Koyappathodi M. Ayisha Umma v. State of Kerala

K. RAMASWAMY, J. This appeal by special leave is against the judgment and decree of the Kerala High Court dated June 11, 1975 made in A.S. No. 764 of 1972. The notification under section 3 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 (Act 21 of 1962) was published in the Gazette on February 28, 1967 acquiring six acres of land in the city of Calicut to construct staff quarters of P & T of Govt. of India. The Land Acquisition Officer by award dated February 29, 1969 awarded compensation @ Rs.230 per cent and also the value of the tree$ .by capitalisation method in a sum of Rs.2,69,421.55 p. towards the land improvement together with 15 per cent solatium and 4 per cent in­ terest. On refere.nce, the Civil Court enhanced the market value by judgment and award dated February 9, 1972 at Rs.500 per cent i.e., in total Rs.3,00,000 towards land value and confirmed the award of the Land Acquisition Officer of 2,69,421.55 p. towards land improvement making in all 5,69,421.55 p. with solatium at 15 per cent and interest at 4 per cent from the date of dispossession. Jn the appeal by the State against the enhanced compensation, it was contended that the Civil Court committed grave error in fixing market value separately to the land and the trees on capitalisation basis to make up the compensa­ tion. That contention was found favour with the High Court and it set aside the award of the Civil Court of the value of the laod of Rs.3,00,000 and confirmed the award of Rs.2,69,421.55. Calling in question the reversing decree of the High Court, this appeal has been filed. Two contentions have been raised by Shri Padmanabhan, the learned senior counsel for the appellant. Firstly he argued that there is an intensive cultivation in the acquired land not only of the fruit bear­ ing trees therein but also using the vacant space for other short term crops to establish which the appellant sought remand to the Civil Court to adduce additional evidence under Order 41 of Rule 27 etc. The High Court had wrongly rejected the request for additional evi­ dence. We find no force in the contention. It was not the case that the appellant was prevented to add.uce evidence in this behalf. Remand under order 41 Rule 27. C.P.C. cannot be made to adduce f·csh evi­ dence, when· though available but was not adduced. Even otherwise it was further argued that the land and ·he trees together constitute the value of the acquired lands and so are sepa­ rately valued which would reflect the true and correct mark<:! value. The Civil Court has correctly adopted the method and the High Court is unjustified in interfering with the award of the Civil Court. It is also further contended that the land possessed of potential value is build­ ing sites and, therefore, the reliance by the Civil Court on fa. A. l dated February 19, 1964 which worked out at Rs.400 per ':ent and Ex. A. 2 dated February 17, 1967 under which 14 cents were p· Jrchased worked out at Rs.556 percent and award of market value@ Ri .. 500 rer cent by the Civil C0urt was not illegal. Ex. B. I under whic i Rs.230 per cent accepted as claimed by the State cannot be relied up•m as the document dated June 3, 1966 does not relate to the lands in tlte neigh­ bourhood. Admittedly they are situated six furlongs away 'rom the limits of Calicut city and one mile from the acquired lands On the other hand, the lands under Ex. A. 1 and A. 2 are situated on' furlong from the acquired lands. Therefore, they provide the companble sales for fixation of market value. The second contention is that tlte appel­ lant is entitled to 30 per cent solatium under section 23(2) of :he Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 as amended under the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The learned counsel appearin ~ for the State has resisted the contentions. He argued that Ex. A. 1 md A. 2 relate to small extent of 5 cents and 14 cents together with tie build- ings situated therein. Therefore, when a large extent of six 1 cres was acquired they offer no comparable price. Small plots always fetch higher price and that, therefore, they cannot form same basis to fix the market value at Rs.500 per cent. He also further contended that the lands and the trees cannot be valued separately. The cornt should adopt only either the value of the land or income of the 11 ·ees with suitable multiplier but not both. The High Court is, therefJre, well justified in rejecting the sale deeds and the total valuation and con­ firmed the capitalisation method of valuation. He also conte11ded that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and 1984 Amendment Act have no G application since acquisition proceedings were admittedly taken under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. The crucial question, therefore, is what is the proper method of valuation of the land in question. The total extent of the land is six acres consisting of 1130 coconut trees; 65 erecanut trees and ,5 pepper H wines. The Civil Court fixed the market value of the lands at I './ AYISHA UMMA v. STATE OF KERALA [RAMASWAMY. J.J 553 Rs.3,00,000. Admittedly, the appellam did not file any cross objec­ tions in the High Court seeking any higher compensation. Accordingly the market value of the lands fixed at Rs.3,00,000 became final. The ~· fixation of the market value on capitalisation method also became final. It is settled law that the methods of valuation to be adopted in ascertaining the market value of the land as on the date of the notifica­ tion are: (i) opinion of experts (ii) the price paid within a reasonable B time in bona fide transaction of the purchase or sale of the lands acquired or the lands adjacent to the lands acquired and possessing similar advantages and (iii) a number of years purchase of the actual or immediately prospective profits of the lands acquired. These method;, however, do not preclude the court from taking any other special circumstances obtained in an appropriate case into consideration. As the object being always to arrive as near as possible in an estimate of C the market value in arriving at a reasonable correct market value, it may be necessary to take even two or all those matters into account inasmuch as the exact valuation is not always possible as no two lands may be the same either in respect of the situation or the extent or the potentiality nor is it possible in all cases to have reliable material from D which that valuation can be accurately determined. In State of Kera/a v. P. P. Hassan Kaya, I 1968] 3 SCR 459 the question arose whether the separate valuation of the land and building would be proper method to be adopted to determine the market value of the acquired property. This Court held that "the land and the building constitute one unit" and the value of "the entire unit must be determined with all its E advantages" and potentialities. When the property is sold with build- ing it is often difficult to have sale of single land with building approxi­ mately in time to the date of the notification. Therefore, the method which is to be adopted in determining the value of the land and build- ing is the method of capitalisation of return actually received or which might reasonably be received from the land or the building separate F valuation of the land and building was not approved and the annual rent received with the proper capitalisation was adopted by the courts below was approved by this Court. In Special Land Acquisiiion Officer v. P. Veerabhadrappa, etc. etc., [1984] 2 SCR 386 this court held that the method of valuation by capitalisation should not be resorted to when other methods are available. However, where definite material G ~. is not forthcoming either in the shape of sales of similar lands in the neighbourhood at or about the date of notification under s. 4( I) or otherwise, the court has no other alternative but to fall back on the method of valuation by capitalisation. IQ valuing land or an interest in land for purposes of land acquisition proceedings, the rule as to number of years purchase is not a theoretical or legal rule but depends H 55-l SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ l99l] 3 S.C.R. upon economic factors such as the prevailing rate of interes in money investments. The return w~ich an investor wi-U expect from an invest­ ment will depend upon the characteristic of income as compared to that of idle security. The main features are: (1) security of the income; (2) fluctuation; (3) chances of increase; (4) cost of collection; etc. The traditional view of capitalised value being linked with gilt-c dged sec­ urities, no longer be rigorous when investment in fixed deposits with nationalised banks. National Savings Certificates, Unit 1 rusts and other forms of Govt. securities and even in the share market :ommand a much greater return are available. The capital in. agricultmal lands normally when the rate of return on investment was 8.25 pn cent in the years 1971-72, the proper multiplier to be applied for the purpose of capitalisation would not. in any event, exceeding 10 per cert. In that case the State had agreed to apply 12-1/2 per cent capitalisec value of the lands, this court upheld capitalisation of the value of land at 12-1/2 per cent Jn Adtnn. General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, [ 1988) 2 SCR 1025 this Court held that usually land and building the"\ln con­ stitute one unit. Land is one kind of property; land and building together constitute an altogether different kind of property. They must be valued as one unit. But where, however, the property comprises extensive land and the structure standing thereon, do not st ow that full utilization of potential of the land realised, it might not be impermissible to value the property estimating separately the market value of the land with reference to the date of the preliminary uotifica­ tion and to add to it the value of the structures as at that time In this method, building value is estimated on the basis of the prime cost or replacement cost less depriciation. The rate of depriciation, ge1erally, arrived at by dividing the cost of construction (less the salvage valued at the end of the period of utility) by the number of years of utility of the building. The factors that prolong the life and the utility of the building, such as good maintenance. necessarily influence anl bring do\\·n the rate of depreciation. In that case larger extent-of 23.C6 acres together with building of 25.000 sq. feets comprises of 35 room;, halls and other appurtenances. and 43 1 fruit bearing and 13 timber trees and 12 bamboo clumps situated in the city of Varanasi were acquirec. With regard to the value of the trees, this Court held that where the land is valued with reference to the potentiality for building purpmes the trees on the land cannot be valued independently on the basi, of its horticultural value or with reference to the value of the yield but this principle does not come in the way of awarding the timber valu,: after deducting costs for cutting and removing them from the la11ds as salvage value. -· '· AY!SHA UMMA v. STATE OF KERALA {RAMASWAMY, J.I 555 It is thus settled law that in evaluating the market value of the acquired property, namely, land and the building or the lands with fruit bearing trees standing thereon, value of both would not constitute one unit; but separate units; it would be open to the Land Acquisitwn Officer or the court either to assess the lands with all its advantages as potential value and fix the market value thereof or where there is reliable and acceptable evidence available on record of the annual income of the fruit bearing trees the annual net income multiplied b; appropriate capitalisation of 15 years would be the proper and fair method to determine the market value but not both. In the former case the trees are to be separately valued as timber and to deduct salvage expenses to cut and remove the trees from the land. In this case the award of compensation was based on both the value of the land and trees. Accordingly the determination of the compensation of the land as well as the trees is illegal. The High Court laid the law correctly. It is seen that Ex. B. I relied on by the State was rejected by both the courts and. therefore, it cannot offer any reasonable basis to fix the market value of the land. It is equally seen that Ex. A. 1 and A. 2 relate to small extent of land together with buildings standing thereon. Therefore, they too do not also form any reasonable basis or guide to determine market value of large extent of six acres of t,he acquired land. The High Court rightly did not place reliance therein. But from the evidence it is clear, as found by the Civil Court, that the lands possessed of potential value as building sites as the lands are situated in the city itself. There was all round development around the lands. The lands are situated half a furlong from the Bombay-Kanyakumari National Highway. It also abutts the road to Naduvattom, a busy bm route within the Corporation, Calicut. It is situated nearby the indust­ rial area. The Western India Steel Mill, the Premier Steel Mills, Arts and Science College, Cinema Theatre, Police Station and other offices are situated in close proximity to the lands and that, therefore, the lands are possessed of potential value but unfortunately the appel­ lant did not place any material of the prevailing prices as house sites. However, the value of the land as fixed at Rs.3,00,000 became final. The market value of the income from the trees with 15 years multiplier was worked out at Rs.2,69.421.55 p. by the Civil Court and the High Court accepted to be the correct valuation and it was also not questioned. But it is lesser than the value of the land. Being higher in value the appellant is entitled to the value of the land as determined by the Civil Court at Rs.3,00,000 (three lakhs) in total. The value of the trees as fire wood shall be determined towards compensation. We have noted the number of coconut trees etc. The learned counsel has left to this Court 556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R. to fix any reasonable compensation and on the totality of th< facts and circumstances wc are of the opinion that total sum of Rs.10,1100 would be reasonable compensation towards the value of the total tr.,es as fire wood or as for use of other purposes after deducting salvage ·!Xpenses. Accordingly we hold that the appellant is entitled to total oimpensa­ tion of Rs.3, 10,000. Admittedly, the appellant is entitled to solatium at I~; percent and 4 per cent interest under the Keraia Land Acquisition Act. Section 30 sub-section (l) of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 6l of 1984 reads thus: "Transitional Provisions-( I) the provisions of sub-section (IA) of s. 23 of the Principal Act, as inserted by Clause (a) of s. 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amend­ ment) Bill, 1982, in the House of People), in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date; (b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the commencement of this Act". (2) "The provisions of sub-section, (2) of s. 23 ands. 28 of the principal Act, as amended by C 1. (b) of s. 15 ands. 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act later the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill. 1932, in the House of the People) and before the commencement of this Act''. A reading of the provisions would reveal the legislative intend­ ment that the transitional provisions could apply to every proceeding for acquisition of any land under the principal Act, namely, Act I of H 1894 (Central Act), pending on the 30th day of April, 1982, ·' AYISHA UMMA v. STATE OF KERALA !RAMASWAMY, J.j 557 · namely, the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amend- A ment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People; in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date or the award made by the Civil Court at the date of the Amendment Act, namely, September 24, 1984. Thus it is clear that the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 including sub-section (2) s. 23 per sc is inapplicable to the acquisi­ tion of the land under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961. In Kanthimathy Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kera/a & Ors., [ 1989] 4 SCC 650 this Court held that by operation of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984 read with Art. 254 of the Constitution. the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 by necessary implication stood repealed in its application to the State of Kerala and that the Land Acquisition Act 1of1984 as amended by Central Act 68 of 1984 stands applicable. Therefore. the proceedings under the Kerala Act being pending proceedings would be continued from the stage at which they stood at. Shri Padmanabhan then contends that the ralio in Union of India & Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Game of Veden Vasco De Gama, [ 1990] l sec 277 would attract the facts in this case and the appellant is entitled to 30 per cent solatium under the amended Act. We are afraid \Vt: cannot accede to this contention. l'hc admitted facts in this case arc that the award was made bv the Collector on February 29, 1969. On reference the Civil Court made the award on February 9, 1972. In Filip Tiago's case the award was made on March 5, 1969 and the Civil Court on reference under section 18 made its award on May 28. 1985. In the light of those facts, this Court by proccssual interpretation of tran'.°)1- E tional provision of s. 30(2) avoided injustice by eschewing literal con­ struction and advanced justice by mending the law. The ratio is clearly distinguishable. In Union of India & Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by Lrs. etc., [1989] 2 SCC 754 a Constitution Bench of this Court, to resolve the conflict of decisions as to the applicability of the . Amendment Act to pending appeals in the High Court and in this F Court, held authoritatively that the award made hy the Collector refer- red to in s. 30(2) is an award made under section 11 of the Parent Act and the award made by (11c Principal Civil Court of original jurisdic­ tion under section 23 of the Parent Act, on reference made to it by the Collector under section IK of the Parent Act. There can, therefore, he no doubt that the benefit of enhanced solatium intended by s. 30(2) is G in respect of an award made by the Collector between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended bys. 30(2) to the case of an award made by the Civil Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24. 1984 even though it be upon reference from the award made before April 30. 1982. Thus it was held that the pendency of the appeals against the H A award made preceding the aforestated two dates in the High Court or this Court would not attract the application of s. 30(2) and that. there­ fore, enhanced solatium under section 30(2) read withs. 23(2) is inap­ plicable. Thereby, the appellant is not entitled to enhanced solatium at 30 per cent. As regards interest is concerned it is fairly conceded that B the claimant is entitled only to 4 per cent as awarded by the courts below. Accordingly we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and hold that the appellant is entitled to Rs.3, 10,000 as enhanced compensation with 15 per cent solatium and interest at 4 per cent on enhanced market value from the date of dispossession. The C appeal is accordingly allowed with costs of this Court. V.P.R. Appeal allowed.