Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (WVG.) Co. Lid. v. Custodian of Vested Forests Palghat and Anr.

K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This appeal by leave from a Full Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court raises a short question E of construction of the plain words of a term 'private forest' as defined in a statutory enactment called "The Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (called shortly "The Vesting Act"). The High Court has decided the question in favour of the State and against the appellant. The judgment of the High Court has since been reported in AIR 1980 Kerala 137. The view expressed by the High F Court has been subsequently affirmed by another Full Bench in State of Kera/a v. Malayalam Plantation Ltd., AIR 1981 Kerala 1 and reiterated by a larger Bench of five' Judges in State of Kera/a v. K. C. Moosa Haji & Ors., AIR 1984 Kerala 149, Losing the construction argument, the appellant has appealed to G this Court. The facts of the case are immaterial for the purpose of this judg- ment, save to state in the barest outline that the appellant is the Rayon Silk Manufacturing Company registered in the State of Madhya Pradesh. One of its industrial undertakings is located in Bilakootam, H Mavoor in Kozhikode District, Kerala State. This establishment pro- , ).. ' ~ J "' ,..:( )- GWALIOR RAYON CO. v. CUSTODIAN OF FORESTS ISHETTY, J.]405 duces Rayon Grade Pulp, using Bamboo Eucalyptus and other species A of wood as basic raw material. It has a large eucalyptus plantation ---<" covering thousands of acres, maintained as captive raw material for use in the factory. The State says that as a consequence of the Vesting Act, the eucalyptus plantation being a privat,e forest and not excluded therefrom is vested in the State with no right, title and interest subsist- ing with the company. The claim of the company, however, is that the B term 'private forest' as defined under the Vesting Act, excludes the eucalyptus plantation. ~ . .it 'Private forest' has been defined in the Vesting Act as well as under the Kerala Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1964) as amended by Amendment Act 35 of 1969 ("The KLR Act"). Since counsel for the c appellant largely depends upon the judicial construction of the defini- lion of 'private forest' in the KLR Act, it is necessary that we should set out hereunder both the definitions placed alongside with each ''- . other: THE KERALA PRIVATE FOR THE KERALA LAND REFORMS, D ESTS (VESTING AND ASSIGN- ACT (ACT 1 OF 1964) AS MENT) ACT, 1971 AMENDEDBYTHEKERALA LAND REFORMS (AMEND- MENT ACT 35/1969) ...._ (Act 26of1971) (AS AMENDED BY ACT5 2. Definitions. In this Act unless of 1978) the context otherwise requires- 2. Definitions: In this Act unless ( 47) 'private forest' means a forest ~- the context otherwise requires- which is not owned by the Govern- nient but does not include- (f) 'private forest' means F ~ ( 1) in relation to the Malabar (i) areas which are waste and dist!iict referred to in sub-section are not enclaves within (2) of Section 5 of the States wooded areas; Reorganisation Act, 1956 (ii) areas which are gardens (Central Act 37 of 1956) ornilams; G (iii) areas which are planted with "'( (i) any land to which the Madras tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, Preservation of Private Forests cardamom or cinnamon; and Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXVIII of 1949) applied immediately (iv) other areas which are culti- H before the appointed day excluding- (A) Lands which are gardens or nilams as defined in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (1 of 1964) (B) Lands which are used princi­ pally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom, or cinnamon and lands used for C any purpose ancillary to the culti­ vation of such crops or for the pre­ paration of the same for the market.· Explanation-Lands used fot the construction of office buildings, godowns, factories, quarters for workmen, hospitals, schools and playgrounds shall be deemed to be lands used for purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such crops; ( C) lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees or are princi- pally cultivated with any other ag- ricultural crop; (D) sites of buildings and lands appurtenant to and necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of, such buildings; (ii) any forest not owned by the Government, to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 did not apply, including wastelands which are enclaves within wooded areas. vated with pepper, arecanut coconut, cashew or other fruit­ bearing trees or are cultivated with any .other agricultural crop; .... " ··-r ~· ' _.,;' 'J. ...... ""--·· GWALIOR RAYON CO. v. CUSTODIAN OF FORESTS ISHETTY, J.]407 (2) in relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala, any forest not owned by the Govern­ ment, including waste lands which are enclaves within wooded areas. Explanation: For the purposes of this clause, a land shall be deemed to be a waste land notwithstanding the existence thereon of scattered trees or shrubs;" We may first examine the scope of the definition of 'private forest' under Section 2( 47) of the KLR Act. It means a forest which is not owned by the Government, excluding thereby four kinds of areas specified under sub-clauses (i) to (iv). The latter part of sub-clause (iv) contains the words " . . . . . Other areas cultivated with any other agricultural crop". The terms 'agriculture' and 'agricultural crop' have wider as well as narrower connotation. The wider concept covers both the primary or basic as well as the subsequent operations. It takes within its fold among other things, the products of the land which have some utility either for consumption or for trade and commerce including forest products such as timber, sal and piyasal trees, casuarina plantations, tendu leaves, horranuts etc. (See: Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, [ 1958] SCR 101 at 156. Of course there must be present all throughout the basic idea that there must be cultivation of land in the sense of tilling of the lands, sowing of the seeds, planting and similar work done in the land. The forest growth or <pontaneous growth of any product, plants or trees, however, would be outside the characteristic of agricultural products or operations. In Malankara Rubber and Produce Co. v. State of Kera/a & Ors., [ 1973] 1 SCR 399, this Court while examining the scheme of KLR Act with particular reference to Chapter III therein observed that 'lands under eucalyptus or teak which are the result of agricultural operations normally would be agricultural lands, but not lands which are covered by eucalyptus or teak growing spontaneously as in a jungle or a forest.' This is the wider concept of agricultural crop, perhaps attributed to the latter part of sub-clause (iv) of the definitipn under Section 2(47) of the KLRAct. The latter part of sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(47) of the KLR H 408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1990] 2 S.C.R. Act, counsel for the appellant contended, is practically the same as the second limb of sub-clause (C) of Section 2(f)(l)(i) of the Vesting Act. It was claimed that since eucalyptus plantation is covered by the expre­ ssion 'any other agricultural crop' in Section 2( 47) sub-clause (iv) of the KLR Act, Section 2(f)(!)(i) sub-clause (C) of the Vesting Act with similar words must also carry the same meaning. It was emphasised that the KLR Act and the Vesting Act constitute a Code of agrarian reform and they are cognate legislations with the Vesting Act as sup­ plementary to the KLR Act. The expression 'any other agricultural crop' used in both the enactments while defining 'private forest' must therefore, receive the same meaning as otherwise, it would lead to anomalies. This is the line of argument for the appellant. This whole line of arguments with respect, is hard to accept. As Felix Frankfurter, J. said: ·'Legislation is a form of literary composi­ tion. But construction is not an abstract process equally valid for every composition, not even for every composition whose meaning must be judicially ascertained. The nature of the composition demands aware- ness of certain presuppositions ...... And so, the significance of an enactment, its antecedents as well,as its later history, its relation to other enactments, all may be relevant to the construction of words for one purpose and fa one· setting but not for another. Some words are confined to their history; some are starting points for history."Words are intellectual ~nd moral currency. They come from the legislative mint with some intrinsic meaning. Sometimes it remains unchanged. Like currency, words sometimes appreciate or depreciate in value''. The learned Judge further stated: "Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a ch.ange of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. That is what. the Judge must seek and effectuate." (See: Courts, Judges and Politics by Walter F. Murphy: 'Some Reflections of the Reading of Statutes' by Felix Frankfurter). Judicial interpretation given to the words defined in one statute does not afford a guide to construction of the same words in another statute .unless the Statutes areyari materia legislations. In the present case, the aim and object of the two legislations are not similar in the first place. Secondly, the definition of 'private forest' in the KLR Act is not just the same as the definition of 'private fore.sit' in the Vesting Act. Indeed, there is a vast difference in between the two. The object of the Vesting Act was to provide for the Vesting in the Government GWALIOR RAYON CO. v. CUSTODIAN OF FORESTS (SHETTY, J.]409 of private forest in the State of Kerala for the assignment thereof to A the agriculturists and agricultural labourers for cultivation. The ~ preamble of the Act provides that such agricultural lands should be so utilised as to increase the agricultural production in the State and to promote the welfare of the agricultural population in the State. Two separate definitions have been provided in the Vesting Act; the first is applicable to the Malabar district where the Madras Preservation of B Private Forests Act, 1949 ('The MPPF Act') applied immediately before the appointed day; the second concerned is in relation to the / remaining areas in the State of Kerala. The definition of 'private ~ ~ forest' as is applicable to the Malabar district is not general in terms but limited to the areas and lands to which the MPPF Act applied and exempts therefrom lands described under sub-clauses (A) to (D). This c significant reference to MPPF Act in the definition of 'private forest' in the Vesting Act makes all the dif:(erence in the case. The MPPF.Act was a special enactment. It was enacted by the erstwhile Madras State -~ to preserve the private forests in the district of Malabar and erstwhile South Kannara District. The Scheme of that Act has been explained by sevfral decisions of the Kerala High Court and that scheme appears to D be that if the land is shown to be private forest on the date on which the MPPF Act.came into force, it would continue to be a forest, even if there was subsequent replantatioll'. (See: State of Kera/a v. Anglo American D. T. T. Co., [1980] Ker. L.T. 215 and State of Kera/a v. K.C. Moosa Haji, (supra) (FB) AIR 1984 Ker. 149 ai 154-155.) \~--- E It is not in dispute that the lands involved in this appeal were all forests as defined in the MPPF Act, 1949 and cm1lmued to be so when the Vesting Act came into force in 1971. In Malankara case (supra), this Court was not concerned with the lands covered b.y the MPPF Act, and denuded thereafter of forest growth ·and cultivated with fresh replantation. Therefore, it seems inappropriate to transplant the meaning accorded to 'private forest' from the KLR Act to the Vesting ~ Act. That wide i;:oncept cannot fit into the new legal source. In State of Kera/av. Gwalior Rayon .Silk tlffg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd., [ 1974] 1 SCR 671, this Court while upholding the constitutional vali- dity of the Vesting Act has observed that the Forest Lands in the State G of Kerala has attained a peculiar character owing to the geography and climate ahd the evidence available showed that the vast areas of these i' forests are still capable of supporting a large agricultural plantations. That much is clear from the following observations (at 683): "It is therefcre, manifest'that when the legislature stated in H 410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 2 S.C.R. the preamble that the private forests are agricultural lands, they merely wanted to convey that they are lands which by and large could be prudently and profitably exploited for agricultural purposes." There is thus a judicial recognition of the distinction between B private forest in Travancore-Cochin area in Kerala State and the pri­ vate forest in Malabar district. This distinction by itself is sufficient to dispel the anomalies suggested by counsel for the appellant. Look at the definition. Sub-clause (A) refers to gardens or nilams as defined in the KLR Act. 'Garden' means lands used princi­ pally for growing coconut trees, arecanut trees or pepper vines or any two or more of the same. 'Nilam' means lands adapted for the cultiva­ tion of paddy. Sub-clause (B) deals with what may be called plantation crops, cultivation of which in the general sense would be cultivation of agricultural crops. Such agricultural crops are by name specified. Lands used for any purpose ancillary to such cultivation or for pre­ paration of the same for the market are also included thereunder. Next follows sub-clause (C). It first refers to lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It thus refers to only the fruit bearing trees. It next refers to 'lands which are princi­ pally cultivated with any other agricultural crop. If the legislature had intended to use the term 'agricultural crop' in a wide sense so as to take within its fold all species of trees fruit-bearing or otherwise, it would be unnecessary to have the first limb denoting only the cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It may be significant to note that the Legislature in each sub-clause (A) to (C) has used the words to identify the different categories of crops or trees. The words used in every sub-clause too have "'associations, echoes and overtones". While construing such words, judges must, as Felix Frankfurter, J., said "retain the associations, hear the echoes and capture the over­ tones" (supra p. 414). When so examined and construed, we do not discover any indication that the words in sub-clause (C) "any other agricultural crop" are quite wide enough to comprehend all species of trees including eucalyptus plantations. It is said, indeed rightly, that in seeking legislative intention, judges not only listen to the voice of the legislature but also listen attentatively to what the legislature does not say. Let us compare the wordings in Section 3 with those of sub-clause (C). Under Section 3 sub-section ( 1), private forests vest in Government. Sub-clause (2) H however, excludes from such vesting lands within the ceiling limits GWALIOR RAYON CO. v. CUSTODIAN OF FORESTS !SHETTY, J.]411 applicable to an owner if they are under his personal cultivation. Culti­ vation for this purpose "includes cultivation of trees or plants of auy species". The explanation to sub-section (2) makes this aspect beyond doubt. The lands used for the cultivation of any kind of tree, fruit­ bearing or yielding only timber or pulp are not vested under Section 3 sub-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub-section (2) the trees of every variety. But while provid­ ing for exclusion under sub-clause (C), the legislature could not have again thought of trees or plants of' all kinds. It seems to have con­ sidered only fruit-bearing trees and not of other species. If the inten­ tion was otherwise, the sub-clause {C) would have been in a different language. In our view as a matter of pure construction untrammelled by authority, the words used in the latter part of sub-clause (C) could not take within its fold all varieties of trees and it could exclude only fruit-bearing trees. This is also the conclusion of the High Court not only in the impugned judgment under appeal but also in the subsequent two deci­ sions; Malayalam Plantation Limited and K. C. Moosa Haji cases (supra). In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs. T.N.A. Appeal dismissed. 8