Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd.

•• BEG. C.J.-'01is appeal by certificate raises the simple question whether :ertain trees, said to be part of a grove, are included in 34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS U 9771 3 S·C.R. grove-land, which, under section 6(a) (i) of the U.P. Zamindari Aboli­ tion and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), vests in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances. This very question was raised by the respondent-decree holder in the. execution proceedings in this very case, between the same parties which came to this Court on an earlier occasion. We have perused the judgment of this Court reported in 1962 (2) S.C.R. 441, in the case. We find that the position taken by the respondent-decree-holder then also was that, after the coming into force of the Act, what could still be sold in execution of the decree was the right in trees of groves as these continued to vest in the intermediary. This Court rejected that submission and held that after vesting of all the rights mentioned in section 6 Gf the Act in the State of Uttar Pradesh, new bhumidhari rights came mto existence under section 18 of the Act. It also held that the only way in which a mortgagee could enforce his right against the mortgagor after the Act came into force is provided in section 6(h) of the Act, read with section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, so that nothing more than the compensation awarded to the intermediary could be proceeded agaimt by the mortgagee. We are surprised that, even after that decision which, according to the appellant-judgment-debtor, constitutes a complete answer to any further execution proceedings iu respect of any part of bhumi­ dhari rights, execution should have proceeded against trees in groves and the view taken by the execution court, that there is a distinction between trees and a grove and groveland, should have been upheld by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench). We find that it is impossible for us to accept this opinion in view of the definition Olf the intermediary's grove~under section 3 (l 3) of the Act, which says : "intermediary's grove' means grove-land held or occupied by an intermediary as such." This means that "grove­ Jand" and "" "intermediary's grove" are equated. And groves are only collectioi;s of trees iu plots of land so as to preclude cultivation in them. The uncut trees are deemed to be parts of the "land''. Section 18 (I) (a) of the Act provides that an "intermediary's grove" is bhumidhari property. Rights in it are part of bhumidhari rights. After these clear words of the enactment. we think it is not necessary even to consider previous definitions or to make out speci­ ous or unrealistic distinctions between standing uncut trees, which are parts of groves, and groves and grove-land. The proposition is well settled, under the general Jaw, that trees, before they are cut, form parts of 'land'. And, an inseparable part is always included in the whole. In view of this very clear legal position, we allow this appeal mid set aside the judgments and decrees of the High Court and the Execution Court with costs. ll S.R. Appeal allowed.