Laxmikant Pandey v. Union of India & Ors.
In Laxmikant Pandey v. Union of India, [1984) 2 SCR 795 this
Court laid down the procedure to be followed in adoption of children
by foreigners. The Court observed the fact tha1 children are a
supremely important national asset and the future well-being of the·
G nation depends upon how the children grow and develop. It quoted
with approval the report of the Study Team on Social Welfare where it
was said:
"The physical and mental health of the nation is deter
mined largely by the manner in which it is shapped in the
H early stages."
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.:ies 1
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PANDEY v. U.0.l. 571
~Court also quoted with approval from the National Policy for the A
~·e of Children where it was said: , ,
"The nation's chilaren are a supremely important assets.
Their nurture and solicitude are our responsibility. Chil
dren's programme should find a prominent part in our
national plans for the development of human resources, so B
that our childccn grow up to become robust citizens, physi
cally fit, mentally alert and morally healthy, endowed with
the skills and motivations needed by society. Equal
opportunities for development to all children during the
period of growth should be our aim, for this would serve
our larger purpose of reducing inequality and ensuring C
social justice."
Thus saying, this Court laid down the procedure to be followed
and while doing so, the Court referred to recognised child welfare
agencies and provided for their licensing or registration by the Central D
Government. Petitioners in this application are some of the licensed
welfare agencies contemplated under the judgment of this court and
petition no. 2 is the Central Voluntary Adoption Resources Agency
which is a coordinating unit based at Delhi.
In these applications petitic;rners have made the following E
prayers:
(a)(i) All Government/juvenile homes, nursing,homes and
hospitals-Government or private, will apply for declara
tion of a child as abandoned and free for placement and if
the parents of the child are not known, such children F
should be transferred to the recognised institution/place
ment agency as requested for by them within a fixed time
frame;
(ii) all recognised placement agencies depending upon G
their capacity to accommodate and care for those children
after accounting for their age and qualification should be
allowed to seek transfer of those children from Govern
ment/juvenile courts and nursing homes/hospitals and such
institutions should be obliged to transfer the children tu
such placement agencies; H
572
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 3 S.C.R.
(iii) Juvenile Welfare Boards/Courts should al;fow ·'1e
aforesaid transfers in favour of the recognised age or
rehabilitation through guardianship/adoption fro.m •I
CV ARAS or otherwise;
(iv) Juvenile Welfare Boards/Courts should not disturb
the custody of children abandoned directly with the recog
nised placement agencies when approached for declaring/
them as abandoned and free for placement and such orders. ·
may be passed ex parte and confirmed after notice to the
concerned parties;
(b )(i) Quota fixed by the Central Government for place
ment of children with Indian families may be quashed'as
being contrary to the decision in Laxmikant Pandey's case;
(ii) in the alternative, if this Court upholds the validity of
the circular fixing the quota, the percentage may be suit
ably reduced;
(iii) this court may direct that if the quota is to be fixed,
children with handii:aps, medical problems and other
drawbacks should be excluded from the total count as also
girls above one year and boys above two years of age
should be exclude from counting;
(c) The State Governments and the various Union Teri
tories should be directed to issue birth certificates based
upon att{Osted copies of court's certificate (decree), adop
tion deed or on the basis of affidavits of officials of the
licensed agencies;
(d) This Court may approve by way of revision of expenses
by about 25% with effect from the date of the application
and another 10% increase annually to enable the agencies
to maintain high standards of care for the children;
( e) The Indian children adopted abroad or to be allowed to
retain their cit.izenship/nationality till they attain the age of
majority wherever they should exercise their option one
way or the other;
(f)(i) The Central Government should be directed to act
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PANDEY v. U.O.I. 573
by itself or through the State/Union Territory Govern
ments to issue show cause notice before refusing to extend
recognition and grant personal hearing before taking offi
cial action and reasoned orders should be made in support
of such action;
(ii) In the event of cancellation of recognition, a time B
frame should be fixed to clear all the cases already in the
pipeline for being processed;
(ii) An appellate authority should be prescribed for chal
lenge of governmental action as stated above;
(g)(i) The Court may direct stay of governmental action in
the matter of setting up of Central Adoption Resource
Agency (CARA) and ultimately hold that there was no
lqnger any need for such as agency in view of the fact that
many private agencies were not available to monitor the
programme.
~ Notice was ordered on these petitions on September 21, 1990,
>-.
and these several months that have followed have been taken by diffe
rent State Governments and Union Territories and others to place
their affidavits for consideration of this Court.
We have heard counsel for the appearing parties at length.
Before we deal with several prayers placed before the Court for con
sideration it is perhaps necessary to refer to the provisions of the
Children's Act of 1960 and the Juvenile Justice Act of 1986. The
scheme of these two Acts is not very different. The definitions of
'neglected child' and 'neglected juvenile' is absolutely the same. The F
mechanism for administering the statutes is also more or less the same.
Under section 4(1) of the Children's Act, a Child Welfare Board is
intended to take charge of neglected children. Under s. 4(1) of the
Juvenile Justice Act, a Welfare Board for the neglected juveniles is
similarly contemplated. Sub-sections (3)·and (4) of either Act autho-
rise the Board to function as a Bench of Magistrates and confers on G
such Board certain powers under Criminal Procedure Code conferable
on a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First
Class. Section 9 of the Children's Act contemplates of Children's
Homes and detailed provisions have been made in the matter of setting
up of such homes and management thereof. Section 11 contemplates
of Observation Homes. Chapter Ill deals with neglected children. H
I
[1991] 3 S.C.R. /
Under Chapter II of the Act of 1986 provision has been made for 1,
setting up of Juvenile Homes (s. 9), Special Homes (s. 10) and Obser
vation Homes (s. 11). Both the Acts provide for After Care
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'•
organisation.
Though these two statutes in recognition of the importance of
B children to society have made these beneficial provisions, 'nothing con
crete and substantial appears to have been done yet for implementing
either statute in a serious way. The Children's Act has been operative
for more than 30 years while the Act of 1986 is in force for about five
years. Yet most of the provisions in the two statutes are still to be
worked out in a real way.
The Union of India has set up a Department of Women and
Child Development and most of the States and Union Territories have
corresponding departments, yet full coordination has not been
achieved. The responsibility of administering the two statutes is not
properly shared. Monitoring seems to be very much wanting.
In course of hearing of this petition we asked learned Additional
Solicitor General appearing for the Union Government to tell us as to
what happens to the children-both boys and girls-who are lodged in
the Homes when they cease to be children under the statute. It may be
pointed out that under the Children's Act boys upto 16 and a girl upto
E 18 years come within the definition of "child". If 'children' within the
meaning of the term are lodged in various types of homes indicated in
the two statutes what exactly happens to them when they cease to be
children by passing of time has remained an·enigma in the absence of a
clear answer. Obviously no provision has been made in these two Acts
to meet such a situation. Is it the intention of the stautes then that once
F a boy or girl ceases to be a child and does not come within the purview
of the stautes he/she would have to be thrown out from the home on to
the street as no more cared for? What then would be the effect of such
a situation? Since that is not very relevant for disposing of this peti
tion, we do not intend to proceed with that aspect any longer.
G We are inclined to keep the handicapped children out of the
purview of the judgment of this Court. We do not, however, agree that .>
Indian citizenship should continue until the adopted child attains the
age of majority and is legally competent to opt. Such a step would run
counter to the need of quick assimilation and may often stand as a
barrier to the«equirements of the early cementing of the adopted child
H il)to the adoptive family. In regard to the issue of the birth certificate
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PANDEY v. U.O.I. 575
of the adopted child we are of the view that such certificate should be
obtained on the basis of application of the society sponsoring adop- A
tion. In most of these cases the registration of birth may not be avail
able because that would not have been done. We are of the view that
on the basis of the application and such other material which may be
relevant to be found in an affidavit to accompany the application made
by a responsible person belonging to the agency the local magistrate B
should have the auihority to make an order approving the particulars
to be entered in the birth certificate and on the basis of the Magisterial
order the requisite certificate should be granted. This process should
be done only after adoption is finalised and the particulars of the
adopting foreign parents are available to be inclined. There is no point
in having tw.o birth certificates, one before the child is placed for
adoption and another when adoption is completed. If the procedure C
for taking out a birth certificate is deferred until adoption is finalised
the certificate can lie obtained once for all. We are of the view that the
Chief District Medical Officer (COMO) may be involved in the matter
of ascertainment of the age and the magistrate may ordinarily act on
the certificate granted by the COMO. 'D
We gather that many of these agencies have indeed no child care
facilities. In the event of such facilities not being available maintaining
children in hygienic condition and in an environment which would be
healthy for the childreil's growth .and mental development would
indeed be difficult. The licensing authority should ordinarily ensure E
that the registered agency has proper child care facilities so that an
agency which does not have such facilities may over a period of years
go out of the field.
The affidavit of the Union Government indicates that it never
intended to fix any quota for the purpose of allowing renewal of regist- F
ration or licence. In view of the clear statement in the affidavit we
must hold that it is not the policy of the Government of India to
require the agency to satisfy the condition of any quota. In fact the
Government of India's circular letter is intended to emphasise on the
feature that registered societies to entitle themselves for renewal of
registration or licence should exhibit their involvement in the process G
of adoption and the authority should have evidence to satisfy that the
agency is really involved in the activity.
We would accept the stand taken by the petitioner that in the
event of registration/licence being proposed to be cancelled, an
opportunity should be granted to such agency. That would answer the H
576 SUPREME'COURT REPORTS [19911 3 S.C.R.
requirements of natural justice and would uphold a healthy scheme of
administration. We have not been able to see any positive justification
for opposition to the setting up of CARA. Such an institution would be
an organisation of primacy and would work as a useful agency in the
field. While we agree that there should be no keen competition for
offering adoptions, regulated competition may perhaps keep up the
system in a healthy condition. Existence of CARA in that field is,
therefore, welcome. We do not agree with the stand of the petitioner
that the scheme envisaged by the main judgment should be altered in
this regard.
The judgment laid down a scale of expenses to be recovered by
the agency offering placement for maintaining the child from the adop
tive parents. There was some modification in 1986. Keeping in view
the general rise in cost of living we are prepared to allow escalation of
30%. We do not, however, agree to an escalation of 10% every year.
The matter may be reviewed once in three years so far as escalation of
expenses in concerned.
Only one aspect is left for consideration and that is the petitio
ner's prayer for fransfer of children from statutory homes to recognised
agencies for placement. The children who can be transferred for such
purposes would be those whose parents are not known, orphans and
perhaps those who are declared as abandoned children. We have
E pointed out already that the homes are not set up in several States and
areas. Even Juvenile Boards have not been properly functioning and
the recognised agencies do not have the facility of child care. In these
circumstances to order transfer of children from statutory homes to
recognised agencies can indeed not be accepted as a rule. We are
prepared to observe that as and when such a request is received from
F recognised agencies, the Juvenile Court or the Board set up under the
Act may consider the feasibility of such transfer and keeping the·
interest of the child in view, the possibility of an adoption within a
short period and the facilities available in the recognised agency as also
other relevant features, make appropriate orders. A strait-jacket
formula may very often bi> injurious to the interest of the child.
This order disposes of the petitions.
V.P.R. Petition Partly allowed.