K. L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India and Others
s .. \BYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. Shri KL. Tripathi, the appellant
llerein joined the State Bank of India in 19 55. At the relevant time,
he was working as Branch Manager, Stat~ Bank of India, Deoria.
Certain complaints were received about his 'conduct from
Gorakhpur Branch Manager, Shri R.S. Kapoor, Staff Officer Grade
II, who reported to the Head Office on 5th May, 1974 that, from
the information given to him by some members of the staff of
Deoria Branch, namely, Shri M.R. Sharma, Head Clerk,· M.S.
Gupta, Field Officer and from other enquiries made by him he found
that the bills negotiated by the Gorakhpur .Branch under a Revolving
Letter of Credit No. 20/1 dated 2 lst March, 1974 established by the
Deoria Branch on Gorakhpur Branch for Rs. 2 lakhs at a time
subject to maximum of Rs. 17 Jakh had remained unpaid to the extent
of Rs. 12 lakhs and that the openers of the Letter of Credit, M /s
Jamuna Prasad Munni Lal Jaiswal, Deoria were unable to meet
their obligations. In the same letter, he also informed that, Deoria
Branch had opened· another Revolving Letter . of Credit No. 20/2
dated 3rd April, 1974 for Rs. 50,000 per day subject to a maximum
o.f Rs. 10 lakhs and that because th~ clauses of the credit had no\
fas SiJl>B.ilMB COURT RBPOR'ts 11984] I s.c.R.
been drawn properly, the bills were not negotiated thereunder by
his Branch, and were instead, sent on collection basis. Certain other
allegations giving the particulars of the bills and records were men
tioned. In.those circumstances, the head office ordered a preliminary
enquiry which was conducted by Shri R.P. Srivastava, Staff Officer,
Grade II and having considered his report, the head office directed
Shri B.D. Sharma, Chief Manager to carry out investigation under
the rules governing the services of the officers of the State Bank.
Shri Sharma conducted th.e investigation between 9th June to
23rd June, 1974 and in the course of the investigation, he visited
Deoria and Gorakhpur. On 9th September, 1974, charges were
framed. The information Shri Sharma could gather was that M/s ·
Iamuna Prasad Muni Lal Jaisw;d, Station Road, Deoria was a sole
proprietorship concern with Shd Jamuna Prasad Jaiswal as the sole
proprietor. Their business was to deal in SGrap iron which they
purchased from Sugar Mills around Deoria and from other sources.
The firm maintained a current account only with an average balance
of Rs. 10,000. There was no opinion report on record with the
Branch. It appeared that the firm had no experience in oil business.
Shri Sharma . enquired from Mr. Tripathi. From the report of
· Shri Sharma, it appears that in respect of all relevant entries upon
which he has based his conclusion, he asked Shri Tripathi after
giving him the gist of the relevant materials gathered from other
persons in the al)sence of the appe]]ant and asked his pinion or
oexplanation in respect of those. We have examined the report
of Shri Sharma and find that at all stages in respect of all the
matter's mentioned in the report the appellant was associated with
the preliminary investigation and his versions or explanations were
sought for and recorded.
I
It is significant that in respect of charge (ii)- Letters of Credit
No. 20/1 dated 21st March, 1974 and No. 20/2 dated 3rd March,
1974, the petitioner stated as follows :-
"That the Revolving Letter of Credit No. 20/1 dated
the 21st.March, 1974 for a sum not exceeding Rs. 2 lakhs
"at a time" subject to a maximum of Rs. 17 lakhs was
established by me after obtaining the permission of the
Regional Manager over telephone. The other Letter of
Credit No. 20/2 dated the 3rd April, 1974 for a sum not
exceeding Rs. S0,000/- "per day" subject to a maximum
of Rs. 10 lakhs w1s established in good faith which was
K.L. TRIPATHI v. STATE BANK (S. Mukhatji, J.) 189
within my power. In so far as compilation of a regular
opinion report on the firm is concerned, I may submit
that the required particulars had already been collected by
the Branch Head Cashier and before issuing the aforesaid
Letters of Credit, I had made my own assessment of the
firm's credit-worthiness means and their ability to meet
their commitments in this regard. ·
In thjs connection, I remember to have informed
Shri B. D. Sharma, the Investigating Officer that the
words "per day" instead of "at a time" were substituted
at the instance of Shri A. K. Chatterjee, Manager, S. I. B.
Division. Gorakhpur Branch at the material time which
I reiterate. It was not my intention lo issue clean letter
of credit and to this end I used the words "accompanied
by once used and unidentified plant lubricating oil in
200 liters each drum". I regret the these words were not
properly placed in the Letters of Credit. Both the typists
attached to the Branch were on deputation at the material
time with the result that formal sanction of the contro
lling authority was not obtained. On my part I was also
awfully busy in inspeciion of Agricnltural loans, other
important duties, mobilisation of deposits and I had
absolutely little lime at my disposal, towards correspon
dence. In these transactions I bad always in mind to
promote the Bank's business interest. I had never
intended to jeopardise the Bank's interest at any time."
He admitted that amount of Draft No. BS00!560 dated 12th
January, 1974 for Rs. 75,000 was not credited to "Margin on
Documentary Credits Account" before issuing the Letters of Credit.
He however stated that margin amount of Rs. 75,000 was lying with
the Bank as security by means of a draft and the Bank's interests
were not jeopardised and were fully protected to that extent. The
draft was, however, not duly discharged. He admitted that there
was delay in retiring of bills but he gave certain explanation to the
show cause notice.
So far as dates of payment of bills No. 30, 35 and 36, he gave
his explanation.
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190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) I S.C.R.
So far as another matter-telegrams relating to the advising
negotiation of bills under Letter of Credit.No. 20/1dated21st Mari:h,
1974, the appellant stated, inter alia, as follows :-
"A representative of F. C. I., Gorakhpur came to
Deoria on the 11th April, 197 4 and handed over Gorakh
pur Branch S. C. No. 774 to 778 along with a D. 0. letter
from Shri Maheshwari, ·oy, Finance Manager, F. C. I.
with a request to arrange for quick payment of the
aforesaid bills as they were in urgent need of moaey.
With a view to render helpful service to valued constituent
like F. C. I. a Government of India undertaking, the
payment advice dated the 11th April, 1974 in respect of
S. C. Nos. 774 to 778 was signed by me before the bills
were paid as I was to leave my office for inspection. In
this connection, I invite your kind attention to the fact
that Shri S. N. Singh was only an Acting Accountant and
his name appeared in the Officers Grade I column of the
Officers list of the Circle. As such I was particular
about signing inter office advices of heavy amounts to
avoid their being . dis-honoured by the branch on which
they were drawn.
The firm's account showed a credit balance of approxi
mately Rs. 1,02,000 and I bad called the· proprietor of
the firm-on that day for depositing sufficient funds in
their account so that _the bills could be retired by debit
to firm's account and it was on his assurance that the ,
payinent advice was signed by me· in good faith and ·
handed over to Shri S. S. Srivastava, Officer Grade II for
delivery to the Corporation'~ representative only when the
required transactions had been put through in the books
of the Branch. On the 11th April, I returned late in the
night fronl inspection and got the news of tragic death of
my gran~ mother at my village in.Ghazipur District."
Thereafter ·he , stated that he was mentally disturbed and he
left for the village and in conclusion stated as follows In respect of
this:-
"However, I am sorry for the fact- that the full
details Qf the above transaction were not advised to Head
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K.L. TRIPAmI v. STATE BANK (S. Mukharji, J.) 191
Office in time. I sincerely regret for this circumstantial
omission on my part and assure, Sir, that there was
hardly any motive or fraduleut intention behind it."·
In the end he did not deny the factual· basis stated to him as
mentioned in the report of Shri Sharma or challenge the veracity or
the correctness of any of these facts or the materials mentioned in the
report of Shri Sharma. He stated in his reply to the second show
cause notice on these points as follows :-
"It would be clear that whatever was done by me in
these transactions was done in g!)od faith and to promote
the interest of the Bank. There was a conspiracy against
-me that I had indulged in fradulent transactions and
attempted to misappropriate Bank's money are baseless.
I never intended to jeopardise the Bank's interest. My
integrity and bonafides have always been above board
during !llY service of about 20 years in the Bank:"
' _It is material to record the conclusions reached by Shri Sharrp.a ·
_ by his investigation upon the basis of which the appellant was
charge-sheeted. These were as follows :-
"Considering all circumstances of the case, I am of
the view that Shri T'ripathi is responsible for the\following
irregularities :- · ·
(1) The opinion on M/s Jamuna Prasad Munnilal Jaiswal
a sole proprietorship concern, has been furnished to f
FCI in an out-of the way manlier, is not based on
any reliable records of the Branch and contains
commitments far beyond the discretionary powers of
the Deoria Manager.
(2) The two clean letters of credit-one for Rs. 17,00,000
and the other for Rs. 10,00,000 opened on Gorakh
pur 'Branch were for beyond his diseretionary powers
and no proper approval therefor had been obtained
from the appropriate authority.
_· (3) Although the letters of credit far exceeding his
discretionary powers were -established-Viz·J:"os. 20/1
192
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984) 1 s.c.I!..
and 20/2 dated the 21st March and 3rd April, 1974
respectively these were reported to the controllin~
authority in a perfunctory manner on the 6th May
and 7th May, ie;, after the position had already come
to their knowledge.
( 4) DDs. for 6 lacs, l!-egotiated by Gorakhpur Branch
and bearing their LBCS Nos. 31, 32 and 33 were.
removed from the.dak and retained by Shri Tripathi
in his personal custody without entering them in the
Bank's books. These were subsequently found in
his safe.
(5) The lists of bills aggregating Rs. 6,01,204.50 relating
to Gorakhpur Branch LBCS. No. 31, 32 and 33
(vide item 5 above), after having been entered in the
schedule No. 8 Book and after having .been referred
to jointly.
(6) The terms and conditions of letter of credit No. 20/1
dated 21.3.1974 were changed without complying
' with the required formalities.
(7) The lists of bills aggregating Rs. 6,01,204.50 relating
to Gorakhpur Branch LBCs. Nos. 31, 32 and 33 (vide
item No. 5 above) after having been entered in the
Schedule 8 Book and after having been referred to
jointly by Sbri S.S. Srivastava, Officer Grade II and
Shri S.N. Singh; Branch Accountant, in the presence
of Shri M.S. ·Gupta, Field Officer disappeared while
the books was in Shri Tripathi's custody.
(8) The Gorakhpur Branch Manager was advised by him
that Gorakhpur Branch LBC No. 30 had been paid
on 20.3.1974 whereas it was actually paid on 2.4.1974
and that the Branch's LBCs No. 34, 35 and 36 had
.been paid on 9.4.1974, whereas these had not been
paid at all.
(9) Although a number of bills negotiated by Gorakhpur
Branch under the letter of credit had. been outstand·
ing no efforts were made by Shri Tripathi for
. recovering the Bank's dues.
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K.L. TRIPATHI v. STATE BANK (S. Mukharji, J.) 193
' (10) Telegrams from Gorakhur Brauch advising peoria
Branch of the negotiations done under the letter of
credit were received at the . Branch but were not
attended to although huge sums were involved.
(11) The letter of credit No. 20/2 was opened by him on
3.4.1974 irrespective of the· fact that a large sum of
money was already due from the drawees who were
unable to pay promptly.
(12) Five SCS, aggregating Rs. 2.5 laps received from
Goral\hpur Branch bearing their S. No. 774 to 778
·.for collection were paid on 11.4.1974 by debit to IBI
Account instead of the drawyee's account.
(13) The plea that since he (Shri Tripathi) was going out
for inspection on 11.4.1974 and so was in hurry,
;
he signed the S.C. payment advice of bills referred to D
in item No. 12, above in order to avoid inconvenience
to Shri Ramji Singh, FCI representative is not
supported by circumstantial evidence. I am satisfied ·
from the evidences available that he did not _go out
on an inspection at 10.15 ~.m. that he was in the
office till late afternoon· and that the inspection plea E
put up by him is an after thought.
"
(14) The bills received for collection from Gorakhpur
llranch were not entered ill Branch Books in the
normal manner on receipt but were detained and
entered at later dates suiting circumstances.
" I, therefore hold that Shri Tripathi was committed the
above irregularities wilfully, violating the established
practices and defying the Bank's instructions and had
done so With the motive of helping unauthorisedly M/s
Jamuna Prasad Munnilal Jaiswal who -were otherwise not
in a position to handle from their own resources, trans
actions involving a turnover of Rs. 27 lacs within the
limited period mentioned in the letters of credit."
Thereafter on this basis, on 19th June, 1975, the appellant was
issued a show cause notice. In the said show cause notice, the appel
lant was communicated of tin~~ ~harges, These chaq~es were"mai11ly
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194 SUl>R.EME COURT REPORTS (1984) 1 s.c.R.
based on the report of Shri Sharma as mentioned hereinbefore
First charge was furnishing of opinion report to the Fertilizer
Corporation oflndia in an unauthorised manner.· Second charge
was about the appellant's conduct in opening two- clean revolving
Letters of credit Nos. 20/l dated 21st March, 1974 and the other
' 20/2 dated 3rd April, 1974. The third ch~rge was aQout irregulari
ties in respect of the opening of Letters of Credit and payment of
bills negotiated thereunder:· Sufficient particulars of these charges
were mentioned and these appear.in the charge-sheet which ,;.e need
not set out in extensq. Tho appe!la.nt was charged as follows :-
"(a) had acted in a manner highly prejud.icial to the
Bank's interest;
(b) had exposed the Bank's interest to serious risk;
(c) had attempted to defraud the Bank which· act on.
your part casts serious aspersions on your integrity
and bonefipes; and
( d) had wilfully and knowingly furnished incorrect
particulars, concealed/withheld information/particu
lars to/from Gorakhpur Branch (negotiating Branch)/
controlling authority and flagrantly· violated Bank:'s
rules and instructions with a view to cover up your
attempts to misappropriate Bank's money and/or to
defraud the Bank.
It is thus evident that as the Branch' Manager you had failed'
miserably to safeguard the Bank's interest; on the contrary, you had
wilfully/knowingly.committed gross i.rregularities in the opening of
the aforesaid Letters ·or Credit ·.and payment of bills drawn there- ·
under and attempted to defraud the Bank. Your actions, which
have seriously jeopardised the Bank's interests and exposed· the
Bank to grave financial risks, cast grave doubts on. your integrity and
bonafides. It is, therefore, proposed to proceed against you in terms
of Rule 49 read with Rule 50 of the State Bank of India (Officers &
AssMants) Service Rules. You are, therefore, required to submit
to us your written statement in defence in terms of Rule 50 (2) ibid
in respect of the aforesaid charges within 15 days of the receipt
hereof; also, if you so desire, you may apply for a hearing . in P.erson
, with the undersigned. Please note that in the event of your failure
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K.L. TRIPA1Hl v. STATE BANK (S. Mukharji, J.) 195
to submit the reply within this period, it will be understood that you
have no.defence to offer."
In his reply dated 5th November, 1975, the appellant had dealt
with the different allegations mentioned in the charge-sheet. So far
as the first charge was ~oncerned regarding issuance of opinion
report fixing estimates arbitrarily and' giving over-estimates as ·
mentioned in the charge-sheet, the appellant admitted the facts but
stated that it was done out of. ignorance ·and he further stated 'this
was, however, done by me out of enthusiasm'.
Regarding Charge (ii), wliat he bad stated has been set out
hereinbefore.
8
It may be mentioned that regarding Charge number (ii), his
reply was that the words which ought to have been there 'accompa
nied by once used and unidentified plant lubricating oil in 200 litres
each drum' which were safeguard for cncashments pursuant to the
letters of credit, were important and significant. He accepted that
those words were not properly placed in the letters-of credit. As
would appear from the report o(Shri, Sharma that the appellant had
admitted that he had clianged the words "at a time" and had used
the words 'per day'. The appellant's defence was that be meant the
same thing. E
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In respect of these charges, he admitted the facts ·and used
expressions like these "I regret that due to inadvert_ence-'-was not
credited".
Another explanation was that be was awfully busy in inspection
of agricultural loans. Another charge was that he did not ensure
prompt payment of the bin on receipt. He admitted in his reply. that
this was so but stated that the Gorakbpur branch "created compli-
cations aml he was put to harassment". He admitted tliat the ' Cl
furnished in respect of charge (iii) (d) in the show cause notice,
incorrect particulars regarding payment of bills negotiated but stated
that he was rearetting these things.
Another explanation for these matters was that he had to leave
· office frequently and early during the day for inspection. . He
admitted in reply \Q ~)l~rge (iii) (e) that be used to receive covers and
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11)6 - SUPREME COURT REPORTS it984] l s.c.it.
. passed these on to Shri Srivastava. Iii respect ·of charge . (iii) (f)
Telegraphic advices from Gorakhpur branch for negotiatio~s of bills
his reply was that he had not attended to.these and amount was n~t
recovered. But his explanation was that it wa~ handled by the
branch accountant and it was not possible or necessary for him,
because of· bis · pre-occupation · to attend • to these telegrams
personally.,
In spite of making allegations against some officers, he did not
ask to cross-examine any of these officers .in respect of the matters
stated against· him. He merely asked for personal hearing. He
wanted an opportunity to expose the conspiracy. It may be stated,
however, that the appellant was given a personal hearing. Even in
respect of the matters of conspiracy, he did not ask any opportunity
to cross-examine the officials. The appellant did not ask for any
opportunity in the reply to lead evidence in support of his defence.
He admitted; however, in his reply that the facts he was stating had
already beeii expl~ined to Shri: Sharma during his preliminary
investigation.
Thereafter on !st May, 1976, the appellant received a letter
from the Chief General Manager intimating to him· that in accor·
dance with the independent investigation conduckd under Rule 50(1)
of the State B1nk of India (Officers & Assistants) Service Rules
cgoverning the appellant's service in the Bank, the statement of
charges served dated 19th June, 1975 and the ~pellant's reply
thereto dated 5th November, 1975 were submitted. to the Local
'Board at its meeting held on the 28th Apr~, 1976 and it was resolved
that the appellant be dismissed from the service in terms of. Rule
49 (f) of the aforesaid service rules. Thereafter the appellant by the
said rule was required to submit his written statement showing canse
why the penalty propo>ed should not be imposed upon the appellant.
The appellant was further informed that if no reply was received, the
State Bank of India's authority will presume that the appellant had
no submissions to make.: Along with the said letter, a copy of the
statement of charges and a copy of the report of the Investigating
Officer who inv0stigated, consisting of investigation in respect of each
of the allegations and the appellant's explanations to the allegations
during tlie time of the preliminary investigation a11d the facts and
.materials gathered during the preliminary investigation in which the
appellant participated as mentioned therein\!efore was sent.
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i{,L, Tii1i>Atu1 v. STATE BANK(S. Mukhar}i, J.) i97
The appellant on 18th June. 1976 submitted a 'reply. These
have been set out in pages 107 to 129 (of the Paper Book)
Annexure 4 to the affidavit of Shri K. P. Rau filed in these proceed·
ings. Apart from the detailed reply which bad already been
SU bmitted by the appellant, a reading of the explanation submitted
by the appellant made it clear according to the appellant that none
of the charges could be made the basis of any disciplinary action
specially action of dismissal. He referred to bis excellent record.
from 1967 to 1973 in which he staied that the entry· of appellant's
performance was 'excellent' in 1970; that he was an asset to the
institution. He further stated that even i(there was some technical
fault on account of certain interpretation of rules mentioned in the
report, the appellant had sought guidance of the Field Officer and
further submitted that on account of technical mistake where the
Bank has not suffered any monetary loss or any other type of loss
and in view pf his long service for more than 20 years during .which
the appellant's service as Officer Grade I was excellent, no action
could or should be taken against the appellant.
He further state.d that the facts and circumstances revealed that
the enquiry was in violation of the principles of natural justice and
he mentioned the statements against him were alleged to have been
recorded during the course of enquiry but while recording those
statements the appellant was never informed nor any statement was
taken in presence of the appellant. The statements were not signed
in his presence. Thereafter he made allegations of bias of certain
officers. The appellant ·further stated that so far as the report of the
enquiry officer regardfog the opinion report of the firm, Mf.s Jamuna ·
Prasad Jaiswal was concerned, the appellant had not committed any
breach of the rules as he had obtained permission on telephone from
the competent authority ai:id this fad was brought to the notice of
the enquiry officer during the investigation. He also mentioned that
the fact that trunk call was booked appears from the register. He
stated that he was not guilty of the charges. The m_ain grievance
was that the enquiry officer only took the statement of the appellant
and none of the statements on which reliance was placed was recor
ded in the presence of the appellant. The appellant prayed that the
penalty proposed may not be imposed.· His explanation along with
other necessary papers was forwarded to the Executive Committee of
th~ Central Board and the Central Board in its meeting dnly consi
dered the same and directed that the appellant be dismissed from the
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suPREME cooil!I: Rl!PoRrs (1984) i s.c.il. •.
Bank's service with immediate effect. The appellant was duly
communicated to the said effect on 19th October, 1976.
On 4th November, 1976, Writ application under Article 226
. was filed by the appellant in ·the Allahabad High Conrt alleging
contravention of the State Bank of India (Officers and Assistants)
Service Rules and on 2nd February, 1978, .the Allahabad High Court
1'y its judgment held that the rules had no statutory effect and· as
such, the writ application was dismissed. The appellant, being the
petitioner therein, has now come up by special leave to this Court
under Article 136 of .the Constitution. It appears that the main·
controversy before the Allahabad High Court was whether Rule 50
of the aforesaid rules in force at the relevant time has been complied
with or not. On behalf of the State Bank of India, it was urged that
the said rules not having been framed under the State Bank of India
Act, these had no statutory force and as such the appellant could not
enforce any statutory right. . In that light, the application under
Article 226 of the Constitution was held not to be maintainable.
. The points for consideration urged before us in this appeal were
mainly:-
(i) that in conducting the enquiry· resulting in the dis
missal of the appellant, the principles of natural
justice had been violated and the appellant ,was . not
given a fair opportunity to· defend himself;
(ii) whether Rule 50 of the said rules as prevalent prior.
·-ro-25.7.1970 had been complied with or not;.
(iii) whether the procedure 'envisaged under Rule 50
. contained requirement of due compliance with the
principles of natural justice.
In this connection it may be-mentioned that if the rules were
not statutory hut m6rely contract between the parties, one of the
points urged before us was that can a partf contract on a basis
different from the principles of natural justice? It may be mentio
ned further that the said rules came into effect from 1st January,
1958 and the appellant had signed the agreement in accordance with
rules on the 9th June, 1974.
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IU .. 1'R11'Ani1 v. STATE BANK(§. Mukharji, J.) 1~~
In dealing with the points in controyersy at this stage it may be
relevant to refer to the relevant rules. Rule 49 (f) which dealt with
the employee who committed any breach of the rules and regulations
'of the Bank, or displayed negligence, inefficiency or indolence or who
knowingly did anything detrimental to the interests of the Bank or in
conflict with its instructions or committed any breach of discipline or
was guilty of any other acts of misconduct would be liable for the
penalty of, inter alia, dismissal.
Sub-rule (1) of Rule 50 of the said rules mentioned abovt
postulates that the Managing Director, if he is satisfied that there
was a prima facie case for proceeding against an .employee,' ·may
investigate the'case himself or appoint any other investigating officer
and submit an independent report in writing. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 50
envisages that- brief statement of the charges together with the
grounds on which the charges are based should. be communicated in
writing to the employee. The employee should be required to submit
a written statement in defence and given an opportunity t.o be heard
in person if desired by hioi, and ~e shall also be given facilities for
access to the records of the Bank for the purpose of preparing his
written statement. The Managing Director for the· reasons .to be
recorded in writing; may refuse such access if in his opinion such.
records were not strictly relevant or .it was not desirable iti'the
interests of the Bank to allow such access,
Thereaftenub-rule (3) envisages that the report of the officer
who investigated the case together with the employee's statement and
a further report in writing by the Managing Director or the Secretary
and Treasurer, indicating the charge or charges against the employees
shall be laid for consideration, in the case of ail employee serving in ·.
or under 'Central Office, before the Executive Committee and in the
case of an employee serving in a Circle, before the Local Board. The
Executive Committee or the ·Local Board as the case may. be shall
make such order as they consider in the circumstance fit and proper
but if they consider it fit for imposing a penalty mentioned in clause
(e) or clause (f) of rule 49, the employee· shall be given a further
opportµnity to state iri writing by a specified date why such penalty
shall not be imposed. "For this purpose the charge or charges
against him together with a copy of the report of the officer who _
investigated the case and specific penalty proposed to be imposed
shall be communicated to him by the Mrnagiitg Director or the
Secretary and Treasurer, as the case may be". If the.employee gives
SUPREME COURf REPORTS
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[1984] l s.c.R..
a reply, that reply will be taken into consideration and the Executive
Committee will conv~y its decision in writing to the employee con,·
cerned. This rule, it may be mentioned, ha§ been altered with effect
from 25th July, 1975. We are, however, not conce~ned with the said
amended rule. · ·
The main argument of Mr. Garg, counsel for the appellant,
was that the requirements of Rule 50 of the aforesaid rules have not
been complied with. He submitt~d that the materials against the
appellant were gathered in his absence and he was not allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses, and that evidence against him was not
recorded in his presence. He urged that only an opportunity to
show cause, after he had replied the charges against him· which were
based on materials gathered behind him for imposition of penalty,
~as given. He submitted that reasonable ·opportunity under the
rules required that materials against a person should not be gathered
behind his back and he shquld be giveµ an opportunity to cross
examine, if necessary, the persons who had supplied the materials
or given evidence against him. He further submitted that the
delinquent officer should also be gi.ven an opportunity to rebut such
evidence. Mr. Garg submitted that infraction of this procedure
under the rule; will 1mke the investigation bad as basic fundamental
requirement of an opportunity was implied in the rule. The impug
ned order should be struck down as having been passed in violation
of the principles of natural justice.
We are of the opinion that Mr. Garg is right that the rules of
natural justice as we have set out hereinbefqre implie_d an opportunity
to the delinquent officer to give evidence in respect of the charges or
to deny the charges against him. Secondly, he submitted that even
if the rules had no statutory force and even if the party had bound
himself by the contract, as he bad accepted the Staff Rule, there
cannot be any contract with a Statutory Corporation which is .viola
tive of the principles of natural justice in matters of domestic enquiry
involving termination of service of an employee. We are in agree
ment with the basic submi.ssion of Mr. Garg in this respect, but we
find that the relevant rules which we have set out hereinbefore have
been complied with even if the rules are read that requirements of
natural justice were implied in the said rules or even if such basic
principles of natural justice were implied, there has been no violation
of the principles of natural justice in respect of the order passed in
this case. In respect of an order involving adverse or' penal conse
quences against an officer or an employee of Statutory Corporations
;
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, I
I
iU: .. rk1PAtli1 v. siATE BANK (s. Mukhar)i, J.) 201
like the State Bank of India, there must be an investigation into· the
'charges consistent with the r~quirements of the situation in accor-.
dance with the· principles of natural justice as far as these were.
applicable to a particular situation. So whether a particular principle
of natural justice has been violated or not has to be judged in the
background of the nature of charges, the nature of· the investigation
conducted in the background of any statutory or relevant rules
governing such enquiries. Here the mfraction of the natural justice
complained of was that he was not given an opportunity to rebut the
materials gathered in his absence. As has been observed in "On
Justice" by J. R. Lucas, the principles of natural'justice basically, if
we may say so, emanate from the actual p)lrase "audi altel'am
partem" which was first formulated by St. Augustine (De Duabus
Animabus, XIV, 22, J. P. Migne, PL. 42, I IO).
In dealing with particular situation 'we must formulate the ,
actual p~in~lples to be applied in a particular situation. · Hence it
inay be illustrated as J. R. Lucas -"On Justice" (page 86) has done D
it, thus:-
"Hence when we, are judging deeds, and· may find
that a man did wrong there is a requirement of logic
that we should allow the putative agent to correct mis
interpretations or disavow the intention imputed to him
or otherwise, disown the 'action. God needed to ask
Adam 'Hast thou eate~ of the tree whereof I commandep'
thee that thou shouldest not eat ?' because it was essential
that Adam should not be blamed or punished unless he
had .done exactly that deed. If the serpent had P.lanted
the evidence, or if he had beguiled Adam into eating it
under the misapprehension that it came from another,
non-forbidden tree, then Adam had not sinned and
should not have been expelled from Eden. Only if the
accused admits the chlrge, or, faced with the accusation,
cannot explain his ·behaviour convincingly in any other
way, are we logically entitled to conclude that he did
indeed do it." •
Wade 'On Administrative Law', 5th Edition at pages 472-475 8 r
has observed that it is not' possible to lay down rigid rules as to
when the principles of natural justice are to apply : nor as to their
scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject•matter, the;
. -SUPREME COtf)lT REPORTS [1984)1 s.c:R
, application of principles of natural justice, resting as it does upon .
. statutory implication, must always be in conformity with the scheme
of'the Act and with the · subject-matter of the case. In the · appli
cation of the concept of fair play thrre must be real flexibility.
There must. also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; ·
there is no such thing as a merely technical ·infringement of natural
justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the
facts and the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the ·
rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt
with, and so forth.
The basic concept is fair play in action administrative, judicial
or quasi-judicial. The concept fair play in action must depend upon
the particular !is, if there be, any, between the parties. If the credi
bility of a pers"on who has testified or given some information is in
dou.bt, or if the version or the statement of .the person who has
testified, is, in dispute, right of cross-examination inust inevitably
form part of fair play in action but· where there is no !is regarding
the facts but certain explanation of the circumstances there is no
requirement of cross-examination to be fulfilled to justify fair play in
action. When on the question of facts there was no dispute, no real
prejudice has been caused to a party aggrieved by an order, by
absence of any formal opportunity of cross-examination per se does
not invalidate or vitiate the decision arrived at fairly. This is more
so when the party '!gainst whom an order has been . passed does not
dispute the facts and does not demand to test the veracity of the
, • version or the credibility of the statement. - '
The party who.does not want to controvert the veracity of the
evidence from or testimony gathered behind his back cannot expecl'
to succeed in any subsequent demand that there was no opportunity
of cross-examination specially when· it was not asked for and there
was no,dispute about the veracity of the statements. Where there is
no dispute as to the facts, or the weight to be attached ou disputed
facts but only an explanation of 'the acts, absence of opportunity to
cross-examination does not create any prejudice in such cases ..
The principles of natural justice will, therefore, depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each particular case. We have set out
hereinbefore the actual facts and circumstances of the case. The
appellant was associated with the preliminary investigation that was
conducted against him. He does not deny or dispute that. Infor
mation and materials undoubtedly were gathered not in his· presence .
-
' ' I
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ict. TiUPATiii v. STATE BANK (S. Mukharji, J.) 2o~
but whatever information was there and gathered namely, the
versions. of the persons, the particular entries which required
examination were shown to him. He was conveyed the informations _
given and his explanation _was a;ked for. He participated in that
investigation. He gave his explanation but he did not dispute any
of the facts nor aid he ask for any opportu~ity to call any evidence
to rebut these facts. · He did ask for a personal hearing, as we have
mentioned herein before and he was_ given such opportunity or perso
nal hearing His explanati0ns were duly recorded. He does not
allege· that his version has been improperly recorded nor did he
, question the veracity of the witnesses or the entries or the letters or
doc)!ments shown ·to him upon which the charges were framed 11nd
npon which he was found gui)ty: Indeed it may be mentioned that
he was really consulted at every stage oi preliminary investigation
' ' upon which the charges wer.e based and upon which proposed action
against him has been taken, In that view of the matter, we are of
the opinion. that it cannot be said that in conducting the enquiry or
framing of the charges or arriving at the decision, the authorities
concerned have acted in violation of the principles of natural j~stice
merely because the evidence was not recorded in his presence or that
the materials, the gist of which was communicated to him, were not
gathered in his presence. As we have set out hereinbefore, indeed he
had accepted the factual.- basis of the allegations. We have set out
hereinbefore in extenso the portions where he had actually admitted
the factual basis of-these allegations against him, where he has not
· questioned the veracity of the witness of the facts or credibility of the
witnesses or credibility of the entries on records. Indeed he has
given explanation namely, he was over-worked, he had consulted bis
-superiors and sought their guidance, his conduct bas not actually,
according to him caused any financial risk or damage to the· Bank
concerned. Therefore, in our opinion, in the manner in which the
investigation was carried out as a result of which action has been
taken against him cannot be-ctmdemned as bad bei~g in violation of
the principles of natu_ral justice. Had he, ho;.,,ever, denied any of
the facts or had questioned (he credibility of the persons who had
given information against him, then different considerations would
have applied and in those circumstances; refusal to give an oppor
tunity to cross-examine the persons giving information against _him
or to lead evidence on his own part to rebut the facts whould have
been necessary ond denial of such opportunity would have been
fatal. But such is not the case here as we have mentioned
hereinbefore.
A-
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ' [I 984).i s.c.R..
Our attention was drawn to the new rules called 'State Bank
of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules' which were first intro·
duced on 25th July, 1975 and thereafter from time to time amended
which laid down detailed procedure. for gathering the information
'and procedure for recording of ihe evidence etc. We are, however,
not concern~d with those rules as at relevant time when the enquiry
was conducted, these rules were not in force.
We may also mention that tire appellant' has contended that
there is no evidence that the appellant has actually defrauded the
Bank or actual loss or damage has been caused to the Bank or actual
risk has been incurred by the Bank. That is true. Bui the charge
against the appellant was that he had so conducted himself which
exposed the Bank to grave risk and for which his explanation was
not accepted, after considering his explanation and after personal
hearing reasonably an opinion niay be formed that his conduct was
such that defrauding of the Bank might have been caused. These
were the charges against .him and these are the charges upon which
he was accused. Therefore, whether actual loss or damage had been
,ca11sed or not, is, in our. opinion, immaterial. ·In that view of the
matter, we are of the opinion that the arguments on this aspect of
the matter on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted. In that
view of the matter, it is not necessary to express any opinion on the
question whether these rules under which the enquiry was conducted
· were statutory rules or not ·and as such whether the appellant has any
statutory remedy against the orders impugned.
Reliance was placed in support of his argument by Mr. Garg
on a decision of this Court in the case of Phu/bari Tea Estate v. Its
Workmen,(') where it would appear from the facts set out at page
1113 of the report that the delinquent had.no opportunity 1of asking
questions t.o the witnesses after knowing what they had said. ag~inst
. him. In this case as we have mentioned hereinbefore, the appellant
was communicated the gist of what had been gathered in bis absence
and even then he did not deny these informations nor did he ask any
opportunity~ to cross-examine the witnesses either regardin,g the
veracity of the-material that was gathered against him or on the
credibility of the persons who had given evidence.
,
(I) A.J.R, 1959 S.C. llll.
> ( .
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K.L. TRIPATH! v. STATE BANK (S. Mukharji, J.) 20s
Reliance was also placed on the observations in the decision, of
this Court in Khem Chand v. The Union of India and others.(1) That
however, was a case dealing with the requirements under Article
311 (2) of the Constitution.
In that decision, the Court was concerned with the expression
'reasonable opportunity of showing cause under Article 311(2) of the
Constiiution'. The facts of that case were entirely. different from the
facts of the instant case. However, Das C.J., dealing with opportunity
to show cause explained at pages 1096-97 of the report the position
under the said Article as follows :-
· "If the opportunity to show cause is to be a
reasonable one it [is clear that he should be informed
about the charge or charges levelled against him and the
evidence by which it is sought to be established, for it is
only then that he will be able to put forward his defence.
If the purpose of this provision is to give the government
servant an opportunity to exonerate himself from the
charge and if this opportunity is to be a reasonable one
he should be allowed to show that the evidence against
him is not worthy of credence or consideration and that
he can only do if he is given a chance to . cross-examine
the witnesses called against him and to examine himself
or any other witness in support of his defence. All this
appears to us to be implicit. in the language used in the
clause, but this does not exhaust his rights. In addition
to showing that he bas not been guilty of any misconduct
so as to merit any punishment, it is reasonable that he
should also have an opportunity to contend that the
charges proved against him do not necessary . require the
particular punishment proposed to be meted out to him.
He may say, for instance, that although he has been
guilty of some misconduct it is not of such a character as
to merit the extreme punishment of dismissal or even of
removal or reduction in rank and that any of the lesser
punishments ought to be sufficient in his case.
To summarise : the
envisaged by the provision
includes .:..._
(I) (1958) S.C .. R 1080.
reasonable
under
opportunity
consideration
206
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1984) I S.C.R.
(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and .establish his
innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the
charges levelled against him are and the allegations on
which such charges are based;
(b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining
the witnesses produced against him and by exa111ining _
himself or any other witnesses in support of his
defence; and finally
r ..._
(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why
the proposed punishment s]Jould not be inflicted on
him, which -he can only do if the comp~tent~~thority,
after the enquiry is over and after applying his mind ·
to th~ gravity or otherwise of the charges proved
against the government servant tentatively proposes
to inflict one of the thr~e punishments and
commun!cates the same to the government servant."
· In substance, in the facts and circumstances of this cases, the
provision of the rules under which the _enquiry was conducted, the
procedure mentioned above has been rollowed. Here also the
appellant was allowed to show that the evidence against him was
i!Ot worthy of credence or consideration. The evidence was discussed.
His explanatfon was sought for and recorded. -The materials and
other records were shown tci him. He did.noi ask for any chance
to cross-examine the witness or to examine, himself or any other ~
witness in support of his defence. , Indeed, as we have noted before,
he admitted the facts. · He was also given in addition ·an. opportunity
of .itowing that he has not befo guilty· of any such misconduct as
to merit the particular 'punishment proposed to be nieted out to
him. This opp9rtunity was given. He f gave ·his explanation and
that was considered .. He asked for a personal hearing which, we
ha~e noted in this case, was duly given to him. We are, therefore,
of the opinion that the aforesaid passage relied on behalf of .the
appellant would not be of any assistance to the appellant in this case.
It is true that all actions against a party which involve penal
or adverse consequences must be in accordance with the principles of
natural justice but whether any particular principle of natural justice
would be applicable to a particular situation or the question whether
there !las l:>een any infn1ction of the application of that principle, has
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K.L. TRIPATHJ v. STATE BANK (S. Mukhar/i, J.) - - 207
to be judged, in the light of facts and circumstances of each parti·
cular case. The basic requirement is t)l.at there must be fair play
in action and the decision must be arrived at in a just and objective
manner with regard to the relevance of the materials and reasons.
We must reiterate again that the rules of nat~ral justice are flexible
and cannot be-put on any rigid-formula, In order tcr sustain a
· complaint of violation of principles of natural justice on the ground
of absence of opp_ortunity of cross·examination, it has to be
established that prejudice has been caused to the appellant by the
procedure followed. See in this connection the observations of this
Court in the case of Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa.(1)
Hidayatullah, CJ., observed there at page 394 of the report "there
is no doubt that if the principles of natural justice are violated and
there is a gross case this Court would interfere by striking down the
order of dismissal; but there. are cases and cases. We have to 1001'
to what . actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the
supposed d;nial to him of a particular right." J~dged by this
principle, in the background of the facts and circumstances mentioned
before, we are of the opinion that there has ·been no real prejudice
caused by infraction of any particular rule of natural justice of which
appellant before us complained in ·this case. See .in this ·connection
observations of this Court in the case of Union of. India & Anr. v.
P.K. Roy & Ors.(2) where this Court reiterated that "the doctrine of
natural justic cannot be imprisone<) within the strait-jacket of a
rigid formula .and its application depends upon the nature of the
jurisdiction. conferred on the administrative authority, upon the
character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy
of the statute and other relevant circumstances disolosed in a paiti·
cnlar case". See also· in this connection .the observations of
Hidayatull~h,_C.J., in the case of Channabasappa Basappa Happa/i v.
State of Mysore.(8) In our opinion, in the background of facts and
circumstances-of this case, the nature of inve.tigation conducted in
which the appellant was associated, there has been no infraction of
that principle. In the premises, for the reasons aforesaid, . there hiis
been in the facts and circumstances of the case, no infraction of any
principle of natural justice by the absence of a formal opportunity of
cross-examination Neither ·cross-examination nor the opportunity
to lead evidence by the delinquent is an integral part of all quasi
judicial adjudications.
oi [1969J 3 s .. c.c. 392.
(2) !1968] 2 S.C.R. 186.
(3) [19711 2 s.c.R. 64s.
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208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (198411 s.c.I!.
Another aspect of the violation of the principles of natural
justice that was urged before us on behalf of the appellant was that
the final order did ·not contain reasons. In this connection reliance
was placed on the observations of this Court in the case of Siemens
Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India v. Union of India & Anr.(1)
where this Court observed that if courts of of law were to be replaced
by administrative authorities and tribunals were essential then
administrative authorities and tribunals should afford fair and proper
hearing to the persons sought to be affected by the orders and
give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders
made by them. The Court, further, observed, that the rule requirin&
reasons to be given in support of an order is. like the prin.ciple of
audi alteram par1em, a basic principle of natural justice which must
inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed
in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would
not satisfy the requirement of law.
It may be mentioned that the facts in that case were . different.
In the instant case though reasons have not been e~pressly stated,
these reasons were implicit namely~ the nature of the charges, the
explanation offered and the reply of the appellant to the show cause
notice. These appear from a fair reading of the order impugned in
this case. It, further, appears that there was consideration of those
facts and the decision was arrived at after consideration of those .
reasons. It is manifest, therefore, that absence of any denial by the
appellant·, indeed admissions of the factual basis and nature of the
explanation offered by the appellant were considered by the authority
to mer.it the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. Such a conclu-
. sion could not, in ·the facts and circum~tances of the case, be consi
dered to be unreasonable or one· which no reasonable man could
make.
•r··,
Counsel relied on the observations of this Court in the case of
Union of India v. H. C. Goel(') at pages 723-726 of the report. These
observations were made again in the context of jurisdiction of the
'High Court to interfere with the orders passed under Article 311 (2) '
read along with Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules. Ihe Court rejected the plea made in that case ·that even if
the enquiry officer made findings against the public servant, the
(1) [1976] Supp. S.C.R. 489.
(2) [1964J 4 s.c.R. ns.
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K.L. TRIPATHI v. STATE BANK (S. Mukharji, J.) 209
Government could never re-examine the matter so that even if the
G9vernment was satis(ied that. the findings against the public. servant A
were erroneous, the Government must proceed on the basis. that the
public servant was guilty and impose some punishment on him. That
is not the position here. In this case, there is no evidence that the
disciplinary authority was not satisfied with the findings arrived at in ·
the investigation This case, therefore, is of no assistance in deciding B
the controversy before us.
Another decision of this Court was relied on by counsel for the
appellant, namely, the decision in the 'case of The Barium Chemicals
Ltd. and Anr. v. The Company Law Board and Others('). That case
arose under proceedings in respect of an order passed by the C
Company Law Board under Section 237 (b) of the Companies Act
appointing four inspectors to investigate the affairs of the appel)ant
company, on the ground that the Board was of the opinion that.
there were circumstances suggesting that the business of the appellant
company was being conducted with intent to defraud its creditors, D
members or any other persons and that the p-ersons concerned irl the
management of the affairs of the company having· connection there·
with were guilty of fraud, misfeasence and other misconduct towards
the company and ite members. Bachawat, J., at page 342 of the
report was of the opinion that in view of the circumstances disclosed
therein, without more, could not reasonably suggest that the business E
of the company was being conducted to defraud the creditors,
members and other persons or that the management was guilty of
fraud towards the company and its members. From the observa-
tions of Shela! J. in that decision, it appears that he was also inclined
to take.the same view. The facts Of the instant. .case are, however,
different. It has to·· he emphasised that the appellant was not F
charged for defrauding the Bank. He was charg~d m'ainly for the
conduct which suggested that he acted improperly and in violation of
the principles on wh,ich sound banking business should be conducted.
The charge against the appellant was that he had acted in violation
of procedure of the Bank, he had disregarded all safeguards in
sanctioning the ov~rdrafts, encashin~ bills and his conduct had
exposed the bank to grave rish and that he had flagrautly violated
the bank. rules and inst~uctions with a view to cover up attempts to ·
misappropriate bank's money after defrauding the bank. Whether
actual misap
1
propr'.ation had been caused or bank defrauded or n9t H
were not re evant ID respect of th~ char&•• a\lainst him . .
(!) (1965] Supp~ S,<; .. ~. ni.
.B
llO SUPREMB COURT REPORTS (1984) 1 s.c.ll..
For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal fails, but for reasons
. different from those given by the High Court, and is accordingly
dismissed but without any order as to costs.
We must, however, observe in conclusion that having regard to
· the record of the service of the appellant prior to the conduct
. revealed in this case and further in view of the fact that actually no
loss has been occasioned to the Bank by the improper. conduct of the·
appellant, if the Bank considers in the interest of justice that the
appellant should be given some job or employment in some capacity
which might mitigate or compensate in some measure the grave loss
suffered by the appellant consequent on the dismissal order, the Bank
· 'might cm1sider taking such a course of action.
, H.S.K. Appeal dismissed.
·,
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