shares and interest from deposits. The original assessments for the relevant years were completed on January 31, 1956, December 27, 1956 and Feh::uary 28, 1958. The residential status adopted in those years was "resident and ordinarily resident person". Income-tax and super­ tax were calculated at the rates appltcable on the total income. In the course of the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1958-59, corresponding. to the year ending on December 31, 1957, ~he assessee filed a declaration under section 17 ( 1) of the Act on March 24, 1959 claiming to be assessed at rates appropriate to the K. L. VARADAJl.AJAN v. c.r, T. (Khanna, J.) 599 total world income. This assessment was completed en March 23, 1960 in the status of a "non-resident". The application under section 17 ( 1) was rejected. As the income-tax officer found that the asseil­ see was a non-resident in the three previous years ending on December 31, ·1954 to December 31, 1956 and his total income had been assessed to income-tax at the normal rates and further as he had failed .to make the requisite declaration under section 11 ( 1) within the requisite time, the income-tax officer formed the view that the earlier assessments had been made at a lower rate. Action under secticn 34 of the Act was accordingly taken by the income-tax officer and a'ssessments for the above mentioned three years were reopened and completed under section 23 ( 3) read with section 34 of the Act. The status of the assessee was treated as that of a non-resident. The assessee's declara­ tim under section 17( ll, which he had made in the course of assess­ ment p:·Jceedings for the assessment year 1958-59, was rejected and ignored and his total income was brought to tax at the maximum rate.s. The assessee in the course of the proceedings for reassessment re­ quested that the income during the three years in question should be taxed at rates appropriate to his wc1rld income. Accmding to the asscssec, the omission on his part to make the declaration earlier under section 17 ( 1 ) was due to inadvertence and ignorance. It was also contended that as the assessments were being reopened and were thus deemed to be pending f.or the earlier years, the assessee's declaration made during the assessment prei=eedings for the year 195 8-59 should be taken into account for the purpose of reassessments. The income­ tax officer rejected all the submissions. According to the income-tax officer, option had been exercised by the assessee after the prescribed <late and it cciuld not have effect on the assessments for the three years in question. The income-tax officer also referred to the first proviso to section 17 (1 ) of the Act and said that the declaration could be entertained only on the first occasion on which the assessee became assessable. The seccnd proviso, it was observed, would also not avail the assessee. The assessee went up in appeal to the Appellate Assistant Com­ missioner. It was contended inter alia on his behalf that the income­ tax officer was wrong in holding that the declaration under section 17 ( 1) could be entertained only on the first occasion when the perion became assessable. According tc1 the assessee, the declaration could be accepted even later provided sufficien,t cause was shown for not filing the decaration earlier. The assessee further submitted that the assessment as non-resident was made for the first time in respect of assessment year 1958-59 and as section 34 proceedings were fresh pro­ ceedings the declaration made in 1958-59 ought to be accepted. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the inceme-tax officer's reasoning for not accepting the declaration under section 17 ( 1) was not correct. In this connection the Appellate Assistant Commis~ioner referred to his. order in the appeal by the assessee for the assessment year 1958-59 wherein he had held that the asscssee had sufficient cause for net. filing the declaration under section 17 (1) when the assessee became first assessable. It was also held that the failure to .file the declaration had not resulted in a reduction of tax liability. 600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1975] 2 s.c.a. The declaration filed on March 24, 1959 by the assessee, in the opinion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, could be availed of for the assessments for the three years in question as the assessment orders conse4uent upon the reopening of assessments were being made sub­ sequent to that date . . The department went up in appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tnbunal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal accepted the reasoning of the Appellate Assistant Com­ missioner and dismissed the appeal. On being moved by the Commis­ sioner of Income-tax the Tribunal referred the question reproduced above tc1 the High Court. The High Court in answering the question against the assessce referred to the expression "all assessments there­ after" in the two provisos to section 17 ( 1) of the Act and observed that those words showed that the declaration could be availed of in respect ct assessments for subsequent years and not in respect of assessments made by the revenue in exercise of its power under section 34 of the Act. The word ·~assessments" in the above expression, in the opinion of the High Court, referred to only original assessments and not to assessments made by the revenue in exercise cd' its power under section 34 of the Act. In appeal before us Mr. Desai on behalf of the assessee-appellant has assailed the judgment of the High Court and has contended that correct view of law was taken by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal. ~s against that Mr. ?ardy on behalf of the revenue has suppcrted the view taken by the High Court. ~ . After hearin& the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the submission made by Mr. Desai is well-founded. The assessee, as mentioned earlier, filed ·the declaratio11 in the course of assessment proceedings relating to the year 1958·59 on March 24" 1959. Although the above declaraticr.i was rejected by the income­ tax officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on appeal in respect of assessment for the assessment year 1958-59 held that there was sufficient cause for the assessee in not making the declaration on the first occasion on which he became assessable and that his failure to make such declaraticin had not resulted in reducing his liability to tax for any year. The assessee was accordingly allowed to make the declaration after the expiry of the prescribed period. According to the second proviso to section 17 ( 1 ) of the Act, once the assessee is allriwed to make the declarati•on after the expiry of the period specified "such declaration shall have effect in relation to the assessment for the year in which the declaration is made (if such assesstnent had not been completed ·before such declaration) and all assessments thereafter", The words of the second proviso to section 1 7 ( r) re­ produced above m1k~ i• clear that the declaration would be operative not only for the assessment for the year in which the declaration is made if such assessment had not been completed before such declara­ tion, but also for all assessments to be made thereafter. The words "all assessments thereafter", in our opinion, signify nclt only assess­ ments for the subsequent years but would also cover assessments for E. K K. L. VARADARAJAN v. C.I.T. (Kha1111a, ].) 601 the earlier years. in case the assessments for those earlier yea.rs are being made subsequent to the filing of the declaration. The words "all assessments thereafter" have a wide amplitude and we see no cogent reascl!l for not giving them their natural meaning or for restrict­ ing their scope. Those words would include within their ambit all assessments made subsequent to the filing of the declaration and it would be wrong to so construe them as if the legislature had used the words '"all assessments for the subsequent years". We are unable to subscribe tc1 the view taken by the High Court that the assessments referred to in the words reproduced above mean only the original assessments and not the reassessments made under· section 34 of the Act. According to section 2(8) of the Income-tax. Act; 1961 the words "assessment" includes reassessment. Althciugh. such a definition was not there in the Act of 1922, the word "assess­ ment" in the second proviso to section 17 ( 1) of the Act must neces­ sarily, in our opinion, cover reassessment under section 34 cd' the· Act. In the case of A. N. Lakshman Shenoy v. Income-tax Officer, Bangalore & Ors. ( 1) this Court held that the word "assessment" in the Finance Act, 1950 would include reassessment. It was observed tharthe col- location cd'. the words "levy, assessment and collection of income-tax" showed that the word "assessment" had a comprehensive meaning so as to cover reassessment. The case of Commissioner of 1 ncome-tax v. Khemclzand Ramdas(2) upon which reliance had been placed by the revenue in Shenoy's case, as has also been dcne in the present case, was. distinguished. This Court referred to the observations of the Judicial Committee in the case of Khemchand Ramdas and held that those· observations lend no support to the view that the word "assessment" must always bear a particular meaning in the _Inccime-tax Act. Re­ liance in this context was placed upon the following observations of the Judicial Committee : "These two questions are so closely related to one another that they can conveniently be ccinsidered together. In order to answer them it is essential to bear in mind the method prescribed by the Act for making an assessment of tax, using the word assessment in its comprehensive sense as including the whole procedure for imposing liability upon the taxpayer. The method consists ctf the following steps. In the first place, the taxable income of the taxpayer has to be computed. In the next place, the sum payable by him on the 'basis of such computation has to be determined. Fm­ ally, a notice of demand in the prescribed form, specifying the sum so_ payable, has to be served upcl!l the taxpayer." This Court further observed in Shenoy' s case : "If the word 'assessment' is taken in its comprehensive sense, as we think it should be taken in the context of section 13 ( 1) H of the Finance Act, 1950, it would include 're-assessment' made under the provisions of the Act. Such 're-assessment' (l) [1958] 34 ITR 275. (2) [1938] 6 ITR 414. 60 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1975] 2 s.c.R. will without doubt come~ within the expression 'levy, assess­ ment and collection of income-tax'. In his speech in Com· 171issioner for General Purposes of Income Tax for the City of London v. Gibbs and Uthers( 1) Lord Simon has pointed out that the word 'assessment' is used in the English Income tax code in more than cine sense; and sometimes within the bounds of the same section, two separate meanings elf the word may be found. One meaning is the fixing of the sum taken to represent the actual profit and the other the actual sum in tax which the taxpayer is liable to pay. It has been contended before us that the Finance Act and the Income-tax Act should be read together as forming one code, and so read the words 'assessment' and 're-assessment' acquire definite and distinct connotations. We are unable to agree, for the reasons which we have already given, that even if we read the <Finance Act along with the Income-tax Act the word 'assessment' can be given a restricted meaning. To repeat thme reasons the Income-tax Code itself uses the word assessment in different senses, and in the context and collocation of the words of the Finance Act, the word 'assess­ ment' is capable of bearing a comprehensive meaning only." 1n the context of section 1 7 ( 1) c~ the Act the word "assessment" must necessarily include reassessment under section 34 of the Act. To hold otherwise would result in an anomalous situation. This can best be illustrated bv taking a concrete case. An assessee files a declaration under section 17 ( 1 ) elf the Act in respect of the assess­ ment year 1955-56. Supposing his assessment for the year 1956-57 is reopened and an order for reassessment is made. In case the declaration made under section 17 (1) can be availed of only for the original assessments and not for reassessments under section 34 of the Act, the result would necessarily be that the declaration would have to be excluded from consideration in making the reassesgment for the year 1956-57 even though the dt:~laration had been filed much earlier. This could hardly have been the intention elf the legislature. The entire scheme of section 1 7 ( 1) as well as the context, in our opinion. clearly shows ,that the word "assessment" in section 17 ( 1) has been used in a comprehensive sense so as to include reassess­ ment. It may also be observed that there are indicaticms in the Act that whenever the legislature intended that the word "assessment" should not include reassessment, it used express words for the purpose. Sec­ tion 33B of the Act empowers the Commissioner of Income-tax if he considers any circler passed by the income-tax officer to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue to make inter alia an order. after complying with the requtrements of that section. cancelling the H assessment and directing a fresh assessment. Sub-section (2) of that (I) [1942] A.C. 402 . .106. D. x. L. VARADARAJAN v. c.u. (Khanna, J.) 603 section makes it clear that no order can be made under that sectioa to revise an order ct reassessment made under the provisions of sec· tion 34. If the order of assessment did not include an order of re­ assessment made under the provisions of section 34, there would have· been hardly any necessity of making a provision in sub-sectic111 (2) of section 33B that no order can be made under sub-section (1) of tliat section to revise an orcier of reassessment made under the pro­ visions of sectictn 34. ' \~'~,1· '<> ......... . .... According to section 67 of the Act, no suit shall be brought in any· Civil Court to set aside or modify any assessment made under the Act. It is obvious that the protection affqrded by that section would be available not only for the onginai assessments but also for re­ assessments made under section 34 of the Act even though the word used in the section· is assessment and not reassessment. Likewise, the fact that the legislature has used the word ''assessments" anll not "reassessments" in the second proviso to section 17 ( 1) of the Aot would not exclude the applicability of that proviso to cases of reassess­ ments subsequent to the filing of the declaration, The matter may also be looked at from another angle. Proceed- in&s under section 34 of the Act can be initiated if the income>-ta.x. officer has reason to believe that income, profits or gains chargeablo to income-tax have escaped ·assessment for any year or have been· under-assessed or assessed at too lciw a rate or have been made the subject of excessive relief under the Act or excessive loss or depro­ ciation allowance has been computed. The first of the above fivo contingencies deals with income, profits or gains chargeable tc1 incom~ tax escaping assessment. In such an event the income-tax officcr­ would after initiating proceedings under section 34 make assessmeR.t of such income, profit or gain. In the other four contingencies, the'. circler made by the inconie-tax officer w6uld be for re-assessing such income, profit or gain or re-computing the loss or depreciation allo"­ ance. If the view propounded on behalf of the revenue were to be accepted that assessment does not include reassessment made undec secfirn 34 of the Act, the result would be that the benefit of the dec­ laration made under section 17 ( 1) of the Act, in case other conditions are fulfilled, would be available only in the first contingency mentioned above relating to escaped ·assessment and not in the remaining con­ tingencies because they pertain to reasspsment. This would certaia- ly be anomalous for it would result in placing persons wh0se income has escaped assessment in a better position compared to persons whoso income has been under-assessed or assessed at too low a rate or has , ) been the subject of excessive relief under the Act or ia whose cases 604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975) 2 s.c.R. excessive loss or depreciation allowance has been computed. This A could hardly have been the intention of the legislature. We, therefore, accept these appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dis<:harge the answer given by it to the question referred to it. The question reproduced above is answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee-appellant and against the re- s venue. The assessee-appellant shall be entitled to his cqsts both in this Couit as, well as in the High Court. One hearing fee. s.c. AppeQls allowed.