Mohmed Inayatullah v. the State of Maharashtra
SARKARIA, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a
judgment of the High Court of Bombay upholding the conviction anl:I
sentience passed against the appellant under s. 379, Penal Code. The
facts are these ;
The appellant was tried in the court of the Presidency Magistrate
5th Court, Dadar on the charge of committing theft of three drums
containing phosphorous pentaoxide, valued at Rs. 300/-, from the
premises of the Bombay Port Trust on 1-8-1968 at 8.40 a.m.
The First Information Report of the theft lodged with the police
by Murari Bhikaji Bidya (PW 1) Shed Superintendent of Haji Bunder,
at 9.15, was as follows :
"Tol:lay in the morning at abaut 8. a.m. I reported for
duty at Haji Bunder. At about 8.40 a.m. or so,, the
Canteen boy named Shri Babu Durga came to me and in
formed me that one M/Car had come inside Haji Bunder
and removed 3 small drums which were lying between 'A'
Shed and Canteen in an open place along with several
drums. I immediately asked Shri Joshi the gate-keeper
who was present in my office at that particular time, to go
out and see what was the matter. After some time Shri
Joshi came to my office and informed me that before he
could reach the gate, the car had already left. However, he
has noted down the number of the Car as 6649. He fur
ther told me that he shouted to stop the car but the driver
ot the said car drove away the Car at a fast speed. I then
went in the open place in between 'A' Shed and Canteen
where the drums were lying when the above said Canteen
boy showed me a gap in between bigger-size drums from
where the small drums were removed ...... "
Sub-Inspector Thora! PW 7, conducted the investigation. After
making inquiries from the Regional Transport Office, he traced the
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INAYATULLAH v. MAHARASHTRA (~arkaria, !. ) 717
owner of the car, BML 6649, and requested him to send his car
d.river to the Police station. Accordingly, the driver, Babu Vithal
(PW 5), accompanied by the accused (appellant) appeared before
the Sub-Inspector in the Police Station on September 26, 1968. The
Sub-Inspector took the accused _into custody. He then called the
Panchas (inclulling PW 6) and, in their presence, interrogated the
accused who made a statement which was recorded by the Sub-Inspec
tor. Rendered into English, this statement (incorporated in the
Panchanama Ex. C) reads :
"I will tell the place of de_posit of the three Chemical
drnms which I took out from the Haji Bundcr on ht
August."
The accused then led the Police Officer and the Panchas to a
Musafirkhana in Crowford Market and pointed out the three \!rums
lying there, bearing the markings, 'ACC I Phosphrous Pentaoxide'.
Thereafter, the drums were identified by PW 1 as the same which had
been stolen. ·
Aic1ong others, the prosecution examined Bhikaji (PW 1). the
infonnant, Vishnu Sakharam (PW 2), the Gate-keeper, Go~indji
(PW 3) the Clearing Agent and Rasal Mohd. (PW 6), a panch wit
ness of the discovery. The driver of the car BML 6649 was also put
in the witness-box as PW 5. He turned hostile and the prosecution
cross-examined him to impeach his credit.
The plea of the appellant was one of plain denial of the prosecu
E tion case.
The courts below have concurrently found these facts :
1. That three drums had been stolen from the shed of
the Bombay Port Trust on 1-8-1968 at 8.40 A.M.
2. That the drums in question were the same that had
been stolen.
3. That these drums were discovered in consequence of
the information (vide Ex. C) given bv the accused whilst in
police custody.
4. That such information, as admissible under s. 27,
Evidence Act, showed that the accused was admittedly in
possession of these stolen drums on 26-9-1968 and therefore,
under illustration (a) of sec. 114, Evidence Act, he would
be presumed to be the thief.
. Mr. Chaudhry, the learned Counsel for the. appellant does not
seriously dispute the first two findings. But he forcefully .assails the
third and the fourth. His contentions are : Qa) that the courts below
have not only misconstrued the statement made by the accused but
have used more of it than was permissible under Sec. 27, Evidence
Act; (b) that properly read,, the admissible portion of the statement,
in the circumstauces of the case, did not warrant an inference under
illustration (a) to Sec. 114,, Evidence Act, that the appellant was the
thief or a receiver o~ stolen property.
As against this, Mr. H. R. Khanna, learned Counsel for lite State
submits that the whole of the information supplied by the accused
was admissible un\ler sec. 27.
Although the interpretation and scope of sec. 27 has been the
subject of several authoritative pronouncements, its application to
concrete cases is not always free from difficulty. It will therefore be
worthwhile at the outset; to have a short and swift glance at the
sec;tion and be remained of its requirements. The Section says :
"Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as dis
covered in consequence of information received from a
person accused of any ol,fience, in the custody ·of a Police
Officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts
to a confession or not, as relates l'.listinctly to the fact thereby
discovered may be proved."
The expression "Provided that" together with phrase ''whether
it amounts to a confession or not" shows that the section is in the
nature of an exception to the preceding provisions particularly Secs.
25 and 26. It is not necessary in this case to consider if this wet.ion
qualifies, to any extent, Sec. 24, also. It will be seen that the first
condition mcessary for bringing this section into operation is the dis
covery of a fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of the infor
mation received from a person· accused of an offence. The second
is that the discovery of such fact must be deposed to. The third
is that at the time of the receipt of the information the accused must
be in police custody. The last but the most important condition is
that only "so much of the information" as relates distinctlv to the fact
thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to
be excluded. The word "distinctly" means "directly", "indubitably",
"strictly", "unmistakably". The word has been advisedly used to
limit and define the scope of the proveable information. The phrase
"distinctly" relates to the fact thereby "discovered" is the linchpin of ·
the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information
supplied by the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of
the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban
against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a
fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the
accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part
only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate
cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches
to the rest of the statement which may be indirectly or remotely retared
to the fact discovered.
At nne time it was held that the expression "fact discovered" in
the section is restricted to a physical or material fact which can be
perceived by the senses, and that it does not include a mental fact (see
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INAYATULLAH v. MAHARASHTRA (Sarkaria, 1.) 719
Sukhan v. Crown,(') Rex v. Ganee)("). Now it is fairly settled that
the expression "fact ~iscovered" includes not only the physical object
produced, but also the place frpm which it is produced and the
knowledge of the accused as t0 this (see Palukuri Kotayya and ors.
v. Empror(3 ), Udai Bhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh.(')
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to be clear about the
precise statement which had been made by the appellant to the Police
Officer. This. statement finds incorprn-ation in the panchnama, Ex.
C and we have reproduced an English rendering 0£ the same earlier
in this judgment. While considering this statement, the High Court
observed that the accused had stated that "he had kept them (drums)
there". We have perused the original record of the statement y.:hich
is in Hindi, and we are of opinion that by no stretching of the words
this statement can be so read or construe\i as has been done by the
High Court. The copy Ex. C of the Pap.chnama, in the Paper-book
contains a correct English rendering of the same. What the accused
had stated was : "I will tell the place of deposit of the three Chemical
drums which I took out from the Haji Bunder on first August". It
will be seen that he never ,said that it was he who had deposited
the drums at the place from which they were produced. It seems
the latter part of the statement which was an outright confession of the
theft, was not completely ruled out of evidence and somethiog of it
was imported into and superimposed on the first part of the statement
so as to fix the responsibility for deposit and possession of the stolen
drums there, on the accused.
Haviog cleared the ground, we will now consider, in the Jijht
of the principles clarified above, the application of s. 27 to this state
ment of the accused. ~e first ste,p iri the process was to pinpoint
the fact discovered in consequeice Of this statement. Obviously, in
the present case, the threefold fact discovered was: (a) the chemical
drums in question, (b J the place i.e. the Musofirkhana, Crawford
Market, wherein they lay deposited and (c) the accused's knowledge
of such deposit. The next step would be to split up the statement
into its components and to separate the admissible from the inadmis
s;ble portion or portions. Only those compon·ents or portions which
were the immediate cause of the discovery would be legal evidence
· anti not the rest which must be excised and rejected. Thus processed.
in the instant case, only the first part of the statement, viz., "I will
tell the place of deposit of the three Chemical drums" was the
immediate and direct cause of the fact discovered. Therefore,, this
portion onlv was admissible under Sec. 27. The rest of the statement .
namely, "which I took out from _the Haji Bunder on first August",
constituted only the past history of the drums or their theft by the
accused: it was not the. distioct and proximate cause of the discovery
and hatl to be ruled out of evidence altogether.
After culling out and rejecting the inadmissible portion, it was
to be considered further whether the admissible portion of. the iofor·
(IJLL.R:iOLah. 283-F.ll. (2) I.L.R. 56 Born. 172.
(3) 74 !. A. 65; (4) [19621 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 830.
mation taken in conjunction with the facts discovered was sufficient
to draw the presumption that the accused was the thief or receiver
of stolen property knowing it to be stolen. The answer to this
question, in the circumstances of the case, had to be in the negative.
The drums in question were found in the compound or yard of a
Musafirkhana which was a place of rest and waiting for Musafus
(travellers). It was not alleged by the prosecution-much less
proveli-that the drums were lying concealed, or that the compound
was under the lock and key of the accused. There is not even an
oblique hint that the place of the deposit of the drums was in any
way under the control or occupation of the accused. The place being
a Musafirkhana, was from its very nature accessible to all and sundry.
It must be remembered that an inference under s. 114, Illustration
(a) should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference from
the circumstances of the given case, which cannot be explained on
any other hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accus~d. Such is
not the case h~re.
The facts proved by the prosecution, particularly the admissible
portion of the statement made by the accused,. could give rise to two
alternative hypotheses, equally possible, namely : (i) that it was the
accused who had himself deposited the stolen drums in the Musafir
khana, or (ii) the accused only knew that the drums were lying at
that place. The second hypothesis was wholly compatible with his
innocence. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, the appellant was
entitled to the benefit of doubt.
Accordingly, we allow his appeal, set aside his conviction and E
acquit him of the charge levell¢ against him.
P.B.R. A.pp~al allow~d.
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