M.B. Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana and Ors.
AHMADI, J. I am in complete agreement with my learned
• Brother Agrawal, J. that there is no merit in this appeal but I would
like to add a few words of my own.
The appellant, a practising Advocate, having failed to persuade
the learned Subordinate Judge to grant an ad-interim injunction pend-
ing filing of a counter by the opposite party, switched gear from
persuasive advocacy to derogatory remarks in the fond hope that such
tactic would succeed and the learned Judge would be browbeaten into
submission. Fortunately the learned Judges was made of sterner stuff G
4 and refused to succumb to such unprofessional conduct. Instead he
made a record of the disrespectful and derogatory remarks made with
intent to tarnish his image as a Judicial Officer and forwarded a report
to the District Judge who in turn reported the matter to the High Court
to enable it to initiate proceedings for contempt of court against the
appellant. The exact words uttered by the appellant, reproduced in the H
judgment of my learned brother. leave no doubt that the intentio11 of
the appellant was to cast aspersions on the integrity of the learned
Judge and to lower him in the esteem of others by creating doubts
regarding his honesty, judicial impartiality and independence. The
tendency of maligning the reputation of Judicial Officers by disgrunt
led elements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on the
increase and it is high time it is nipped in the bud. And, when a
member of the profession resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view
to browbeating the judge into submission, it is all the more painful.
When there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake
the confidence of the litigating public in the system, the damage
caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned judge but also to
be fair name of the judiciary. Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour, use
of disrespectful language and a't times blatant condemnatory attacks
like the present one are often designedly employed with a view to
taming a judge into submission to secure a desired order. Such cases
raise larger issues touching the independence of not only the con
cerned judge but the entire institution. The foundation of our system
which is based on the independence and impartiality of those who man
it will be shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made
against the Presiding Judicial Officers with impunity. It is high time
that we realise that the much cherished judicial independence has to
be protected not only from the executive or the legislature but also
from those who are an integral part of the system. An independent
judiciary is of vital importance to any free society. Judicial indepen
dence was not achieved overnight. Since we have inherited this con
cept from the British, it would not be out of place to mention the
struggle strong-willed judges like Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas, and many others had to put up with the Crown as
well as the Parliament at considerable personal risk. And when a
member of the profession like the appellant who should know better so
lightly trifles with the much endeared concept of judicial indpendence
to secure small gains it only betrays a lack of respect for the martyrs of
judicial independence and for the institution itself. Their sacrifice
would go waste if we are not iealous to protect the fair name of the
judiciary from unwarranted attacks on its independence. And here is a
member of the profession who has repeated his performance ·presum
able because he was let off lightly on the first occasion. Soft-justice is
not the answer-not that the High Court has been harsh with him-what
I mean is he cannot be let off on an apology which is far from sincere
His apology was ~.ollow, there was no remorse-no regret-it was only
a device to escape the rigour of the law. What he said in his affidavit
was that he had not uttered the words attributed to him by the learned
.,. .
II
M.B. SANGH! v. HIGH COURT [AHMADI, J.l 317
Judge; in other words the learned judge was lying-adding insult to
injury-and yet if the court finds him guilty (he contested the matter
tooth and nail) his unqualified apology may be accepted. This is no
apology, it is merely a device to escape. The High Court rightly did not
accept "it. That is what this Court had done in a similar situation in
L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P., [1984] 3 SCC 405. This Court described it
as a 'paper' apology and refused to accept it in the following words:
"We do not think that merely because the appellant has
tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence and
allow him to go unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person
wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the grossest impu
tations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scandalize
him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which
costs him practically nothing. If such an apology were to be
accepted, as a rule. and not as an exception, we would in
fact be virtually issuing a 'licence' to scandalize courts and
commit contempt of court with impunity. It will be rather
difficult to persuade members of the Bar, who care for
their self-respect, to join the judiciary if they are expected
to pay such a price for it. And no sitting judge will feel free
to decide any matter as per the dictates of his conscience on
account of fear of being scandalized and persecuted by an
advocate who does not mind making reckless allegations
if the Judge goes against his wishes. If this situation were
to be countenanced, advocates who can cow down the
Judges, and make them fall in line with their wishes, b}
threats of character assassination and persecution, will be
preferred by the litigants to the advocates who are mindful
of professional ethics and believe in maintaining the
decorum of courts."
When a member of the Bar is required to be punished for use of
contemptuous language it is highly painful-it pleases none-but pain-
ful duties have to be performed to uphold the honour and dignity of
the individual Judge and his office and the prestige of the institution.
Courts are generally slow in using their contempt jurisdiction against G
erring members of the profession in the hope that the concerned Bar
Council will chasten its member for failure to maintain proper ethical
norms. If timely action is taken by Bar Councils, the decline in the
ethical values can be easily arrested.
By refusing to interfere with the impugned order of the High H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1991) 3 S.C.R.
A Court this Court is not merely punishing the appellant but is in fact
upholding the independence of the Judiciary. Let me conclude with ._.
the hope that this Court will not be called upon to deal with such a ' situation in future.
For the above reasons I agree that the appeal be dismissed.
S.C. AGRAWAL, J. This appeal filed under section 19(1)(b) of
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana dated January 13, 1987 whereby the appellant has been
convicted for having committed contempt of court under section
c 2( c)(i) of the Act and has been sentenced to pay Rs.1,000 as fine and in
case of default in payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for
seven days.
The appellant, who is practising as an Advocate at Narnaul, was
representing the plaintiff in Civil Suit titled Hari Ram v. Municipal
D Committee. On September 20, l.985, the appellant appeared in the said
suit for the plaintiff and orally prayed for ex-parte ad'interim stay. The
said request was declined by the Subordinate Judge, Narnaul, who
ordered for issuance of notice to the defendants for September 24,
1985. On September 24, 1985, Shri Banwari Lal Sharma appeared for
the defendants and requested for a date for filing a reply to the said
e application which request was not opposed by the appellant but the
appellant prayed for ad-interim stay in favour of the plaintiff. The
Subordinate Judge told the appellant that the question of ad-interim , stay would be co.nsidered after filing of the reply by the defendants and
adjourned the case for September 26, 1985. It appears that the appel-
!ant was not satisfied with this order passed by the Subordinate Judge
F and according to the Subordinate Judge, Shri S.R. Sharma, the appel-
!ant uttered the following words in the Court:
"You are wholly favouring the Municipal Committee. Are
you sitting as Judge or as Administrator of Municipal Com-
·-mittee? To me it seems that your are deciding the case as
G Administrator of Municipal Committee. You are acting ..
as, if you are a contractor of the Municipal Committee. I do
not expect any justice from you. I do not think that you will
grant stay to me as you are fully siding with the Municipal
Committee. You are not granting stay to me as you are in
collusing with the Deputy Commissioner and under his
H (Deputy Commissioner) influence, you do not want to •
M.B. SANGH! v. HIGH COURT (AGRAWAL, J.( 319
grant stay to me and that he will complain against me to the A
Hon'ble High Court."
On September 25, 1985, the Subordinate Judge submitted a
report Ex. P.A. to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul for taking
necessary action against the appellant wherein the aforementioned
words alleged to have been uttered by the appellant were set out. The B
District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul submitted a report dated
October 12, 1985, to the High Court and on the basis of the said
report', proceedings for contempt were initiated against the appellant
by the High Court. The appellant submitted a reply by way of affidavit
wherein he denied to have uttered the words mentioned in the report
of Shri S.R. Sharma, Subordinate Judge, Narnaul to the District and C
Sessions Judge, Narnaul and also offered an unqualified apology. Shri
S.R. Sharma filed his affidavit in the High Court and he was also
examined as a witness. In addition, the High Court examined Shri
·Krishan Kumar Sharma, who was at the relevant time reader in the
court of Shri S.R. Sharma, and three advocates, namely, Shri Banwari
Lal Sharma, Shri Gyan Chand Sharma and Shri Satya Narain Sharma. D
The appellant did hot examine himself as a witness before the High
Court.
The High Court found that the appellant had attacked the
integrity of the learned Sub-Judge by saying that he was a contractor of
the Municipal Committee, that he was in collusion with the Deputy E
Commissioner and he was under his influence and that the attack made
on the learned Sub-Judge disparaging in character and derogatory to
his dignity would vitalJy·shake the confidence of the public in him and
that the aspersions made against the Sub-Judge were much more than
merely insult and, in fact, they scandalise the court in such a way as to
create distrust in the people's mind and impair confidence of the F
people in court. The High Court was, therefore, of the view that the
appellant had brought himself clearly within the ambit of contempt of
court and he was accordingly found guilty under section 2(c)(i) of the
Act. As regards the apology tendered by the appellant, the High Court
observed that this was not the first occasion and earlier also the pro
ceedings for contempt had been initiated against him in pursuance of a G
report made by Shri K.K. Chopra, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Narnaul in C.0.C.P. No. 12 of 1983 wherein also the appellant had
tendered an unqualified apology in the High Court and the rule against
him was discharged and that the appellant is addicted to using con
temptuous language and making scurrilous attacks on the judges. The
High Court held that apology must, in order to dilute the gravity of the H
A offence, be voluntary, unconditional and indicative of remorse and
contrition and it should be tendered at the earliest opportunity and
further, that the aspersions mentioned in the letter Ex. P.A. at 'A' to ..
'A' sent by Shri S.R. Sharma to the District and Sessions Judge, •
Narnaul were made by the appellant with a design and were not simply
thoughtless and in such a case, the appellant cannot be allowed to get
B away by simply feeling sorry by way of apology as the easiest way. The
High Court did not, therefore, accept the apology tendered by the
appellant.
Shri Mahabir Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the appel-
!ant, has submitted that the High Court was in error in holding that the ,-
appellant had uttered the words mentioned in the letter Ex. P.A. sent
c by Shri S.R. Sharma to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul. Shri
Mahabir Singh has invited our attention to the statements of the
witnesses who were examined before the High Court and has laid
particular emphasis on the statement of Shri Banwari Lal Sharma,
Advocate, who was representing the defendant Municipal Committee
D in the Civil Suit before the Subordinate Judge and was present in the
court at the relevant time and who has stated that the appellant has not
used any unparliamentary or foul language towards Shri S.R. Sharma,
Sub-Judge. Shri Mahabir Singh has also referred to the statements of . ..,
Shri Gyan Chand Sharma, Advocate and Shri Satya Narain Sharma,
Advocate who have stated that they were present in the court of Sub-
E Judge, Narnaul on September 24, 1985 at about 2 or 2.15 p.m. when
the appellant had requested the Subordinate Judge to grant ad-interim
stay against the Municipal Committee for demolition of a chabutra in
the case of Hari Ram v. Municipal Committee and the said request of
the appellant was declined by Shri S.R. Sharma and that the appell'J_nt •
did not use any discourteous or impolite language against Shri S.R·.
F Sharma.
We have carefully perused the statements of the three Advocates
mentioned above on which reliance has been placed by Shri Mahabir
Singh. Their evidence has to be considered along with the statements
of the Sub-JUdge, Shri S.R. Sharma Narnual and Shri Krishan Kumar
Sharma, who was posted as reader in the court of Shri S.R. Sharma at
G that time. Shri S.R. Sharma, during the course of examination-in-chief r.
has stated that when he did not pass orders for interim injunction in
favour of the appellant, he started speaking loudly and used defamat-
ory language. He has also cepeated the language which was used by the
appellant which in substance was in the same terms as mentioned in his
letter Ex. P.A. addressed to the District and Sessions Judge, Narnaul,
H Shri Krishan Kumar Sharma in his deposition has stated:
M.B. SANGH! v. HIGH COURT [AGRAWAL, J.J 321
" ...... Shri M.B. Sanghi repeatedly tried to compel Shri
Sita Ram Sharma to issue the ad-interim injunction in A
.. favour of his client, but Shri Sita Ram Sharma had declined
y that request without hearing the arguments. Shri M.B. ,.
Sanghi then stated that he had no hope of justice from Shri
Sita Ram Sharma as the latttr was behaving like an
Administrator of the Municipal Committee. Shri M.B. B
Sanghi, addressed Shri Sita Ram Sharma saying that he
(Sh. Sita Ram Sharma) was under the pressure of Deputy
Commissioner. N arnaul."
Nothing has been brought out duting the course of examination-
in-chief of these witnesses which may show that they were deposing
falsely against the appellant. The High Court has placed reliance on c
the testimony of these witnesses in preference to the testimony of
three advocates, namely, Shri Banwari Lal Sharma, Shri Gyan Chand
Sharma and Shri Satya Narain Sharma. After considering the evidence
of all the witnesses, I am inclined to agree with the appreciation of the
evidence by th.e High Court. I find no reason to discard the testimony D of Shri S.R. Sharma who has been corroborated by his reader, Shri
Krishan Kumar Sharma. Considering the language used by the appel-
lant in the Court of Shri S:R. Sharma, as mentioned by liim in his
report Ex. P.A'. to the District & Sessions Judge, Narnaul and
repeated by him in his statement before the High Court it must be held
that the appellant had made an attack on the learned Subordinate E Judge which was disparaging in character and derogatory to his dignity
and would vitally shake the confidence of the public in him and that
the aspersions made by the appellant had the effect of scandalising the
• court in such a way as to create distrust in the people's mind and impair
confidence of the people in court. The appellant has, therefore, been
rightly held guilty of having committed the contempt of court under F section 2(c)(i) of the Act.
Shri Mahabir Singh has urged that the appellant is a fairly senior
Advocate and has been practising for more than 20 years and since he
had fendered unqualified apology before the High Court the same
ought to have been accepted. With regard to apology in proceedings
for contempt of court, it is well-settled that an apology is not a weapon G r of defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to
operate as a universal panacea, but it is intended to be evidence of real
contriteness. (See: M. Y. Shareef & Anr. v. The Hon 'ble Judges of the
High Court of Nagpur & Ors., [1955) 1 SCR 757 at p. 764). In the
instant case, 1 find that in his affidavit in reply to the notice issued by
H the High Court which is annexed at Annexure II, the appellant first
denied having used the words as mentioned by Shri S.R. Sharma in his
report sent to the District & Sessions Judge, Narnual or having shown
disrespect in any manner whatsoever to Shri S.R Sharma, the Presid
ing Officer of the court of Sub-Judge, Narnaul on September 24, 1985.
In para 3 of the said affidavit, the appellant has stated as under:
"That if this Hon'ble Court comes to the conclusion that
the deponent has committed contempt, the deponent
tenders an unqualified apology to this Hon'ble Court and
begs for forgiveness. The deponent is a senior and respec
ted member of th·e Narnaul Bar besides that being law abid
ing citizen has greatest respect and regards for the judiciary
and all the Presiding Officers."
This would show that the apology that was tendered by the
appellant before the High Court was to be taken into consideration in
the event of the High Court finding the appellant guilty of having
committed contempt of court. Moreover in the present case, it has
been found that this was not the first occasion in which proceedings for
D contempt of court had been initiated against the appellant and on an
earlier occasion also proc,~edings for contempt of court had been
initiated against the appellant in pursuance of a report of Shri K.K.
Chopra, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Narnaul and in those pro
ceedings the rule issued against the appellant was discharged on his
tendering unqualified apology before the High Court. In those pro-
E ceedings also the appellant is said to have made disparaging remarks
against the Judge. Keeping in view the said circumstance, the High
Court has found that the appellant was addicted to using contemp
tuous language and making scurrilous attacks on judges. Having
regard to the fact that inc1idents of insubordination and use of impro
per language towards the judges are on the increase, the High Court
F was of the view that the appellant could not be allowed to get away by
simply feeling sorry by way of apology as the easiest way. I am unable
to say that the High Court was not justified in taking this view. Taking
into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact
that the appellant, a fairly senior advocate, is prone to use disparaging
and contemptuous remarks against judges, I am of the opinion that
G this is not a case in which the apology tendered by the appellant may
be accepted.
I, therefore, find no merit in the appeal and the same is accord
ingly dismiss~d.
G.N. Appeal dismissed.