State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Ors.
CHANDRACHUD, J. These two apoeals bv soecial leave arise out of
a judJµnent dated Septem~r 30, 1975 rendered by the High Court
KARNATAKA v. L. MUNISWAMY (Cha11drachud, J:) 115
of Karnataka in Criminal Petitions Nos. 248 and 253 of 1975. By
the aforesaid judgment the High Court in the exercise of its inherent
powers has quashed proceedings initiated by the State of Karnataka,
appellant herein, agamst the respondents.
The incident out of which these proceedings arise took place on
December 6, 1973 in the Central Avenue of the Indian, Telephone
Industries Colony, Bangalore. Thyagaraja Iyer, accused No. 1, who
was an employee of the Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. was dis
missed from service on September 20, 1973 on the allegation that he
had assaulted a Canteen supervisor. The complainant Ajit Dutt,
Works Manager of the Crossbar Division, attempted to serve the
dismissal order on him but he refused to accept it and threatened the
complainant that he, the complainant, was primarily responsibfo for
the dismissal and would have to answer the con,cquences: It is
alleged that the LT.I. Employees' Union took up cudgels on his
behalf and resolved to support his cause. The case of the prosecu
tion is that accused Nos. 1 andi 8 to 20 conspired to commit the
murder of the complainant and; that in pursuance of that conspiracy
accused Nos. I, 8 and 10 hired accused Nos. 2, a notorious criminal,
to execute the object of the conspiracy. Accused No. 2 in turn en
gaged the services of accused Nos. 3 to 7 and eventually on the morn
ing of December 6, 1973 accused Nos. 1 to 6 are allegett to have
assaulted the complainant with knives, thereby committing offences
under ss. 324, 326 and 307 read with s. 34 of the Penal Code.
Accused No. 2 was charged separately under s. 307 or in the alter
native under s. 326, Penal Code.
By his order dated October 23, 1974 the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate, V Court, Bangalore directed all the 20 accused to take
their trial before the Sessions Court for offences under s. 324, 326
and 307 read with s. 34 of the Penal Code.
At the commencement, of the trial before the learned First Addi
tional District and Sessions Judge, Bangalore, two preliminary ques
tions were raised, one' by the prosecution and the other by the accused.
It was contended by the prosecution that the specification of particu
lar sections in the committal order did not preclude the Sessions Court
from framing a new charge under s. 120-B of the Penal Code. On
the other hand it was contended by the accused that there was no
suflicient ground for proceeding with the prosecution and therefore
they ought to be discharged. The learned Additional Sessions Judge
accepted the contention of the prosecution that he had the power to
frame a charge under s. 120-B. The correctness of that view was not
challenged before us by Mr. Frank Anthony who appears on behalf
of the accused. that is as it ought to be because the power of the
Sessions Court to frame an appropriate charge is not trammelled by
the specifications contained in the committal order. The Sessions
Court, being seized of the case, has jurisdiction to frame appropriate
charges as the facts may justtty or the circumstances may warraut.
The contention of the accused that they ought to he discharged was
accepted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge partly. He held
that there was no case against accused Nos. 11, 12 and 16 and that
they were therefore entitled to be discharged. By an order dated
August 8, 1975 the learned Judge discharged those three accused in
the. exercise o~ his, powers under' s. 227 of the Code of Criminal Pro
cedure, 1973. We are informed that the correctness of that order is
under challenge before the High Court in a proceeding taken by the
State of Karnataka. We are not concerned with that order in thr,se
appeals. After discharging accused, Nos. 11, 12 and 16 the learned
Judge, turning to the case against the remaining accused, observed
that there was "some material to hold that they have had somethipg
to do with the incident which occurred on 6-12-1973 in the LT.I.
Colony Bangalore". The learned Judge adjourned the case to Sep
tember 1, 1975 "for framing specific charges as made out from the
material on record against the rest of the accused persons."
Two revision petitions were filed against this order, one by
accused Nos. 10, 13, 14 and 15 and the other by accused Nos. 17
to 20. Those petitions were allowed by the High Court on the view
that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against the peti
tioners before it. The High Court accordingly quashed the proceed
ings in regard to them which has led to these appeals.
Mr. Mookerjee who appears on beha\.f of the State of Karnataka
contends that the High Court ought not to havei exercised its powers
to quash the proceedings against the respondents without giving to the
Sessions Court, which was seized of the case, an opportunity to con
sider whether there was sufficient material on the record on which to
frame charges against ihe respondents. It is argiiedl that the Sessions
Court had adjourned the case for a consideration of that very ques
tion and it was not proper for the High Court to withdraw the case,
as it were, and to exercise its extraordinary powers, thereby prevent
ing the Trial Court from examining the sufficiency of the material
which it is the primary duty and function of that Court to examine.
There is some apparent justification for this grievance because the
language in which the Sessions Court couched its order would seem
to suggest that it had adjourned the case to September 1, 1975 for
consideration of the question as to whether there was sufficient
ground for proceeding against the respondents. But a careful read
ing of the Sessions Court's judgment would reveal that while dis
charging accused Nos. 11, 12 and 16 it came to the conclusion. that
insofar as the other accused were concerned there was some material
to hold that they were connected with the incident. The case was,
therefore, adjourned by the Court for framing specific charges against
them. In other words, the learned Judge adjourned the case not for
deciding whether any charge at all could be framed against the re
maining accused but for the purpose of deciding as to which charge
or charges could appropriately be framed on the basis of the mate
rial before him. The grievance therefore that the High Court inter
fered with the Sessions Court's order prematurely iS not justified.
The second limb of Mr. Mookerjee's argument is that in any event
the High Court could not take upon itself the task of assessing or appre
ciating the weight of material on the record in order to find whether
any charges could be legitimately framed against the respondents. So
t
KARNATAKA v. L. MUNISWAMY (Chandrachud, J.) I Ii
long as there is some material on the record to connect the accused
with the crime, says, the learned counsel, the case must go on and
the High Court has no jurisdiction to put a precipitate or premature
end to the proceedings on the belief that the prosecution is not likely
to succeed. This, in our opinion, is too broad a proposition to accept.
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 of 1974, provides
that:
"If, upon consideration of the record of the case and
the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this be
half, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for so doing."
This section. is contained in Chapter XVIII called "Trial Before a
Court o~ Sessions". It is cleat from the provision that the Sessions
Court has the power to discharge an accused if after perusing the
record and hearing the parties be· comes to the conclusion, for reasons
to be recorded, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The object of the provision which requires the
Sessions Judge to record bis reasons is to enable the superior court
to examine thel correctness Qf the reasons for which the Sessions
Judge has held that there is or is not sufficient ground for proceeding
agamst the accused. The High Court therefore is ~ntitled to go into
the reasons given by the Sessions Judge in support of his order and
to determine for. itself whether the order is justified by the facts and
circumstances of the case. Section 482 of the New Code, which cor
responds to s. 561-A of the Code of 1898, provides that:
"Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect
the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders
as may he necessary to give effect to any order under this
Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled
to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the
proceeding to continue would be an abuse o~ the process of the
Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to
be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both
in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public
purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted
to degenerate into weapon of harassment or persecution. In a crimi
nal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature
of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the
like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the
interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of
mere law though justice has got to be administered according to Jaws
made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these
observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and
purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of
the Hi?h Court to dQ justice between the State and its subjects, it
would be impossible to appreciate the width arid contours of that
salient jurisdiction.
Let us thellj turn to the facts of the case to see; whether the High
Court was justified in holding that the proceedings against the res
pondents ought to be quashed in order to prevent abuse of the pro
cess of the court and in order to..secure the ends of justice. We asked
the State counsel time and again to point out any data or material on
the basis of which a reasonable likelihood of the respondents being
convicted of any offence in connection with the attempted murder of
the complainant could be predicated. A few bits here and a few bits
there on which the prosecution proposes to rely are woefully inade
quate for connecting the respondents with the crime, howsoever, skil
fully one may attempt to weave those bits into a presentable whole.
There is no material on the record on whlch any tribunal could
reasonably convict; the respondents for any offence connected with
the assault on the complainant. It is undisputed that the respondents
were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of the assault.
What is alleged against them is. that they had conspired to c.ommit that
assault. Thls, we think, is one of those cases in which a charge of
conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct in
volvement of the accused is lacking. we have been taken through the
statements recorded b,Y the police during the course of investigation
and the other materiaL The worst that can be said against the res
pondents on the basis thereof is that they used to meet one another
frequently after the dismissal of accused No. 1 and prior to the com
mission of the assault on the complainant. Why they met, what they
said, and whether they held any deliberations at all, are matters on
which no witness has said a word. In the circmnstances, it woul.d be
a sheer waste of public time and money to permit the proceedings to
continue against thei respandents. The High Court was therefore
justified in holding that for meeting the ends of justice the proceed
ings against the respondents ought to be quashed.
Learned counsel for the State Govermnent relies upon a decision
of this Court in R. P. Kapur v. The State of Punjab(') in whlch it was
held that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under s. 561A of
the Code o[ 1898, the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry
as to whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not That may
be so. But in the instant case the question is not whether any
reliance can be placed on the veracity of this or· that particular wit
ness. The fact of the matter is that there is no material on the record
on the basis of which any tribunal could reasonably come to the con
clusion that the respondents are in any manner connected with the
incident leading to the prosecution. Gajendragadkar, J., who spoke
for the Court in Kapur's( 1) case observes in his judgment that it was
not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule
which would govern the exercise of the Hieh Court's inherent juris
diction. The three instances cited in the judgment as to when tl1e
High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent iurisdiction are
only illustrative and can in the very nature of things not be regarded
as exhaustive. Considerations jnsti{ying the exercise of inherent
powers for securing the ends of justice naturally vary from case to
(l) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 388
KARNATAKA v. L. MUN!SWAMY (Chandrachud, J.) 119
case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred by s. 482
ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula.
On the other hand, the decisions cited by learned counsel for the
respondents in V adi/al Panchal v. D. D. Ghadigao11ki1r( ') and Cen
twy Spinning & Manufacturing Co. v. State of Maharashtra(') show
that it is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the court
<:annot apply its judicial mind to the consitleration whether or not
there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by
the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a
charge affects a person's liberty sub&tantially r.ntl therefore it is the
duty of the court to consider judicially whethe~ the material warrants
!he framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of
the prosecution that the accused be asked Lo face a trial. In
Vadi/al Panchal's case (supra) section 203 of the old Code was under
consideration, whichJ provided that the Magistrate could dismiss a
complaint if after considering certain ·matters mentioned in the sec
tion there was in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding
with the case. To an extent section 227 of the new Code contains an
analogous power which is conferred on the Sessions Court. It was
held by th.is Court, while considering the true scope of s. 203 of the
old Code that the Magistrate was not bo.und to accept the result of
:rn enquiry or investigation an_d that he must apply his judicial mind
to the material on which he had to form his judgment. These deci
sions show that for the purpose of determining whether there is suffi
cient ground for proceeding against an accu>ed the court possesses a
comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can deter
mine the question whether the material on the record, if unrebutted,
is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to
lie possible.
We arc therefore in agreement with the view of the High. Court
that the material on which the prosecution proposes to rely against the
respondents is wholly inadequate to sustain the charge that they arc
in any manner connected with the assault on the complainant. We
would, however, like to observe that nothing in our judgment or in
the judgment of the High Court should be taken as detracting from
the case of the prosecution, to which we have not applied our mind,
as against accused Nos. 1 to 9. The case against those accused must
take its due and lawful course.
The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
S.R.
(!)A.LR. 1960 S.C. l 113.
(2) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 545.
9-241lSCT 177
Appeals dismissed