Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat v. Cellulose Products of India Ltd.

· OJHA, J. This appeal has been preferred on the basis of a certificate granted by the High Court of Gujarat under Section 261 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The judgment appealed against is reported in Cellulose Products of India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat, [1977) 110, l.T.R. page 151. The respondent is a public limited company incorporated on April 14, 1989 mainly for the purpose of carrying on business of manufactur­ ing chemical products. The Memorandum of Association of the respondent company, as is apparent from the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, inter alia contains the follow­ ing clause: "to carry on the business of manufacture of and dealer and importers and exporters in chemical products of any nature and kind whatsoever and particulary of Carboxy Methyl Cel­ lulose (CMC), Cellulose Pulps . and other chemical products." The respondent was granted an industrial licence by the Central G Government for the manufacture of Sodium Carboxy Methyl Cellu­ lose (for short CMC). In pursuance of the said licence the respondent installed a Cellulose plant, in which was manufactured Cellulose pulp which in its tum was meant to be used as a raw material for manufacture of CMC. This fact does not appear to have been in dis­ pute that the respondent began production of Cellulose pulp from H March 18, 1961 in the said plani while the production of CMC w'as started from June 15, 1961. / . C.LT. v. CELLULOSE PRODUCTS IOJHA, J.] 891 In the assessment year in question namely 1966-67, the previous year of account being the financial year 1965-66 ending on March 3 l, 1966, the respondent claimed relief contemplated by Section 84 of the • Act (as it stood prior to its being deleted with effect from April 1, 1968 by Finance (No. 2)Act, 1967). The Income Tax Officer took the view that since the respondent had started production of Cellulose pulp from March 18, 1961 it had begun to manufacture or produce finished .articles or goods in the year ending on March 31, 1961 and conse­ quently the assessment year 1961-62 was the first year in which the assessee was entitled to relief under Section 84. According io him, the relief contemplated by Section 84 being available only for five years namely the assessment year 1961-62 and the four assessment years ,. immediately succeeding as contemplated by Sub-section (7) of Section C 84 of the Act, the respondent was not entitled to the relief claimed in the assessment year 1966-67 which fell beyond the aforesaid period. This finding of the Income Tax Officer was affirmed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The matter was taken by the respondent in further appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tri­ bunal. The- respondent's contention that the production of Cellulose D pulp during the month of March 1961 was a trial production was repel- led by the Tribunal and a categorical finding was recorded by it that l.c Cellulose pulp manufactured by the respondent during the month of March 1961 was a finished product which was a marketable commodity. On this view the Tribunal held that the respondent having begun pro­ duction or manufacture of finished product which was capable. of being E sold in the market in the year of account relevant to the assessment year 1961-62, the last year in which the respondent was entitled to get relief under section 84 of the Act was the assessment year 1965-66 and the claim made by it for the said relief in the assessment year in question namely 1966-67 was not·maintainable. The Tribunal, how­ ever, on an application made in this behalf by the respondent referred F the following question to the High Court of Gujarat for its opinion:- "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in rejecting the assessee's claim for relief under section 84 of the Act for the assessment year 1966-67?" . G The High Court by the judgment under appeal answered the question aforesaid in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. It held that even though the word "article" used in Sub­ section (7) of section 84 of the Act was undoubtedly an ordinary word employed by the legislature but in the context in which it was used and H A looking to the object with which it was enacted it was obvious that it could only refer to the end product of the industrial undertaking ·as a whole where there was no phased programme of installation and con- ~- struction. On this view the High Court found that the mere fact that the respondent started the production of Cellulose pulp which was an intermediate product on March 18, 1961 did not mean that the com- .B pany had begun to produce or manufacture '_'articles" in the assess- \ ment year 1961-62. It has been urged. by learned counsel for the appellant that the , . finding recorded by the Tribunal referred to above was essentially a .. finding of f~ct based on appraisal of evidence and it was not open to - the High Court in its advisory jurisdiction to take a contrary view. For -. c the respondent, on the other hand, in support of the judgment appealed against, it was urged by its learned counsel that inasmuch as section 84 of the Act contemplated grant of relief to a new undertak- ing, it should be construed liberally so as to effectuate the object thereof. He maintained that since the undertaking established by the D respondent was to manufacture CMC and the industrial licence had also been granted to it for the saif! purjlose, exemption under section 84 of the Act could be claimed byft only in the y~ar during which CMC was actually manufactured and since it was so done during the assess- • ment year 1962-63 exemption could not be claimed in the assessment year 1961-62, notwithstanding the fact that Cellulose pulp for captive' E consumption was manufactured in that year. According to him, there- fore, the period of five years contemplated by sub-section (7) of section 84 of the Act would represent the assessment year 1962-63 and the four assessment years immediately succeeding and in this view of the matter the High Court was right in allowing the relief claimed by J the respondent during the assessment year in question, namely 1966- F 67. In the alternative, he submitted that if ultimately the view ofthe Tribunal prevailed that the production had started in the assessment ,~ year 1961-62 then the disallowance of the relief in the 5th year namely in the assessment year in question should be restricted to the invest- ment of the pulp factory and the respondent should not be denied the relief in respect of the investment exclusively related to the CMC G plant. ~ Having given our anxious consideratio'lrto-the respective submis- sions made by the learned counsel for the parties, we are inclined to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court on the facts and in the circumstances of the instant case H committed an error in interfering with the conclusion of the tribunal. It "" C.I.T. v. CELLULOSE PRODUCTS (OJHA, J.J 893 is settled law that a High Court hearing a reference under the Act does .not exercise any appellate or revisional or supervisory jurisdiction over A the Tribunal and that it acts purely in an advisory capacity. If the Tribunal after considering the evidence produced before it on a ques­ tion of fact records its finding it cannot be interfered with in a refe­ rence by the High Court unless of course such finding was not sup­ ported by any evidence, was perverse or patently unreasonable. In our opinion, the finding of the Tribunal in the instant case did not suffer from any of these infirmities. The finding that the production of Cellulose pulp during the month of March 1961 was not a trial produc­ tion and that Cellulose pulp as manufactured by the respondent was a finished product which was a marketable commodity was essentially a finding of fact based on appraisal of evidence. It is true that Celllulose C pulp constitutes raw material for manufacture of CMC but it has not been disputed before us by the learned counsel for the respondent that it was even by itself a finished marketable commodity. The circums­ tance that the industrial licence granted to the respondent was for the manufacture of CMC and not of Cellulose pulp is, in our opinion, keeping in view the nature of the two articles,, not of much signifi- D cance. In the same manner as a licence, for instance, for the manufacture of cloth includes the manufacture of cotton yarn, an intermediate product necessary for manufacturing cloth, the licence granted to the respondent for the manufacture of CMC included the manufacture of Cellulose pulp which was an intermediate product to be used in its turn as a raw material for the manufacture of CMC. The E relevant clause of the Memorandum of Association of the respondent­ company, already quoted above, is obviously wide in its amplitude, It contemplates manufacture of "chemical products of any nature and kind whatsoever and particularly of CMC, Cellulose pulp and other chemical products". Manufacture of Cellulose pulp was thus indeed one of the objects of the company. The question involved had to be F considered 'in this background and the Tribunal having done so and recorded the finding of fact referred to above the High Court obvi­ ously committed an error in holding that manufacture of Cellulose pulps during.March 1961 was of no consequence and that the first year of production would be the assessment year 1962-{;3 when CMC was actually manufactured. The decision of the Madras High Court relied G on by the l~arned counsel for the respondent reported in. Madras Machine Tools Manufacturers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras, [1975) 98 ITR 119, in view of what has been obseiVed above on the facts of the instant case does not advance the case of the respon­ dent any further than the reasons recorded in the judgment under appeal. H As regards the alternative submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent suffice it to say that the case on the basis of which this alternative submission is sought to be made was not set up before the Tribunal nor any such question was sought to be referred on the basis of which this alternative submission could be made. It cannot, as such, be perrnitted to be made in the present appeal. The submis­ sion that the provisions of section 84 of the Act should be construed liberally so as to effectuate the object thereof need detain us for long. It is only when there is any genuine doubt about the interpretation of a fiscal statute or where two opinions are capable of being formed tr at the rule of interpretation canvassed by learned counsel for the respon­ dent may be taken to. In the instant case a plain reading of sub-section (7) of section 84 of the Act makes it clear without any doubt that the period of five years was to start from the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the undertaking began to manufacture or produce "articles". Since the language of the sub-section is plain and admits of no ambiguity there is no scope of applying the aforesaid rule of interpretation. The question as to in which assessment year "the undertaking begins to manufacture or produce articles" is essentially a question to be decided on the facts of each case and on the basis of the evidence placed on record. In view of the foregoing discussion, this appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs and the judgment of the High Court under appeal is set aside. S.B. Appeal allowed. l