Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. G.R. Karthikeyan, Coimbatore

B.P. JEEV AN REDDY, J. This appeal is preferred against the Judgment D of the Madras High Court answering the question referred to it in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the asses see and against the Revenue. The question referred under section 256 (1) of the Income-tax Act reads as follows: I "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the total sum of Rs. E 22,000 received by the assessee from the Indian Oil Corporation and All India Highway Motor Rally should not be brought to tax?" The assessment year concerned ~s 1974-75. The assessee, G.R.Karthikeyan, assessed as an individual, was having income from various sources including salary and business 'income. During the accounting year relevant to the said assessment year, he participated in the All India Highway Motor Rally. He was awarded the first prize of Rs. 20,00(J by the Indian 0il Corporation and another Sum ofRs. 2,000 by the All India Highway Motor Rally. The Rally was organised jointly by the Automobile Association of Eastern India and the Indian Oil Corporation and was supported by several Regional Automobile Associations as well as Federation of Indian Motor Sports Clubs and the Federation of Indian Automobile Associations. The rally was restricted to private motor cars, the length of the rally route was approximately 6,956 kms. One could start either from Delhi, Calcutta, Madras or Bombay, proceed anti-clock wise and arrive at the starting H point. The rally was designed to test endurance driving an.d the reliability of the -- C.l.T. v. G.R. KARTiilKEYAN (JEEVAN REDDY, J.] 331 automobiles. One had to drive his vehicle observing the traffic regulations at A different places as also the regulations prescribed by the Rally Committee. Prizes were awarded on the basis of overall classification. The method of ascertaining the fir$t prize was based on a system of penalty points for various violations. The competitor with the least penalty points was adjudged the first-prize winner. On the above basis, the assessee won the first prize and received a total sum of Rs. 22,000. The Income Tax Officer included the same in the income of the respon­ dent-assessee relying upon the definition of 'income' in clause (24) of section 2. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that inasmuch as the rally was not a race, the amount received cannot be treated as income within the meaning of section 2 (24) (ix). An appeal preferred by the Revenue was dismissed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal recorded the following findings: (a) That the said rally was not a race. It was predominantly a test of skill and endurance as well as of reliability of the vehicle. (b) That the rally was also not a 'game' within the meaning of section 2(24) (ix). (c) That the receipt in question was casual in nature. It was nevertheless not an income receipt and hence fell outside the provisions of section 10 (3) of the Act. 3. At the instance of the Revenue, the question aforementioned was stated for t'1e opinion of the Madras High Court. The High Court held in favour of the assessee on the following reasoning: (a) The expression 'winnings' occuring at the inception of sub-clause (ix) in section 2(24) is distinct and different from the expression 'winning'. The expres­ sion 'winnings' has acquired a connotation of i.ts own. It means money won by gambling or betting. The expression 'winnings' controls the meaning of several expressions occurring in the sub-clause. In this view of the matter, the sub-clause cannot take in the receipt concerned herein which was received by the assessee by participating in a race which involved skill in driving the vehicle. The rally was not G a race. In .other words the said receipt does not represent 'winnings'. (b) A perusal of the memorandum explaining the provisions of the Finance Bill. 1972, which inserted the said sub-clause in section 2(24), also shows that the idea behind the sub-clause was to rope in windfalls from lotteries, races and card games etc. H ,· I A (c) Section 74 (A) which too was introduced by the Finance Act, 1972 supports the said ~iew. Section 74 (A) provides that any loss resulting from any of the sources mentioned therein can be set off against the income received from that source alone. The sources referred to in the said section are the very same sources mentioned in sub-clause (ix) of section 2(24) namely lotteries, crossword puzzles, races including horse races, card games etc. The correctness of the view taken by the High Court is questioned herein. The definitic:m of 'income' in !>ection 2(24) is an inclusive definition. The Parliament has been adding to the definition by adding sub-clause (s) from time C to time. Sub-clause (ix) which was inserted by the Finance Act, 1972 reads as follows: "(ix) any winnings from lotteries, crossword puzzles, races includ­ ing horse races, card gaines and other games of any sort or from gambling or betting of any form or nature whatsoever;" We may notice at this stage a provision in section 10. Section 10 occurs in chapter III which carries the heading "Incomes which do not form part of total income". Section 10 in so far as is relevant reads thus: E "I 0, Incomes not included in u>tal income: Ih computing the total in.come of a previous year of any person, any income falling within any of the following clauses shall .not be includ.ed: . (d) any receipts which are of a casual and non recurring nature, not being winnings from lotteries, to the extent such receipts do not exceed one thousand rupees in the aggregate". (The clause has been amended by Finance Act, 1986 but we are not concerned with it. Similarly it is not necessary to notice the proviso to the said clause.) It is not easy to define income. The definition in the Act is an inclusive one. G As said by Lord Wright inKamakshyaNarayan Singh v. C.I.T. 111.T.R. 513 P.C. "income ............ .is~ word difficult and perhaps impossible to define in any precise general formula. It is a word of the broadest connotation". In Gopttf&lran Narain Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax 3.1.T.R. 237 P.C., the Privy Council pointed out that "anything than can properly be described as income is taxable under the ·Act unless expressly exempted." This Court had to deal with the ambit of the H expression 'income' ~Navin ChandraMafatlalv. C.l.T. Bombay 261.T.R. (S.C.) ---- - -- .... C.l.T. v. G.R. KARTHIKEYAN [JEEVAN REDDY, J.) 333 The Indian Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947 had A inserted section 12 (B) in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Section 12(B) imposed a tax on capital gains. The validity of the said Amendment was questioned on the ground that tax on capital gains is not a tax on 'income' within the meaning of entry 54 of list-1, nor is it a tax on the capital value of the assets of individuals and companies within the meaning of entry-55, oflist-1 of the seventh schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. The Bombay High Court repelled the attack. The matter was brought to this Court. After rejecting the argument on behalf of the assessee that the word 'income' has acquired, by legislative practice, a restricted meaning-and after affirming that the entries in the seventh schedule should receive the most liberal construction-the Court observed thus: "What. then, is the ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning of the word "income"? According to the dictionary it means "a thing that comes ih." (See Oxford Dictionary, Vol. V,p. 162; .Stroud, vol.II, pp. 14-16). In the United States of America and.in Australia both of which also are English speaking countrje'f:.the word "in­ come" is understood in a wide sense. so as to include a capital gain. D Reference may be made to-'Eisner v. Macomber', [1919] 252 US 189 (K); -'Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. 'Smietanka' [1920) 255 US 509 ( L) and-'United States of America Ii. Stewart', [1940] 311US60 (M) and- 'Resch v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation', [ 1943] 66 CLR 198 (N). In each of these cases very wide meaning . was ascribed to the word "income" as its natural meaning. E The relevant observations of learned Judges deciding those cases , which have been quoted in the judgment of Tendolkar J. quite clearly indicate that such wide ~eaning was put upon the word 1 "income" not because of any particular legislative practice either in tlie United States or in the Common we:µ th of Australia but because such was the normal concept and conno.tation of the ordinary English word "income". Its natural meaning embraces any profit or gain which is actually received. This is in consonance with the observations of Lord Wright to which reference has already been made. The argument founded on an assumed legislative practice being thus out of the way, there can be no difficulty in applying its natural . and grammatical meaning to the ordinary English word "income". As already observed, the word should be given its widest connora..: ·n tion in view of the fact that it occurs in a le_gislative head conferring legislative power." 8. Since the definition of income in section 2(24) is an inclusive one, its ambit, in our opinion, should be the same as that of the word income occurring in entry 82 of list 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution (corresponding to entry 54 of list 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act). 9. In Bhagwandas Jain v. Union of India 128 l.T.R. 315 S.C. The challenge was to the validity of section 23(2) of the Act which provided that where the property consists of house in the occupation of the owner for the purpose of his own c residence, the annual value of such house shall first be determined in the same manner as if the prop~rty had been let and further be reduced by one half of the amount so determined or Rs. 1,800 whichever is less. The contention of the assessee was that he was not deriving any monetary benefit by residing in his own house and, therefore, no tax can be levied on him on the ground that he is deriving income from that house. It was contended that the word income means realisation D of monetary benefit arld that in the absence of any such realisation by the assessee, thMnclusion of any amount by way of notional income under section 23(2) of the Act in th~ chargeable income was impermissible and outside the scope of entry 82 of .li8t~1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The said contention was rejected affirming that the expression income is of the widest amplitude and that it includes not merely what is received or what comes in by exploiting the use of the property but also that which can be converted into income. 10, Sub-clause (ix) of section 2(24) refers to lotteries, crossword puzzles, races including horse' races, card games, other games of any sort and gambling or' betting of any form or nature whatsoever. All crossword puzzles are not of a gambling nature. Some are; some are not. See State of Bombay v. R.M.D. ChamarbaugwalaA.I.R. 1957 S.C. 699. Even in card games there are some games which are games of skill without an element of gamble (See State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Satyan'arayan [1968] 2 S.C.R. 515. The words "other games of any sort" are of wide amplitude. Their meaning is not confined to games of a gambling nature alone. It thus appears that sub-clause (ix) is not confined to mere gambling G or betting activities. But, says the High Court, the meaning of all. the aforesaid words is controlled by the word 'winnings' occurring at the inception of the sub­ clause. The High Court .says, relying upon certain material, that the expression 'winnings' has come to acquire a P¥ticular meaning viz, receipts from activities of a gambling or betting nature alone. Assurning,.t_hat the High Court is right in its H interpretation of the expression 'winnings'. docs it follow that merely because .. C.I.T. v. G.R. KARTIUKEYAN [JEEVANREDDY,J.) 335 winnings from gambling/betting activities are included within the ambit of A income, the monies received from non-gambling l!iid non-betting activities are not so included? What is the implication flowing from insertion of clause (ix)? If the monies which are not earned-in the true sense of the word--constitute income why do moneies earned by skill ~d toil not constitute income? Would it not look odd. if one is to say that monies received from games and races of gambling nature represent income but not those received from games and races of non-gambling nature? The rally in question was a contest, ifnot a race. The respondent-assessee entered the contest to win it and to win the first prize. What he got was a 'return' for his skill and endurance. Then why is it not income-which expression must be construed in its widest sense. Further, even if a receipt does not fall within sub­ ciause (ix), or for that matter, any of the sub-cl!iuses in section 2(24), it may yet constitute income. To say otherwise, would mean reading the several clauses in section 2(24 ))lS~!thaustive of the meaning of'income' when the Statu.te expressly says that it is inclusive. It would be a wrong approach to try to place a given receipt under one or the other sub-clauses in section 2(24) and if it does not fall under any of the sub-clauses, to say that it does not constitute income. Even if a receipt does not fall within the ambit of any of the sub-clauses in section 2(24), it may still be income if it partakes of the nature of the income. :fhe idea behind providing inclusive definition in section 2(24) is not to limit its meaning but to widen its net. This Court has repeatedly said that the word_ 'jncome' is of widest amplitude, and that it must be given its natural and grammatical meaning. Judging from the above standpoint, the receipt concerned herein is also income. May be it is causal in ·nature but it is income nevertheless. That even the casual income is 'income' is evident from section 10 (3). Section 10 seeks to exempt certain 'incomes' from · being included in the 'total income'. A casual receipt- which-Should mean, in the context, casual income - is liable to be included in t}l!}tot~ income if it is in excess of Rs. 1,000, by virtue of clause (3) of section 10. Even though it is a clause exempting a particular receipt/income to a limited extent,oitis yet relevant on the meaning of the expression 'income'. In our respectful opinion, the High Court, having found that the receipt in question do.es not fall within sub-clause (ix) of ~ection 2(24), erred in concluding that it does not constitute income. The High Court has read the several sub-clauses in .section 2(24) as exhaustive of the definition of income when in fact it is not so. In this connection it is relevant to notice the finding of the Tribunal. It found that tberecelpt in question was casual in nature but-it opined-it was nevertheless not an income receipt and fell outside the provision of section IO (3) of the Act. We have found it difficult to follow the logic behind the argument. 11. For the above reasons we hold that the receipt il>question herein does B A constitute 'income' as defined,in clause (24) of section 2 of the Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the question referred by the Tribunal under section 256(1) of th~ Act is answered .in the negative i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs. RSK. Appeal allowed. --