Deepak Sibal & Ors v. Punjab University and Another
DUTT, J. Special leave is granted in both these matters. Heard G
);: learned Counsel for the parties.
These two appeals preferred by the appellants, Deepak Sibal and
Miss Ritu Khanna, are directed against the common judgment of the
Punjab & Haryana High Courfwhereby the High Court dismissed the
two writ petitions filed by the appellants and also some other writ H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19891 1 S.C.R.
petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the rule for admis
sion in the evening classes of the Three-Years LL.B. Degree Course
conducted by the Department of Laws of L ~Punjab University.
The impugned rule that was published in the prospectus for the
year 1988-89 relating to admission to 150 seats in the evening classes in
the Three;Year LL.B. Degree Course is extracted as follows:
"Admission to evening classes is open only to regular
employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions/
affiliated colleges/Statutory Corporations and Government ~-1
Companies. A candidate applying for admission to the
evening classes should attach No Objection/Permission
letter from his present employer with his application for
admission." _..,
It is not disputed that there are 150 seats in the morning classes
and another 150 seats in the evening classes. In both the morning and
D evening classes reservation has been made for scheduled castes,
scheduled tribes, backward classes, physically handicapped persons,
outstanding and defence personnel. In the morning classes out of 150
seats, 64 seats are reserved for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes,
backward classes etc. and the remaining 86 seats are allotted to general j.
students selected on merit basis. Similarly in the evening classes, the
E remaining 86 seats are also reserved for regular employees of
Government/Semi-Government institutions etc., as mentioned in the
impugned rule for admission.
The appellant, Deepak Sibal, passed the Bachelor of Commerce
Examination from the University of Punjab in June, 1981securing61.5 {__.
per cent marks in the aggregate. On June 1, 1988, he was appo:inted to ' '
the post of Accountant in Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. with effect from
June 2, 1988 on probation for a period of six months. Agro Chem
Punjab Ltd. is stated to be a joint venture with Punjab Agro Corpora-
tion Ltd., Chandigarh, an Undertaking of the Punjab Government.
G On July, 18, 1988, the appellant, Deepak Sibal; applied for
admission in the evening classes of the Punjab University for the --;(_
Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course with a 'No Objection Certificate'
from his employer dated July 18, 1988. He was granted an interview
sometime in the first week of August, 1988, but he was not selected.
On enquiry, he came to know that although his position was 29 in the
H merit list, he was declared ineligible because he was an employee of a
' DEEPAK SIBAL v. PUNJAB UNIVERSITY (DlfIT, J.L 697
"',~ ·:.__-~~.------~~-'"' -
Public.Limited Company and did not fall within the e~clu~ive cate
gories, as mentioned in the impugned rule, to which admission in the
evening classes was restricted. ' · · ·
The other appellant, namely. Miss Ritu Khanna, passed the
Bachelor of Arts Examination from the. Punjab University securing
418 marks out of 650 marks. She was temporarily appointed to the post
of Helper in the office of the Director, Water Resources, Punjab. She
also applied for admission in the evening classes of the Three-Year
LL.B. Degree Course of the University with all requisite certificates
on July 18, 1988. She was granted an interview on July 30, 1988 and
although her position in the merit list was 19, she was not selected for
admission on the ground that she was only a temporary employee.
Both the appellants, being aggrieved by the refusal of the Uni
versity to admit them in the evening classes of the Three-Year LL.B ..
Degree Course, filed two separate writ petitions in the Punjab &
Haryana High Court challenging, inter alia, the constitutional validity
of the impugned rule. Five other writ petitions were also filed by the D
candidates who were refused admission in the evening classes in view
of the impugned rule. At the hearing of the writ petitions before the
·High Court, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners including the
appellants, that the impugned rule was violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. The High Court overruled the contention and, as stated
already, dismissed the writ petitions. Hence these two appeals by the E
two appellants.· ·
.It is now well settled tha; Artie!~ '14 forbids class legislation, but
does not forbid reasonable classification. Whether a classification is a
permissible classification under Article 14 or not, two conditions must
be satisfied, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an F
· intelligible differentia which _distinguishes persons or things that are ·
grouped together from others left out of the group, and (2) that the
differentia must have a rational nexus to the• object sought to be
achieved by the statute in question.
By the impugned rule, a classification. has been made for the G
purpose of admission to the evening classes. The question is whether
the classification is a reasonable classification .JNithin the meaning of
Article 14 of the Constitution. In order to consider the question as to
the reasonableness of the classification, it is necessary to take into
account the objective for such classification. It has been averred in the
written statement of Dr. Bairam Kumar Gupta, Chairman, Depart- H
ment of Laws, ·Punjab University, the respondent No. 2, filed in the
High Court, that the object of starting evening classes was to provide
education to bona fide employees who could not attend the morning
classes on account of their employment. The object, therefore, was to
accommodate bona fule employees in the evening classes, as they were
unable to attend the morning classes on account of their employment.
Admission to evening classes is not open to the employees in general
including private sector employees, but it is restricted to regular
employes of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc., as men
tioned in the impugned rule. In other words, the employees of
Government/Semi-Government institutions etc. have been grouped
together as a class to the exclusion of employees of private
establishments.
It appears that in or about the year 1986, admission to evening
classes was open to those who were in bona fule employment including
self-employed persons. In supersession of that rule, the impugned rule
was framed excluding private sector employees and self-employed
D persons. In the counter-affidavit filed in this Court on behalf of the
respondents by the Registrar of the Punjab University, an explanation
has been given why the University framed the impugned rule restrict
ing the admission in the evening classes open to Government/Semi
Government institutions etc. The explanation, as given in the counter
affidavit, is extracted below:
"It is submitted that since the morning classes are open to
all, the merit is much higher, whereas since the admission
to the evening classes is only for regular employees of
Government/Semi-Government etc. the merit goes lower.
It is in this view of the matter that in the past also, the ~~-'--r
Department of Law found that various certificat1~s by
employees were found to be incorrect and obtained by
applicants only with a view to get admission to the evening
classes and, thereafter, applied for transfer to the morning
classes. On account of the past experience it was felt that
the admission to the Law Courses in the morning be kept
open to all persons whether employed or unemployed but
the admission to the evening classes be restricted to only
those who will be genuine and regular employee. Since the
Government/Semi-Government and similar other institu-
tions as mentioned in the prospectus are actually involved
in lot of litigation, it was felt that ,'~:'.';:;arting legal education
to the employees of such institu '•ns would be in public
DEEPAK SIBAL v. PUNJAB UNIVERSITY [DUTT, J.) 699
interest. It is submitted that it is in view of this practice of
issuing of certificates by private employers in the past that
the Department of Law was compelled to restrict the
admission of students of evening classes as has been done.
Thus, the respondents have sought to justify the exclusion of
"7 private employees restricting admission to evening classes only to the
Government/Semi-Government and similar other institutions princi
pally on two grounds, namely, (1) production of bogus certificates of
employment from private employers, and (2) imparting of legal educa-
t. _ti on to the employees of the Government/Semi-Government and other
institutions, as mentioned in the impugned rule, in public interest.
Besides the above two grounds, Mr. P.P. Rao, learned Counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondent, has added two more grounds,
namely, ( 1) a candidate should have an assured tenure of employment
likely to continue for three years, and (2) as far as possible, there
should be no possibility of wastage of a seat. It is submitted that
employees of only Government/Semi-Government institutions etc.
have an assured tenure of employment and if the admission in the
evening classes is restricted to such employees, there would be no
possibility of any wastage of a seat and the University will not have to
engage itself in finding out whether or not a certificate produced by an
i employee of a private establishment is a bogus certificate and whether
such. employee has an assured tenure of employment likely to continue
for three years. In upholding the validity of the impugned rule, it has
been observed by the High Court that the Government employees
have protection of Article 311 of the Constitution, which non
Government employees do not have and that employees of Semi
Government institutions are also on the same footing.
_,.,.-.f._ It is apparent that in framing the impugned rule, the respondents
'have deviated from its objective for the starting of evening classes. The
objective was to accommodate in the evening classes employees in
general including private employees who were unable to attend morn
ing classes because of their employment. In this backdrop of facts, we
are to consider the reasonableness of the classification as contemp
lated by the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution.
>: It is difficult to accept the contention that the Government emp-
loyees or the employees of Semi-Government and other institutions,
as mentioned in the impugned rule, stand on a different footing from
the employees of private concerns, in so far as the question of admis-
sion to evening classes is concerned. It is true that the service condi- H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 1 S.C.R.
lions of employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc, ).-
are different, and they may have greater security of service, but that
hardly matters for the purpose of admission in the evening classes. The
test is whether the employees of private establishments are e.1ually in a
disadvantageous p0sition like the employees of Government/Semi
Government institutions etc. in attending morning classes. There can
be no doubt and it is not disputed that both of them stand on an equal )!;;
footing and there is no difference between these two classes of emp
loyees in that regard. To exclude the emplo, ~es of private establish
ments will not, therefore, satisfy the test of intelligible differentia that
distinguishes the employees of Government/Semi-Government insti- ~1
tutions etc. grouped together from the employees of private establish
ments. It is true that a classification need not be made with mathemati-
cal precision but, if there be little or no difference between the persons
or things which have been grouped together and those left out of the
group, in that case, the classification cannot be said to be a wasonable
one.
It is, however, submitted on behalf of the respondents that the
employees of private establishments have been left out as it is difficult
for the University to verify whether or not a particular candidate is
really a regular employee and whether he will have a tenure for at least
three years during which he will be prosecuting his studies in the -+-
Three-Year LL.B. Degree Course. It is submitted that in making the
E classification, the surrounding circumstances may be taken into
account. In support of that contention, much reliance has been placed
on the decision of this Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri
Justice S.R. Tendolkar, [19591 SCR 279. In that case, it has been
observed by Das, C.J. that while good faith and knowledge of the
existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if 1
there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circum-·~ ·'!
stances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification
may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitution
ality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that thc:re must
be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain indi
viduals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. It
G follows from the observation that surrounding circumstances may be
taken into consideration in support of the constitutionality of a law
which is otherwise hostile or discriminatory in nature. But the circum
stances must be such as to justify the discriminatory treatment or the
classification subserving the object sought to be achieved. In the
instant case, the circumstances which have been relied on· by the
H respondents, namely, the possibility of production by them of bogus
DEEPAK SIBAL v. PUNJAB ·UNIVERSITY [DUTI, J..! 701
-...< certificates and insecurity of their services are not, in our opinion, ·such A
circumstances as will justify the exclusion of the employees of private
establishments from the evening classes.
We are also unable to accept the contention of the respondents
.that such .exclusion of the employees of private establishments is
.. _j( justified on the ground of administrative convenience. The decision in B
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, ·(1957] SCR 233 reli.ed on by the
respondents does.not, in our opinion, lay down any such.proposition·of
;law. In that case, :the provision of section 5(7)A of the Income Tax Act
1982 was, .inter alia, challenged as ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitu
.tion .inasmuch a~ it was discriminatory. Section 5(7A) confers power -)--
.on the ·Commissioner of Income Tax and the Central Board of C
Revenue, inter a/ia, to transfer any case from one Income Tax Officer
-
'·
')-· :to another. It has been observed by this Court that in order to
minimise the inconvenience of the assessee, the authority concerned
may transfer the.case of such assessee to the Income Tax Officer who is
nearest to the area where it would be convenient for the assessee to
atten.d and if, on account of administrative exigencies, this is not possi- D
ble and the assessee requests that the examination of accounts or
evidence to be taken should be in a place convenient to him, the
Income Tax Officer comply with the request of the assessee by holding
the hearing at the place requested. It is manife.stly clear from the
observation that the power of transfer is not exercised for adminis
trative .convenience, but for the convenience of the assessee. In the E
instant case, there is no question of any administrative inconvenience.
The respondents have not placed any material before the High Court
,or in .this Court as to in how many cases they had come across such
. bogus certificates produced by private employees during the time the
··+' admission to evening classes was open also to private employees. It
-· -·· . -may be that there were one or two cases of production of bogus certifi- F
cates, but that cannot be a ground for th exclusion of all private
.employees from the benefit of getting legal education in the evening
classes.
In the circumstances, we are not at all impressed with the conten
tion that in order to. avoid production of bogus certificates of employ- G
men! from the private employers and having regard to the fact that
employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions etc. have an
assured tenure of employment likely to continue for three years, the
private employees were excluded for the purpose of admission to the
evening classes. By the impugned rule, admission to evening classes is
restricted to regular employees of Government/Semi-Government H
-
institutions etc. There is no material to indicate that by the: expression
"regular employees" it is intended to include only those employees
who will have an assured tenure of service for three years, that is to
say, co-extensive with the period of the Three-Year LLB. Degree
Course. The expression "regular employees", in our opinion, nor
mally means bona fide employees. Such bona fide employ1,es may be
permanent or temporary. All that the University can insist is that one
should be a bona fide employee and if there be materials to show that a
candidate for admission in the evening classes is a bona fide: .employee
the University, in our opinion, cannot further insist on an assured
tenure of service of such an employee for a period of three years. Be
that as it may, the reason for exclusion of private employees on the
ground that there may not be an assured tenure of employment likely
to continue for three years, not only does not stand scrutiny but also is
unfair and unjust and cannot form the basis of such an exclusion.
In this connection, we may also examine another ground restrict-
ing the admission in the evening classes to the employees of
Government/Semi-Government and other institutions, as mentioned
in the impugned rule, namely, imparting of legal education to such
employees. According to the respondents, imparting of legal educa-
tion to the employees of Government/Semi-Government and other
institutions, as mentioned in the impugned rule, would be .in public i- -
interest. Indeed, in the counter-affidavit filed in this Court on behalf
of the respondents by the Registrar of the University, that is also the
objective for framing the impugned rule. The counter-affidavit is,
however, silent as to why imparting of legal education to the
employees of Government/Semi-Government institutions ew. would -
be in public interest. It is not understandable why Government/Semi
Government employees in general should be imparted legal educatio~t/ ~
and what sort of public interest would be served by such legal educa-
tion. It may be that certain sections of Government employees require
legal education but, surely, Government employees in general do not
require legal education.
A similar rule, which was framed by the Government of Kerala
G reserving 100 per cent seats to Government and quasi-Government
employees irrespective of their category, came to be considered by the ·:ii. "'
Kerala High Court in Jolly v. State of Kera/a, AIR 1974 Kerala 178. In
that case, it has been observed by the Kerala ·High Court that there
may be some posts in Government service, some even in public corpo-
rations which may require incumbents who may be able to p1,rform
H their functions very efficiently with a legal background provided to
·r
!
DEEPAK SIBAL v. PUNJAB UNIVERSITY [DUTT, J,[ 703
them, but this cannot be said of all employees whether of the State
Government or Central Government or of the public corporations or
Government owned companies. In our opinion, there is much force in
the observation of the Kerala High Court. It cannot be laid down that
only Government employees require legal education and not private
employees. Certain private sector employees may require legal educa
tion in the interest of the establishments of which· they are employees.
It is difficult to understand the logic of the rule restricting admission in
the evening classes to employees of Govenwient/Semi-Government
institutions etc. on the plea that such employees require legal educa
tion in public interest.
In considering the reasonableness of classification from the point
of view of Article 14 of the Constitution, the Court has also to consider
the objective for such classification. If the objective be illogical, unfair
and unjust, necessarily the classification will have to be held as
unreasonable. In the instant case, the foregoing discussion reveals that
the classification of the employees of Government/Semi-Government
institutions etc. by the impugned rule for the purpose of admission in
the evening classes or Three-Year LLB. Degree Course to the exclu
sion of all other employees, is unreasoriable and unjust, as it does not
subserve any fair anci logical objective. it is, however, submitted that
classification in favour of Government and public sector is a reason
able and valid classification. In support of that contention, the decision
in Hindustan Paper Corpn. Ltd. v. Government of Kera/a, [1986] 3
SCC 398 has been relied on by the learned Counsel for the respon
dents. In that case, it has been observed that as far as Government
undertakings and companies are concerned, it has to be held that they
form ·a class by themselves, since any project that they may make
l would in the end result in the benefit to the members of the general
.___,,· -r·. public. The Government and public sector employees cannot be
equated with Government undertakings and companies. The classifi
cation of Government undertakings and companies may, in certain
circumstances, be a reasonably classification satisfying the two tests
mentioned above, but it is difficult to hold that the employees of
Government/Semi-Government institutions etc., as mentioned in the
impugned rule, would also constitute a valid classification for the
purpose of admission to evening classes of Three-Year LLB. Degree
Course. The contention in this regard, in our opinion, is without any
substance.
The next contention of the respondents is that the University,
being an educational institution, is entitled to identify the sources for H
:?04 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 1 S.C.R.
admission to the evening classes and that has been done by the Uni
versity by the impugned rule and that cannot be challenged as violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of this contention, much
reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondents on a decision of
this Court in Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India, [ 1970] 1 SCR 413 relatiiig
to reservation of seats in a medical college. In upholding such re.serva
tion of seats it has been observ!'.d by this Court as follows:
"It is the Central Government which bears the financial
burden of running the medical college. It is for it to lay
down the criteria for eligibility. From the very nature of
things it is not possible to throw the admission open to
students from all over the country. The Government can
not be denied right to decide from what sources the admis-
sion will be made."
This observation in Chitra Ghosh's case has also been relied on by
the High Court. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the
respondents that the question of reasonable classification has nothing
to do with the identification of sources for admission by an educational
institution. We are unable to accept the contention. It is true that an
educational institution is entitled to identify sources from which admis
sion will be made to such institution, but we do not find any difference
between identification of a source and a classification. If any source is
specified, such source must also satisfy the test of reasonable classifica
tion and also that it has a rational nexus to the object sought to be
achieved. Indeed in Chitra Ghosh's case, it has also been observed that
if the sources are properly classified whether on territorial, geographi
cal or other reasonable basis, it is not for the courts to interfere with
the manner and method of making the classification. It is very clear i
from this observation that the sources must be classified on reasonable t- ·.-·-·
basis, that is to say, it cannot be classified arbitrarily and unreason-
ably.
The principle laid down in Chitra Ghosh's case has been reitera
ted by this Court in a later decision in D.N. Chanchala v. State of
G Mysore, [ 1971] Supp. SCR 608. It has been very clearly laid down by
this Court that Government colleges are entitled to lay down criteria
for admission in its own colleges and to decide the sources from which Jl ....,.
admission would be made, provided of course, such classification is
not arbitrary and has a rational basis and a reasonable connection with
the object of the rules. Thus, it is now well established that a classifica-
H ti on by .the identification of a source must not be arbitrary, but should
DEEPAK SIBAL v. PUNJAB UNIVERSITY [DUTT, J.) 705
be on a reasonable basis having a nexus with the object sought to be
achieved by the rules for such admission.
It follows from the above discussion that the impugned rule, with
which we are concerned, having made a classification which cannot be
justified on any reasonable basis, must be held to be discriminatory
... :ir· and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is, however, submit- B
ted by Mr. P.P. Rao that in case the C~urt holds against the constitu
tional validity of the impugned rule, the entire rule may not be
quashed, but only such portion of it which is found to be discrimi-
.; )·· natory in nature and, as such, invalid. It is contended that if the
impugned rule had not restricted the admission to evening classes to
the employees of Government/Semi:Government .institutions etc. but
had provided for admission to regular employees including employees C
t of private sectors, the classification would have been .a .reasonable one
and having a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the
rule, namely, to accommodate the regular employees in the evening
classes, as they would be unable to attend the morning classes.
Accordingly, it is submitted that instead of striking down the whole of D
the impugned rule, a full stop may be put after the words "regular
employees" in the impugned rule and the remaining part of the rule
after the said words can be struck down as discriminatory and violative
- ~ of Article 14 of the Constitution. If that be done, the rule will be .read
as· "Admission to evening classes is open only to regular employees" ..
Prima facie it appears that this part, which is sought to be retained, :is E
not severable from the remaining part of the nile. 'In R.'M.iD.
- Chamaibaugwalla v. Union of India, l 1957) SCR '930 it has been laid
·down by this Court that if the valid and invalid provisions are ·so
inextricably mixed up that they cannot be separated from one . .another
l then the invalidity of the portion must result in the 'invalidity "in its
----r ~r entirety. In the instant case, the invalid portion is inextricably mixed ·f'
up with the valid portion of the rule and, accordingly, the entire rule
requires to be struck down. Our attention has, however, been drawn
to a later decision of this Court in B. Prabhakar Rao v. StateofAndhra
Pradesh, [1985) Supp. SCC 432. In this case, a Bench of Three-Judges
of this Court struck out the word 'not' from the provisions of clause
3( 1) of Ordinance 24 of 1984 and section 4( 1) of the Act 3 of 1984 so as '.G
., to bring those provisions to conform to the requirements of Article 14
X of the Constitution. We do not think we should try to bring .the
:impugned rule in conformity with the provision of Article 14 of the
1constitution by putting a full stop after the words "regular:employees"
and·striking.down the remaining part of.the impugned rule.on the'basis
iof ifue 'same principle :as in Piabhakar 'Rao's •case :(supra;. For., •it has ilil
A been stated by Mr. P .P. Rao, learned Counsel for the respondents,
that the respondents will frame a fresh rule for admission in the even
ing classes in conformity with and in the light of the decision of this
Court in the instant case.
But, the next important question is even if the restriction from
B the impugned rule is removed and the admission to evening classes is
I
made open to regular or bona fide employees including Government
and non-Government employees, whether reservation of cent percent
seats in the evening classes for the employees will be justified and
reasonable. It has been urged by Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Counsel
appearing on behalf of te appellants, that reservation of 100 per cent
C seats in an educational institution for a specified class of persons is not
at all permissible. The University, being an autonomous body, must be
accessible, and such access must be based on the principle ilhat those
who are the most meritorious must be preferred to those who are less
meritorious. This principle is, however, subject to the provision of
Article 15 of the Constitution of India which allows positive discrimi-
D nation, despite the merit principle, on the basis that the equality clause
will not be meaningful unless equal opportunity is given to such classes
enumerated by Article 15 by giving them preferential treatment.
Apart from the provision of Article 15, reservation may be made on
the basis of doctrine of source only with a view to giving equal
opportunity to some disadvantaged classes for their education but,
E learned Counsel submits, whether the reservation is made under Arti
cle 15(4) of the Constitution or otherwise on the theory of identifica
tion of source, in any event, such reservation cannot be 100 per cent at
the cost of merit. -
In our opinion, the above contention is not without forc:e. In this I ~
F connection, we may refer to a decision of this Court in M.R. Balaji v. ~ ..-
State of Mysore, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 439. In that case, the State of
Mysore passed an order reserving 68 per cent of scats in the engineer-
ing and medical colleges and other technical institutions for the educa-
tionally and socially backward classes and Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes, and left only 32 per cent of seats for the merit pool.
G In striking down such reservation, it was observed by this Court that it
would be extremely unreasonable to assume that in enacting Article <:{
15(4), Parliament intended to provide that where the advancement of -,..,.
the backward classes or the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
was concerned, the fundamental rights of the citizens constituting the
rest of the society were to be completely and absolutely ignored.
H Speaking generally and in a broad way, it was observed by this Court
•. >r
. --t-
DEEPAK SIBAL v. PUNJAB UNIVERSITY [DUTI, J.[ 707
that a special provision should be less than 50 per cent and the actual
percentage must depend upon the relevant prevailing circumstances in
each case. Thus, the provision of Article 15(4) does not contemplate to
reserve all the seats or the majority of the seats in an educational
institution at the cost of the rest of the society. The same principle
should also apply with equal force in the case of cent percent reserva
tion of seats in educational institutions for a certain class of persons to
the exclusion of meritorious candidates.
In Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, [1984] 3 SCR 942, the ques
tion of reservation of seats in medical colleges for MBBS and post
graduate medical courses on the basis of domicile or residential qµalifi
cation and institutional preference, came to be considere(I by this
Court. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed
that the effort must always be to select the best and most meritorious
students for admission to technical institutions and medical colleges by
providing equal opportunity to all citizens in the country and expres
sed an opinion that such reservation should, in no event, exceed the
outer limit of 70 per cent which again needs to be reduced.
In Pradeep Jain's case (supra), no reason appears to have been
given for the observation relating to the reservation of 70 per cent of
seats. In a later decision of this Court in Nidamarti Maheshkumar v.
State of Maharashtra, [1986] 2 SCC 534 a more or less similar question
regarding regionwise reservation of seats in medical colleges for
admission to MBBS Course also came to be considered, and this time
Bhagwati, C.J., speaking for the Court, gave the reason for reserva
tion of 70 per cent of seats. It was observed by the learned Chief
Justice as follows:
"In the first place it would cause a considerable amount of
hardship and inconvenience if students residing in the
region of a particular university are compelled to move to
the region of another university for medical education
which they might have to do if selection for admission to
the medical colleges in the entire State were to be based on
merit without any reservation or preference regionwise. It
must be remembered that there would be a large number of
students who, if they do not get admission in the medical
college near their residence and are assigned admission in a
college in another region on the basis of relative merit, may
not be able to go to such other medical college on account
of lack of resources and facilities and in the result, they
708
would be effectively deprived of a real opportunity for
pursuing the medical course even though on paper they
would have got admission in the medical college. The
opportunity for medical education provided to them would
be illusory and not real because they would not 'be able to
avail of it. Moreover some difficulty would also arise in
case of girls because if they are not able to get admission in
the medical college near the place where they r'eside they
might find it difficult to pursue medical education in a
medical college situated in another region where hostel
facilities may not be available and even if hoste:l facilities
are available, the parents may hesitate to send them to the
hostels. We are therefore of the view that reservation or
preference in respect of a certain percentage of seats may
legitimately be made in favour of those who have studied in
schools or colleges within the region of a particular
university, in order to equalise opportunities for medical
admission on a broader basis and to bring about real and
not formal, actual and not merely legal, equality. The only
question is as to what should be the extent of such reserva-
tion or preference. But on this question we derive consider-
able light from the decision in Pradeep Jain case [1984] 3
sec 654 where we held that reservation based on residence
requirement or institutional preference should not exceed
the other limit of 70% of the total number of open seats
after taking into account other kinds of reservations validly
made and that the remaining 30% of the open seats at the
least should be made available for admission to students on
all-India basis irrespective of the State or th<: university
\
from which they come. We would adopt the same principle (
in case of region wise reservation or preference and hold ·· '1 ~
that not more than 70% of the total number of open seats
·in the medical college or colleges situate within the area of
jurisdiction of a particular university, after taking into
account other kinds of reservations validly made, shall be
reserved for students who have studied in schools or
colleges situate within the region and at least 30% of the
open seats shall be available for admission to students who
have studied in schools or colleges in other regions within
the State."
In Pradeep Jain's case (supra), .although it was stated that the
H .outer limit of ·such reservation should not ·exceed 70 per cent of the
"+-· ,
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DEEPAK SIBAL v. PUNJAB UNIVERSITY [DUTI, J.[ 709
total number of open seats after taking into account other kinds of
reservations validly made, yet the Court expressed the view that this
outer limit 70 per cent needs to be reduced. In the instant case, the
respondents have reserved 64 seats out of 150 seats for Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, backward classes, etc. In our opinion, out of
the remaining 86 seats, reservation of seats for regular or bona fide
employees for admission to evening classes shall, in no event, exceed
the limit of 50 per cent. The admission to the remaining 43seats will be
open to, general candidates on merit basis. Thus, while the respondents
wiU be at liberty to reserve seats for regular or bona fide employees for
admission to evening classes, such reservation shall not exceed 50 per
cent after deducting the number of seats reserved for Scheduled
Castes,. Scheduled Tribes, backward classes, etc.
The only question which remains to be considered is whether the
appeHants are entitled to any relief. It has been already noticed that
the appellant, Deppak Sibal, was refused admission on the ground that
he was an employee of a Public Limited Company which did not fall
within the exclusive categories, as mentioned in the impugned rule, to D
which admission to the evening classes was restricted. The appellant
was appointed on probation for a period of six months in Agro Chem
Punjab Ltd. with effect from June 2,. 1988. In proof of his appoint
ment, the appellant produced before the respondents a certificate of
employment dated June I, 1988 issued by the Director of Agro Chem
Punjab Ltd'. According to the respondents, the certificate of employ~
ment produced by the appellant is not a genuine one inasmuch as the
appellant was admitted to the first semester in the LL.B. Course of the
Himachal Pradesh University at Simla on July 12, 1988. We fail to
understand how it can be said that the certificate of employment of the
' appellant in Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. was not a genuine certificate,
--.' ·--f ·simply because the appellant was admitted in the first semester of the
C'C.B. Course of the Himachal Pradesh University on July 12, 1983. It
~-·
is common knowledge that a candidate very often seeks admission in
more than one college or university. The appellant also made an appli
cation for admission to the LL.B. Course in Himachal Pradesh Uni
versity and he was admitted. It may be that after the respondents
refused to admit the appellant in the evening classes, the appellant had G
to join LL.B. Course of the Himachal Pradesh University after giving
up his service in Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. But, when the appellant
made the application for admission in the evening classes of the Law
Department of the Punjab University, he was in employment of Agro
Chem Punjab· Ltd. We do not find any reason to doubt the. genuine
ness of the certificate of employment in Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. It is H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 1 S.C.R.
the case of the appellant that to prosecute his studies in LL.B. Course
in Himachal Pradesh University will put him to great hardship and
inconvenience and it will be convenient for him to prosecute his
studies in the University of Punjab. Similarly the other appellant, Miss
Ritu Khanna, was refused admission by the respondents on the .ground
that her appointment was purely temporary, although her position was
19 in ihe merit list.
It bas been already found that the impugned rule is discriminat
ory and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and, as such,
invalid. The refusal by the respondents to admit the appellants in the
evening classes of the Three-Year LL. B. Degree Course was illegal.
The appellants are, therefore, entitled to be admitted in the evening
classes. It is, however, submitted on behalf.of the respondents that all
the seats have been filled up and, accordingly, the apellants cannot be
admitted. As injustice was done to the appellants, it will be no answer
to say that all the seats are filled up ..
For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the High Court is set
aside and the impugned rule for admission in the evening classes is
struck down as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Con
stitution and accordingly, invalid. We, however, make it clear that the
striking down of the impugned rule shall not, in any manner what-
E soever, disturb the admissions already made for the session 1988-89.
The respondents are directed to admit both the appellants in the
second semester which has commenced from January, 1989 and shall
allow them to complete the Three-Year LLB. Degree Course, if not
otherwise ineligible on the ground of unsatisfactory academic perform
ance. As was directed by this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
F Sehravardi, [1981) 2 SCR 79, the seats allocated to the appellants will
be in addition to the normal intake of students in the college.
Both the appeals are allowed. There will. however, be no order
as to costs.
N.P.V Appeal allowed.
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