Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma and Ors. v. Chancellor, Nagpur University and Ors.
SA WANT, J, The two questions raised in this appeal are:
(i) Whether the employment notice issued by the respondent- D
University on July 27, 1984 ought to have indicated reservations
postwise, and
(ii) Whether, assuming that the said notice was invalid the
termination of services of the appellants on April 21, 1987 was
valid? E
2. The University issued the employment notice in question in
viting applications for a total of 77 posts which included 13 posts of
Professors, 29 posts of Readers and 35 posts of Lecturers in different
.... ~ubjects ranging from Economics, Politics and Sociology to Physics,
Pharmacy and Geology. The notice mentioned total number of reser
t- vations categorywise but not subjectwise as follows:
Professors - Scheduled Castes-3, Scheduled Tribes-2 and VJ/NT-1
Readers - Scheduled Castes-6, Scheduled Tribes-4 and VJ/NT-2
Lecturers - Scheduled Castes-7, Scheduled Tribes-5 and VJ/NT-4 G
A number of applications were received for the posts from candi-
1 dates including the petitioners belonging to both reserved and non-
' reserved castes for all the three categories of posts, viz., Professors,
Readers and Lecturers. This advertisement was corrected by Corri
gendum of February 1, 1985. Thereafter, a further employment notice H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1990) 3 S.C.R.
for additional posts in all the three categories was issued on August 1,
1985 but we are not concerned with the same. Different selection . \
committees in all 53 in number were constituted and they recommen
ded 47 candidates for 53 posts. It appears that while recommending the
selections, the committees also gave weightage to the candidates be
longing to the reserved castes. Thereafter, the Executive Council con
stituted a sub-committee to decide which posts should be reserved for
the reserved castes. On the recommendation of the sub-committee and
after taking into consideration the backlog of reservations, the Execu
tive ·Council decided to keep ·apart 17 posts and made permanent
appointments only to 30 out of 47 candidates by its appointment orders
issued on March 30, 1985 for the academic year 1985-86. As regards 17
posts which were kept apart for reserved candidates, it decided to fill
in the same by temporary appointments for those posts pending the
availability of the suitable candidates from reserved castes.
3. It appears that against these appointments some social work
ers and organisations made representations to the Chancellor making
D a grievance both against the employment notice as well as the proce
dure followed in making the said appointments. By his order dated
February 22, 1986, the Chancellor appointed a one:man committee
under Section 76 of the Nagpur University Act, 1974 (hereinafter re
ferred to as the 'Act') to inquire into the matter. The committee sub
mitted its report on September 24, 1986 which was accepted by the \.:
E Chancellor.
4. In the meanwhile, a batch of writ petitions was filed in the
High Court challenging the employment notice on the ground that the --
non-obtaining of the recommendation from the Board of University / """I"
Teaching and Research ('BUTR' for short) before issuing the employ-
F ment notice was bad in law in view of the provisions of Section 32(2)
(iii) of the Act. The High Court accepting this contention quashed the -1
employment notice and set aside the appointments to the posts which
were challenged in those petitions. In all the petitions the Court also
restrained the University from making any appointment without ob
taining the recommendations from the BUTR.
Taking into consideration both the report of the one-man com
mittee and also the decison of the High Court, the Chancellor directed
the Vice-Chancellor to terminate the service of all the appointees in- l
eluding the appellants and accordingly the Vice-Chancellor issued
orders of termination of services of the appellants and others similarly
H appointed on April 21, 1987. The termination orders mentioned four
grounds as follows:
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S.C. VERMA v. CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY [SAWANT, J.] :889
(a) the reservation policy adopted by the University was con
trary to Section 57 of the Act;
(b) the decision of the Executive Council allocating all reserved
posts to Vlth Plan posts were arbitrary and discriminatory;
(c) the University had failed to comply with the mandatory provi
sions of Section 32 of the Act since it had not .consulted the B
BUTR;and
(d) that the employment notice was not in accordance with law.
It may be mentioned here that although the services were thus
terminated by the said order the Vice-Chancellor on the same day C
issued another order in exercise of his emergency powers under Sec
tion 11( 4) of the Act and appointed all the appellants and others to the
same posts protecting their pay and allowances at the same time mak-
- _,._ ing it clear that the appointments were temporary.
We are concerned in this appeal only with two grounds as stated D
at the outset. The third ground, viz., whether the recommendations of
BUTR were mandatory before the issuance of the employment notice
was not pressed before the Full Bench from which the present appeal
arises. It appears that on the first ground, viz., whether the general
reservation instead of the postwise reservation was illegal, there was a
--> difference of opinion between two Division Benches of the High E
Court. One Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 1876 of 1984
(hereinafter referred io as the 'Bhakre's case' (decided on December 7,
1984 took the view that the postwise reservation was not necessary
whereas anqther Division Bench differed with the said view and sent
•--the papers to the learned Chief Justice for referring the matter to a
larger Bench and the issue referred to the larger Bench was as follows: F
"Is non-reserving the posts of University teachers subject
wise in the employment notice a breach of letter and spirit
of reservation policy contained in Section 77C read with
Section 57 of the Act?"
That being the only issue, the Full Bench was really called upon
to answer it alone. However, thereafter by the the consent of parties
J one more issue was raised before the Full Bench which is the second of
"'-...the two questions which we have to decide in this appeal, viz.,
whether, notwithstanding the illegality of the general reservation, the
services of the appellants were liable to be terminated. On the first H
A issue, the Full Bench held that general reservations were in breach of
the provisions of the Act and against the reservation policy and, there
{ore, illegal. On the second issue, by majority the Full Bench held that
since the appointments were not according to law from the beginning,
·the termination of the appellants' services was legal.
B 6. As regards the first question, we have narrated earlier the
method which was adopted by the University for reserving the posts. It
announced the posts categorywise as Profesors, Readers and Lecturer;
in different subject and made a blanket declaration that 6 of the posts
of Professor, 12 of the posts of Readers and 16 of the posts of Lectur-
ers would be reserved for backward castes. Neither the University nor
c the candidates knew at that time as to for which of the subjects and in
what number the said posts were reserved. The result was that the
candidates belonging to the reserved category in particular, who
wanted to apply for the reserved posts did not know for which of the
posts they could apply and whether they could apply at all for the posts
in the subjects in which they were qualified. That this could be the
D expected consequence of such an employment notice can legitimately
be inferred and need not be and indeed cannot be, demonstrated by
evidence of what actually happened, for there may be mimbar of
candidates who on account of the said uncertainty might have re-
frained from applying for the posts as against those who applied to
take a chance. What is further, the selection committees which were
E appointed to interview the candidates for the respective posts did not
also know whether they were interviewing the candidates for reserved
posts or not, and to assess merits of the candidates from the reserved
category as such candidates. The contention advanced on behalf of the
appellants that the selection committees even without know whether
the posts concerned were reserved or riot, had given weightage to the
F candidates from the reserved category and, therefore, it cannot be said
that any ·injustice had resulted to them is without merit. In the first
instance, the contention proceeds on the footing that all those belong-
ing to the reserved category who wanted to apply for all the said posts
had done so even without knowing that the concerned posts were
reserved. Secondly, it also presumes that all eligible candidates from
G unreserved category had applied for the posts without knowing
whether the posts were reserved or not. The possibility that many
eligible candidates belonging to both reserved and unreserved cate-
gories might not have taken the risk and chose11 to gamble cannot be
ruled out. This argument further ignores the fact that the suitability of
a candidate from a reserved category to the particular post has to be
H ad judged by taking into consideration various factors and the desired
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S.C. VERMA v. CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY [SAWANT, J.] 891
result cannot be obtained by merely giving uniform weigbtage marks
>- to the candidates concerned which was the only method followed by
. the selection committees while selecting the candidates. Further, there
is nothing on record to show that this method of giving weightage to
the candidate was not followed in respect of reserved category candi
dates even if they had not applied for the post in the reserved seats.
What is more, there is also nothing on record to show whether any
candidates belonging to the reserved category has applied for a parti
cular post in a reserved seat, without the prior knowledge that the post
,>-....-was reserved. It is, therefore, difficult to understand as to how the
selection committees proceeded to give weightage to the candidates
without knowing whether they had applied for reserved or non
reserved seats. What is more objectionable in the procedure was that
its Executive Council proceeded to classify the posts in different sub
jects between reserved and non-reserved posts after the lists of selec
ted candidates were received from different selection committees. This
-~method was open to an obvious objection since it gave a scope to
eliminate unwanted selected candidates at that stage. Whether it oc
curred in the present case or not is immaterial for testing the validity
and the propriety of the method followed by the University. As has
been stated earlier, in fact, after the receipt of the list of selected candi
dates not only the Executive Council constituted yet another commit
tee to decide which of the subjectwise posts should be reserved or not
,but the Executive Council also decided that although candidates for 47
~ posts were selected only 30 of them should be appointed permanently.
The latter included some backward class candidates for reserved posts
so categorised later. But 17 of the posts were set apart although the
candidates were selected for them, and they were so set apart for being
filled in afresh by candidates belonging to the reserved category. In
~· 1erestingly, however, the employment notice issued subsequently for
these 17 posts mentioned reservations postwise (subjectwise).
7. The argument based on Section 57(4)(a) of the Act to support
the procedure adopted by the University is, according to us, not well
merited. The contention is that since Section 57( 4)(a) requires the
University to state in the advertisement only the total number of posts
and the number of reserved posts and not postwise, i.e., subjectwise,
the employment notice in question was not bad in law. According to us,
the word "post" used in the context has a relation to the faculty, disci-
~ pline, or the subject for which it is created. When, therefore, reserva
·tions are required to be made "in posts", the reservations have to be
postwise, i.e., subjectwise. The mere announcement of the number of
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1990] 3 S.C.R.
A reserved posts is no better than inviting applications for posts without
mentioning the subjects for which the posts are advertised. When, \
therefore, Section 57(4)(a) requires that the advertisement or the
employment notice would indicate the number of reserved posts, if any,
it implies that the employment notice cannot be vague and has to
indicate the specific post, i.e., the subject in which the post is vacant
B and for which the applications are invited from the candidates belong
ing to the reserved classes. A non-indication of the post in this manner
itself defeats the purpose for which the applications are invited from
the reserved category candidates and consequently negates the object
of the reservation policy. That this is also the intention of the legislature
is made clear by Section 57(4)(d) which requires the selection commit-
C tees to interview and adjudge the merits of each candidate and recom
mend him or her for appointment to "the general posts" and "the
reserved posts", if any, advertised.
8. A support was also sought to be derived by the appellants to
their contention from the policy of reservation as enunciated in
D Government Resolution dated March 30, 1981 wherein instructions
were issued in the matter in exercise of the power conferred on the
Government under Section 77(c) of the Act. The contention was that
since in para 3(b) of the said Resolution it is stated that "similarly, at
any given time of recruitment to the teaching posts, only the total
number of reserved vacancies and the sections from which they are to
E be filled in should be determined. H would be enough if the required ',..
percentage is fulfilled as a whole and not with reference to any particu-
lar post. If the reserved vacancies cannot be filled, then so many posts
as cannot be filled in, may be kept vacant for six months and should be
again advertised thrice. If, even after readvertising the posts three
times, suitable candidates belonging to the reserved category do not
become available, they may be filled in by candidates belonging to the
"open category". We are afraid that this interpretation placed on the
aforesaid contents of the Government Resolution stems from their -1
misreading. Read in the context in which the said contents appear, it is
clear that what is soought to be conveyed by them is that although at
any given time the total percentage of reservation, viz. 34 is not made
G up vis-a-vis particular post or posts, it would be an enough compliance
with the Resolution if the total number of vacancies filled in all the
posts together conform to the said percentage. It is common know
ledge that the vacancies in posts in different subjects occur from time ,l
to time according to the exigencies of the circumstances and they arise
unequally in different posts. There may not be vacancies in one or
H some posts whereas there may be a large number of vacancies in other
• ' •
S.C. VERMA v. CTIANCELLOR. UNIVERSITY [SAWANT, J.] 893
posts. In such circumstances, it is not possible to comply with the
!-minimum reservation percentage of 34 vis-a-vis each post. It is for this
reason that the Resolution states that although minimum percentage
of reserved posts may not be filled in one· or some posts, it will be
enough if in that year it is filled in taking into consideration the total
number of appointments in all the posts. This, however, does not
absolve the appointing authority from advertising in advance the
vacancies in each post and the number of posts in such vacancies meant
for the reserved category, and inviting applications from the candi-
.~- -dates belonging to the reserved and unreserved categories with a clear
statement in that behalf. In fact, the overall minimum percentage has
to be kept in mind, as stated in the Resolution, at the time of issuing
the employment notice or the advertisement as the case may be.
On behalf of the appellants reliance was also sought to be placed
on a Full Bench decision of the Kamataka High Court in Dr. Raj
- - Kumar v. Gulbarga University, AIR 1990 KAR 2125. We do not see
how the decision in question helps the appellants, for the Full Bench
has observed there that general reservation has to be cadrewise and
subjectwise. But an excep.tion could possibly be made in cases like the
one of professors in which post available in each of the subjects is only
one while grouping all of them together for purposes of reservation so
that at least in the subjects in which the candidates belonging to the
reserved category are available, they could be accommodated. It is not
"'necessary for us in this case to express our opinion on the correct
course to be adopted when only one post is available in a particular
subject at a given time. The course to be adopted would depend upon
the unit of reservations, the period over which the backlog is to be
carried, the number of appointments already made in the said posts, -._ the availability of candidates from the reserved category etc. What is
material from our point of view in this case is to point out that even the
1-- Karnataka Full Bench has taken the view that generally reservation
· had to be cadrewise and subjectwise. It was also a case of the filling in
of the vacancies in teaching posts in a University.
We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view taken by
the Full Bench that the employment notice dated July 27, 1984 was bad
in law since it had failed to notify the reservations of the posts subject
wise and had mentioned only the total number of reserved posts with-
j out indicating the particular posts so reserved subjectwise.
9. The second contention need not detain us long. It is based
primarily on the provisions of Section 57(5) of the Act. The contention
is that since the provisions of that section give power to the Chancellor
to terminate the services of a teacher only Tf he Is satisfied that the __ ,
appointment "was not in accordance with the law at that time in force"
and since the law at that time in force, viz., on March 30, 1985 when
the appellants were appointed, was the law as laid down in Bhakre's
case (supra) which was decided on December 7, 1984, the termination
B of the appellants is beyond the power of the Chancellor. The argument
can only be described as naive. It is unnecessary to point out that
when the court decides that the interpretation of a particular provision
as given earlier was not legal, it in effect declares that the law as it
stood from the beginning was as per its decision, and that it was never
the law otherwise. This being the case, since the Full Bench and now
C this Court has taken the view that the interpretation placed on the
provisions of law by the Division Bench in Bhakre's case (supra) was
erroneous, it will have to be held that the appointments made by the
University on March 30, 1985 pursuant to the law laid down in
Bhakre's case (supra) were not according to law. Hence, the termina
tion of the services of the appellants were in compliance with the
D provisions of Section 57(5) of the Act.
When, therefore, the services of the appellants are to be termina-
ted in view of the change in the position of law and not on account of
the demerits or misdemeanour of individual candidates, it is not neces
sary to hear the individuals before their services are terminated. The
rule of audi a/trem partem does not apply in such cases and, therefore, -<
there is no breach of the principles of natural justice. In the result. we
are of the view that there is no merit in this case. The appeal, there
fore, stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however,
there will be no order as to costs.
10. However, it is pointed out to us that some of the appellants
had resigned from their earlier jobs and joined the University, some of
them have become overaged for making any fresh application while
others will have no chance either because the posts as per the new 1
advertisement of 1987 are either reserved or non-reserved and they
belong to the other category. We can, therefore, only recommend that
the University may take into consideration the relevant facts pertain-
ing to each of the appellants, and if it is possible, accommodate them
without transgressing the law and the claims of other eligible candi- ·
dates. We make it clear that this recommendation is not a direction
and is made purely on compassionate grounds. It is to be followed only
if it is possible for the University to do so without giving rise to further
litigation by candidates who may be aggrieved on that account.
G.N. Appeal dismissed.