Brij Mohan v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi
PATHAK, J.-Is an assessee, who bas concealed the particulars
of bis income, liable to penalty under clause (iii) of sub-section ·(1)
of section 271 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as it stood on the date
of the concealment or as it stood during the assessment year rele-
vant to the previous year in which the income was earned ?
That is the question in this reference made by the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal under section 257 of the Income Tax Act
The assessee is a partner in two firms, Messrs. Hindustan
pOttery Agency and Messrs. New Crockery House. He filed a
return of his total income for the assessment year 1964-65 on April
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B.l!J MOHAN V. C'. !. T. (Pathak, !.) . 201
24, 1968. He disclosed an income of Rs. 460/- from his share in
the profits of Messrs. Hindustan Pottery Agency. He did not dis
close the income from his share in Messrs. New Crockery House.
In the course of the assessment proceedings, the Income Tax Officer
found that the assessee had received income from Messrs. New
Crockery House also. Because of non-compliance by the assessee
with a notice issued under section 143 (2) of the Act, the Income
Tax Officer made a best judgment assessment unde.r Section 144
of the Act on a total income of Rs. 12,118/-. This included a
share income of Rs. 1,462/- from Messrs. Hindustan Pottery Agency
and a share income of Rs. 3,456/- from Messrs. New Crockery
House. Certain other items of income were also included. On
appeal by the assessee, the Appellate Assistant [Commissioner re
duGcd the income from Messrs. New Crockery. House to Rs. 2,955/
and taking into account certain other items determined the figure of
concealed income at Rs. 7,357.
The Income · Ta)!: Ofil~er instituted penalty proceedings, and
applied clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 271 of the Act,·
as it stood after amendment by the Finance Act, 1968. Having
regard to the minimum penal(y which, in his opinion, was Jeviable,
he referred the case to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. The
Inspecting Assistant Commissioner examined the matter, and on the
basis that the concealed income was Rs. 7,357 I - he imposed a
penalty in the like sum, in view of the amended clause (iii) of sub
section (1) of section 271 of the Act. The assessee appealed to the
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and contended that the amended
provision could not be invoked and what came into operation was
the law as it stood in th~ assessment year 1964-65. The Tribunal
rejected the contention. But it reduced the penalty to Rs. 2,955/
taking the view that the assessee was guilty of concealing the share
income from Messrs. New Crockery House only. The assessee then
applied for a reference. The Tribunal saw a conflict of opinion on
the point raised by the 'assessee between the Kerala High Court in
Hajee K. Asseinar v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kerala(') and
the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Income Tax Reference No.
45 of 1971 (decided on April, 26, 1972) which had followed Saeed
Ahmed v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Range
ll, Lucknow(') decided by the Allahabad High Court . In the cir
cumstances, it made the present reference directly to this Court on
the following question of Jaw :
(I) 811.T.R. 423.
(2) 79 I.T.R. 298.
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202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [J 980] J S.C.R.
"Whether the Tribunal was, in law, right in sustaining
the penalty of Rs. 2,955/- by applying the provisions of
Section 271(1) (c) (iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as
amended with effect from 1-4-1968 ?"
Section 271 of the Income Tax Act provides for penalties in
certain cases. Clause (c) of sub-Section (!) of section 271 speaks
of a case where the Income Tax Officer is satisfied that a person
has concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate
particulars of such income. The measure of the penalty is specified
in clause (iii) of the sub-section . During the assessment year 1964-
65, clause (iii) read :
"(iii) in the cases referred to in clause (c), in addition
to any tax payable by him, a sum which shall not be less
than twenty per cent but which shall not exceed one and
a half times ·the amount of the tax, if any, which would
have been avoided if the income as returned by such per
son had been accepted as the correct income."
That clause was substituted with effect from April 1, 1968 by
the Finance Act, 1968 by the followhlg :-
"(iii) in the cases referred to in clause (c), in addition
to any ta:x: payable by him, a sum which shall not be less
than, but which shall not exceed twice, the amount of the
income in respect of which the particulars have been con
cealed or ina·ccurate particulars have been furnished."
It is evident that the quantum of tax which is levied under the
substituted clause (iii) can be greater than that imposable in terms
of the original clause (iii).
The case of the assessee is that an assessment proceeding for
the determination of the total income and the computation of the
tax liability must ordinarily be made on the basis of the law pre
vailing during the assessment year, and inasmuch as concealment
of income is concerned with the income relevant for assessment
during the assessment year any penalty imposed in respect of con
cealment of such income must also be governed by the law pertain
ing to that assessment year. We are unable to accept the contention.
In our opinion, the assessment of the total income and the com
putation of tax liability is a proceeding which, for that purpose, is
governed by entirely different considerations from a proceeding for
penulty imposed for concealment of income. And this is so notwith
standing that the income concealed is the mcome assessed to tax.
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BRIJ MOHAN V. C. I. T. ( PatMk, J.) 203
Jn the case of the assessment of income and the determination of the
consequent tax liability, the relevant law is the law which rules
during the assessment year in respect of which the total income is
assessed and the tax liability determined. The rate of tax is deter
mined by the relevant Finance Act. In the case of a penalty, how
ever, we must remember that a penalty is imposed ou account of
the commis'sion of a wrongful ;ict, and plainly it is the law operating
on the date on which the wrongful act is committed which determines
the penalty. Where penalty is imposed for concealment of parti
culars of income, it is the Jaw ruling on the date when the act of
concealment takes place which is relevant. It is wholly immaterial
that the income concealed was to be assessed in relation to an assess
ment year in the past.
-' We do not think that the caseS to which the Tribunal has re-
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ferred can be said to differ on this.
The concealment of the particulars of his income was effected
by the assessee when he filed ff return of total income on April 24,
l 968. Accordingly, it is the substituted clause (iii), brought in by
the Finance Act. 1968, which governs the case. That clause came into
effect from April 1, 1968.
Another contention raised by the assessee may be noticed. It is
urged that under section 139 of the fncome Tax Act, as it stood
.during the assessment year 1964-65 the return of income should
have been filed by the end of September, 1964 and inasmuch as the
return, although filed as late as April 24, 1968, was accepted by the
Income Tax Officer it should be deemed that the return was treated
as filed within time or, in other words, that the return had been
filed by September 30, 1964. In that event, the submission conti
nues, the concealment of the particulars of income must be deemed
to have taken place when the original clause (iii) of section (1) of
section 271 of the Act was in operation. This contention is also
without force. Under section 139 of the Act, although the statute
itself prescribes the date by which a return of income must be filed,
power has been conferred on the Income Tax ,Officer to extend the
date of furnishing the return. A return filed within the extended
period is a good return in the sense that the Income Tax Officer is
bound to take it into consideration. But nowhere does section 139
declare that where a return is filed within the extended period it
will be deemed to have been filed within the period originaUy pres
cribed by the statute l. On the contrary, the section contains a pro
vision for payment of interest where the return is filed beyond the
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204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] I S.C.R.
A prescribed date even though within the extended period. That is
evidence of the fact that the return filed during the extended period
is not regarded by the statute as filed within the time originally pres
cribed.
Accordingly, we are of opinion that clause (iii) substituted
B in sulrsection (1) of section 271 of the Income Tax Act,
1961 by the Finance Act, 1968, governs the case before us and,
therefore, the penalty imposed on the assessee in the instant case
is covered by that provision.
We answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the
c Revenue and against the assessee. The Revenue is entitled to itsl
costs of this Reference.
N.K..A. Reference answered in favour of Revenue.
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