State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Krishnamurthy

CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Gingelly oil mixed with 15% of groundnut oil was sold as gingelly oil by the respondent to the Food Inspector, Thanjavur Municipality. The defenee of the respondent was that he kept the oil in his shop to be sold, not for human consumption, but, 1 B for external use. The Trial Magistrate did not accept the defence. He convicted him under s. 16(1)(a)(i) read with s. 2(f}(a) of tlie­ Food Adulteration Act and sentenced him to suffer imprisonll!ent tiU I I ' ' ' ' TAMIL NAD!J v. R. KRISHNAM!JRTHY (C/Unnappa Reddy,!.) 61 'the risi'.ng of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 200. On ap~al, 1he learned Sessioµs Judge accepted the defence of the respondent and acquitted ]l_im to the charge. According to the learned Sessions Judge, the respondent could not be convicted unless it was established that the sale of the gingelly oil was for human consumption. The 'State of Tamil Nadu preferred an appeal to the Madras High Court . The High Court confirmed the order of acquittal. The State of Tamil Nadu has filed this appeal by special leave of this Court. The learned counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu made it clear to us at the hearing that the State was not anxious, at this di§tance of time (the occur­ rence was on 26-5-69) to secure a conviction, but was anxious that the legal position should be clarified. We accordingly proceed to do ·so. Section 16(1) (a) (i) as it stood at the relevant time was as follows:- "16. (1) If any person- ( a) whether by himself or by a'ny other person on his behalf imports into India or manufactures for sale, or stores, sells or distributes any article of food- (i) which is adulterated or misbranded or the sale of which is prohibited by the Food (Health) authority in the interest of public health; ~ xx xx xx xx ,'.:) he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of section 6, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six mo'.tiths but which may extend to six years, and with fine which shall not be less tl,ian one thousand rupees : Provided that- .(i) if the offence is under sub-clause (i) of clause (a). and is with respect to an article of food which is adul­ terated under sµb-clause (1) of clause (i) of section 2 or misbranded under sub-clause (k) of clause (ix) of that section; or {ii) if the offence is 1!llder sub-clause (ii) of clause (a), the court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be· mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than: six months or of fuie of less than one thousand rupees or of both impri- c ' o, P' 'A sonment for a term of less than six months and fine of less than 0ne thousand rupees." Section 7 is also relevant abd it was as follows :- "7. No person shall himself or by any JJ~rson on his behalf . manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute- (i) any adulterated food; (ii) any misbranded food; (iii) any article of food for the sale of which a licence is prescribed, except in accordance with the conditions of the licence. (iv) any article of food the sale of which is for the time beillg prohibited by the Food (Health) Authority in the interest of public health; or ( v) any article of food in contravention of any other pro­ vision of this A9t or pf any rule made thereunder." "Food" is defined by s. 2(v) as meaning "any article" used all' food or drink for human consumption other titan dru~ and water and includes- , E "(a) any article which ordinarily enrers into, or is used , F in the composition or preparation of human food, and (b) any flavouring matter or condiments." "Sale" is defined by s. 2(xiii) as follows :- "Sale" with its grammatical variations and cognate expres­ sions, means. the sale of any article of food, whether for cash or on credit or by· way of exchange and whether by wholesale or retail, for human consumption or use, or for analysis, and includes an agreement for sale, an offer for sale, the exposing for sale or having in possession for sale of any such article, and includes also an attempt to sell any such article;" Section 16(1) (a) (i) read with s. 7{i) prohibits and penalise& the sale of any article of food which is adulterated or misbranded etc. The question for consideration is whether the sale of adulterat­ ' H ed gingelly oil which is sold or offered for sale ·for external use is sale of a'n article of food which is adulterated. This must depend i:ipon the definitions of "sale" and "food" ill the Act , ' ' ' TAMIL NADU v. R. KRISHNAMURTHY (Ohinnappa Reddy, J.) 63 According to the definition of "food" which we have extracted above, for the purposes of the Act, any article used as fooo or drink for human consumption and any article which ordinarily enters into or is used in the composition or preparation of human food is "food". It is not necessary that it is intended for human consumption or for preparation of human food. It is also irrelevant that it is described or exhibited as intended for some other use. It is enough if the article is generally or commonly used for human consumption or in the preparation qf human food. It is: µotorious that there are, unfortunately, in our vast country, large segments of population, who, living as they do, far beneath ordinary subsistence level, are ready to consume that which may otherwise be thought as not fit for · human consumption. In order to keep body and soul together, they are often tempted to buy and use as food, articles which are adulterat­ ed and even unlit for human consumption but which are sold at inviting prices, under the pretence or without pretence that they are intended to be used for purposes other than human consumption. It is to prevent the exploitation and self-destruction of these poor, igno­ rant and illiterate persons. that the definition of "food" is couched in such terms as not to take into account whether an article is intended for human consumption or not. In order to be "food" for the pur­ poses of the Act, an ~rticle need not be "fit" for human consump­ tion; it need not be described or exhibited as intended for human collS'Umption; it may even be otherwise described or exhibited; it need not even be :necessarily intended for human consumption; it is enough if it is generally or commonly U8ed for human consumption or in the preparation of human food. Where an article is generally or commonly not used for human consumptidn or in the preparation. of human food but for some other purpose, notwithstanding that it may be cap~bfo of being used, on rare occasions, for human consump­ tion or in t11e preparation of human food, it may be said, dependi'ng on the facts and circumstances of the case, that it is not "food". In such a case the question whether it is intended for human consump­ tion or in the prnparation of human food may become material. But where the article is one which is generally or commonly used for human consumption or in the preparation of human food, there can be no question but that the article is "food". Gingelly oil, miired or not with gronnd'.nut oil or some other oil, whether describe<l or . exhibited as an article of food for human consumption or as an article for external use only is "food:' within the meaning of the definitiol<! contained in s. 2(v) .of the Act. Most of tl)e High Courts appear to have 50 understood the meaning of the word "food", though there appears to have been some 64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS " ~1980}_ 2 s.c.R. .A confusion because of a misunderstanding of certain observations of this Court in Andhra Pradesh Grain & Seed Merchants' Association v. Union of India(') and Shah Ashu JaiwaJJI v. State of Maha­ rashtra(2). In the first case it was observed :- "We are again unable to accept the argument that under the Act even when an article is purchased not as an article of food, but for use otherwise, the vendor will be deemed gllilty if the article does not conform to the prescribed stand­ ards, or is as an article of food adulterated or misbranded. Counsel said that coconut oil is used in the State of Keiala as a cooking medium, and sale of adulterated coconut oil may in Kerala be a'n offence under s. 16, but in other parts of tbe country where coconut oil is not used as a cooking medium and is used as a component of hair oil or for othec purposes, it amounts to imposing an unreasonable restriction to penalise the vendor who sells coconut oil knowing that the purchaser is not buying it as a cooking medium. But there are no articles which are used as food only in one part, and are not at all used l!S food in another part of the country. Even coconut oil is used as a cooking medium by certain sections of the people in parts of India other than Kerala. In any event it is .always open to a person selling an article capable of being used as an article of food as well as for other purpose to inform the purchaser by clear notice that the article sold or supplied is J).Ot intended to be used as an article of food. What is penalised by s. 16 ( 1) is importa­ tion manufacture for sale, or storage, sale or distribution of any article of food. If what iS imported manufactured or stored, sold or distributed is not an article of food, evidently s. 16 can have no application." In the second case, it was observed :- "Hence, where Section 7 prohibits manufacture, sale or storage or distrib.ution of certain types of "food'', it neces­ sarily denotes articles intended for human consumption as foqd. It becomes the duty of the prosecution to prove that ' the article which is the subject-matter of an offence is ordi­ narily used for hunian consumption as food whenever reason- (!) [1971] I $.C.R. 166. (2) [1976] 2 s.c.c. 99. ' j ' • I L TAMIL NADU v. R. KRISHNAMURTHY (Qhinnappa Reddy, !.) able doubts arise on this question. It is self-evident that certain articles, such as milk, or bread, or butter, or food­ grains are meant for human consumption as food. These are matters of common knowledge. Other articles may be presumed to be meant for human consumption from repre­ sentations made about them or ~rom circumstances in which they are offered for sale." 65 The seeming confusion created by the observations in the two .cases will disappear if they are properly undei;stood in the context in which they were made. In the first case the Court was considering the argument based upon the supposition that there might be articles which were "food" somewhere and not "food" elsewhern. The Court first remarked that there were no articles which were used as food ·only in cme part, and were not at all used as fooq in another part of the country. In such an unlikely event, the person selling the article could inform the purchaser that the article sold Wl!s not meant to be ·used as an article of food. If prosecuted he could establish that in that area what he sold was not an article of food at all. That was all that was observed. If the expression "food" is understood as we have explaine~ earlier, the1'<' would be no· occasion for any con­ fusion. The observations in the second case are in accord with what we have said. The Court merely observed tba~ if there was any doubt in -a particular case whether an article was ordinarily nsed for human consumption in order to fall within the definition of "food", the pro­ secution would have to prove the same That gingelly oil, however describev or exhibited, is an article of food is not an end of ff\lr problem. We have further to investi­ gate the definition of "sale". Now, the definition is designedly wide. It seems a real sale as well as an 'embryonic' sale (like agreement •for sale, offer for sale, exposure for sale, possession for sale, attempt at sale) are sales for the purposes of the Act. The sale may be for cash or credit or by way of exchange. The sale may be by whole­ sale or retail. Thus every kind, manner and.method of sale are cover­ ed. Finally, the sale may be "for human consumption or use, or for .analysis". In the context, these words can only mean 'whether for human consumption or for any other purpose (including analysis)'. The object is to emphasise that whatever be the purpose of the sale it is a sale for the purposes of the Act, just as the words "whether ty wholesale or retail" or "whether for cash or credit or by way .of exchange" are intended to emphasise that it is immateri~l for the 66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 2 s.c.R. purposes of the Act what manner and method of sale is adopted. To give any other interpretation to the definition of "sale" would be to exclude from the ambit of the Act that which has been iucluded by the definition of "food". Further, a sale "for analysis" can never be a sale "for human consumption" but it is nonetheless a sale within the meaning of the definition. It is an unqualified sale for the purpooes of the Act. To insist that an article sold for analysis should have been offered for sak for human c011sumption would frustrate the very object of the Act. A person selling an adulterated sample to a Food Inspector c9uld invariably inform him that it was· not for human consumption and thereby insure himself against pro­ secution for ·selling adulterated food. If sale· for analysis is an un­ qualified sale for the purposes of the Act, there is no reason why other sales of the same article should not be sales for the purposes of the Act. The question may be asked why sale for analysis should be specially mentioned if all manner of sales are included in the­ definition. It is only to prevent the argument that sale for analysis is not a consensual sale and hence no sale, an argument which was advanced and rejected in Mangaldas vs . . State of Maharashtra('). We are therefore of the opinion that the sale of gingel!y oil mixed with groundnut oil is punishable under s. 16(1) (a)(i) read with s.2(1)(a) notwithstanding the fact that the seller had expressly stated at the time of sale that it was intended for external use only. We declare the illegal position as indicated in the earlier paragraphs but we refrain from passing any further order in the appeal which we accordingly dismiss. We have not referred to any of the decisions of the '{arious High Courts which were considered by us and all of which, we may add, have been studiously collected and scrupulously considered by Madhusudana Rao, J. in Public Prosecutor v. Rama Chandra Raju( 2). N.V.K. (I) A.LR. 1966 S.C. 121 (2) [1977] I An. W.R. 356 Appeal iismissed.