Balumal Jamnadas Batra v. State of Maharashtra
Cited by 1 judgment in this corpus
- Mon Mohan Kohli vs Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Another · 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5250
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
BEG, J.-The appelJant before us by special leave to appeal was
convicted under Section 135(b) (ii) of the Customs Act, 1962 (here
inafter referred to as 'the Act'), and sentenced to six months rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,0CYJ/-, and, in default, to three
months further rigorous imprisonment. Goods in respect of which
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this offence was found to have been committed were also confiscated. E
On 21-4-1967, Police Officers of the Anti-Corruption and Prohi
bition Bureau, Greater Bombay, acting on information received, had
searched room No. 10 at 56, Sheriff Deo.ii Street, Bombay. This
room was divideld by partitions into three parts. In the central portion
the police found the appellant and three other persons. This portion
was again sub-divided with a locked connecting door fixed in the pas- F
sage to the sub-divided part. This was opened by one of the two
Godrej lock keys produced by the appellant from a si\:!e pocket of his
trousers. Eleven wooden boxes covered with jute cloth and secured
by iron strips were found there. On opening them, six of them were
found to contain cigarette lighters of "Imco Triplex Junior" brand
"Made in Austria''. Each of the six boxes were tightly packed with
1200 lighters. The remaining five boxes contained fifty sealed tins G
of flints for cigarettee lighters which bore the following writing : "Tcgo
Lighter Flints of Superior Quality Made in Germany". On the
wooden boxes containin~ the lighters were found written "Dubai" and
"Made in Austria". The five boxes containing flints had the words
"Dubai" and "Made in West Germany" inscribed on them. A pan·
chnama was prepared before Panchas. A rent receipt in the name of '
the appellant in respect of room No. 10, in this house, of which a por- H
lion was occupied by the appellant, and a bill for the consumption of
electricity were also seized from the custody of ):he appellant together
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BALUMAL V, MAHARASHTRA (Beg, J.) 541
with th~ Godrej lock and the keys produced by the appellant. Subse
quei;tly, the seized articles were made over to the inspector of Central
ExcJSe and Customs, Marine and Prevention Division, Bombay, on
24-4-1967, nuder Sectmn 110 of the Customs Act.
The v.alue of 7200 sigarette lighters was stated as Rs. 14,400/- and
of 250 tins of flints as Rs. 15,000/- on which Customs duty of
Rs. 15,840/- and Rs. 10,~00/- respectively was alleged to be payable.
In the complaint filed on 30th October, 1968, by the Assistant Collec
tor of Central Excise, Marine and Prevention Division, Bombay, it is
alleged that the cigarette lighters and flints were imported into India
without an import licence and in contravention of provisions of
Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Import
Control Oilier No.17/55 dated 7-12-1955 (as amended) issued under
Section 3 (2) of the Import & Export (Control) Act, 1947, which was
to be deemed to be an order passed under Section 11 of the Act. It
was submitted that the accused, having been concerned in a fraudu
lent evasion of payment of Rs. 26,340/- as customs duty to the
Government, had committed offences punishable under Section 135 (a)
and ( b) of the Act. The goods were also, as a necessary conse
quence, said to be liable to confiscation under Section 111 (d) of the
Act.
The appellant had denied being in possession of the offending
goods although he had admitted th!' production of keys from his pos
session. He alJeged that the oortion of the room from which th~
2oods were recovered was sublet to Dwarumal and Kishen who had
kept the goods there. The appellant's explanation had been dis
believed by the trying Magistrate as well as by the High Court. The
production of the key which, according to the prosecution evidence,
the appellant had at first refused to produce, proved that the portion
in which the boxes were kept was in appellant's exclusive possession
with all that was contained ·in it. It is oossible that he may have sub
let other portions of the partitioned room to other persons, but there
is no reason to doubt that the appellant was not only in oossession of
the boxes but knew something about the incriminating nature of their
contents. Otherwise, why should he, at first, have refused to produce
the key he had ? Furthermore, the appellant had not given any evi
dence to show that his sub-tenants had placed the boxes there, or that
there was any reason why he should allow them to use the portion
reserved by him for himself. His case rested on his bare assertions in
a written statement. Of course, no one had come forward to state or
allege that the goods found, in the circumstarices stated above, had
been imported without payment of duty. The only question argued
before us was whether the presumption contained in Section 123 of the
Act, corresponding to Section 128(A) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878,
or any other provision of law would place the onus of proving inno
cent possession of these goods upon the appellant. Section 123 of the
Act reads as follows :
"123. Burden of proof in certain cases.---
( 1) . Where any goods to which thi~ section app~ies are
seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that
t!J,ey are smuggled goods, the burdeu of proving that
they are not smuggled goods shall be on th.e person
from whose possession the goods were seized.
(2) This section shall apply to gold, diamonds, manu
facturers of gold or diamonds, watches, and any
other class o~ goods which the Central Government
may by notification in the Official Gazette specify".
It is true that lighters and flints were notified as provided in Sec
tion 123(2), in the Official Gazette of 26-8-1967. Nevertheless, as
the provisions of Section 123(1) of the Act only lay down a proce
dural rule, they could be applied when the case came up for trial
before the Presidency Magistrate who actually decided it on
15-7-1969. Indeed, the complaint itself was filed on 30-10-1968. It
is immaterial that the appellant was found in possession of the goods
on 21-4-1967. There is, however, another objection to the applica
bility of Section 123(1) of the Act. It is that it would apply only tll
goods seized under the Act. It is contended that the goods in respect
of which the appellant was prosecuted were not seized under the Act.
Reliance was placed for this contention upon Gian Chand & Ors. v.
the State of Punjab(,!).
Even if the goods with which we are concerned here were not
seized under the Act, as provided by Section 111 of the Act, it is
contended on behalf of the State that Section 106, read with Section
114 of the Evidence Act, was sufficienno enable the prosecution to
ask the Court to presume t]Jat the appellant knew that the goods must
have been smUl?,l!led or imported in contravention of the law. The
appellant had not produced evidence to show that the goods were
legally brouJl,ht into India. Reliance was placed on behalf of the
prosecution on : Collector of Customs, Madras & Ors. v. D. Bhoor
mull{2); Mis. Kanungo & Co. v. The Collector of Customs, Calcutta
& Ors.("), Issardas Daulat Ram & Ors. v. the Union of India &
Ors.( 4 ), Anant Gopal Sheorey v. The State of Bombay(").
Learned Counsel for the appellant had. in his turn, relied upon
The State of Punjab v. Gian Chand & Ors.( 6 ). He contended that it
was necessarv for the prosecution to prove : ( 1) that, the goods in
question were actually smuggled or brought into the country without
payment of customs duty at a time when payment of such duty had
become obligatory; and, (2) that, the appellant was dealing with them
knowing them to be smuizy;led goods. It was contended that mere
possession bv the accused of such goods could not enable the prose
cution to apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act when the appellant
could not know where the goods caine from. It was urged that there
was no evidence which could enable the api>ellant to know where the
goods came from or when the goods were imported or that duty, if
l~'l'i!ible, wa~_not paid on them. The admissibility and sufficiency of
(1) [1962] (Suppl.) I S.C.R. 364. (2) A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 859.
(3) A.I.R. 1972 S.C.R. 2136. (4) [1962] Suppl. (1) S.C.R. 358.
(5) [1959] S.C.R. 919.
(6l Criminal Appeal No. 195 of 1962 -decided by this Court on 2-4-1963.
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BALUMAL v. MAHARASHTRA· (Beg, J.) 543
the inscriptions on the goods and the writing on boxes in which they
were found, for proving the place from where they came, or when they
were llllPOrted, were questroned, The contention was, that even if
the appellant is deemelj to be in possession with full knowledge o{
what the goods actually "CeW, the Court could not' go further and
assume them to be smuggled or imported into the country from
another country of their assumed origin after a time when the restric
tions on their import had been imposed. Unfortunately, the appellant
did not admit the possession of the goods at all. If he could have
succeeded in explaining satisfactorily how he was an innocent receiver
of such goods without knowing that they were illegally importep or
smuggled he may have had a chance of getting the benefit of doubt
The very appearance of the goods and the manner in which they were
packed indicated that they were newly manufactttred and brong)it into
tills countrv verv recen\lY from another country. The inscriptions on
them and writin~ on the boxes were parts of the state in which the
goods in unopened boxes were found from whlch inferences about their
origin and recent import could arise. The appellant's conduct, m
cluding his untruthful denial of their possession, indicated conscious
ness of their smuggled character or mens rea. In any case, there was
some evidence to enable the Courts to come to the conclusion that the
goods must have been known to the appellant to be smuggled even if
he was not a party to a fraudulent evasion· of duty. Consequently, the
appellant had been convicted only under Section 135(1)(ii) of the
Act. We do not find sufficient reasons to interfere with this finding
of fact or the sentence imposed. It would also follow that the goods
were rightly confiscated.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed .
V.M.K. Appeal dismissed.