Jangbir v. Mahavir Prasad Gupta
The Judgmellt of the Court was delivered by E
BEG, J.-Jangbir, appellant, is a tenant of a room in a house which
was purchased by the respondent Mahavir Prasad Gupta on 15th May,
1956, for Rs. 1930/- shown in his sale deed as situated in "Khasra
No. 203, Khewat No. 1, situated at Village Chowkri Mubarkabad,
Delhi Province, within the abadi of Onkar Nagar-II". The landlord
owner had filed a suit ~or the ejectment of the appellant and for re- F
covery of rent which was dismissed by a Subordinate Judge of Delhi
on 26th May, 1966 on the ground that the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court was barred by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') which provided the only modes of relief for
aggrieved landlords by proceeding under the Act.
The respondent landlord had alleged that the suit lay in the ordinary
Civil Court and that it was governed by the provisions of the Transfer G
of Property Act inasmuch as the house, in which the appellant was the
tenant of a room, fell outside the area to which the Act was applicable.
The short question on which the case was decided was whether the
house of the respondent was situated in an area to which the Act had
been applied by a notification tinder Section 507(a) of the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, dated 7th January, 1960. pub
lished in the Delhi Gazette on 17th January, 1960 read with the noti- H
fication dated 12th April, 1962 under Section 1, sub. s. (2) of the Act.
published in the Gazette of India on 21st April, 1962.
The operative part of the notification of the Delhi Administration
reads as follows :
"No. F. 9/5/59-R&S-In exercise of the powers con
ferred by clause (a) of Section 507 of the Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957), the Corporation with
the previous approval of the Central Government hereby .
declares that the following localities mentioned in the Sche
dule given below, hitherto forming part of the rural areas,
shall cease to be rural area".
Thereafter, was given a schedule and then came the heading
"Shahdara Zone". The schedule has 5 columns. The first is for the
"Serial No." The second is for the name of the "Revenue estate",
which is translation of Mauza, said to be an area composed of several
villages. The third column is for the name of the actual ·;i!lage or
colony of the Mauza. It is headed "Name of Colony Village proposed
to be included in the urban area". The fourth column is for what is
called the "square number". The last and the fifth column was headed :
"Khasra/Killa Nos. covered by the Colony /Villages". We are con
cerned here with serial No. 7 which has the entries indicated below
made under the appropriate number of each column :
"I. No. 7.
2. Chowkri Mubarakabad.
3. Onkar Nagar.
Lekhu Pura.
4. Square No. Not given.
5. Across "Onkar Nagar" are shown : "238, 242, 240, 234,
235, 236, 234, 231, 230 and 271"; and, across "Lekhu
Pura" are shown : "215 to 217, 211, 212, 199 to 203".
The notification published in the Gazette of India on 21st April,
1962, may be reproduced in toto. It reads :
"New Delhi, the 12th April, 1962.
G. S. R. No. 486-ln exercise of powers conferred by
the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958), the Central Governmen.t
hereby extends all the provisions of the said Act :- ·
(a) to the areas which immediately before the 7th April,
1958, were included in the Notified Area Committee,
Najafgarh and the Notified Area Committee, Narela;
and
(b) to the localties mentioned in the schedule to the noti
fication of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi No.
F-9/5/59-R&S, dated the 28th December, 1959.
published in the Delhi Gazette Part IV, dated the 7th
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I
JANGBIR V. MAHAV!R PD. GUPTA (Beg, J.) 673
January, 1960, and which by virtue of tha! notifica
tion have formed part of the urban areas within the
limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.
(No. 35/8/61-Delhi-I)
A. V. Venkatasubban, Deputy Secretary".
The Subordinate Judge, very rightly observed that there was no dis
pute between the parties that Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabi1;d was in
cluded within the limits of Delhi Municipal Corporation by the notifi
cation dated 7th January, 1960. He pointed out that there was no
indication of a sub-division of Khasra No. 203 showing that any part
of it was divided or separately numbered. ·
The disappointed plaintiff landlord was, however, not content with
so obviously correct a finding. He appealed to the District Judge who
agreed entirely with the Trial Court and also recorded a· finding of fact
that Khasra No. 203, situated in the Mauza or Revenue Estate of
·Chowkri Mubarakabad, was covered by the notifications. It seems to
us that no other inference was reasonably possible.
The plaintiff respondent seems, in a gambling spirit, to have decided
to try his luck by a second appeal to the High Court. What surprises
us is that a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court, without considering
the objects of the notifications or discussing any principle of construc-
tion of documents which could indicate that a point of law had really
arisen for decision before him, decided to set aside the concurrent find-
ings of fact, and, thereby, patently exceeded the jurisdiction of the High E
Court nnder Section 100 Civil Procedure Code. We need hardly say
that there cannot be any doubt that he did so. We are surprised that
the law laid down by this Court, and, before that, by the Judicial Com
mittee of the Privy Council should have been so comp1etely ignored.
By way of example we m_ay refer to the following cases : Deity
Pattabhiramaswamy v. S. Hanyamayya & Ors.('); Sri Sinha Ramanuja
Jeer & Ors. v. Shri Ranga Ramanuja Jeer & Anr.( 2 ); Nedunuri Kames- F
waramma v. Sampdti Subba Rao( 3 ); Bhusawal Borough Municipality
v. Amalgamated Electricity Co. Ltd. & Anr.( 4 ); Secy. of State v.
Rameshwaram Devasthanam & Ors.( 5); Anup Mahto v. Mita Dusadh
& Ors.,(G) Sahebrao Narayanrao Deshmukh v. Jaiwantrao Yadaorao
Deshmukh & Anr.(7)
It is urged on behalf of the appellants that the construction of a G
document is always a question of law. Reliance was placed uoon ·
Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v. The . Commissioner of Income-tax,
Madras,( 8) and Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati · Subba Rao
(Supra). This Court has never laid down that inferences from con-
tents of a documents always raise questions of law. Indeed, in
(1) A.LR. 1959 S.C. 57. (2) [1962] (2) S.C.R. 509. H
(3) [1963] (2) S.C.R. 208. (4) [1964] (5). S.C.R. 905.
(5) A.LR. 1934 PC. 112. (6) A.LR. 1934 P.C. 5.
(7) A.LR. 1933 P.C. 171. (8) [1956] S.C.R. 691.
Nedunuri Kaineshwaramma's case (supra), this Court observed (at
p. 215-216)
"A construction of documents (unless they are docu
ments of title) produced by the parties to prove a question
of fact does not involve an issue of law, unless it can be shown
that the material evidence contained in them was misunder
stood by the Court of fact. The documents in this case,
which have been the subject of three separate considerations,
were the Land Registers the Amarkam, and Bhooband
Accounts and the Adangal Registers, together with certain
documents derived from the Zamindari records. None of
these documents can be correctly described as a document of
title, whatever its evidentiary value otherwise''.
We think that, unless interpretation of a document involves the
question of application of a principle of law .mere inferences from or
the evidentiary value of a document generally raises only a question
of fact.
We think that, if the learned Judge of the High Court had cared
to consider the provisions of law relating to the exten~ion of the Act
to urban areas.or to bear in mind the correct principles of construction
of documents, or, tried to appreciate the true nature of the case
before him, he could not have possibly interfered with the concurrent
findings of the two Courts below simply because the number of the
Khasra in which the house of respondent lay was not mentioned against
both the portions of Chowki Mubarakabad but wholly against Lekhu
Pura. In so far as the assumption, from the entries in column 5 of
the notification, could be that th1~ whole of No. 203 fell in Lekhupura.
it was an obviously erroneous assumption. A clerical error was ti'le
most that was indicated by such an entry. But, even so, it left no
doubt that the whole Khasra No. 203 ·was duly notified.
"l. · (1) This Ad may be called the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958.
(2) It extends to the area included within the limits of the
New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi Cantonment
Board and to such urban areas within the limits of the Muni
cipal Corporation of Delhi as are specified in the first
Schedule;
Provided that the Central Government may, by notifica
tion in the Official Gazette, extend this Act or any proYisiorr
thereof, to any other urban area included within the limits
of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi or exclude any area
from the operation of this Act or any provision thereof".
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H It is evident that the proviso does not require the mention of any-
thin o- more than the urban area which is to be included or excluded
fro; the limits of the Municipal Corporation. That area was sufficient- )._
ly clearly indicated by entries in columns 2 and 3 meant for the Revenue
JANGBIR V. MAHAVIR PD. GUPTA (Beg, J.) 675
Estate or Mauza and for the colony or the village. It is clear from
these that the whole of Mauza Chowkri Mubarakabad and the whole
of Onkar Nagar and Lekhupura were meant to be notified. The mere
fact that the last column was not filled up by whoever drew up the
notification in such a manner as to show precisely where each Khasra
number lay did not affect the question whether-the area to be included
was sufficiently indicated or not. The well-known principles of inter
pretation applicable to such cases are : (a) Firstly, a document must
be construed as a whole. (b) Secondly, it has to be so construed as
not to reduce what was meant or being done by it to a patent absurdity.
(c) Thirdly, if any entry of a column appears to have been carelessly
made, so as not to give a correct indication of what was otherwise
clearly capable of being inferred from the objects and rest of the con
tents of such a notification, the slight error, due obviously to inadver
tence, would not matter on an application of the principle : Falsa
Demo11stratio non nocet. A deliberate intention to omit a part of a
Khasra number the whole of which is given in the notification of 7th
January, 1960, could not possibly be inferred.
When we look at Section 507 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation
Act, 1957, we find the relevant part runs as follows :
"507. Notwithstanding anything contained in the fore
going provisions of this Act,-
( a) the Corporation with the previous approval of the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, declare that any portion of the rural areas shall cease
to be included therein and upon the issue of such notification
that portion shall be included in and form part of the urban
areas;
(b) the Corporation with the previous approval of the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette,-
(i) exempt the rural areas or any portion thereof from
such of the provisions of this Act as it deems fit.
(ii) Levy. taxes, rate·s, fees and other charges in the rural
areas or any portion thereof at rates lower than those
at which such taxes, rates, fees and other charges are
levied in the urban areas or exempt such areas or
portion from any such _tax, rate, fee or other charge;"
Thus, we find the provisions of Section 1 (2) of the Act as well as
of Section 507(a) and (b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act
refer only to "areas" and not to mere Khasra Nos. which are con
venient divisions for the purposes of indicating what lay within each
area. The Khasra is often spoken of as the "village map". Khasra
for "abadi" areas even indicat~ the type of construction which may lie
within a particular number or the use to which a piece of land was
being put. The term "urban area" or "rural area" is used for much
larger units than Khasra Nos. It would, obviously, be quite impossible
to think of one particular number, within an "abadi" area, left out or
B.
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977) 1 S.C.R.
dropped deliberately, without any rhyme or reason, from the notifica
tions mentioned above. No conceivable reason has been suggesteJ for
such an omission. Indeed, there is not even an omission the effec;t of
which may have been helpful to the appellant. It was only a cq"se
where the whole number is shown against one village only instead of
being shown against two.
The learned High Court Judge, by basing his whole judgment on
a farfetched conjecture from supppsed omission of No. 203 in column
5, against Onkar Nagar, adopted a construction of the Notification,
if that is what the learned Judge was doing, which was quite un intelli
gible with reference to the facts of the case or purposes of such noti
fications. The learned Judge would h_ave been well advised to rest
content with the obviously correct position that what the two Courts
below had done was to arrive at a pure finding of fact as to whether
a particular Khasra number containing the house in question was in
cluded within a Mauza to the whole of which the provisions of the Act
had been plainly extended. In view of all the facts of the case, no
other conclusion was reasonably possible.
Consequently, we allow this appeal, by special leave, with costs
throughout, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the
plaintiff's suit. As no counsel appeared to hear the Judgment today's
costs are disallowed to both the parties.
S.R. Appeal allowed.
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