S. M. Gopalakrishna Chetty v. Ganeshan & Ors.

'H GoswAMI, J.-These appeals by special leave are directed against the order of the High Court of Madras in three Civil Revision Petitions under section 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) 274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS Cl.9-7611 S.C.R. Act 1960, briefly the (Act) whereby the High Court refused to interfere with the orders of the appellate authority under the Act holding that the appellant (hereinafter to be described as the landlord) has no nght to evict the respondents (hereinafter to be described as the tenants)' from the premises in question on the ground of demolition and recon­ struction. The tenancy und·~r the landlord is admitted by the tenants. There is also no question with regard to validity of the notice of eviction. The only questions in controversy in these appeals are whether the land­ lord in this case, who is the holder of life interest in the property, is entitled to evict the tenant~ under section 14 (!) ( b) of the Act on the ground that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for demoli­ tion and for reconstruction. The second question raised in one of the appeals is whether a single petition is maintainable to evict the tenants from two different tenancies one for residential purpose and the other for non-residential purpose. The latter point has been held by the High Court in favour of the landlord bnt the tenants are raising it in• seeking to supporl the earlier order of the appellate authority; The premises are situated at Anna Pillai Street, Madras. Originally the premises belonged to late S. Manicka Chettyar, father of s: M. Gopalakrishna, the present landlord. By virtue of a Deed of Settlement executed by S. Manicka Chettyar on May 9, 1934, possession of the premises was delivered to his wife, Manoranjithammal, as' trustee and guardian of his three minor children, S. M. Gopalakrishna tnen aged 13 years, and his two minor daughters, Indrani Ammal and Palani Ammal. We are not concerned with the various directions in the Deed of Settle­ ment except to note the admitted position that Manoranjithammal was allowed to enjoy the rents and profits of the property for her lifo time subject to certain charges mentioned in the Deed. After the life time of the setlior's wife, his son, S. M. Gopalakrishna (appellant) "shall enjoy the rents and profits of the said property. . . . for his life time" subject to certain charges on account of his two sisters. It is further mentioned in the Deed that after the life time of Gopalakrishna, his son and son's heir of any predeceased son living: at that time shall enjoy the property subject to identical charges as absolute owners with right of sale, gift, etc. There are further directions in case of other contingencies 1vith which we are not concerned. We may, however, note that S. M. Gopala­ krishna is issucless. From the above terms Of the Settlement it is contended by the tenants that the landlord has only a life interest in the premises i.n question anld that it is inherent in such a life interest that it is not permissible for the landlord to invoke section 14(1) (b) as grounds for eviction o{ llie: tenants by demolition of the property for the purpose of reconstructiori . . It is emphasised that since the interest of the remainder-man may be pre­ judiced, the landlord with a life interest in the premises cannot evict the tenants on these grounds. The Rent Controller held that the requirement of the landlords bona fide and ordered for eviction of the tenants. The Court of Small Causes, ' • c \ ' y - ..... ~ ' s. M. GOPALAKRISHNA v. GANESHAN (Goswami, !.) 275 A · which is the appellate authority, allowed the appeals lodged by the tenants against the orders of eviction and set aside the orders of eviction. ·As noticed earlier the High Court refused to interfere in revision. The High Court agreed with the view of the appellate authority that the landlord had no riglit to ask for eviction of the respondents on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, he admittedly having only a B life interest or right to enjoy the property for his life. The app.ellant sub­ mits that this-view is not legally tenable. Before we proceed to consider the point in controversy, we may read section 14 (1 ) (b) : 14. "Recovery of possession by la!ldlord for repairs or for recon­ structiotL- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of section 12 and 13, on an application made by a. landlord the Controller shall, if he is satisfied- (b) * * * * that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demo­ lishing it and _such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date". The expression landlord is defined under section 2 ( 6) as follows :- " 'Landlord' includes the person who is receiving or is en­ titled to receive t\J~ rent of a building, whether on his own ac­ count or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself and others or as an age.nti trustee, executor, administrator, recei~ ver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entit­ led to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant". x x x x x This inclusive ~efinition of landlord ~.ould clearly take in its sweep the present land!Drd '\\1ho holds l\ life interest in the premises and who admittedly has been on his own right under the Deed of Settlement as a trustee rece;ving rents of the premises from the tenants. We are not even concerned with the question as has been sought to be established in the case by_ proving that there is no possibility or any objection from the daughters of the settlor or from any other remainder-man. It is suffi­ cient to observe that the rights between S. M. Gopalakrishna and the remainder·man with regard to the terms of the Deed of Settlement will have to be worked out in appropriate proceedings, if necessary and the H general law will govern the matter if any occasion arises. ' On the other hand, the Act with which we are concerned is a se!f­ contained and complete code for regulation of the rights between landlord and tenants as defined in the Act (See M/ s Raval and Co. v. K. G. Ramachandran and others( i). Thus a controversy that may arise bet­ ,veen a landlord and others, who are not his tenants under the Act, is outside the _ken of this Act. Even a possible dispute, imaginary or real, between the landlord and the remainder-man cannot affect adjudication of the claim of the landlord against his tenants under the provisions of the Act. It will also not affect the efficacy of t:he nature of the plea of bona fide on the part of the landlord, if otherwise so. Such questions as are raised in this appeal by the te11ants are, therefore, irrelevant in a litigation between the landlord and tenants when a suit for eviction is instituted by the former on any of the grounds available to him u,1der the Act. It is clear that when the objection on the score of the landlcrd being a holder of life interest and hence incapable of invoking section 14(1)(b) fails the suit must be decreed. .It was strenuously submitted by Mr. Natesan that a tenant \vith a life interest cannot be allowed to demolish the property in order to ne­ construct it as that action would, per se be not bona fide. We are un­ able to accede to this submission. A landlord bas every right to demo­ lish his property in order to build a new structure. on the site with a view to improve his business or to get better returns on his investment. Such a step, per se, cannot be characterised as mala fide on the part of 1he landlord. There is, therefore, no merit in this contention. Mr. Natesan faintly submitted that ·a single petition with regard to two different tenancies, although in the same premises, one for residen­ tial purpose am! the other-for non-residential purpose, is not maintain­ able. We do not find any substance in such a contention ·when the tenancy is one. In the result the appeals are allowed and the order of the High Court as well as that of the appellate authority are set aside. The order of the Controller allowing eviction of the tenants stands restored. We will, however, allow time to the tenants upto 31st January, 1976, to vacate the premises on the distinct condition that they shall submit affidaYits in this Court undertaking to vacate the premises by the aforesaid date within two weeks from to-day. The appellant will be entitled to his costs in these appeals. One set of costs P.H.P. A ppea/ a//mrcd. (1) A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 818. ' -- - . ~ --.....·.