Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal-ii, Calcutta v. Kalyanji Mavji & Company
PATHAK, J. : This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court
at Calcutta under s. 66A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 is
directed against the judgment dated August 5, 1971 of that High
Court disposing of an income-tax reference.
The respondent asscssee is a registered firm and owns several col
lieries in West Bengal and Bihar. One of the collieries is known as
the South Samia Colliery. The South Samia colliery was under mili
tary occupation from 1942 and was released in 1955. During the
period of military occupation the assessee incurred expenditure on
account of minimum royalty payable in respect of the coJ:iery, the sur·
face rent and salaries for the watch and ward employees. The ex
penditure was allowed in income-tax proceedings as a business ex
penditure. After the colliery was released by the military, the assessee
incurred n further expenditure amounting to Rs. 1,61, 7 42 on the col
liery with a view to resuming mining OJX'rations. The expenditure
was incurred during the previous year beginning October 24, 1957 and
ending November 11, 1958 relevant to the assessment year 1959-60.
In the assessment proceedings for that assessment year the assessee
claimed a deduc'ion of the amount of Rs. 1,61,742 under s. 10(2)
(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, but the deduction was disal1owed
by the Income-tax Officer on the ground that the expenditure was
capital in 'nature. On apJX'al, the Appe:late Assistant Commissioner
affirmed that the expenditure was in the nature of capital expenditure.
The assessee proceeded in second appeal, but the Income Tax Appel
late Tribunal, without giving any reasons of its own, merely recorded
itE agreement with the income-tax authorities. The assessee obtained
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C.I.T. v. KALYANJ! MAVJ! (Pathak, !.) 7 Gi
a reference to the High Court at Calcutta for its opinion ob the follow·
ing question :
"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Income-tax appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that
the expenditure claimed on the South Samla Colliery at
Rs. 1,61,742 was capital in nature."
Th~ High Court noted the following facts :
The assessee carried on busihess in coal as the owner of various
collieries. The South Samia Colliery, which was one of them, was
occupied by the military from 1942 until it was derequisitioncd in
1955. During that period the assessee did not, because hei
could not, work the colliery. He continued, however, carrying
on hie business in coal and working other collieries during
that period. While the South Samia Colliery remained under military
occupation the assessee incurred expenditure on payment of surface
rent and minimum royalty in respect of that colliery and also on
account of salary for the watch and ward staff. The expenditure had
been claimed and allowed as business expenditure of the assessee.
After the colliery was handed over to the assessee upon derequisition,
the assessee incurred, during the relevant period, an expendi'.ure of
Rs. 1,61,742 in renovating the bnil\ling, reconditioning the machinery
and clearing the land of debris accumulated over a numrer of years.
The expenditure of Rs. 1,61,742 consisted of Rs. 66,937 spent on the
staff and labour force by way of salaries, wages and other benefits and
an amount of Rs. 94,805 spent on the purchase of various stores,
machinery repairs, dhowrah repairs etc. This expenditure had to be .
incurred by the assessee for the purpose of putting the machinery in
working order and bringihg the colliery to a state where the mining
operations could be resumed. The colliery had not started working
and mining operations had not been resumed . during the relevant
year.
The High Court observed that the assessee was carrying on its
business throughout and the circumstance that one of the collieries was
not being worked did not affect the carrying on of that business. The
business of the assessee, the High Court said, had to be considered as
a whole and not on the basis of its different sources of snpr~Y or uuits
of production. The High Court held that on the facts admitted and
fon:nd it could not be said that any fresh asset had been acquired by
the assessee by spending Rs. 1,61,742. The expenditure, it observed,
was incurred by the assessee for the purpose of carrying on an exist
ing concern and not for acquiring any concern not in existence. Ac-
B.
cordi'ngly, it held that the expenditure was in the n&ture of revenue ex
penditure and, therefore, answered the question in favour of the
assessee.
In this appeal the first con:ention raised by the Revenue is that
the High Court had no jurisdiction to re-appraise the facts and there
fore its finding on th~ nature of the expenditure is vitiated. The con
tention is without substance. The facts on which the High Court has
relied are admitted between the parties or are facts found by the in
come-tax authorities. We have no hesitation in rejecting the first
contention.
The second contention is that the claim of the assessee must be
considered with reference to s.10(2) (v) and not s.10(2)(xv) of tho
Act. It is urged that if s.10(2) (v) is the relevant clause, being the
specific provision in respect of expenditure on current repairs to build
ings nnd machinery, there is no justification for relying on s.10(2)(xv).
S. 10(2) (xv) is a residuary clause, and deals with expenditure not be
ing an allowance of the 'nature described in any of the preceding
clauses of s.10 (2). The submission is that where repairs are effected
to buildings and machinery a deduction under s.10(2) is permissible
only in respect of curo~nt repairs, and repairs which are not "curre·nt
repairs" are not intended to be the subject of relief. The Act, it is
conte'nded, limits the repairs to "current" repairs. Th·~ repairs made
by the assessee, it is said, cannot be described as "current repairs".
Now, this contention rests on the principle; that if a special rrovision
covers the case, resort cannot be had to a general provision. It seems
to us that if the renovation of the building. the reconditioni'ng of machi
nery and the removal of debris cannot be described as "current re
pairs"-and we assume that to be so--the case would be entitled to
consideration under s.10(2)(xv). Section 10(2) (v) deals with cur
rent repairs only. The subject matter of s.10(2) (v) is "current
repairs" a'nd it appears· difficult to agree that repairs which are not
"current repairs" should not be considered for deduction on general
princiQles or under s.10(2) (xv). There must be very strong evidence
that in the case of such repairs, the Legislature intended a departure
from the principle that an expenditure, laid out or expended wholly
and exclusively for the purposes of the business, a'nd which expendi
ture is not capital in nature, shoud not be allowed in computing the
income from business. There is nothing in the language of s.10(2)
(v) which declares or necessarily implies that repairs, other than,
current repairs, will not qualify for the benefit of that principle. We
must remember that o'n accepted commercial practice and trading
principles an item of business expenditure must be deducted in order
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C.I.T. v. KALYANJI MAVJI (Pathak, J.) 763
to arrive at the true figure of profits and gains for tax purposes. The
rule was held by the Privy Council in C.l.T. v. Chitnis(') to be appli
cable in the case of losses, and it bas been applied by the courts in
India to business expenditure incurred by an assessee. Motipur Sugar
Factory Ltd. v. C.I.T., Bihar and Orissa(') and Devi Films Ltd . . v.
C.I.T. Madras('). The principle found favour with this Court in
Badridas Daga v. C.I.T.( 4 ) and Calcutta Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T. West Ben
zal(5). If the contents of that rule be true on general principle, there
is good reason why the scope of s.10(2) (xv) should be construed
liberally. In our opinion, even if the expenditure made by the asseswe
in the present case cannot be described as "current repairs", he is en
titled to invoke the benefit of s. 10(2) (xv). We may mention that
in The Law Shipping ·ca. Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue(')
it has been held that accumulated arrears for repairs are none the less
repairs necessary to earn profits, although they have been allowed to
accumulate.
The question then is whether s.10(2)(xv) is attracted. There can
be little doubt that the expenditure incurred is incidental to the busi
ness of the assessee. It was involved in renovating the buildings, re
conditioning the machinery and clearing the debris, from the land. All
the work done was for the purpose of resuming the operation of the
colliery. The expenditure was laid out wholly and exclusively for the
purposes of the business. We do not think there can be any dispute
as to that.
But the more serious question is whether the expenditure can be
regarded as capital in '.nature, for if that be so the benefit of s.10(2)
(xv), o.-i its plain ternis, must be denied. Now, whether an expendi"
ture can be described as capital or revenue falls to be decided by seve
ral ~osts, each one of which approaches the queGtion from one pers
pective or another, conditioned by the particular facts of each case.
We need not refer to all of them. On the facts of the present case, it
seems sufficient to mention the tests laid down by this Court in Assam
Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T. West Bengal('). The business of the
assessee in the present case was coal-mining, and it was carried on by
the operation of a network of collieries. Each colliery was a unit o~
production. While the several units of production continued to be
(!) 59 I.A 297.
(2) 28 l.T.R. 120.
(3) 75 l.T.R. 301.
(4) 34 l.T.R. 10, 15.
(5) 37 l.T.R. 1, 9.
<(G) 12 Tax Cases 621, 625 .
17) [1955] 271.T.R. 34.
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764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980) 2 S.C.R.
employed· and the business continued to be carried on, one alone of
the units, the South Samla Colliery was compelled to suspend produc
tion. The suspension was expected to be of temporary duration, b~
cause the property was merely requisitioned for military use, it was not
acquired. As soon as the property was de-requisitioned, the assessee
took measures to resume production of coal. It was necessary to re
move the impediments which had come in the way by reason of the
temporary suspension of work. The buildings were renovated, the
machinery reconditioned and the accumulated debris removed from the
land. The colliery was, in a word, reinstated to the condition neces
sary for ensuring production. No new asset was brought into exis
tence; no advantage for the enduring benefit. of the business was ac
quired. Ail activity which was continuously in operation but had been
temporarily suspended was to be resumed. It is imm:rterial that during
the year under consideration there was no m!ning activity. That the
colliery was regarded as an asset of a continuing business all along,
even during the period of military occupation, is evidenced by the fact
that expenditure incurred by the assessee during that period in respect
of the colliery was allowed as a permissible deduction ih its income tax
assessments. The expenditure of Rs. 1,61,742 under consideration in
the present case was also expenditure laid out as part of the process of
profit earning. The nature of the expenditure is clearly revenue in
character. The High Court is right in holding that the expenditure is·
not of a capital nature.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
N.V.K. Appeal disJ01i.1•rcl .