Special Military Estates Officer v. Munivenkataramiah & Another
M.M. PUNCHHI, J. It is to establish a right of appeal in the
appellate forum of the High Court that the Special Military Estates
Officer, Bangalore, the common appellant in these two Civil Appeals
by Special Leave, is here in this Court, challenging the common judg
ment and order of the High Co11rt of Karnataka.
The facts leading to the present appeal are these. Some lands,
the extent and description of which is not materi.al here, belonging to
the first respondent in either of these two appeals, were requisi\ioned
by the Union of India under Section 29 of the Defence of India Act,
1962 (hereafter referred to as the Defence Act) by issuing a notifica
tion to that effect on April 8, 1963. The possession of such lands was G
taken by the military authorities on May 28, 1963. The competent
authority, being the Deputy Commissioner of the district, fixed Rs.280
per acre per annum as crop compensation. Respondent No. I was not
satisfied with the measure of compensation. He sought a reference
from !he competent authority to an arbitrator. The Arbitrator so
appointed went into the matter and finally made an award on June 30, H
1971, whereby he worked out rental compensation at the rate of
Rs.6969.60 per acre per annum on the premises that the value ofthe
land worked out to be Rs. l, 16, 160 per acre and if 6 per cent interest
were to be awarded themon the figure arrived at would be Rs.6969.60
per acre, which could well be the rental income per annum. Obviously,
the increase was sharply contrasted being Rs:Z80 per acre per annum
as awarded by the compi:tent authority and almost Rs. 7 ,000 per acre
per· annum as awarded by the Arbitrator. The aggrieved Special Mili
tary Estates Officer filed two appeals against the orders of the
Arbitrator in the High Court of Kamataka at Bangalore, taking shel
ter under Section 11 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immov
able Property Act, 1952 (hereafter referred to as the Requisitioning
Act). At the time of their final disposal, a preliminary objection was
raised on behalf of the respondents that the appeals were not main
tainable, which found favour with the High Court. The appeals were
consequen'tly held not maintainable and accordingly dismissed. This
has led the appellant-Special Military Estates Officer, to this Court.
It is not far history that the Defence Act was passed by the
Parliament in the wake of the Chinese aggression, in order to provide,
inter alia, special measures to ensure public safety and interest in the
Defence of India and Civil Defence and other connected matters. It
had been passed when the Requisitioning Act was already in force.
·Under the provisions of both the Acts, immovable property could be
requisitioned. Reference for the purpose may be had to section 3 of
the Requisitioning Act and Section 29 of the Defence Act. Under both
Acts compensation on such requisition is determinable and payable
and any person interested, being aggrieved by the amount of compen
sation so determined, can have an Arbitrator appointed to determine
compensation. The award of the Arbitrator on such determination
under Section 8 is appealable under Section 11 of the Requisitioning
Act before the High Court within whose jurisdiction the requisitioned
property is situate. The award of the Arbitrator made under Section 30
in pursuance of the requisition made under Section 29 of the Defence
Act is apparently final, though specifically not provided so, since no
right of appeal against the award of the Arbitrator has been conferred
thereunder on any authority. The Defence Act ceased being applicable
as it perished on January 10, 1968. Simultaneously Section 25 in the
Requisitioning Act was substituted. The substituted Section 25 reads
as follows:
"25(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,
any immovable property requisitioned by the Central
ESTATE OFFICER v. MUNIVENKATARAMIAH [PUNCHHI, J.] 9
Government or by any officer or authority to whom powers A in this behalf have been delegated by that Government,
under the Defence of India Act, 1962, and the rules made
thereunder (including any immovable property deemed to
have been requisitioned under the said Act) which has not
been released from such requisition before the 10th
January, 1968, shall, as from that date, be deemed to have B
been requisitioned by the competent authority under the
provisions of this Act for the purpose for which such pro-
perty was held immediately before the said date and all the
provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.
Provided that: c
}
(a) all determinations, agreements and awards for the pay-
meM of compensation in respect of any such property for
any period of requisition before the said date and in force
immediately before the said date, shall continue to be in
force and shall apply to the payment of compensation in D
respect of that property for any period of requisition as
from the said date;
(b) anything done or any action taken (including any
orders, notifications or rules made or issued) by the Central
Government or by any officer or authority to whom powers E
in this behalf have been delegated by that Government, in
exercise of the powers conferred by or under Chapter VI of
the Defence of India Act, 1962, shall, in so far as it is not
inconsisten.t with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to
have been done or taken in the exercise of the powers
conferred by or under this Act as if this section was in force F
on the date on which such thing was done or action was
taken.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (1), the pro-
visions of the Defence of India Act, 19.62, and the rules
made thereunder, in so far as those provisiqqs relate to the G
~
requisitioning of any such immovable pr.operty as is refer-
' red to in sub-Section (1), shall as from the 10th January,
1968, cease to operate except as respect things done or
omitted to be done before such cesser and Section 6 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897, shall apply upon such.cesser of
operation as if such cesser were ·a repeal of an enactment by H
a Central Act.
The ~eCJ\l.isi(ioned property ad'l1\t\e\lly was not released before
January 10, 1968, in terms of Section 25(1) of the Requisitioning Act,
afore quoted, Since the requisition had not been released before
January 10, 1968, from that day onwards it had to be treated deem
ingly to have been requisitioned by the competent authority under the
provisions of the Requisitioning Act for the purpose for which such
property was held immediately before the said date and all the provi
sions of the said Act were to apply accordingly. The objection to the
maintainability of the appeals rested on proviso (a), afore-quoted, on
the ground that the word 'determination' in the context meant
determination only by the competent authority under the Defence Act
and since such determination held the field and was in force
immediately before January 10, 1968, no challenge thereto could be
made by appealing against the same, on the premises that a provision
amongst all the provisions of the Requisitioning Act provided an
appellate forum challenging the same. The objection was met on the
argument that the word 'determination' when considered in the con
text of the proviso, meant 'final determination' and not merely
determination of compensation at the level of the competent autho
rity. The High Court, as said before, upheld the objection, dismissing
the appeals.
It is settled law that the right of appeal is a substantive right
conferred on a party by the statute. The conferring of right of appeal is
not circumscribed by the right. being available at the time of the institu
tion of the cause in the court of the first instance. The right of appeal in
a given situation may already be available at the institution of the
cause in the court of the first instance or may even be subsequently
conferred. In either situation, without any distinction, such right is
conferred by statute. Here, as would be seen, Section 25(1) substan
tively provides that the requisition of property under the Defence Act
continuing upto January 10, 1968, is deemingly a requisition by the
compet~nt authority under the provisions of the Requisitioning Act
and all the provisions of the said Act shall apply thereto accordingly.
Proviso (a) however, says that all determinations, agreements and
awards for the payment of compensation in respect of any such pro
perty for any period of requisition betore the said date and in force
immediately before the said date, shall continue to be in force and
shall apply to the payment of compensation in respect of that property
for any period of requisition as from the said date. It is discernible
from the scheme of things and from the reading of Section 25 of the
Requisitioning Act as a whole that for the period of requisition before
January 10, 1968, the determination for payment of compensation
ESTATE OFFICER v. MUNlVENKATARAMlAH [PUNCHHl. J.J 11
under the Defence Act would remain untouched and unaltered for A
appeal had never been provided under that Act. The reason is not far
to seek, because the order of the competent authohty under the
Defence Act was for the purpose of Defence of India. That jlUrpose
having gone with effect from January 10, 1968, the same determination
for payment of compensation being applicable to the post-date .period
was deemingly a requisition by the competent autht\tity tinder the
Requisitioning Aci and since all the provisions of the said Act appiied
to such a requisiticin, ilie payrii'eiit of cc.>mpensatioil as from January
10, 1968, became appealable as an appeal is provided under this Act.
In that sense, the word 'determination', so far as it related to the
period of requisition prior to January 10, 1968, was a determination,
final in character whether it was right or wrong as having been made
under the Defence Act. But for the period thereafter, the word
'determination' iii the context would mean 'final determination' i.e.
the determination of the competent authority if unchallenged and
becoming final, and if appealed against, final determination by the
appellate forum. In this sense, the latter portion of proviso (a) cannot
be allowed to eat away the applicability of all the provisions of the
Requisitioning Act, indusive that of appeal under Section 11 of the
Act. Thus a harmonious construction of the said proviso with the
whole of parent section persuades us to hold that the rate of compensa
tion as determined by the ccirilpeteni authority under the Defence Act
was valid uptil the period before January 10, 1968, but from that day
onward the same rate of compensation per annum would keep apply
ing till upset or altered in appeai, because deemingly from that date it
is a requisition under the other Act and of a different worth and
correctable in appeal. The Arbitrator as it appears had passed both the
awards on June 30, 1971, pertaining to the period commencing from
May 28, 1963, (the date on which the possession of the land
requisitioned was taken) and valid for the period following and ensu
ing. Plainly the award was made covering a period not only prior to
January 10, 1968 but to a period thereafter also. As we have inter
preted Section 25, the objection as raised before the I-iigh Court was
valid for the period before January 10, 1968, liut not beyond ihe period
commencing thereafter. The High Court's view , irl sustaihing the
objection for the later period as well, does not commend to us. The G
Legislature by enacting Section 25 of the RecjliiSitioning Act and on
the perishing of the Defence Act, has mote than i.ilipliedly made avail
able a right of appeal regarding the rate of compensation for a pro
perty remaining under requisition for the post 10th January, 1968
period: recurring as the rate of compensation wolild be. We hold it
accordingly. H
A For the view above taken, we partially allow these appeals and
remit these cases back to the High Court of Kamataka for disposal on
merits in accordance with law. We, however, make no order as to costs
in the appeals before us.
B N.V.K. App_eals allowed partly.