Elizabeth Antony v. Michel Charles John Chown Lengera
Cited by 2 judgments in this corpus
- Pasupati Nath Das(Dead) Thr. Lrs. vs Chanchal Kumar Das(D) Thr. Lrs And Ors. · 2018 INSC 868
- KRISHNA KUMAR BIRLA v. RAJENDRA SINGH LODHA AND OTHERS · 2008 INSC 424
These judgments mention this one. Whether each followed, distinguished or doubted it is not recorded here — read them before relying on any of it.
K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J. We have heard both the sides
and the matter is being disposed of at the admission stage.
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This petition is directed against the order of a learned Single
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Judge of the Madras High Court confirming the order passed by the
Subordinate Judge, Nilgiris. The matter arises under the Indian Sue-
cession _Act, 1925 ('Act' for short) and the facts that give rise to the
petition are as follows:
The testatrix Mary Aline Browne was the wife of Herbel Evan-
der Browne who was the eldest son of one John Browne. The testatrix
had a daughter of the name of Zoe Enid Browne and she died on
8.10.1977. The respondent claiming to be the beneficiary to the estate
of Mary Aline Browne who died on 28.3.1972 under the terms of a will
said to have been executed by her on 12.3. 1962 filed an application for
letters of Administration with a copy of the will annexed in the Sub
Court, Nilgiris. The same is numbered as O.S. No. 23 of 1980. Along-
_with the application the respondent also filed an affidavit of an attestor -...,/_
of the Will. In that proceeding, the petitioner and her deceased
husband lodged a caveat on the ground that the said Mary Aline
Browne did not execute any will and the will propounded by the
respondent was a fictitious and forged one, intended to disentitle Zoe
Enid Browne, daughter of the testatrix from claiming interest in the •
estate of her mother. The petitioner also claimed that Zoe Enid
Browne executed a will dated 23.6.1975 in favour of the petitioner and \. that she also executed a gift-deed in her favour. The petitioner also
claimed that she was a trustee of John Browne Trust and that there-
fore, the petitioner has caveatable interest. Thus they opposed the
probate of the will. Before the Sub-Court, several documents were
filed. The respondent herein contested the caveat stating that the
petitioner herein has no interest in the estate. The learned Subordi-
nate Judge held that the petitioner is not in any manner related either
to Mary Aline Browne or Zoe Enid Browne. The learned Single Judge ,
of the High Court in an elaborate order having considered the rival
contentions dismissed the Civil Revision Petition holding that the
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MRS. ELIZABE1H v. MICHEL (REDDY, J.( 489
petitioner cannot claim to be a person who has a caveatable interest in
the estate of the deceased testatrix Mary Aline Browne. We are told
that the will has subsequently been probated and the letters of
Administration have been granted.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that both the
courts below have erred in holding that the petitioner has no caveat-·
able interest. It is submitted that the petitioner is executor and legatee
of the will dated 23.6.1975 executed by Miss Zoe Enid Browne daugh-
ter of Mrs. Mary Aline Browne and that Miss Zoe has also executed a
registered gift-deed dated 29.3.1974 in respect of the second item ot the
estate and that the petitioner was also appointed a trustee of John
Browne Trust on 11.6.1975 and therefore, in law the petitioner has an
interest in the property which is the subject-matter of the will and thus
have caveatable interest.
Under Section 283 of the Act, the District Judge or District
Delegate may, if he thinks proper, issue citations calling upon all
persons claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased to
come and see the proceedings before the grant of probate or letters of
administration. Section 284 provides for lodging caveat against grant
of probate or administration. Section 285 lays down that no proceed-
ing shall be taken on a petition for probate or letters of administration
after a caveat against the grant thereof has been entered until the
notice has been given to the caveator. Section 286 deals with the power
of a District Delegate and lays down that he shall not grant probate or
letters of administration in any case in which there is "contention" as
to the grant, or in which it otherwise appears to him that probate or
letters of administration, ought not to be granted in this Court. Under
Section 288 where there is contention or where the District Delegate
thinks that probate or letters of administration should be refused, the
documents shall be returned to the applicant. In the instant case the
Sub-Judge comes within the meaning of the District Delegate and the
necessary powers were conferred on him by a notification which is not
in dispute. According to the learned counsel the petitioner duly lodged
a caveat against the grant of probate and that both the courts below
have not properly appreciated the effect of such a contention and erred
in striking off the petitioner's caveat.
In Nabin Chandra Guha v. Nibaran Chandra Biswas and Ors.,
AIR 1932 Calcutta 734, the Division Bench held that a person who has
a real interest in the estate which is or is likely to be prejudicially
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490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990! 2 S.C.R.
affected or adversely affected by the will can oppose the grant of
probate or letters of administration. In Gourishankar Chattorajv. Smt.
Satyabati Debi, AIR 1931 Calcutta 470, it is held that the petitioner
therein who was related to the deceased through a common ancestor,
can be said to have interest in opposing the application for probate. In
Shanti Devi Aggarwal/av. Kusum Kumari Sarkar & Ors., AIR 1972
Orissa 178, Justice Ranganath Misra, as he then was, held that the
. vendor legatee is entitled to enter caveat and the purchaser having
stepped into the shoes of vendor is also entitled to enter the caveat. In
Narayan Sah v. Smt. Davaki, AlR 1978 Patna 220, considering the
locus standi of a person to oppose grant, it is held that any interest,
however, slight and even a bare possibility of an interest is sufficient to
entiile a person to enter caveat in a probate proceeding.
Relying on these decisions the learned counsel urged that the
petitioner in the instant case has substantial interest in the estate. The
learned counsel for the respondent did not dispute the legal position.
He, however, contended that there was absolutely no material before
the Courts below to substantiate the alleged interest of the petitioner
in the estate. It is submitted that the so-called will said to have been
executed· by Miss Zoe Enid Browne, daughter of Mrs. Mary Aline
Browne has not been filed. Likewise, the gift-deed also was not filed.
Coming to the trust of John Browne it is submitted that the trust does
not exist and got extinguished. The learned counsel for the respondent
further submittea that except mentioning these three aspects in a bare
manner no other material was placed ·before the Court. Having
gone through both the orders we are mclined to agree with the learned
counsel for the respondent that the petitioner did not establish her
caveatable interest. We have perused the entire order of the trial court
in this context. Admittedly neither the original nor a copy of the will
said to have been executed by Zoe Enid Browne, was filed. Now
coming to the trust, it is in the evidence of P. W. 1 that John Browne
Trust has come to an end in March, 1972 and the same was not in \.r
existence. The trial court has considered both the documentary and
oral evidence in this regard and has rightly held that the petitioner has
no existing benefit from the trust. Likewise the registered gift-deed or
a copy of it has not been filed. Before the learned Single Judge of the
High Court also same contentions were put forward. The learned
Judge observed that from the objections filed by the caveator she
desires the Court in the probate proceedings to uphold her title on the
strength of a gift-deed and the Trust deed. It is observed:
"Equally, the petitioner has not placed before the Court
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MRS. ELIZABETH v. MICHEL (RIIDDY, J.] 491
the will dated 23.6.1975 stated to have been executed by
Zoe Enid Browne to establish that under the will dated
·12.3. 1962 stated to have been executed by Mary Aline
Browne some interest given to'the petitioner under the will
dated 23.6.1975 of Zoe Enid Browne, is liable to be in any
manner affected or otherwise displaced, by the grant of
letters of administration in respect of the will aated
12.3.1962 stated to have beeo executed by Mary Aline
Browne."
Accordingly the learned Judge held that the pet1t1oner has not
established that she has a caveatable interest justifying her opposition
to the probate proceedings for grant of letters of administration. In c
this state of affairs, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel
that the petitioner has caveatable interest.
Learned counsel, however, submitted that the will executed by
Zoe Enid Browne on 23.6.1975 in favour of the petitioner though not
filed but was subsequently probated in the year 1989 and the fact that
probate is granted can be taken into consideration by this Court as a
subsequent happening, as the appeal before this Court, is only a
rehearing or the continuation of the matter. Reliance is placed on
Section 227 of the Act which reads thus:
"Effect of Probate-Probate of a will when granted E
establishes the will from the death of the testator, and
renders valid all intermediate acts of the executor as such."
It is submitted that since the will executed by Zoe Enid Browne in
favour of the petitioner is probated it must be deemed that it was
existing since the death of the testatrix namely Miss. Zoe Enid Browne
and that validates all intermediary acts. According to the learned
counsel, the effect of such a probate is that the petitioner's interest in
the estate gets established even on the date of entering caveat. We are
unable to see any force in this submission. The said probate, admit
tedly, took place in a court in the Madras City. We do not know
whether the citations were issued to all the persons interested. This
probate also admittedly was granted when the special leave petition
was pending in this Court yet the respondent had no notice about this
probate proceeding. Under these circumstances, exercising our juris
diction under Article 136 we do not see that it is expedient to ack
nowledge this probate proceeding and re-open the matter.
A Lastly an attempt was made to show that the Sub-Court has no
jurisdiction but we find that there a necessary notification issued by
the High Court conferring powers on the Sub Court. We see no force
in any one of these submissions.
The learned counsel, however, lastly submitted that the peti-
tioner inspite of having substantial interest in the estate is losing her
right, to prove that the alleged will by Miss Zoe Enid Browne is not a
genuine one and that it is a fictitious one. We must point out that by
granting a probate, the court is not deciding the disputes to the title.
Even with regard to a probate granted, it can be revoked as provided
under Section 263 of the Act in any one of the cases mentioned
therein. But the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
findings of the Sub Court and the High Court regarding the caveatable'
interest will come in the petitioner's way in seeking revocation of the
grant of probate. It is needless to say that the findings regarding the
caveatable interest of the petitioner have a limited effect and are rele
vant only to the extent of granting of probate. But they cannot deprive
D his right, if he has any, to invoke Section ·263 of the Act and it is upto
the petitioner to satisfy the Court.
With these observations, the special leave petition is dismissed.
T.N.A. Petition dismissed.
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