Kishan Lal and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

R.M. SABAi, J. Validity of Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 {for brevity the Act) levying market-fee on sale and purchase of agricultural produce in market-yard or sub-market­ yard was challenged by dealers for ·lack of legislative competence, violation of Articles 14, 19, 301 and 304 of Constitution, absence of C any quid pro quo in the fee paid and service rendered, illegal and arbitrary inclusion of manufactured articles such as Khandsari, Shak­ kar, Gur and Sugar as agricultural produce in the schedule etc. Acts of other States, for instance, Punjab and Haryana and U.P. were also assailed for similar infirmities. Whether these petitions, D which appear to be identical, are reproduction of any of those peti­ tions, which were pending in this Court from before is not relevant but various group of petitions of Punjab and Haryana deale~s challenging constitutionality and legality of Act and its provisions including Gur, Khandsari and Shakkar as agricultural produce in the schedule of Pun jab Act have been dismissed by different benches presumably E because of decisions in Kewal Krishan Puriv. State of Punjab, [1979] 3 SCR 1217; Ramesh Chandra v. State of U.P., [1980] 3 SCR 166; Rathi Khandsari Udyog v. State of U.P., [1982] 2 SCR 966 and Sreenivisa General .Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 1264. Despite these decisions spelling out basic principles for deter- F mining validity of marketing legislations dealing with agricultural pro­ duce the petitioners were not willing to take it lying down probably because none of these decisions dealt with sugar. It was urged that inclusion of sugar in the Schedule of the Act was arbitrary,, primarily because it being a declared commodity of public importance under Entry 52 of List I of Schedule VII the State legislature was precluded G from legislating on it. Its inclusion in the Schedule was also assailed as it being a Mill or Factory produce it could not be deemed to be agricultural produce which is basically confined to produce of or from soil. Sugar is one of the items which was included in the Schedule to H the Act, statutorily, right from its inception. Such inclusion is found in .. ··~ .. KISHAN LAL v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [SAHAI, J.[ 145 Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal, Bihar etc. Whether it was subse­ quently deleted or re-included or re-grouped or it was added later was immaterial as Section 40 of the Act empowered State Government to amend or include any item in the Schedule of agricultural produce. Existence of such delegated power is usual feature of the statutes. No illegality or infirmity could be pointed out in it. Any challenge, therefore, founded on excessive delegation of legislative power was misconceived. Inclusion of sugar in the Schedule was urged to be arbitrary as it was not produced out of soil the basic ingredient of agricultural pro­ duce. Fallacy of the submission is apparent as it was in complete disre­ gard of definition of the word "agricultural produce" in the Act which includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mill or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks expanse of the expression "or otherwise as specified in the Schedule." Nor switch over from indigenous method of producing anything to scientific or mechanical method changes its character. Khandsari sugar, which is produced by open pan process and is not different from sugar pro­ duced by vacuum pan process except in composition, filterability and conductivity as held in Rathi Khandsari Udyog, (supra) was held to be agricultural produce in some decisions. No distinction was made on method of production, namely, by modem plant and machinery. To say, therefore, that sugar being produced in mill or factories could not be deemed to be agricultural produce is both against the statutory language and judicial interpretation of similar provisions of the Act in statutes of other States. Rice or dal produced in mills have been held to be agricultura\produce in Ramesh Chandra v. U.P. State, (1980] 3 SCR 194 and State of U.P. v.Ganga Das Mill, (1985] SCR 87-88. Even in Halsbury Law of England,' Vol. I the word agricultural produce for purpose of agricultural marke.ting schemes is understood as, 'including any product of agriculture or horticulture and any article of food or drink wholly or partly manufactured or derived from any such product and fleeces (including all kinds of wool) and the skins of animals'. In the same volume products covered by the provisions of EEC Treaty as to agriculture (classified according to the Brussels Nomenclature of 1965) are mentioned in paragraph 1845. Sugar is one of them. 146 SUPREME' COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R. Another legalistic challenge regarding inhibition of State to legislate on SU_llar or of repeated argument of occupied field was more attractive than of any substance. Reliance on Article 246 of the Con­ stitution was academic only. As far back as 1956 Constitution Bench of this Court in Choudhary Tika Ram and others v. State of U. P., [ 1956] SCR 393 examined the matter in detail and held sugar legislations to be within the scope of Entry 33 of concurrent list. It was observed that all 'Acts and the notifications issued thereunder by the Centre in regard to sugar and sugarcane were-enacted in exercise of concurrent · jurisdiction'. Effect of it was described thus, 'The Provincial Legisla­ tur¢ as well as the Central Legislature would be competent to enact such pieces of legislation and no question of legislative competence would arise'. Any further discussion on clash between Entry 52 of List I of VII Schedule with Entry 28 of List II in the circumstances is unnecessary. As regards the submission of occupied field suffice it to say that there is no repugnancy in the Central and State legislation. Atleast none was made out. Even if there would have been any the Act having received assent of the President it is fully protected by Article D 254(2). For these reasons these petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. N.P.V. Petitions dismissed.