Mohd. Fida Karim and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors.
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 2 S.C.R.
A . The Judgment of this Court was delivered by ~
KASLIWAL, J. Special leave granted.
This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Patna High Court
B dated 6th September, 1991. Initially Mohd. Fida Karim and Dasrath Das
had filed special leave petition challenging the dismissal of their writ ).._ petition, C.W.J.C. No. 2102 of 1991 by a Division Bench of the Patna High
Court by order dated 6th September, 1991. In view of the fact that by a
common decision, the Patna High Court had dismissed many other identi-
cal writ petitions, the petitioners in those other writ petitions also sub-
mitted intervention applications before this Court and such intei:vention .-(
applications have been allowed. 35 applicants/interveners are also support-
ing the present appeal filed by Mohd. Fida Karim and Dasrath Das.
"1'
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The controversy in this case relates to the mode of settl~ment of the
0 right of vend of country liquor, Indian made foreign liquor and spiced
country liquor under the provisions of the Bihar Excise Act, 1915
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Excise Act') and Rules framed thereunder.
The Government changed its policy from time to time. Prior to 1984,
settlement of country liquor shops was done by renewing the licence
E according to the sliding scale of system. In 1984, the. State Government
decided to make settlement of country liquor shops by public auction. This
~ was done on annual basis for a period commencing from 1st of April to
31st March of the next following year. This practice continued tipto 1989-
90. During the currency of the above licensing period 1989-90, the State
Government appointed a high power committee and according to its
recommendations made a policy to make settlement of liquor shops for five
years by renewing the existing licences, subject to fulfilling certain condi-
tions like, satisfactory record of performance and enhancement of licence
-f fee at the rate of 10 per cent every year and also enhancement of the -
minimum guaranteed quota at the rate of 5 per cent every year. The above
policy decision was taken by a Cabinet Memorandum dated 25th January,
1990. In pursuance to the above policy decision, the Excise Commissioner
by communication dated 8th February, 1990 informed the licensing
authorities to take steps for settlement of excise shops as per the amended
~ policy of the Government. On 17th February, 1990, necessary amendments
H were also made in the Rules framed under Section 89 of the Excise Act
MOHD. FIDA KARIM v. STATE [KASLIWAL, J.] 411
. ~ inconsonance with the new policy of the Government. The amendments A
were duly published in the official Gazette on 7th March, 1990, to come
into force with effect from 1st April, 1990. The case of the appellants is
that in pursuance to the aforesaid policy, the appellants agreed to the new
terms and conditions and necessary agreements were also executed. The
appellants also deposited six months' licence fee for the first year of B
,.t settlement, on 7th March, 1990. According to the appellants a concluded
contract came into effect on 7th March, 1990 itself, which was to come into
force with effect from 1st April, 1990.
Some of the persons not satisfied with the aforesaid Government
~ policy, challenged the same by filing four \\Tit petitions in the High Court. C
The High Court passed interim orders on 9th March, 23rd March, and 13th
_.. .,.._ April, 1990 in these writ petitions. The High Court in the interim orders
granted stay on the new policy of the Government and in its place gave
directions to grant the licence on yearly basis through public auction.
Initially, it was directed that the period of such settlements shall not exceed D
four months, but subsequently it was made on monthly basis. It was also
directed that the aforesaid orders will not stand in the way of the State
Government in reviewing the policy decision. We have only mentioned the
substance of such interim orders passed on 9.3.1990, 23.3.1990 and
13.4.1990, as the same have been quoted in extenso by the High Court in
its impugned order dated 6th September, 1991. It appears that the E
)-- aforesaid interim orders were passed by the High Court under the vain
hope that the main Mit petitions would be disposed of soon. However,
before the writ petitions could be heard finally, the Government started
_..... the process of reviewing the policy decision dated 25th January, 1990/Sth
February, 1990. By Memor~ndum dated 7.7.1990 placed before the Council F
of Ministers, it was proposed that the settlement of the country liquor
shops, spiced country liquor shops and foreign liquor shops should be
...,.. \ made by auction-cum-tender method, according to which the persons
interested were required to submit their sealed tender and also to par
ticipate in the public auction. The settlement was to be made finally in
favour of the person making the highest offer whether by way of tender or G
at auction. The Cabinet approved the aforesaid policy on 16th August,
1990. The Excise Commissioner also sent necessary instructions to all
~ licensing authorities by letter dated 25th February, 1991 in regard to the
proposed mode of settlement by auction-cum-tender for the year 1991-92.
A The present appellants as well as the interveners filed writ petitions chal- ~
lenging the aforesaid new policy of auction-cum-tender for the year 1991-
92.
Similar contentions have been raised before us on behalf of the
appellants, which were made before the High Court. The challenge to the
new policy has been made on the following three grounds. Firstly, it bas > been submitted that there is no provision in the Excise Act or the Rules
to review or revoke the grant of licence or to curtail or reduce t~e period
of licence except as. provided under Sections 42 and 43 of the Excise Act.
The licence already granted for a period of five years from 1990 to 1995
~ c cannot be made ineffective by the so-called new policy of auction-cum-
tender. A further limb of this ground is that the period cannot be curtailed
without compliance of the mandatory provisions of Sections 42 and 43 of ..., ......
the Excise Act. The second ground of challenge is that the Government is
estopped from doing so on the principle of promissory estoppel. The third
D ground is that in any event, the exercise of power, in the facts of the case
is arbitrary, irrational and patently unreasonable and as such is violative of
Article 114 of the Constitution. The High Court has dealt with all these
contentions in detail and has rejected the same by giving cogent reasons.
We fully agree with the view taken by the High Court.
It is important to note that the Memorandum dated 25th January,
-< 1990 and the letter dated 8th February, 1990 and the sale Notification on
the basis of which the appellants are claiming the right to continue the
licence fOi a period of five years, clearly mentioned that the grant of licence
was on annual basis and such renewal after every year was subject to the
conditions mentioned therein and also subject tO any change in policy.
Thus, the Government was fully competent to change its policy under the
terms of the grant of licence itself. It is also well settled that the right of J- ......
vend of excisable articles is exclusively and absolutely owned by the State
Government.
Mr. Ka.pil Sibal, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of th~
appellants did not dispute the aforesaid legal position, but his contention
was that the impugned order of the Government made iii August, 1990 ~ cannot be termed a change of policy, but in fact was merely an executive
H order passed on a wrong assumption as if the High Court in its interim
. .(
.......
MOHD. FIDA KARIM v. STATE [KASLIWAL, J.J 413
orders had given a direction to the Government to review its policy. We A
do not find any substance in this contention. The new policy of adopting
the method of auction-cum-tender is certainly a change of policy. The
reason for change of policy given by the Government is that it realised that
making settlement for five years would give rise to monopolistic tendency,
which will not be in public interest, at the same time the interest·of revenue B
was not fully protected in the former policy. This clearly goes to show that
the Government wanted to adopt a new policy in public interest to be made
applicable from the year 1991-92. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
the State of,Bihar submitted in clear terms that the earlier policy was wrong
and the Government realised its mistake and thus adopted a new policy to
augment its revenue and to avoid monopolistic tendency. We do not find
anything wrong in taking such view by the State Government and to change
its policy considering the same to be in public interest. It is not disputed
that the appellants have continued the business of sale of liquor for the
whole year 1.4.1990 to 31.3.1991. The appellants as such have no right to
challenge the new policy which has to apply for the year 1991-92, even D
under the terms of their agreement. We do not find any force in the
contention raised on behalf of the appellants on the ground of promissory
estoppel or under Articie 14 of the Constitution. There is no basis at all
made out in the pleadings in support of the above grounds and the High
Court has rightly rejected the same. There was neither any promise nor
there is any justification to hold that the appellants altered their pllSition
on the basis of promise. Sections 42 and 43 of the Excise Act have no
application in the case of change of policy by the Government.
Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the licensees
who had taken the licence under the earlier policy of the Government of
25th January, 1990/8th February, 1990 had submitted National Saving
Certificates by way of secruity and in case the Government had changed
its policy, it was bound to return the National Saving Certificates to the
respective licensees. We consider this submission to be just and proper.
Learned Counsel for the State appearing before us also conceded that such G
National Saving Certificates would be returned to the licensees. We ac
cordingly direct the State Government to return all the National Saving
Certificates taken by way of secruity to all the licensees who had entered
in agreements under the old policy of five years license, within two months
A from the date of the communication of this order. This direction will not
apply in case of such licensees who have filed civil suits for the recovery
of such amounts and their cases would be governed by the ultimate
decision in those civil proceedings.
In the results, we dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.
T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.
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