Pushpaben & Anr. v. Narandas v. Badiani & Anr.
F AZAL Au, J .-This is an appeal under s. 19 of the Contempt of
Courts Act (hereinafter called the Act) against an order of the High
Court of Bombay convicting the appellants for a Civil Contempt and
sentencing th(m to one month's simple imprisonment. The facts of the
case have been fully detailed by the High Court and it is not necessary
for us to reprnt the same all over again. It appears that Respondent
No. 1 had gi~cn a loan of Rs. 50,000/- to the appellants on certain
conditions. Somehow or other, the loan could not be paid by the
appellants as a result of which Respondent No. 1 filed a complaint
under S. 420 I.P.C. against the appellants. While the complaint was
pending before the Court of the Magistrate, the parties entered into
a compromise on 22-7-1971 under which the appellants undertook
to pay the loan of Rs. 50,000/- with simple interest@ 12% per annum
on or hefore 21-7-1972. An application was filed before the Court for
allowing the parties to compound the case and acquit the accused. The
Court after hearing the parties, passed the following order :-
"The accused given an undertaking to the court that
he shall repay the sum of Rs. 50,000/- to the complainant
·.1 on or before 21-7-1972 with interest as mentioned on the
reverse. In view of the undertaking, I permit the compro
mise and acquit the accused".
It is obvious, therefore, that the Court permitted the parties to
compound the case only because of the undertaking given by the
appellants.
Thereal'tcr, it apears, that the undertaking was violated and the
amount of loan was not paid to the Respondent No. 1 at all. The res-
• ,~ pendent, therefore, moved the High Court for taking action for con
_., tempt of Court against the appellants as a result of which the present
proceedings were taken against them. The High Court came to the
conclusion that the appellants had co=itted a wilful disobedience of
the undertaking given to the Court and were, therefore, guilty of civil
contempt as defined in S. 2(b) of the Act. Hence, this appeal before
.,
us.
Mr. V. S. Desai appearing in support of the appeal has raised two
short points before us. He has submitted that there is no doubt that the
appellants had violated the undertaking but in the circumstances it
cannot be said that the appellants had committed a wilful disobedience
of the orders of the Court. So far as this point is concerned, we fully H
agree with the High Court. In the circumstances, the appellants un
doubtedly committed wilful disobedience of the order of the court
by committing a serious breach of the undertaking given to the Court
on the basis of which alone, the appellants had been acquitted. For
these reasons, the first contention put forward by Mr. Desai, is over
ruled.
It is, then, contended that under S. 12(3), normally the sentence
that shonld be, given to an offender who is found guilty of ci·;il con
tempt, is fine and not imprisonment, which should be given only where
the Court is satisfied that ends of justice require the imposition of such
a sentence. In our opinion, this contention of learned counsel for the
appellants is well-founded and must prevail. Sub-section 3 of S. 12
reads thus :--
"Notwithstanding anything contained 111 this section,
where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the Court,
if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and
that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of
sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be
detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six
months as it may think fit".
A close and careful interpretation of the extracted section leaves no
room for doubt that the Legislature intended that a sentence of fine
alone should be imposed in normal circumstances. The statute, how
ever, confers special power on the Court to pass a sentence of imprison
ment if it think that ends of justice so require. Thus before a Court
passes the extreme sentence of imprisonment, it must give special
reasons after a proper application of its mind that a sentence of im
prisonment alone is called for in a particular situation Thus, the sen
tence of imprisonment is an exception while sentence of fine is the rule.
Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case,
we do not find any special reason why the appellants should be sent to
jail by sentrncing them to imprisonment. Furthermore, respondent
No. 1 before us despite service, has not appeared to support the sen
tence given by the High Court. Having regard to these circumstances,
therefore, we are satisfied that the present case, squarely falls in the
first part of S. 12(3) and a sentence of fine alone should have been
given by the High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal to this
extent that the sentence of imprisonment passed by the High Court is
set aside and instead the appellants are sentenced to pay a fine of
Rs. 1000/- each. In case of default, 15 days simple imprisonment.
Four weeks time to pay the fine.
P.B.R. Appeal allowed m part.
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