Shantilal Rampuria & Ors. v. Vega Trading Corporation & Ors.
D SHARMA, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of a suit
filed by the appellants for eviction of the respondent-tenant (herein
after referred to as the Corporation) from certain premises on
Lalbazar Street, Calcutta, on the ground of sub-letting. The City Civil
Court, Calcutta, decreed the suit, but on appeal by the tenant
Corporation, the Calcutta High Court reversed the judgment and
E dismissed the suit.
2. Admittedly the defendant-Corporation was inducted as a
tenant under a registered deed of lease dated 23.4.1948 for a period of
three years from 1.5.1948. After expiry of the period in 1951, the
Corporation continued in possession, and by holding over became a
F month to month tenant. The premises consists of a big room, described
as room No. 3, along with a small room for the use of a Darwan
(porter), staying there as guard. The big room was, from time to time,
leased out by the tenant-Corporation in portions to different sub
tenants and in 1960 the landlord brought a suit, registered as
Ejectment Suit No. 978 of 1960, for the eviction of the Corporation on
G several grounds including sub-letting. In the meantime West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 had been enacted, and the provisions of
S.13(1)(a) which are in the following terms, were relied on by the
parties:
"S. 13. Protection of tenant against eviction. ( 1) Not
withstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no
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SHANTI LAL RAMPURIA Y. VEGA TRADING CORPN. [SHARMA, J .J 635
order or decree for the recovery of possession of any
premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the
landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the
following grounds, namely:
I
(a) where the tenant or any person residing in the
premises let to the tenant without the previous
consent in writing of the landlord transfers. assigns or
sub-lets in whole or in part the premises held by him;
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' · 3. The tenant-Corporation contended that it was permitted to
create sub-leases under clause 6 of the lease document which is quoted
" below and it cannot, therefore, be accused of sub-letting without the C
consent of the landlords:
"That the lessees shall use the demised premises as office in
connection with their business and shall be entitled to
sublet the portion which may not be used by them." o
It was asserted on behalf of the tenant-Corporation that all the sub
tenants had been inducted in the premises in question in pursuance of
the aforesaid permission and before the expiry of the lease period in
1951. The City Civil Court decided the issue in. favour of the
tenant-Corporation on the ground that all the sub-tenancies had been E
created within the period covered by the lease deed and before coming
in force of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The suit was
held to be not maintainable also on the ground that a legally valid
notice terminating the tenancy had not been served on the tenant. The
suit was thus dismissed on 30.8.1962 by the judgment Ext. B(2).
F 4. The present suit was filed in 1972 alleging that the tenant
Corporation has, without the consent of the landlords, created fresh
sub-tenancies in the premises in favour of other sub-tenants after the
dismissal of the earlier suit. The case is that after the original lease
exhausted itself by efflux of time, and otherwise also came to an end by
the landlords' notice terminating it, the general permission under G
clause 6 of the lease deed, mentioned above, also disappeared.
Alternatively the appellants have contended that even assuming that
the term in clause 6 continues to bind the parties, it does not authorise
the respondent-Corporation to sub-let the entire premises. The
dominent purpose of the lease was actual user by the tenant itself for
the purpose of running its office and clause 6 permitted it to sub-let H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1989] 3 S.C.R.
A only such portion which was left unused as surplus. The appellants
have also alleged default of payment of rent, but the plea has been
rejected by the trial court and has not been pressed before us.
5. The suit was defended by the respondent-Corporation con
tending that as held in the earlier suit the defendant was and is entitled
B to grant sub-tenancies, and the plaintiffs' case is fit to be dismissed.
Reliance was placed, besides the plea of res judicata, on the language
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of clause 6 which according to the defendant continues to bind the
parties. The City Civil Court rejected the defendant's case of res
judicala and agreeing with the plaintiffs on the question of sub-letting,-~,
decreed the suit. It held that a number of sub-tenants who were in r
C possession of the premises at the time of the earlier suit have been
substituted later by another set of sub-tenants after the coming into
force of the Act. The learned Judge also agreed with the plaintiffs that
the entire premises was let out to sub-tenants which was not consistent
with the terms of the permission as mentioned in clause 6. The Court,
holding that the tenant had violated the provisions of the 1956 Act,
D passed a decree for eviction in favour of the· plaintiffs. The
tenant-Corporation appealed before the Calcutta High Court.
6. The High Court disagreed with the City Civil Court on the
interpretation of clause 6 of the lease deed, and held that by reason of
the judgment in the earlier suit, the present suit was barred by the rule
E of res judicata. The appeal was, accordingly, allowed and the suit
dismissed.
7. Mr. B: Sen, the learned counsel appearing in support of the
appeal contended that since large portion of the disputed property was
sub-let to fresh sub-tenants after the institution of the earlier suit of
1960, there was no scope for applying the doctrine of resjudicata to the
present litigation. He inter a/ia argued that having regard to the change
in the law brought about by the 1956 Act and specially in view of the
provisions of ss. 13, 14 and 16, the appellants are entitled to a decree.
8. The factual position is that there are 16 sub-tenants as
G mentioned in Annexure B to the plaint who are occupying the disputed
room now. Out of them 5 had been inducted before the 1960 suit and i;
were parties thereto (as was rightly pointed out by the respondent
Corporation in its application dated 17.12.1973 for amendment of the
written statement). The other 11 sub-lessees were let in after the
earlier suit, when the 1956 Act was in force. The question is whether
H the creation of these sub-tenancies violated the provisions of the Act.
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SHANTILAL RAMPURIA v. VEGA TRADING CORPN. [SHARMA. J.[ 637
In the earlier suit all the sub-lessees were inducted during the period
the lease was operative, i.e., much before the present Act was passed.
The question of violation of the provisions of the present Act,
therefore, did not arise there. It follows that so far this issue is
concerned the earlier judgment can not operate by way of res judicata .
9. The main question which remains to be decided is whether in
the circumstances, the plaintiffs' case, based on alleged violation of the
Act can be accepted. S. 14 enjoins that after the commencement of the
Act no tenant shall, without the previous consent in writing of the
_\,landlord, sub-let the whole or any part of the premises held by him as a
' tenant; or transfer or assign his rights in the tenancy or in any part
thereof. According to Mr. Tapas Ray, the learned counsel of the
respondent-Corporation, clause 6 of the lease deed, which continued
to bind the parties by reason of the Corporation holding over, must be
treated to contain the necessary consent of the appellants. As has been
seen earlier, this clause granted a general permission to the tenant to
induct a sub-tenant. Can such a provision in general terms satisfy the
requirements of the Act? Or, as has been suggested on behalf of the
appellant, tbe consent contemplated by the Act has to be specific in
regard to each sub-lease?
10. S. 13 protects a tenant from eviction except on the grounds,
·enumerated therein and one of the grounds in clause (a) of sub-s. (I) is
in the following terms:
"(a) where the tenant or any person residing in the
premises let to the tenant without the previous consent in
writing of the landlord transfers, assigns or sub-lets in
whole or in part the premises held by him;"
The language of Ss. 13 and 14 by itself does not resolve the issue.
However, the provisions of S. 16 which is quoted below clearly
indicate that permission to the tenant to sub-let in general terms can
not be deemed to be consent for the purposes of Ss. 13 and 14:
"S.16 Creation and termination of sub-tenancies to be G
notified-( 1) Where after the commencement of this Act,
any premises are sub-let either in whole or in part by the
tenant with the previous consent in writing of the landlord,
the tenant and every sub-tenant to whom the premises are
sub-let shall give notice to the landlord in the prescribed
manner of the creation of the sub-tenancy within· one H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1989] 3 S.C.R.
Ill
A month from the date of such sub-letting and shall in the ;.
prescribed manner notify the termination of such sub-
tenancy wthin one month of such termination.
(2) Where before the commencement of this Act, the tenant !!I ,,
B with or without the consent of the landlord, has sub-let any
premises either in whole or in part, the tenant and every '.l'
sub-tenant to whom the premises have been sub-let shall
give notice to the landlord of such sub-letting in the
prescribed manner (within six months) of the commence-
ment of this Act and shall in the prescribed manner notify_ ,l
the termination of such sub-tenancy within one month of '
c such termination. '
:.
(3) Where in any case mentioned in sub-section (2) there is
no consent in writing of the landlord and the landlord
denies that he gave oral consent, the Controller shall, on an
application made to him in this behalf either by the land-
lord or the sub-tenant within two months of the date of the
receipt of the notice of sub-letting by the landlord or the
issue of the notice by the sub-tenant, as the case may be, by
order. declare that the tenant's interest in so much of the
premises as has been sub-let shall cease and that the sub- -tenant shall become a tenant directly u'lder the landlord
E from the date of the order. The Controller shall also fix the
rents payable by the tenant and such sub-tenant to the
landlord from the date of the order. Rents so fixed shall be
deemed to be fair rent for purposes of this Act."
It is plain from the above that the Act contemplates that while one
~ F sub-tenant may be evicted another may continue in the premises as a
tenant directly under him, depending on the circumstances. We are,
therefore, of the view that previous consent in writing of the landlord
with respect to each sub-letting separately is essential ..\rid a general
authority to the tenant in this regard will not be sufficient in law. Our
view is supported by the observations in Mis Shalimar Tar Products
Ltd. v. H. C. Sharma and Others, I 1988] 1 SCC 70; a case arising under
the Delhi Rent Control Act. An examination of Ss. 14(l)(b), 16, 17
~ and 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act would show that the two Acts
(West Bengal Act and the Delhi Act) are similar so far the present
question is concerned. In the present case, since it is not suggested on
behalf of the respondent that consent of the appellants was obtained
H specifically for each of the sub-tenancies, the respondent-Corporation
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SHANTI LAL RAM PU RIA'· VEGA TRADING CORPN. !SHARMA. J.J 639
must be held to have violated S. 14. The appellants have thus, A
established the ground mentioned in S. 13(1)(a) and are entitled to
succeed.
11. None of the sub-tenants has been impleaded in the present
suit, but as it is not the case of the tenant-Corporation that any of them
had sent any notice to the plaintiffs, the suit, so far the present
respondent is concerned, can not fail on the ground of their non-
impleading. However, the sub-tenants can not be bound by' the finding
in this suit that they have failed to serve a notice as prescribed by the
·Act on the plaintiffs and will be entitled to be heard if and when the
plaintiffs seek their eviction. So far the sub-tenants who had been
inducted in the premises earlier and were parties to the 1960 suit may
have still a better claim on the strength of the decree in their favour
and may insist that they would be entitled to continue iii possession as
tenants directly under the plaintiffs.
12. For the reasons mentioned above, the decision of the High
Court is set aside and the decree of eviction passed by the City Civil
Court against the respondent-Corporation is restored. The appeal is
accordingly allowed with costs throughout.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed .
El