Narcinva v. Kamat and Anr. Etc. v. Alfredo Antonio Doe Martins and Ors.
.__ '°' .DESAI, J. A monopoly successfully avoided its legally in-
~curred liabiliiy on the wholly untenable ground. That is the
scenario in these appeals. Oriental Fire and General Insurance
Company Ltd., a nationalised company having the monopoly of
general insurance is the Fifth Respondent in the first appeal and
the second respondent in the second appeal. ,It would be refer·
red to and 'insurance company' hereinafter.
An accident occurred on Praca de Jorge Barrete Road,
Margao on May 17, 1976 around 10.30 A.M. in which one Sita
Gomes and her sister-in-law Ida Menezes were injured. Ida
succumbed to her injuries and Sita Gomes recovered. The offen
ding vehicle was a pick-up van belonging to M/s. Narcinva V.
Kamat, a firm carrying on 'business at Mar.gao, Goa. The vehicle
was insured with the insurance company. Two petitions claiming .
compensation came to be filed ; one by the heirs of Ida and the
other. by· Sita. The 'Motor Acc.ident Claims Tribunal (Tribunal
for short) held that the driver of the van was responsible for
the accident as the van was being driven at the relevant time,
rashly ·and negligently. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 75,000 as
compensation to the heirs of Ida and Rs. 3,000 to Sita.
In the proceedings before the Tribunal, the Insurance Com
pany, appeared and contended that according to the terms of the
contract of insurance as evidenced by the policy of insurance,
the vehicle can be driven either by a driver in the employment of
the insured or with the pen11ission of the insured by one who holds
a valid driving licence. In respect of this contention the Tribu
nal' , framed issue Nos. 7 and 8 in both the petitions in the fol
lowint: terms.:
G'
ff
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 985] 3 S.C.R·
A "7. Whether the respondent No. 6 (insurance com-
B.
D.
pany) proves that there is no liability on them as the
respondent No. 2 Narcinva Kamat who was driving the
vehicle involved in the accident was not holding any effec
tive driving licence ?
8. Whether the respondent No. 6 proves that under
the provisions of Sec. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act and
the policy in force their liability in any event is limited
to the extent of Rs. 50,000 in all both in respect of this
Claim Petition as well as other Claim Petition filed in
the same Tribunal on account of the same accident being
Claim Petition Nos. 22-23/76 filed in the Trib'unal on
account of the same accident."
The Tribunal answered both the issues in favour of the
insurance company observing that at the time of the accident the
vehicle was being .driven by appellant No. 2, the partner of the
firm, which was the owner of the vehicle and as the driver did not
produce his driving licence, it must be held that the driver did
not have a valid driving licence. The Tribunal therefore, con
cluded that in the absence of a valid driving licence, there was a
breach of the contract of insurance and the insurance company
was absolved from the liability undor the policy of insurance.
The firm and its partner proforred two appeals before the
Panaji Bench (Goa) of the High Court of Bombay. A Division
Bench of the High Court agreed with the findings of the Ttibu
nal and dismissed the appeals. Hence these appeals by special
F leave.
11.
The scope of the appeals is very limited. The appeals are
by the firm, owner of the vehicle which was involved in the acci
dent and one of its partner who it was alleged was shown to be
driving the vehicle at the time of the accident and while granting
leave it was limited to the question : whether both the Tribunal
and the High Court were justified in holding that the insurance
company was not liable to satisfy the award under the contracts of
insurance.
The undisputedJacts are that the pick-up van-motor vehicle
bearing No. GDT-9510 belong' to: the first appellant-firm, and
I
N.v. KAMAT v. ;\, A. D. MARTINS (Desai, J.) 9)5
the second appellant is the partner of the firm. This vehicle
was involved in an accident that occurred on May 17, 1976 at
around 10.30 a.m. There is a concurrent finding that the vehicle
was driven rashly and negligently by the partner who was then
driving the vehicle and that in this accident, Sita and Ida suffered
injuries. Ida's . injuries proved fatal. The amount of the com·
pensation awarded in both the petitions is no more open to dis
pute. The question is whether the insurance company under the
contract of insurance is liable to satisfy the award ~
Before the Tribunal and the High Court, it was. contended
on behalf of the appellants that at the relevant time, it was not
appellent No. 2 but one Pandu Lotlikar, who was respondent No.
4 before the Tribunal was driving the vehicle. It has been con
currently found that it was appellant No. 2 who was driving the
vehicle. The concurrent finding must be accepted as correct.
Appellant No. 2 is none other than the partner of the first
appellant-firm which.is the owner of the vehicle. The High Court
has extracted a term in the schedule of the policy of insurance
pertaining to the pick-up van which may be reproduced from the
judgment of the High Court.
"Driver : Any of the following :
(a) (deleted in type)
(b) any other person provided he is in the Insnred's
employ. and is. driving on his order or with his per
mission.
Provided that the person driving holds a licence to
drive the Motor Vehicle or has held and is not disqualified
for holding or obtaining such a licence."
·we have reproduced this term from the judgment of the
High Conrt because the learned counsel for the insurance com
pany did not have a copy of the policy of the insurance nor
the one was shown from the record. Of course, the Tribunal re
cords that the vehicle was· insured as a private carrier aild this was
culled out from the claim form submitted on October 14, 1976.
It is produced at Ext. 37. One Jaimo Albert was examined on
956 SUPRB!IE COUkT RBPORTS [I 985) 3 s.C.lt.
A behalf of the insurance company. He was shown Ext. 29 which
was identified as a copy of the policy of insu·rance issued by the
insurance company in favour of the first appellant. He admitted
tliat it was a comprehensive policy meaning thereby 'that the
in~~rance company would be liable .to satisfy the claim of damage
ar1smg out of the use of the vehicle. He does not speak ofany
B other term of the contract of insurance.
Now would the insurance compnay be discharged from the
liability under the contract of insurance if as contened by it, at
the relevant time, appellant No. 2 was driving the vehicle. Appel
lant No. 2 is the partners of the firm. All the partners of the firm
C if they have a valid driving licence would be entitled to drive
the vehicle. Each partner of the firm is an agent of the firm as
well as the other partner as provided by Sec. 18 of the Partnership
Act. Every partner is entitled to attend diligently to his duties in
the conduct of the business as provided in Sec. 12 of the Partnership
D Act. Sec. 26 provides that 'where by the wrongful act or omission
of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of a firm,
or with the authority of his partners, loss or injury is caused to any
third party, or any penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefor
to the same extent as the partner.
E A conspectus of these provisions shall show that where tl;e
pick' UP van belonging to the firm is being driven by a partner, it
can be said that it is done with the permission of the owner namely,
the firm or with its implied authority.
The next question is whether the partner had a valid driving
F licence· at the relevant time. Unfortunat\y, while dealing with
this aspect of the case, both the Tribunal and the High Court
fell into an error which resulted in giving a clean chit to the insu-
rance company. It is admitted. that this pick-up van could be !
used as a private carrier. It is also admitted that the insurance
company had issued a comprehensive insurance policy in respect
G of this vau and at the reievant time it was in force. '
It is contended on behalf. of the insurance company thil1
the second appellant did not have a valid driving licence. It is
the insurance company which complains that there has been a
breach of one of the important terms of the contract of insurance
H as evidenced by tl1e policy of insurance (the whole of which was
'
l.
N.V. KAMAT v. A. AD. MARTINS (Desai, J.) 951
not shown to us) and that the second appellent who was shown
to be driving the vehicle at the relevant time, did not have a
:valid driving licence to drive the pick-up van. The insurance
company complains of breach of a term of contract which would
permit it to disown Its liability under the contract of insurance.
If a breach of a term of contract permits a party to the contract
to not to perform the contract, the burden is squarely ou that
party which c~mplains of breach to prove that the breach has been
committed by the other party t.o the contract. Thel test in such a
situation would be who would fail if no evidence is led. The
language and the format in which issues Nos. 7 and 8 have been
cast by the Tribunal clearly casts the burden of proof ont he insu
rance company. Not an iota of evedence has been led by the
insura·nce company to show that the second appellant did not have
a valid driving licence to drive the vehicle. Mr. J. Sharma,
learned counsel who appeared for the appellant urged that a ques
tion was asked in the cross-examination o( the ,second appellant
whether he would produce his driving iicence, and that as he
failed to produce the same an adverse inference must be drawn
against him that he did not have a valid driving licence. The
High Court has recorded a finding in this behalf which may first
be extracted in its own words:
"Mr. Cardoso 's contention proceeds on a misreading
of clause (b) indented above, which brings to the fore
front that the person driving the vehicle must be 'in the
insurer's employ' and further, being in such employment
was driving the vehicle on the order of the insurer or with
his permission. In this case, the very first premise is
missing for the simple reason it is not even the second
appellant's case that he was every in the employment of
the first appellant firm but was at all material times a
partner thereof. Even if the first appellant held a valid
driving licence, clause (b) would not absolve him from
liability for payment, if the van had been driven by him
at the relevant time."
The High Court took no notice of the fact that the van
belonged to the firm and every partner for that reason would be
the owner of the property of the firm because tlie firm is not a·
legal entity in the sense in which the company under the Com- H
.G
958 SUPREME COURT RBPOUTS (1985] 3 S.C.R.
panies Act has a juristic personality. Firm is a compendious
name for the partners. And the High Court limited its enquiry
to ascertain whether the first part of the condition is satisfied viz.
whether the driver was in the employ of the insurer. It com
pletely overlooked the second clause th?t the driver appellant
No. 2 was driving with the permission of the insured, the firm
in this case. Two clauses ·are disjointed by a dlsjuntive 'or'. On
a proper analysis and interpretation of the term of contract of
insurance, the insurance company cannot escape the liabi\ity if
(a) the insured himself was driving the vehicle or (b) the driver is
in the employment of the insurer and is driving on the order of
the insurer or (c) he is driving with his permission. The words with
his permission does not qualify the expression 'is in the insurer's
·employ'.· The clause can be properly read thus : 'any other person
with insurer's permission.' This ought to be so because a friend
can alwyas be permitted if he has a valid driving licence to drive a
friend's car. If in every such situation where the person driving
the vehicle is not shown to be the insurer himself or someone
in his employment, the contract of insurance would afford no pro
tection and the insurance compauy having collected the premium
would wriggle out of a loophole. Therefore the proper construc
tion of this condition. must be to read it as stated hereinbefor.e.
Approaching the matter from this angle, if appellant No. 2
was driving the vehicle belonging to the firm, it can be said to be
by the i.nsurer itself or with its permission.
The last question is whether he had a valid driving licence.
The High Court has not recorded a clear cut finding on this point.
The finding of the Tribunal is more evasive then the one by the
High Court. Mr. Sharma did not dispute that the second
appellant had driving licence. His grievance is that he having
failed to produce the same when called upon to do so in the cross
examination, an adverse inference be drawn against him that he
did not have a valid licence to drive a pick-up van. The submis
sion fails to carry conviction with us. The burden to prove that
there was breach of the contract of insurance was squarely placed
on the shoulders of the insurance company. It could not be said
to have been discharged by it by a mere question in cross-exami
nation. The second appellant was under no obligation to furnish
evidence so as to enable the insurancf: company to riggle out its
li.v. KAMAT v. A. A. I), MARTINS (Desai, j,) '9$9
liability under the contract of insurance. Further the R.T.A
which issues the driving licence keeps .a record of the licences
issued and renewed by it. The insurance company could have
got the evidence produced to substantiate his allegation. Apply
ing the test who would fail if no evidence is led, the obvious ans
wer the insurance company.
To sum up the insurance company failed to prove that there
was a breach of the term of the contract of insurance as evidenced
by the policy of insurance on the ground that the driver who was
driving the vehicle at the relevant time did not have a valid dri
ving licence. Once the insurance company failed to prove that
aspect, its .liability under the contract of insurance remains in
tact and unhampered and jt was bound to satisfy the award
under the comprehensive policy ·of insurance.
Accordingly, both these appeals must succeed and are partly
allowed. The award of the Tribunal as well as the judgment of
the High Court are modified directing the Oriental Fire and
General Insurance Co. Ltd. to satisfy the award with interest at
12 per cent from the date of the accident •ill payment, and full
costs in favour of the original claimants. The full payment to
satisfy the award shall be made within a perid of two moths from
today.
A.P.J. A ppea/s allowed.