Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. v. Dabholkar. Etc. Etc

but all concurred irl treating the Bar Coun- cil as an 'aggrieved person'. The earlier decision iu Bilataraju(2) strikes a note in consonance with this view. No hesitancy inhibits me from hazarding the opinion that the social canvas must be spread wide when making out the profile of a statute like the Advocates Act for the good reason that the Bar has a share in being the sentinel on the qui vive when the legal dykes of right and justice are breached by authoritarianism. or citizen-wrong doing. Nor do I conceal my half- horror at any professional tribunal glossing over 'snatching briefs' and 'dragging clicnts'-providcd they are proved-as less than gross mis- conduct. If the salt lose their savour, wherewith shall they be salted? However, I hasten to make it plain, to avoid prejudice to the parties, that I totally desist from pronouncing on the merits of the evidence in this case. One more point. A case of professional misconduct is not a Its in the British sense nor a case and controversy in the American mean- ing. . ~t is ::Jeu~lic investigation about misconduct by o!1e belonging to f a public pr ession where, every member of the Bar with a reputation to lose has a stake and every one concerned with the justice adminis- tration is interested. Traditionally used to the adversary system, we --- search for individual persons aggrieved. But a new class of litigation-- public inter.est litigation-where a section or whole of the community is involved (such as consumers' organisations or NAACP-National Association for Advancement of Coloured People-in America), emerg- G es. In a developing country like ours, this pattern of public-oriented litigation better fulfils the rule of law if it is to run close to the rule of life. The Bar Council clearly comes within this category of organisa- tions when a lawyer is involved. · . "·)' l derive support for this philosophy of approach from academic and judicial opinion in England and America. A question arose whe- H ther a railroad company-BAR (Bangor and Aroostook Railroad)- could bring an action against the stockholders for having drained BAR (I) [1971] 1 SC. R. 863. (2) [1955]1 S, C.R. 1055, 1064. 324 SUPREMTI COURT REPORTS [I 976] 1 s.c.n. improperly. Although an academic critic took the view that the Dist­ rict Court was incorrect in its view that BAR was the 'sole beneficiary', he .went on to state that the public's interest in the financial health of BAR provided a separate interest in bringing the action. The learn­ ed author wrote : "It would seem to be incontestable that the public has a very real interest in rail roads. Railroads have been found vital to a healthy national economy; any such factor must a priori, be deemed a potent component of the public welfare. As such, it is evident that a financially healthy railroad is of con- cern not only to its stockholders, but to the public as well .... Finding that the management of a railroad has obligations running to the public as well as fiduciary duties owing to the corporation's stockholders, the Court concluded that, of these two responsibilities, the public interest is paramount. "It must be remembered," the Court cautioned, "that railways are public corporations organized for public purposes ... They a 1 primarily owe duties to the public of a higher nature even than that of earning large dividends for their sharehold- crs." T (Review by James F. Simon of Bangor & Aroostook R. R. v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc (Bangor & Aroostook), 482 F.2d 865 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S.Ct. 863 (1974) Columbia Law Review Vol. 74 No. 3, April 1974- p. 528 at pp. 531-532). Similarly, the American Supreme Court relaxed from the restrictive attitude towards 'standing' in pub1ic action in Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186 (1962), vide Maryland Law Review, Vol. XXXIII 1973 p. 506: "In Baker, voters challenged the failure of the Tennessee legislature to reapportion itself since 1901; the plaintiffs lived in countries which had become under-represented under the old Jaw. The Supreme Court held that these voters had the requisite standing to challange the inaction of the legislature. The Court expanded the notion of direct injury to include mere 'debasement' of a vote, rather than the total deprivation which had previously been required." . American jurisprudence has recognised, for instance, the expanding impprtance of consumer protection in the economic system and per­ mitted consumer on~anisations to initiate or intervene in . actions, althou!Jh by the narrow rule of 'locus sta11di', . such a course could not have been justified (see p. 807-New York University Law Review, Vol. 46, 1971). In fact, citizen organisations have recently been campaip;ning for usin!l' legal actions for protection of community inter­ est, broadening the scope of 'standing' in legal proceedings (see p.403- Boston University Law Review, Vol. 51, 1971). n • "-,. • c \' . .,.. [) ~ t' • "" (; .. IlAR COUNCIL v. M. v. DABHOLKAR (Krishna Iyer, !.) 325 A In the well-known case of Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierra .-._· Sarr N.'Jie(I), Lord Denning observed about the Attorney-General's standing thus : " ... The worM 'person aggrieved' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They n do not include, of course, a mere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been • made which prejudicially affects his interests. Has the T/ Attorney-General a sufficient interest for this purpose ? Their Lordships think that he has. The Attorney Genera] in a l colony represents the Crown as the gu,ardian of the public interest. It is his duty to bring before the judge any mis-c conduct of a barrister or solicitor which is of sufficient gravity to warrant disciplinary action." Ray, J (as he then was) crystallised this (supra) thus : · ratio in A .P. Gandhi 0 "The Judicial Committee construed the words 'person aggriev- ed' to include the Attorney General of Gambia as represent- ing the public interest.'.' (p.927) '"The profession touches the public on the one hand and the courts on the other. On no other basis could the presence of E the Advocate General be explained." (p. 928) Although not strictly confined to 'standing' with reference to suits . .iurists have thrown some light on this subject. Professor S.A. de Smith has observed : F "All developed legal systems have had to face t11c problem of adjusting conflicts between two aspects of the public inter- est-the desirability of encouraging individual citizens to parti- ~ cipate actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undes· irability of encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in matters that do not concern him." (; (Quoted in 'Standing and Justiciability' by V. S. Deshpande-- Journal of the Indian Law Institute-April-June 1971- Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 174) " .. Professor H.W.R. Wade has observed : H "In other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow con- ception of locus standi. It contains an element of the actio (!) [1961] A, C. 617. \ 32G SlJPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1976] 1 S.C.R. popularis. This is because it Jooks beyond the personal rights of the applicant; it is designed to keep the machinery of justice in proper wlorking order by preventing inferior tribunals and public authorities from abusing their powers." (Standing and Justiciability-iNd, p. 175) The possiblo apprehension that widening fogal standing with a public connotation may unloose a flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges is misplaced because public resort to court to suppress pub­ lic mischief is a tribute to the justice system. In this very case, tu grant an exclusionary windfall 011 the respondents is to cripple the Bar Council in its search for justice and insistence on standards. I have been long on a short point, but brcvily, where there is some­ thing to speak. is not the soul of wit but a sign of something diffor­ l'nt. P.13.R.