Rajendera Nath Kar v. Gangadas & Gangadhar Rathi & Ors.
CHANDRACJIUD, C. J.-On November 27, 1962 respcmdents filed
a suit for eviction against the appellant under the West Bengal pre
mises Tenancy Act. l 956 ("The Act") on the ground that the appel
lant was in arrears of rent, that he had sublet the premises and that
the respondents required the ptemiscs for their personal use. The
summons of the suit was served on the appellant on January 9, 1963
and he deposited the arrears of rent within a period of thirty days
thereafter i.e. on February 5, 1963. On July 10, respondents filed
an application umlcr section 17 (3) of the Act for striking off the
defence of the appellant on the ground that though the appellant had
deposited the arrears o[ rent, he had 11ot deposited the interest due on
the arrears, as required by section 1 7 (1) of the Act. By an order
dated July 25, 1963 the trial court accepted the respondents' contention
and struck off the appellant's defence. On August 26, 1963 the
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R. N. KAR v. GANGADAS (Chandrachud, C.J.) 947
appellant filed a civil revision application in the Calcutta High Court
against that order but it was dismissed by the High Court on April
4, 1968.
Between August 26, 1963 when the appellant filed the revision
application in the High Court and April 4, 1968 when the revision
application was dismissed, ce11ain important events happened. On
August 26, 1967 an Ordinance was passed by the West Bengal Gov
ernment by which a new section, namely, Section 17B was introduc
ed into the Act. By that section. tenants were. given the right, if
the proceeding for eviction was not yet disposed of, to apply within
thirty days of the commencement of the Ordinance, for setting aside
the order striking off the defence. ·on the expiry of that Ordinance,
another Ordinance containing identical provisions was passed on
January 8, 1968. This Ordinance was replaced on March 26, 1968
by President's Act 4 of 1968. Section 17-B which was inserted in
the Act by the two Ordinances was numbered as section 17-A under
the President's Act, the provisions of the section remaining unalter
ed. Section 1 (2) of the President's Act provided that the said Act
shall be deemed to have come into force on August 26, 1967 which
was the date on which the first Ordinance had come into force.
After the dismissal of the revision application on April 4, 1968,
the appellant ·fikd an application on May 3, 1968 in the Trial Court
under section 17-A, praying that the order dated July 25, 1963
passed by it, striking off his defence be set aside. It ought to be
mentioned that though the Trial Court had passed the order striking
off the appellant's defence as Jong back as in 1963, the eviction suit
filed by the rc,;pondcnts continued to remain on the file because. on
September 16, 1963 the High Court in the revision application filed
by the appellant had issued an order staying all further proceedings
i11 the suit. Along with the application under section 17-A, the appel-
lant filed an application under sccti.on 5 of the Indian Limitation Act,
1963 praying that the delay caused in filing the application may for
reasons stated therein be condoned. Both the applications were
dismissed by the Trial Court by an order dated August 17, 1968
which was confirmed by the Calcutta High Court in revision on June
3, 1969. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court in
Civil Rule No. 2924 of 1968, the tenant has preferred this appeal by
special leave of this Court.
The High Court has dismissed the application filed by the appcl- H
!ant under section 17-A of the Act on the ground .that it was not
• ~ filed within 30 days of August 26, !967 when the first Ordinance
came into force and further on the ground that since Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 had no application to the proceeding, the Court
had no power to condone the delay. It is patent that the applica
tion under section 17-A was not filed within the prescribed period of
thirty days. The sole question for decision, therefore, is whether the
provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act can apply to an appli
cation under section 17-A of the Act.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides, to the extent relevant,
that any application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the
applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making
C the application within the said period. .On the applicability of sec
tion 5 to the proceedings under section 17-A of the Act, the provi
sions of section 39 of the Act have a material bearing and must be
noticed. Section 39 of the Act provides :
"Subject to the provisions in this Act relating to limita
tion, all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
shall apply to suits, appeals and proceedings under this Act."
This provision, which is clear and specific, leaves no doubt that the
provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under
the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, subject to the condition that
if there is a provision in the West Bengal Act relating to limitation,
that provision would prevail over the provisions of the Indian Limi
tation Act relating to limitation. Since the West Bengal Act pres
cribes a specific period of limitation for filing an application for sett
ing aside an order striking out the defence, namely, a period of 30
days cominencing on August 26, 1967 when the first Ordinance came
into force, that period would undoubtedly apply to the making of
F the application under section 17 A of the Act. And since the appel
lant did not file his application under section 17-A before the due
date, that i"s to say, before September 25, 1967, the application must
be held to be barred by limitation. But, by reason of section 39
of the Act, all other provisions of the Limitation Act would be attrac-
G ted, including section 5 of the latter Act. Whether the appellant has
made out sufficient ground for the condonation of delay is another
matter but, in view of the provisions of section 39 of the Act, it seems
to us clear that the aPPlication filed by the appellant under section 5
of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is maintainable and
has to be decided on meri\s.
H The learned Single Judge of the Calcutta Court has referred in
his judgment of June 3, 1969 to the provisions of section 39 but he
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took the view that sine c section 17 A lays down a special period of ~ •
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R. N. KAR v. GANGADAS ( Chandraohud, C.J.) 949
limitation for filing a petition to set aside an order striking ont the
defence, that period could not be extended by invoking the provi"
sions of the Limitation Act. This view is unsupportable. The true
meaning and effect of section 39 is that if any special period of Jimi-
1ation is prescribed by the Act, that period will govern the proceed
ing under the Act in perference to the period, if any, prescribed by
the Limitation Act. But, apart from such an over-riding effect or
of the period of limitation prescribed by the Act, not only that the
other provisions of the Limitation Act do not stand excluded or sup
erseded, but they are expressly made applicable by section 39 of the
Act. When a Court condones the delay caused in filing a proceeding,
it does not extend the period of limitation prescribed by law for filing
it. It treats the proceeding as if it is filed within limitation, which
it has the power to do if sufficient cause is shown for not filing the
proceeding within the prescribed period.
In M/s. Pokarmal Gurudayal v. Sagarmal Bengani(') a Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court took the view that section 5 of the
Limitation Act would apply even to an application made for setting aside
the decree passed after and following upon an order striking out of the
defence. We endorse the view of the High Court which, ex hypothesi,
would justify the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act to an
application for setting aside an order striking out the defence.
That leaves for consideration the question whether the appellant has
tihown sufficient cause for not preferring his application within a period
<>f thirty days after August 26, 1967. On this aspect of the matter, it
is relevant to bear in mind that in the revision application filed by the
appellant against the order striking out his defence, the High Court on
September 16, 1963 had stayed all further proceedings in the suit. If
the appellant were to succeed in that revision application, the suit would
have been required to be heard on merits and there would have been no
reason or occasion for him to resort to the provision newly inserted by
the Ordinance,, under which an application could be made for setting aside
the order striking out the defence. The appellant was evidently advised
wrongly as regards the true legal position, as a result of which he awaited
the disposal of his rnvision application. He filed the application under
section 1 7 A within 30 days of the date on which the revision applica
tion was dismissed. The appellant acted bona fide in pursuing his
remedy by way of a revision application which he had already filed and
which, if successful, could have given him effective relief. We are
cSatisfied that he had sufficient cause for not filing the application under
(I) 76 C'akuita Weekly Notes 486.
950 SuPREMB COURT REPORTS [1979] 2 s.c.rr.
A section 17 A within the prescribed period. Accordingly, tlie delay cauS
ed in filing that application must be condoned under section 5. of the
Limitation Act and the application under section 17 A must he allowed ..
For these reasons, we allow the application filed by the appellant
under section 17A of the Act, set aside the order dated July 25, 1963
B striking ont his defence and remit the matter back to the Trial Court
for deciding the respondents' suit for eviction in accordance with Jaw.
The suit has been pending since September 1962 and we direct that it
shall be disposed of expeditiously.
The appeal is accordingly allowed and the High Court's Judgment is
set aside but without an order of costs.
V.D.K. Appeal allowed.
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