S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan & Ors.
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S.T. MUTHUSAMI v. K. NATARAJAN [VENKATARAMIAH, J.[ 763
VENKATARAMIAH, J. The question for consideration in this
case is whether it is appropriate for the High Court to interfere with an
election process at an intermediate stage after the commencement of
the election process and before the declaration of the result of the
election held for the purpose of filling a vacancy in the office of the
Chairman of a Panchayat Union under the provisions of the Tamil
Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 (Act XXXV of 1958) (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Act') on the ground that there was an error in the matter of
allotment of symbols to the candidates contesting at such election .
The appellant-S.T. Muthusami, respondent No. 1-K. Natara-
jan, respondent No. 6-M. Thangavelu and two others were nomina-
ted as candidates at the election held to the office of the Chairman,
Panchayat Union, Madathukkulam, Udamalpet Taluk, Coimbatore
District in the State of Tamil Nadu. The date of scrutiny of the nomi-
n"ation papers was 3 lst January, 1986 and the last date for withdrawal
of nominations was 3rd February, 1986. The election was to take place
on the 23rd February, 1986. On the date of the scrutiny of the nomina-
' ,.. lion papers, the nomination papers of the appellant, respondent No. 1,
respondent No. 6 and of two others were found to be valid by the
,.,., Returning Officer, respondent No. 5. As regards the allotment of .,
l
symbols to the candidates the Order made by the State Government
on 8.1.1986 in exercise of the powers under rule 17(1) of the Tamil
'y Nadu Panchayats (Conduct of Election of Chairmen of Panchayat
Union Councils and Presidents and members of Panchayats) Rules,
.,... 1978 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') directed that the Return-
4 ing Officer shall assign to the candidates set up by the National and the
4'
State parties the symbols reserved for the purpose by the Chief Elec-
tion Commissioner. The symbol reserved for the Indian National Con-
...._. gress (I) was 'hand'. Similarly the symbols were also reserved for the
All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and Dravida Munnetra
~ ! Kazhagam. 15 other symbols were also notified by the Returning
Officer which could be assigned to the independent candidates con-
testing the elections. Under the procedure prescribed by the Govern-
ment where a candidate was set up by a national party who could claim
~
~
the symbol which was reserved for such national party, the said
national party had to send an intimation to the State Election Author-
'-y ity, namely, the Director of the Rural Development, Madras (respon-
dent No. 3) intimating in Form 'A' annexed to the Order of the Gov-
ernment the names and the specimen signatures of not more than two
representatives of the party who had been authorised to send intima-
tions of the names of the candidates set up by the party in respect of
the election to the office of the Chairmen of the Panchayat Union
A Councils and the Presidents of Town Panchayats. These representa- Y
tives of the parties, whose names were intimated to the Director of the
Rural Development were then either singly or generally required to
intimate the names of the persons, whom the party concerned had
authorised to contest as its official candidates in order of priority in
Form 'B' annexed to the Government Order. If the support to acandi-
B date was withdrawn an intimation was required to be sent to the
Returning Officer not later than 3.00 P .M. on the last date fixed for j..
withdrawal of the nomination papers. If no intimation was received
before 3.00 P,M. on the last date fixed for withdrawal the Returning
Officer was directed not to consider any candidate as a candidate set
up by the political party and not to assign the symbol for which the
C priority was given to the concerned party. This order also stated that
symbols should be assigned only by drawing lots when there were
conflicting claims between two or more candidates and that no priority
could be given to any candidate. In the case before us intimation was
received by the Returning Officer showing the appellant as the official
candidate of Indian National Congress (I) under the signature of the
D President of the Tamil Nadu Congress (I) Committee by 12.00 noon on
the 3rd of February, 1986. A similar letter was handed over by respon
dent No. 6 at 12.45 P.M. on that date showing that he was also the
official candidate of the Indian National Congress (I). That letter also
appeared to have been signed by the President of the Tamil Nadu
Congress (I) Committee. Havingfound that two persons were claiming
E to be the official candidates of the same party, the Returning Officer
declined to grant the symbol 'hand' to any one of them. These two
candidates, i.e., the appellant and respondent No. 6 then gave in
writing their choice of symbols belonging to the unreserved category
giving three alternative choices. Accepting the first choice of each of J
-
them, the Returning Officer allotted at 4.30 P.M. on 3.2.1986 the~
symbol 'glass tumbler' to the appellant and the symbol 'fish' to respon" ~
dent No. 6. The Returning Officer then proceeded to publish the list of '
the candidates nominated as per rule 17(2) of the Rules with the
symbols allotted to each of the three candidates, whose nomination
papers had been found to be valid. Immediately after the publication
of the said list of the nominated candidates, the President of the Tamil
G N adu Congress (I) Committee who was alleged to have signed both the
letters given to the Returning Officer representing that the appellant
and respondent No. 6 were both official candidates wrote to the
Director of The Rural Development Department, respondent No. 3,
who was the Election Authority as well as the Secretary to the Govern
ment, Rural Development Department, Government of Tamil Nadu
H on 4.2.1986 stating that he had not given his approval to respondent
S.T. MUTHUSAMI v. K. NATARAJAN (VENKATARAMIAH, J.( 765
~ No. 6 being an official Congress (I) candidate and that the authorised
candidate of the Congress (I) Party was the appellant, S.T. Muthu- A
sami. On receipt of the said letter respondent No. 3-the Director of
the Rural Development Department, the Election Authority sent a
telex message to the Collector of Coimbatore to treat the appellant as
the official candidate of the Indian National Congress (I) Party and to
assign the symbol 'hand' to him. The Collector communicated this B
message to the Returning Officer by sending telex message on
6.2.1986. In accordance with that direction the Returning Officer
issued an Errata Notification ,in Form VI assigning of the symbol
'hand' which had been reserved for the Indian National Congress (I) to
the appellant on that date itself and the copies of the said Errata
Notification were sent by him to all the contesting candidates through
special messengers. This action of the Returning Officer was chal- C
lenged by respondent No. 1-K. Natarajan, who was a validly nomina-
ted candidate with 'bow and arrow' as his symbol by filing a petition in
Writ Petition No. 1178 of 1986 on the file of the High Court of Madras
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India contending that the
issuing of the Errata Notification was an abuse of power committed on D
extraneous and irrelevant consi~erations and there was undue interfer
ence with the actual conduct of the election. He prayed before the
High Court that the Errata Notification dated 6.2.1986 should be
quashed and the election should be directed to be proceeded with in
'y accordance with the notification issued on 3.2.1986 under which the
'glass tumbler' symbol had been allotted to the appellant. The above E
Writ Petition came up for consideration before the learned Single
Judge of the High Court on 17.2.1986. The learned Single Judge dis
missed the Writ Petition holding that respondent No. 1-K. Natara
jan, who had filed the Writ Petition, could not be considered as an
aggrieved party since he did not claim to be the candidate sponsored
~y the Indian National Congress (I) and that the dispute could be, if at F
) all, between the appellant and respondent No. 6. Aggrieved by the
order of the learned Single Judge, respondent No. 1 filed an appeal in
Writ Appeal No. 173 of 1986 before the High Court of Madras. The
said appeal was heard by a Division Bench and it was allow~d on
8.4.1986. The Division Bench quashed the Errata Notification issued • by the Returning Officer and directed him to hold the election on the G
basis of the symbols originally allotted, treating 'glass tumbler' as the
"y symbol of the appellant and 'fish' as the symbol of respondent No. 6.
The Returning Officer was further directed to proceed immediately
with the election process fron;i that stage as provided by the Rules.
' Aggrieved by the order of the Division Bench, the appellant has filed
this appeal by special leave.
j
ll
766 SLJPREME COL:IU REPORTS l 1988) 2 S.C.R.
In this appeal there is no dispute about the facts which have been
set out above. The point urged by the appellant before us is that the
Division Bench was in error in setting aside the Errata Notification
issued by the Returning Officer in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the declaration of the
result of the election in view of the existence of an alternative remedy
under the Rules framed under section 178(2)(ii) of the Act entitled
'Decision of Election Disputes Relating to Panchayat Union Councils'
have provided a machinery for the settlement of the election disputes
relating to Panchayat Union Councils. The relevant parts of rule 1 and
rule 11 of the said Rules read thus:
"I(l) Save as otherwise provided, no election held
under the T.N. Panchayats Act, 1958 whether of a
member, chairman or vice-chairman of a panchayat union
council shall be called in question except by an election
petition presented in accordance with these rules to an
election court as defined in sub-rule (2) by any candidate or
elector against the candidate who has been declared to
have been duly elected (hereinafter called the returned
candidate).
(2) The election court shall be-
I
(i) except in cases falling under clause (ii) in the case
of districts other than the Nilgiris, the District Munsif hav
ing territorial jurisdiction over the place in which the office
of the panchayat union council is situated, or if there is J more than one such District Munsif, elections governed
would and in the case of Nilgiris district the Subordinat~~
Judge,Ootacamund; and ".-- \
(ii) where the Government so direct, whether in re
spect of panchayat union councils generally or in respect of
any class of panchayat union councils or in respect of
panchayat union councils in the same district or taluk, such
officer or officers of Government as may be designated by
the Government in this behalf by name or by virtue of
office:
Provided that an election petition may, on applica
tion, be transferred-
y'
S.T. MUTHUSAMI v. K. NATARAJAN [VENKATARAMJAH, J.] 767
(a) if presented to a District Munsif under clause (i),
by the District Judge concerned to another District Munsif
within his jurisdiction; and
(b) if presented to an officer of Government under
clause (ii), by the Government to another officer of
Government;
Provided further that where an election petition is
transferred to any authority under the foregoing proviso,
such authority shall be deemed to be the election court.
11.-If in the opinion of the election court-
( c) the result of the election has been materially D
affected by any irregularity in respect of a nomination
paper or by the improper reception or refusal of a nomina
tion paper or vote or by any non-compliance with the provi
sions of the Act or the rules made thereunder, the election
of such returned candidate shall be void.
The Government Order No. 1677 L.A. dated 8.10.1960 provides
-1'!.hat for all the purposes of the Act, the District Collector and the
Division Development Officer in respect of panchayat constituted F
under the said Act under the area within their respective jurisdiction,
the District Collector in respect of every panchayat union council con
stituterl under the Act in the District under his charge and the Addi
tional Development Commissioner, Madras in respect of every said
panchayat union council under the said Act shall be the election
authorities. The expression 'election authority' is defined by section G
'v 2(9) of the Act as such authority, not being the president or vice-
r president or a member of the panchayat or the chairman or vice
chairman or a member of the panchayat union council as may be
prescribed. Rule 5 of the Rules provides that subject to the superin
tendence, direction and control of the election authority the Returning
Officer shall be responsible for the proper conduct of the election H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] 2 S.C.R.
A under the rules. Instructions issued by the Election Authority to the
Returning Officer regarding the allotment of the symbols cannot,
therefore, be construed as interference with the election process by an
authority unconnected with the process of election. Even if there is
any mistake committed by either the election authority or the Return
ing Officer in the allotment of symbol to the appellant the said mistake
B can only amount to a non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or
the Rules made thereunder. It is clear from clause (c) of rule 11 of the
Rules made for the purpose of providing a machinery for the decision
of election disputes relating to panchayat union councils that every
action amounting to such non-compliance with the provisions of the
Act and the Rules made thereunder would not automatically vitiate an
c election. It is only when the election court on a consideration of the
entire material placed before it at the trial of an election petition
comes to the conclusion that the result of the election has been mate
rially affected by such non-compliance with any of the provisions of
the Act or the Rules made thereunder the election of the returned
candidate can be declared void. Rule 1 of the said Rules provides that
D an election held under the Act whether of a member or chairman or
vice-chairman of a panchayat union council can be called in question
only by an election petition and not otherwise. In these circumstances
it has to be seen whether the Division Bench of the High Court was
justified in setting aside the Errata Notification issued by the Return
ing Officer with regard to the allotment of symbols.
It is no doubt true that rule (1) of the Rules made for the settle
ment of election disputes which provides tha~ an election can be
questioned only by an election petition cannot have the effect of over·
riding the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitu· J
tion of India. It may, however, be taken into consideration in
determining whether it would be appropriate for the High Court t~
exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a -' 1
case of this nature. '
In N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Consti
tuency and Others, 11952] S.C.R. 218 dealing with the question
-
whether a writ petition was a proper remedy which can be availed of by , ~
G a person aggrieved by any irregularity in the conduct of an election
before the result of the election is declared, Fazal Ali, J. on a consid- y'
eration of the nature of litigation in respect of elections observed thus
at page 234:
"The conclusions which I have arrived at may be
summed up briefly as follows:
i·
S.T. MUTIIUSAMI v. K. NATARAJAN IVENKATARMIIAH, J.I 769
(1) Having regard to the important functions which A
the legislatures have to perform in democratic countries, it
has always been recognized to be a matter of first import
ance that elections should be concluded as early as possible
according to time schedule and all controversial matters
and all disputes arising out of elections should be post
poned till after the elections are over, so that the election B
proceedings m·ay not be unduly retarded or protracted.
(2) In confornlity with this principle, the scheme of
the election law in this country as well as in England is that
no significance should be attached to anything which does
not affect the 'election'; and if any irregularities are corn- C
mitted while it is in progress and they belong to the categ-
ory or class which, under the law by which elections are
governed would have the effect of vitiating the 'election'
and enable the person affected to call it in question, they
should be brought up before a special tribunal by means of
an election petition :and not be made the subject of a dis- D
pule before any court while the election is in progress."
Having laid down the above principles, the Court further held
that Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India had the effect of oust-
.'y ing the jurisdiction of the courts with regard to the matters arising
between the commencement of the polling and the final selection. E
Repelling the argument that Article 329(b) of the Constitution ousted
the jurisdiction of the courts only with regard to matters arising bet
ween the commencement of the polling and the final selection and that
\ questions relating to nominations could be agitated under Article 226
. ~f the Constitution, this Court observed thus:
t "The question which has to be asked is what conceiv
able reason the legislature could have had to leave only
matters connected with nominations subject to the jurisdic
tion of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitu
tion. If Part XV of the Constitution is a code by itself i.e.,
it creates rights ancj provides for their enforcement by a G
special tribunal to the exclusion of all courts including the
High Court, there can be no reason for assuming that the
Constitution left one small part of the election process to
be made the subject-matter of contest before the High
Courts and thereby upset the time schedule of the elec
tions. The more reasonable view seems to be that Article H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19881 2 S.C.R.
329 covers all 'electoral matters.'"
It is thus seen that in the above decision (which was rendered by the '!
Full Court) this Court first laid down as a matter of general principle
that interference with an election process between the commencement
of such process and the stage of declaration of result by a court would
B not ordinarily be proper and next laid down that Article 329(b) of the
Constitution had the effect of taking away the jurisdiction under Arti- f.,
cle 226 of the Constitution also in respect of the disputes arising out of
election during the said period. "
Following the above decision in N.P. Ponnuswami's case (supra)'-.1
in Nanhoo Mai & Ors. v. Hira Mai & Ors., [197611 S.C.R. 809 this (
Court held that the right to vote or stand for election to the office of \
the President of a Municipal Board is a creature of the statute, that is r
the U.P. Municipalities Act and it must be subject to the limitations
imposed by it. Accordingly, this Court held that the election to the
office of the President of the Municipal Board could be challenged
D only according to the procedure prescribed by that Act and that is by
means of an election petition presented in accordance with the provi-
sions of that Act and in no other way. The Court further held that the
said Act provided only for one remedy, that remedy being an election
petition to be presented after the election was over and there was no
remedy provided at any intermediate stage. Referring to the decision -f.
E in N.P. Ponnuswami's case (supra) this Court observed in the above
decision at page 814 thus:
"These conclusions follow from the decision of this
Court in Ponnuswami's case (supra) in its application to the i
facts of this case. But the conclusions above stated were
arrived at without taking the provisions of Article 329 int6~\
account. The provisions of Article 329 are relevant only 1
to the extent that even the remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution is barred as a result of the provisions. But
once the legal effect above set forth of the provision of law
which we are concerned with is taken into account there is
no room for the High Courts to interfere in exercise of their
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Whether
there can be any extraordinary circumstances in which the
High Courts could exercise their power under Article 226
of the Constitution in relation to elections it is not now
necessary to consider. All the considerations applied in
coming to the conclusion that elections to the legislatures
y
'
=
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' ··~
),
,.
<
~
S.T. MUTHUSAMI v. K. NATARAJAN [VENKATARAMIAH, J.[ 771
should not be delayed or protracted by the interference of A
Courts at any intermediate stage before the results of the
election are over applied with equal force to elections to local
bodies."
In the above· passage this Court clarified that the conclusions in
N.P. Ponnuswami's case (supra) had been arrived without taking the
provisions of Article 329 of the Constitution into account and that the
provisions of Article 329 of the Constitution were relevant only to the
extent that even the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution was
barred as a result of the provisions. Earlier in the course of the deci
sion in Nanhoo Mal's case (supra) this Court observed at page 811:
"After the decision of this Court in N. P. Ponnu
swami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency & Ors.
there is hardly any room for Courts to entertain applica
tions under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters relat
ing to elections."
A Full Bench [>f the High Court o! Madhya Pradesh expressed
the same view in the year 1971 earlier in Ma/am Singh v. The Collector,
Sehore, M.P. and Others, AIR1971MP195. In the above decision the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh was called upon to consider the con
troversial question whether it was proper that the High Court should
exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constiution in election
matters arising under the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962 at
intermediate stages, that is, to interfere with individual orders passed
during the process of election and thus impede that process or should it
.\ decline to exercise that power and leave the parties to their remedy of
~an election petition to be presented after the election was over. The
- provision that fell for consideration before the Full Bench of the F
f Madhya Pradesh High Court ,in that case was section 375(1) of the
Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962, the language of which was
identically the same as that of '.section 80 of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951. It was pointed out that the Court in N. P. Pon
nuswami' s case (supra), having regard to the words 'Notwithstanding
anything in this Constitution' used in Article 329(b) held that they G
were sufficient to exclude jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with
any matter which may arise while the elections are in progress.
Nevertheless, the decision of the Court in N.P. Ponnuswami's case
(supra) did not entirely tum on the language of Article 329(b) of the
Constitut~on but. the Court als? enunciated certain well-settled princi
ples applicable to election ca~es in general. In particular, the Court H
I
772 •SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.
A interpreted section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
The Full Bench observed that though it was not concerned with Article
329(b) of the Constitution, it was bound by the principles laid down in
N.P. Ponnuswami's case (supra). In delivering the judgment of the
Full Bench, one of us (Sen, J.) observed:
"9. First of all, their Lordships rejected the conten
tion that the post-election remedy of an election petition
was inadequate to afford the relief which the petitioner
sought. On the strength of the observations of Wallace, J.,
in Sarvothama Rao v. Chairman, Municipal Council,
Saidapet, ILR 47 Mad 585 AIR 1923 Mad 475, it was urged
before them that to drive him to that remedy would be an
anomaly, which their Lordships more appropriately des
cribed as hardship or prejudice. It was further urged that
the Court could not stultify itself by allowing the wrong
which it was asked to prevent to be actually consummated.
While rejecting the contention, their Lordships noticed
with approval the following observations of Wallace, J. in
Desi Chettiar v. Chinnasami Chettair, AIR 1928 Mad 1271:
The petitioner is not without his remedy. His
remedy lies in an election petition which we under-
"' .,
't
~
·I,
stand he has already put in. It is argued for him that --{
remedy which merely allows him to have set aside an
election once held is not an efficacious as the one
which would enable him to stop the election altoge-
ther and certain observations at page 600 of ILR 47
Mad 585 (AIR 1923 Mad 475) (supra), are quoted. In
the first place, we do not see how the mere fact that'1'"'
the petitioner cannot get the election stopped, arta · 'i
has his remedy only after it is over by an election )
petition, will in itself confer on him any right to
obtain a writ. In the second place, these observations
were directed to the consideration of the propriety of
an in junction in a civil suit, a matter with which we
are not here concerned. And finally, it may be
observed that these remarks were made some years ·
ago when the practice of individuals coming forward l
to stop elections in order .that their own individual
interest may be safeguarded was not so common. It is
clear that there is another side of the question to be
considered, namely, the inconvenience to the public
-
'
'
S.T. MUTHUSAMI v. K. NATARAJAN IVENKATARAMIAH, J I 773
administration of having elections and the business of
Local Boards held up while individuals prosecute
their individual grievances.
These observations of Wallace, J. were made in re
gard to elections to Local Boards. It thus follows that the
alternative remedy of an election petition is not less conve
nient, beneficial and effectual."
" It was then observed:
\
~
' '
"Next, their Lordships re-stated the principle that the
right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a C
civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and
must be subject to· the limitations imposed by it. Their
Lordships relied on the dictum of Willes, J., which has
become classical:
It is now well-recognised that where a right or D
liability is created by a statute which gives a special
remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that
statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated
with great clarity by Willes, J., in Wolverhampton
New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford, [1859) 6 CB
(NS) 336, at p. 356, in the following passage: E
There are three classes of cases in which a lia
bility may be established founded upon statute. One
is, where there was a liability existing at common law,
and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a
special and a peculiar form of remedy different from F
the remedy which existed at common law; there, un
less the statute contains words which expressly or by
necessary implication exclude the common law
remedy, the party suing has his election to pursue
either that or the statutory remedy. The second class
of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue G
merely, but provides no particular form of remedy;
there, the party can only proceed by action at com
mon law. But there is a third class, viz., where a
liability not existing at common law is created by a
statute which at the same time gives a special and
particular remedy for enforcing it . . . . . . . . The H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 2 S.C.R.
remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and ~
it is not competent to the party to pursue the course
applicable to cases of the second class. The form
given by the statute must be adopted and adhered
to"
The rule laid down by this passage was approved by
the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express News- A.
paper Ltd., [1919] AC 368, and has been reaffirmed by the
Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago '
v. Gordon Grant & Co., [1935) AC 532 and Secy. of State v.
Mask & Co., 44 Cal. WN 709 AIR 1940 PC 105, and it has'f'
also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of (
rights (see Hurdutrai v. Off. Assignee of Calcutta, [1948) 52 \
Cal WN 343 at p. 349. r
Further it was observed:
"Lastly, their Lordships stated that the law of elec
tion in this country does not contemplate that there should
be two attacks on matters connected with election proceed
ings, in the following passage:
In my opinion, to affirm such a position would -f
be contrary to the scheme of ......... the Represen-
tation of the People Act, which as I shall point out
later, seems to be that any matter which has the effect
of vitiating an election should be brought up only at
the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner be- -I:
fore a special tribunal and should not be brought u~
at an intermediate stage before any Court. It seems1'o ~"!
me that under the election law, the only significance, \
which the rejection of a nomination paper has, con-
sists in the fact that it can be used as a ground to call
the election in question."
In the ultimate analysis, the Full Bench laid down:
"12. There is no constitutional bar to the exercise of
writ jurisdiction in respect of elections to Local Bodies such
as, Municipalities, Panchayats and the like. However, as it
is desirable to resolve election disputes speedily through
the machinery of election petitions, the Court in the exer-
-
-
S.T. MUil!USAMI v. K. NATARAJAN (VENKATARAMIAH, J.J n5
cise of its discretion should always decline to invoke its writ . A
:cjurisdiction in an election dispute, if the alternative remedy
. ~·an election petition is available. So, their Lordships of
·· ·the Supreme Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal,
Kotah, AIR 1955. SC 425 stated:
.... though no legislature can impose limitations B
on these constitutional powers it is a sound eirercise of
discretion to bear in mind the policy of the legislature to
have disputes about these special rights decided as speedily
as may be. Therefore, writ petitions should not be lightly
entertained in this class of cases." · ·
\ . We are inclined to accept this view which lays down a salutary c
principle.
The Division Bench of the High Court against whose decision the
present appeal by special leave is filed was of the view that the issuing
of the Errata'. Notification by the Returning Officer amounted a very· D
-.../ serious breach and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution
\ of India was called for. Taking into consideration all the aspects of the
present case including the fact that the person who filed the writ peti-
tion before the High Court was not one of the candidates nominated
~· by the Indian National Congress (I) and the fact that the President of
the Tamil Nadu Congress (I) Committee had written that he had E
authorised the appellant to contest as the candidate on behalf of his
party and he had not given his approval to respondent No. 6 contesting
_ l as a candidate on behalf of his party, we feel that the exercise of the
/· jurisdiction by the High Court in this case under Article 226 of the
• , Constitution cannot be supported_. The parties who are aggrieved by
'the result of the election can question the validity of election by an p
'election petition which is an effective alternative remedy.
We are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court
. committed a serious error in issuing a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution quashing the Errata Notification allotting the symbol
'hand' to the appellant by its judgment under appeal. We, therefore,
set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and
dismiss the writ petition filed in the High Court. The Returning
Officer shall proceed with the election in accordance with law from the
stage at which it was interrupted by the order of the High Court. The
appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
S.L. Appeal allowed. H
- ·--_J