Pandurang & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra

THAKKAR, J. 'Right', or 'wrong', 'guilty' or 'not guilty', is not the question. Whether the learned Single Judge had the. 'right' to hear and decide the appeal and hold that the appellants were guility whilst seUing aside their acquittal by the Judgment under appeal' is the ques­ tion which has surfaced in the context of a judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge which according to the relevant rules of the High Court was required to be heard and decided by a Division Bench. · The State of Maharashtra (respondent herein) preferred an ap­ peal to the High Court of Bombay in order to challenge the order of acquittal rendered by the lower Court in favour of the present appel­ lants. The acquittal was in respect of an offence under Section 7(1) read with Sections 16 and 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration 1. Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1983 decided by the High Court of Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) on J~e 13, 1986 resulting in the present appeal by special leave. H. 1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS l198tj] 3 S.C.R. . Act 1954. The offence was punishable with a sentence of imprisonment exceeding two years.' The appeal was, therefore, required to be heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and not by a learned Single Judge. · Such is the problem that has arisen in the context of Rule 1 read with Rule 2-II( e) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960.3 What then is the consequence? Is the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Single Judge who allowed the appeal merely irregular er void? When a matter required to be decided by a Division Bench of the High Court is decided by a learned Single Judge, the judgment would be a nullity, the matter having been heard by a Court which had no competence \o hear the matter, it being a matter of total lack of juris- 2. Sec. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: 16. PENALTIES: "Subject to the provisions ......... he shall, in addition to the penalty to which he may be liable under the provisions of Section 6, be punish­ able with imprisonment for a tenn which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years, and with fine which shall not be less than ane thousand rupees:... " :;. Rule I: "The Civil and Criminal jurisdiction of ·the Court, on the Appellate Side, shall, except in cases where it is otherwise provided for by these rules, be exercised by Division Bench consisting of two or more Judges.'' Ruic 2 ll(e): "'Save as otherwise expressly provided by these 2 rule~. a Single Judge may dispose of the following matters: II "Appeals against convictions in which only a sentence of fine has been awarded or in which the sentence of imprisonment awarded does not exceed five years with or without fine, appea1s against acquittals wherein the.offence with which ihe accused was charged is one punish­ able on conviction with a sentence of fine only or with a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding two years or with such imprisonment and fine, and appeals under Section 377 of the Code of Criminal Proce­ dure, revision applications and Court notices for enhancement of sent­ ence for offences punishable on conviction with sentence of imprison­ ment not exceeding two years or with such imprisonment and fine. (e) Applications for leave tO appeal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against acquittals wherein the offence with which the accused was charged is one punishable on conviction with a sent­ ence of fine only or with a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding two years or with such imprisonment and ~ine." PANDURANG v. STATE OF'MAHARASIITRA [THAKKAR,J.J 1007 'r diction. The accused was entitled to be heard by at least two learned A Judges constituting a Division Bench and had a right to claim a verdict as regards his guilt or innocence at the hands of the two learned Judges. This right cannot be taken away except by amending the rules. So long as the rules are in operation it would be arbitrary and dis- criminatory to deny him this right regardless of whether it is done by B • reason of negligence or otherwise. Deliberately, it cannot be done. .. _ Negligence can neither be invoked as an alibi, nor can cure the in- firmity or illegality, so as to rob the accused of his right under the rules. What can be done only by atleast two learned Judges cannot be ..,.-y~ done by one learned Judge. Even if the decision is right on merits, it is ' by a forum which is lacking in competence with regard· to the subject_ matter. Even a 'right' decision by a 'wrong' forum is no decision. It is c non-existent in the eye of law. And hence a nullity. The Judgment under appeal is therefore no judgment in the eye of law. This Court in -.\ 1982(3) S.C.R. page 81 (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dewadas & Ors.) has taken a view which reinforces our view. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge, and D send the matter back to the High Court for being placed before a Division Bench of the High Court, which will afford reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides and dispose it of in accordance with law, expeditiously. We wish to add that the Registry of the High .i Court was expected to have realized the true position and ought not to · have created a situation which resulted in waste of court time, once for E hearing the appeal, and next titrre, to· con~der the effect of the rules. No Court can afford this luxury with the mountain of arrears which .,.;. every Court is carrying these days . , M.L.A. Appeal allowed. ~